Compare commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 Laan Tungir
|
ac2e6347a2 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
d7369646fb | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
b1f8076b1d | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
314f1c520a | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
ea2f1cd78e | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
9282e22b00 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
2ba81c4bc8 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
64fbd5c874 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
ca18e1e42d | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
b3421c3e40 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
96ab9741ef | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
2af12868e2 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
a0a5987ffa | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
0b0ec5eb1a | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
0355744103 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
db274ce487 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
56f37e092d | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
a017dc40e0 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
05c055503d | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
a7c6de2dcd | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
16a6da817c | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
1cf541b02d | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
8015742e29 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
09f3ec2f7c | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
5744b83288 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
21892c108e | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
344add841c | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
3e3013dde1 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
11d3760d7b | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
c5f1a70658 | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
6fd7b8ce1f | ||
|
Laan Tungir
|
1b5af2fd33 |
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
alarm impact educate burden vague honey horn buyer sight vocal age render
|
||||
|
||||
index 0
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
"index": 0,
|
||||
"nsec": "nsec1z2lrfamae2dzax7dmnlhv497uuxe4mw0m3w694upx5x54q6dgttqvzrrwl",
|
||||
"npub": "npub1j7d7yf47w8k2kseknqjr3045jvm00u0wnt3433kk6vu67d2zamcs8ynuw4",
|
||||
"npubHex": "979be226be71ecab4336982438beb49336f7f1ee9ae358c6d6d339af3542eef1",
|
||||
"nsecHex": "12be34f77dca9a2e9bcddcff7654bee70d9aedcfdc5da2d781350d4a834d42d6",
|
||||
"fipsIpv6": "fd55:b7c6:536e:26ee:a79:6e25:6f05:a85f",
|
||||
"strDerivationPath": "m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -55,7 +55,9 @@ RUN if [ "$(uname -m)" = "aarch64" ] && ! command -v aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc >/dev
|
||||
|
||||
# Copy source files
|
||||
COPY src/ /build/src/
|
||||
COPY libotppad/ /build/libotppad/
|
||||
COPY resources/tui_continuous/ /build/resources/tui_continuous/
|
||||
COPY resources/pqclean/ /build/resources/pqclean/
|
||||
|
||||
# Build nsigner as a fully static binary
|
||||
RUN ARCH="$(uname -m)"; \
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +72,12 @@ RUN ARCH="$(uname -m)"; \
|
||||
-I/build/nostr_core_lib/nostr_core \
|
||||
-I/build/nostr_core_lib/cjson \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/tui_continuous \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/pqclean \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/pqclean/common \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65 \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s \
|
||||
-I/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768 \
|
||||
-I/build/libotppad \
|
||||
/build/src/main.c \
|
||||
/build/src/secure_mem.c \
|
||||
/build/src/mnemonic.c \
|
||||
@@ -83,6 +91,33 @@ RUN ARCH="$(uname -m)"; \
|
||||
/build/src/key_store.c \
|
||||
/build/src/socket_name.c \
|
||||
/build/src/auth_envelope.c \
|
||||
/build/src/miner.c \
|
||||
/build/src/pq_crypto.c \
|
||||
/build/src/pq_drbg.c \
|
||||
/build/src/otp_pad.c \
|
||||
/build/src/http_listener.c \
|
||||
/build/libotppad/libotppad.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/sign.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/poly.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/ntt.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/sign.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/hash.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/thash.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/utils.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/wots.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/fors.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/address.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/common/fips202.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/common/sha2.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_openssl.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/reduce.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/ntt.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/cbd.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/verify.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/symmetric.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/poly.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/indcpa.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/kem.c \
|
||||
/build/resources/tui_continuous/tui_continuous.c \
|
||||
"$NOSTR_LIB" \
|
||||
-o /build/nsigner_static \
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
CC := gcc
|
||||
CFLAGS := -Wall -Wextra -std=c99 -Os -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -DNOSTR_ENABLE_NSIGNER_CLIENT=1 -Isrc -Iresources/nostr_core_lib -Iresources/nostr_core_lib/nostr_core -Iresources/nostr_core_lib/cjson -Iresources/tui_continuous
|
||||
