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ngit-grasp/docs/explanation/inline-authorization.md
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DanConwayDev 745c21c5cc docs(sync): explain invitation dependency recovery
The rejected-event documentation still described removing cold IDs and waiting for a future broad synchronization. That is the failure mode which allowed reciprocal maintainership invitations to remain at 0/N after their full hot-cache events expired.

Document retained exact IDs, recursive maintainer relay discovery, parallel background requests, authorization ordering, retry timing, and success-only removal. Clarify the cache configuration trade-offs and distinguish the legacy invalidation counters from the new non-destructive recovery path.
2026-07-26 01:31:30 +01:00

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# Explanation: Inline Authorization
**Purpose:** Understand why ngit-grasp validates Git pushes inline rather than using Git hooks
**Audience:** Developers and architects wanting to understand design decisions
---
## The Problem
Git hosting with authorization requires validating pushes before accepting them. The question is: **where** should this validation happen?
Two approaches exist:
1. **Git Hooks** (traditional): Use Git's pre-receive hook mechanism
2. **Inline Authorization** (our approach): Validate before spawning Git
This document explains why we chose inline authorization and what benefits it provides.
---
## Background: How Git Hooks Work
Git provides a **pre-receive hook** that runs during `git push`:
```
Client Server
| |
|--- git push ----->|
| |--- spawn git-receive-pack
| |
| |--- pre-receive hook runs
| | (reads stdin: old new ref)
| | (exit 0 = accept, 1 = reject)
| |
|<--- success ------| (if hook exits 0)
|<--- error --------| (if hook exits 1)
```
**Pros:**
- Standard Git mechanism
- Language-agnostic (hook can be any executable)
- Well-documented
**Cons:**
- Hook output goes to stderr (client sees as `remote:` messages)
- Hard to provide structured error messages
- Requires hook installation and management
- Difficult to test (needs Git repository setup)
- Hook runs _after_ Git has started processing
---
## Background: How Inline Authorization Works
With inline authorization, we validate **before** spawning Git:
```
Client Server (ngit-grasp)
| |
|--- git push ----->|--- HTTP handler receives request
| |
| |--- Parse ref updates from request
| |--- Query database + purgatory for state
| |--- Validate push against state
| |
| |--- If invalid: return HTTP error
| |--- If valid: spawn git-receive-pack
| |
|<--- success ------| (if valid)
|<--- HTTP error ---| (if invalid)
```
**Pros:**
- Full control over error messages (HTTP response)
- Can skip spawning Git entirely for invalid pushes
- Easier testing (pure Rust, no Git setup needed)
- Shared state between Git and Nostr components
- Better performance (early rejection)
- Can check both database and purgatory for authorization
**Cons:**
- Requires parsing Git protocol ourselves
- Less standard than hooks
- Tighter coupling to Git HTTP protocol
---
## Why Inline Authorization Is Better for GRASP
### 1. Purgatory Integration
**Critical advantage:** Inline authorization allows checking **both database and purgatory** during authorization:
```rust
// From src/git/authorization.rs
pub async fn authorize_push(
database: &SharedDatabase,
identifier: &str,
owner_pubkey: &str,
request_body: &Bytes,
purgatory: &Arc<Purgatory>, // Can check purgatory!
repo_path: &std::path::Path,
) -> anyhow::Result<AuthorizationResult>
```
**Why this matters:** State events go to purgatory when git data doesn't exist yet. Without inline authorization checking purgatory, we'd have a deadlock:
1. State event arrives → No git data → Goes to **purgatory** (not database)
2. Git push arrives → Hook checks **database only** → No state found → **REJECTED** ❌
With inline authorization:
1. State event arrives → No git data → Goes to purgatory
2. Git push arrives → Checks **database + purgatory** → State found → **AUTHORIZED** ✅
3. After push succeeds → Save event to database → Remove from purgatory
See [`src/git/authorization.rs:342-400`](../../src/git/authorization.rs) for implementation.
otherwise we'd need another way of storing purgatory events.
### 2. Better Error Messages
**With hooks:**
```
$ git push
remote: error: Push rejected - not authorized for ref refs/heads/main
remote: See https://docs.gitnostr.com/errors/unauthorized
To https://gitnostr.com/alice/myrepo.git
! [remote rejected] main -> main (pre-receive hook declined)
```
**With inline authorization:**
```
$ git push
error: RPC failed; HTTP 403 Forbidden
error: Push rejected: No state event found in purgatory from authorized publishers
```
The inline approach provides clear, actionable error messages directly in the HTTP response.