CFLAGS := -Wall -Wextra -std=c99 -Os -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -DNOSTR_ENABLE_NSIGNER_CLIENT=1 -D_GNU_SOURCE -Isrc -Ilibotppad -Iresources/nostr_core_lib -Iresources/nostr_core_lib/nostr_core -Iresources/nostr_core_lib/cjson -Iresources/tui_continuous -Iresources/pqclean -Iresources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65 -Iresources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s -Iresources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768 -Iresources/pqclean/common
|
||||
LDFLAGS := -Wl,--gc-sections resources/nostr_core_lib/libnostr_core_x64.a -lz -ldl -lpthread -lm -lssl -lcrypto -lcurl -lsecp256k1
|
||||
|
||||
SRC_DIR := src
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,31 @@ EXAMPLES_DIR := examples
|
||||
|
||||
TARGET_DEV := $(BUILD_DIR)/nsigner
|
||||
|
||||
# PQClean ML-DSA-65 sources (Phase 3)
|
||||
PQCLEAN_DIR := resources/pqclean
|
||||
PQCLEAN_SOURCES := \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/sign.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/poly.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/ntt.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/sign.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/hash.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/thash.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/utils.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/wots.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/fors.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/address.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/common/fips202.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/common/sha2.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/common/crypto_backend_openssl.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/reduce.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/ntt.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/cbd.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/verify.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/symmetric.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/poly.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/indcpa.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_DIR)/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/kem.c
|
||||
|
||||
SOURCES := \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/main.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c \
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +49,13 @@ SOURCES := \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/socket_name.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/auth_envelope.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/miner.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c \
|
||||
$(SRC_DIR)/http_listener.c \
|
||||
libotppad/libotppad.c \
|
||||
$(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) \
|
||||
resources/tui_continuous/tui_continuous.c
|
||||
|
||||
HEADERS :=
|
||||
@@ -40,18 +72,29 @@ TEST_SOCKET_NAME_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_socket_name
|
||||
TEST_AUTH_ENVELOPE_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_auth_envelope
|
||||
TEST_QREXEC_AUTH_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_qrexec_auth
|
||||
TEST_MNEMONIC_INPUT_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_mnemonic_input
|
||||
TEST_MINE_EVENT_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_mine_event
|
||||
TEST_PQ_CRYPTO_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_pq_crypto
|
||||
TEST_ED25519_X25519_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_ed25519_x25519
|
||||
TEST_ML_DSA_65_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_ml_dsa_65
|
||||
TEST_SLH_DSA_128S_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_slh_dsa_128s
|
||||
TEST_ML_KEM_768_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_ml_kem_768
|
||||
TEST_PUBKEY_FORMAT_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_pubkey_format
|
||||
TEST_ALGORITHM_API_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/test_algorithm_api
|
||||
EXAMPLE_GET_PUBLIC_KEY_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_get_public_key_client
|
||||
EXAMPLE_SIGN_EVENT_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_sign_event_client
|
||||
EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_TCP_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_get_pubkey_tcp
|
||||
EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_QREXEC_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_get_pubkey_qrexec
|
||||
EXAMPLE_PQ_SIGN_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_pq_sign
|
||||
EXAMPLE_PQ_KEM_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_pq_kem
|
||||
EXAMPLE_SSH_SIGN_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/example_ssh_sign
|
||||
DEMO_C99_TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/demo_c99
|
||||
|
||||
.PHONY: all lib dev static static-debug static-arm64 firmware-feather test test-integration test-mnemonic test-mnemonic-input test-role test-selector test-enforcement test-dispatcher test-policy test-socket-name test-auth-envelope test-qrexec-auth examples test-client clean
|
||||
.PHONY: all lib dev static static-debug static-arm64 firmware-feather test test-integration test-mnemonic test-mnemonic-input test-role test-selector test-enforcement test-dispatcher test-policy test-socket-name test-auth-envelope test-qrexec-auth test-mine-event test-pq-crypto test-ed25519-x25519 test-ml-dsa-65 test-slh-dsa-128s test-ml-kem-768 test-pubkey-format test-algorithm-api examples test-client clean
|
||||
|
||||
all: dev
|
||||
|
||||
lib:
|
||||
cd resources/nostr_core_lib && ./build.sh --nips=1,4,6,19,44
|
||||
cd resources/nostr_core_lib && ./build.sh --nips=1,4,6,13,19,44
|
||||
|
||||
dev: lib $(TARGET_DEV)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -74,7 +117,7 @@ static-arm64:
|
||||
firmware-feather:
|
||||
cd firmware/feather_s3_tft && idf.py build
|
||||
|
||||
test: lib test-mnemonic test-mnemonic-input test-role test-selector test-enforcement test-dispatcher test-policy test-socket-name test-auth-envelope test-qrexec-auth test-client
|
||||