### 3. Performance Benefits
**With hooks:**
- Git process spawns
- Git starts receiving pack data
- Hook runs (might query Nostr relay)
- If rejected, Git throws away received data
**With inline authorization:**
- Parse ref updates from HTTP request (pkt-line format)
- Validate against database + purgatory state
- If rejected, return HTTP error immediately
- Never spawn Git for invalid pushes
**Result:** Faster rejection, less resource usage, no wasted pack data transfer.
### 4. Easier Testing
**With hooks:**
```bash
# Test setup
mkdir -p /tmp/test-repo
cd /tmp/test-repo
git init --bare
cp pre-receive.sh hooks/pre-receive
chmod +x hooks/pre-receive
# Test execution
git push /tmp/test-repo main
# Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/test-repo
```
**With inline authorization:**
```rust
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_unauthorized_push() {
let relay = TestRelay::start().await;
let result = validate_push(&state, "refs/heads/main", alice_pubkey).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
relay.stop().await;
}
```
**Result:** Pure Rust unit tests, no shell scripts, no Git setup.
See [`tests/push_authorization.rs`](tests/push_authorization.rs) for actual test examples.
### 5. Shared State and Types
**With hooks:**
- Hook is separate process
- Must query Nostr relay over WebSocket
- Can't share in-memory cache
- Can't access purgatory
- Separate error types
**With inline authorization:**
```rust
// From src/git/handlers.rs
pub async fn handle_receive_pack(
repo_path: PathBuf,
body: Bytes,
database: Option<SharedDatabase>, // Shared with Nostr relay!
purgatory: Option<Arc<Purgatory>>, // Shared purgatory access!
npub: &str,
identifier: &str,
) -> Result<Response<Full<Bytes>>, GitError> {
// Direct database + purgatory access for authorization
let auth = authorize_push(
&database,
identifier,
owner_pubkey,
&body,
&purgatory, // Can check purgatory!
&repo_path
).await?;
// ...
}
```
**Result:** Better performance, type safety, simpler architecture, purgatory integration.
### 6. Simpler Deployment
**With hooks (ngit-relay):**
```
Docker container:
- nginx (HTTP frontend)
- git-http-backend (C binary)
- pre-receive hook (Go binary)
- Khatru relay (Go binary)
- supervisord (process manager)
Setup steps:
1. Install all components
2. Configure nginx
3. Install hook in each repository
4. Set up supervisord
5. Configure inter-process communication
```
**With inline authorization (ngit-grasp):**
```
Single Rust binary:
- HTTP server (Hyper)
- Git protocol handler
- Nostr relay (nostr-relay-builder)
- Authorization logic
Setup steps:
1. Run binary
2. Configure environment variables
```
**Result:** Simpler deployment, fewer moving parts.
---
## Technical Implementation
### How We Parse Ref Updates
The Git HTTP protocol sends ref updates in pkt-line format:
```
POST /alice/myrepo.git/git-receive-pack HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request
00a5 0000...0000 abc123...def456 refs/heads/main\0 report-status\n
0000
PACK...
```
We parse this **before** spawning Git. See [`src/git/authorization.rs:695-778`](../../src/git/authorization.rs) for the implementation:
```rust
/// Parse the refs being updated from a Git pack
///
/// The receive-pack protocol sends ref updates in pkt-line format:
/// - 4-byte hex length prefix (e.g., "00a5")
/// - Payload: `<old-oid> <new-oid> <ref-name>\0<capabilities>\n`
/// - Flush packet "0000" terminates the list
pub fn parse_pushed_refs(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<(String, String, String)> {
// Handles both pkt-line format (real Git clients)
// and simple text format (for unit tests)
}
```
### How We Validate
The authorization flow (from [`src/git/authorization.rs:51-162`](../../src/git/authorization.rs)):
```rust
pub async fn authorize_push(
database: &SharedDatabase,
identifier: &str,
owner_pubkey: &str,
request_body: &Bytes,
purgatory: &Arc<Purgatory>,
repo_path: &std::path::Path,
) -> anyhow::Result<AuthorizationResult> {
// 1. Parse refs from push request
let pushed_refs = parse_pushed_refs(request_body);
// 2. Separate refs/nostr/ refs from state refs
let (nostr_refs, state_refs) = partition_refs(&pushed_refs);
// 3. Handle refs/nostr/ refs (PR events)
// - Validate event ID format
// - Check purgatory for PR event
// - Create placeholder if git-data-first scenario
// 4. Handle normal refs (state events)
// - Check database + purgatory for state events
// - Collect authorized maintainers
// - Find latest authorized state
// - Validate refs match state
// 5. Return authorization result with purgatory events
}
```
**Key validation checks:**
1. **For state refs** (`refs/heads/*`, `refs/tags/*`):
- Query database for announcements → collect authorized maintainers
- Check **purgatory** for matching state events (critical for purgatory flow!)
- Filter to events from authorized maintainers
- Find latest state event
- Validate pushed refs match state event refs
2. **For PR refs** (`refs/nostr/<event-id>`):
- Validate event ID format
- Check purgatory for PR event with matching commit
- If no event found, create placeholder (git-data-first scenario)
- Collect PR events from purgatory for post-push processing
**No-Op Push Acceptance:** Pushes where all refs have `old_oid == new_oid` are accepted without requiring a purgatory state event, matching Git's "Everything up-to-date" behavior and avoiding race condition rejections.
---
## State Event Authorization
State events (kind 30618) undergo authorization checks at three points (defense-in-depth):
### 1. On Arrival (StatePolicy)
When a state event arrives via WebSocket or sync:
```rust
// src/nostr/policy/state.rs
impl StatePolicy {
async fn admit_event(&self, event: &Event) -> Result<Decision, Error> {
// Check 1: Does announcement exist for this repository?
let announcements = query_announcements(pubkey, identifier);
if announcements.is_empty() {
return Reject("No announcement exists for repository");
}
// Check 2: Is author in maintainer set?
let maintainers = build_maintainer_set(announcements);
if !maintainers.contains(&event.author) {
return Reject("Author not in maintainer set");
}
// If git data doesn't exist yet, goes to purgatory
// Otherwise, accepted to database
}
}
```
### 2. On Announcement Acceptance (Purgatory Re-evaluation)
When a repository announcement is accepted, waiting state events are re-evaluated:
```rust
// After announcement is saved to database
for state_event in purgatory.get_state_events(identifier) {
// Re-check authorization now that announcement exists
if author_in_maintainer_set(state_event.author, identifier) {
// If git data now exists, save to database
// Otherwise, keep in purgatory
} else {
// Remove from purgatory - not authorized
}
}
```
### 3. On Git Data Arrival (Purgatory Sync)
When git data is pushed, purgatory state events are validated before saving:
```rust
// src/git/handlers.rs - after successful git push
for state_event in purgatory.get_matching_state_events(identifier) {
// Final authorization check before database save
if author_in_maintainer_set(state_event.author, identifier) {
database.save(state_event);
purgatory.remove(state_event);
} else {
purgatory.remove(state_event); // Not authorized
}
}
```
### Why Three Checkpoints?
**Defense-in-depth** ensures authorization is always validated:
1. **On arrival**: Prevents unauthorized events from entering the system
2. **On announcement acceptance**: Handles race condition where state arrives before announcement
3. **On git data arrival**: Final check before committing to database
This prevents scenarios where:
- Unauthorized state events are saved after maintainer changes
- Race conditions bypass authorization
- Purgatory holds events that will never be authorized
### Rejection Tracking
State events rejected during authorization are tracked in the rejected events index:
- **Reason: MaintainerNotYetValid** - Author not in maintainer set (may become valid later)
- **Reason: Other** - Other validation failures
When a repository announcement is accepted, rejected state events still present
in the hot cache are re-processed immediately. Reciprocal invitation
announcements can enter purgatory before their source state and Git data are
available. During that bootstrap flow, rejected state events are:
1. **Retained** in the cold index until policy processing succeeds
2. **Retrieved** from the hot cache and re-processed immediately when the full event is still available
3. **Fetched by exact event ID** from the recursive maintainer relay chain when the hot-cache copy has expired
4. **Removed from both tiers** only after the event is accepted, enters purgatory, or is already stored
Repository announcements are processed before dependent state events. Network
requests run outside the main sync-manager lock, and unsuccessful requests retain
their IDs for a throttled retry. This enables rapid recovery from arrival-order
races without reopening a broad synchronization query.
See [GRASP-02: Integration with Rejected Events Index](grasp-02-proactive-sync.md#integration-with-rejected-events-index)
for complete details on rejection tracking and re-processing.
---
## Comparison with Reference Implementation
| Aspect | ngit-relay (hooks) | ngit-grasp (inline) |
| ------------------ | ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------- |
| **Components** | nginx + git-http-backend + hook + Khatru | Single Rust binary |
| **Validation** | Pre-receive hook (separate process) | Inline HTTP handler |
| **Error messages** | Hook stderr → `remote:` | HTTP response JSON |
| **Performance** | Spawns Git first | Validates first |
| **Testing** | Shell scripts + Go tests | Pure Rust tests |
| **Deployment** | Docker + supervisord | Single binary |
| **State sharing** | WebSocket query | Direct database access |
Both are GRASP-compliant, but inline authorization is simpler and more efficient.
---
## Trade-offs and Limitations
### What We Gain
- ✅ **Purgatory integration** - Can check database + purgatory during authorization
- ✅ **Prevents deadlock** - State events in purgatory can authorize pushes
- ✅ Better error messages
- ✅ Better performance (early rejection)
- ✅ Easier testing (pure Rust)
- ✅ Simpler deployment (single binary)
- ✅ Tighter integration (shared state)
### What We Lose
- ❌ Non-standard approach (not using Git's hook system)
- ❌ Tighter coupling to Git HTTP protocol
- ❌ Must parse pkt-line protocol ourselves
### Is It Worth It?
**Absolutely**, because:
1. **Purgatory integration is essential** - Without it, we'd have a deadlock where state events in purgatory can't authorize pushes
2. Protocol parsing is isolated in [`src/git/authorization.rs`](../../src/git/authorization.rs)
3. GRASP is already non-standard (Nostr authorization)
4. Benefits far outweigh the coupling cost
5. We can still add hook support later if needed (but purgatory checking would still need inline access)
---
## Implementation References
Key files in the ngit-grasp implementation:
| Component | Location |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| HTTP routing | [`src/http/mod.rs`](../../src/http/mod.rs) |
| Git handlers | [`src/git/handlers.rs`](../../src/git/handlers.rs) |
| Push authorization | [`src/git/authorization.rs`](../../src/git/authorization.rs) |
| Pkt-line parsing | [`src/git/authorization.rs:695-778`](../../src/git/authorization.rs) |
| Subprocess management | [`src/git/subprocess.rs`](../../src/git/subprocess.rs) |
| Purgatory integration | [`src/purgatory/mod.rs`](../../src/purgatory/mod.rs) |
| Event acceptance policy | [`src/nostr/builder.rs`](../../src/nostr/builder.rs) - `Nip34WritePolicy` |
---
## Future Considerations
### If We Need Hooks Later
We can add hook support without removing inline validation:
```rust
pub struct GitConfig {
inline_validation: bool, // Default: true
hook_validation: bool, // Default: false
}
```
This would allow:
- Migration path for hook-based systems
- Extra validation for paranoid deployments
- Compatibility with other Git tools
### If Git Protocol Changes
The protocol parsing is isolated in [`src/git/protocol.rs`](src/git/protocol.rs). If the Git protocol changes:
- Update the protocol module
- Tests will catch any breakage
---
## Conclusion
**Inline authorization is the right choice for ngit-grasp** because:
1. **Purgatory integration** - Without inline authorization, state events in purgatory couldn't authorize pushes, creating a deadlock
2. **Better error messages** - Direct HTTP responses with clear rejection reasons
3. **Better performance** - Early rejection before spawning Git
4. **Easier testing** - Pure Rust unit tests, no Git setup needed
5. **Simpler deployment** - Single binary with shared state
6. **Shared database + purgatory** - Both authorization sources accessible during validation
The trade-off (coupling to Git HTTP protocol) is acceptable because:
- The pkt-line protocol is stable and well-specified
- Protocol parsing is isolated in [`src/git/authorization.rs`](../../src/git/authorization.rs)
- Purgatory integration requires inline access anyway
- Benefits far outweigh the cost
This decision aligns with our goal of creating a **developer-friendly, production-ready GRASP implementation** that properly handles the event-git-data ordering problem via purgatory.
---
## Related Documentation
- [Architecture Overview](architecture.md) - Full system design
- [Design Decisions](decisions.md) - All architectural choices
- [Comparison with ngit-relay](comparison.md) - Detailed comparison
- [Git Protocol Reference](../reference/git-protocol.md) - Protocol details
- [Test Strategy](../reference/test-strategy.md) - How we test this
---
_Part of the [ngit-grasp explanation docs](./)_