test: lib test-mnemonic test-mnemonic-input test-role test-selector test-enforcement test-dispatcher test-policy test-socket-name test-auth-envelope test-qrexec-auth test-mine-event test-pq-crypto test-ed25519-x25519 test-ml-dsa-65 test-slh-dsa-128s test-ml-kem-768 test-pubkey-format test-client
|
||||
|
||||
test-integration: $(TEST_INTEGRATION_TARGET) $(TARGET_DEV)
|
||||
./$(TEST_INTEGRATION_TARGET)
|
||||
@@ -109,13 +152,37 @@ test-auth-envelope: $(TEST_AUTH_ENVELOPE_TARGET)
|
||||
test-qrexec-auth: $(TEST_QREXEC_AUTH_TARGET) $(TARGET_DEV)
|
||||
./$(TEST_QREXEC_AUTH_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-mine-event: $(TEST_MINE_EVENT_TARGET) $(TARGET_DEV)
|
||||
./$(TEST_MINE_EVENT_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-pq-crypto: $(TEST_PQ_CRYPTO_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_PQ_CRYPTO_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-ed25519-x25519: $(TEST_ED25519_X25519_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_ED25519_X25519_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-ml-dsa-65: $(TEST_ML_DSA_65_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_ML_DSA_65_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-slh-dsa-128s: $(TEST_SLH_DSA_128S_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_SLH_DSA_128S_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-ml-kem-768: $(TEST_ML_KEM_768_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_ML_KEM_768_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-pubkey-format: $(TEST_PUBKEY_FORMAT_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_PUBKEY_FORMAT_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-algorithm-api: $(TEST_ALGORITHM_API_TARGET)
|
||||
./$(TEST_ALGORITHM_API_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
test-client: examples
|
||||
|
||||
examples: $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBLIC_KEY_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_SIGN_EVENT_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_TCP_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_QREXEC_TARGET) $(DEMO_C99_TARGET)
|
||||
examples: $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBLIC_KEY_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_SIGN_EVENT_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_TCP_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_QREXEC_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_PQ_SIGN_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_PQ_KEM_TARGET) $(EXAMPLE_SSH_SIGN_TARGET) $(DEMO_C99_TARGET)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_MNEMONIC_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c -o $(TEST_MNEMONIC_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_MNEMONIC_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_MNEMONIC_INPUT_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_mnemonic_input.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
@@ -129,13 +196,13 @@ $(TEST_SELECTOR_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c -o $(TEST_SELECTOR_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_ENFORCEMENT_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c
|
||||
$(TEST_ENFORCEMENT_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c -o $(TEST_ENFORCEMENT_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c -o $(TEST_ENFORCEMENT_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_DISPATCHER_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
$(TEST_DISPATCHER_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c -o $(TEST_DISPATCHER_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_DISPATCHER_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_POLICY_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_policy.c $(SRC_DIR)/policy.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
@@ -157,6 +224,38 @@ $(TEST_QREXEC_AUTH_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_qrexec_auth.c $(SRC_DIR)/auth_envel
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_qrexec_auth.c $(SRC_DIR)/auth_envelope.c -o $(TEST_QREXEC_AUTH_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_MINE_EVENT_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_mine_event.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_mine_event.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_MINE_EVENT_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_PQ_CRYPTO_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c -o $(TEST_PQ_CRYPTO_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_ED25519_X25519_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_ed25519_x25519.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_ed25519_x25519.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_ED25519_X25519_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_ML_DSA_65_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_ml_dsa_65.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_ml_dsa_65.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_ML_DSA_65_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_SLH_DSA_128S_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_slh_dsa_128s.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_slh_dsa_128s.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_SLH_DSA_128S_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_ML_KEM_768_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_ml_kem_768.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_ml_kem_768.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_ML_KEM_768_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_PUBKEY_FORMAT_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_pubkey_format.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_pubkey_format.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_PUBKEY_FORMAT_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(TEST_ALGORITHM_API_TARGET): $(TEST_DIR)/test_algorithm_api.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/policy.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(TEST_DIR)/test_algorithm_api.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_crypto.c $(SRC_DIR)/pq_drbg.c $(PQCLEAN_SOURCES) $(SRC_DIR)/key_store.c $(SRC_DIR)/dispatcher.c $(SRC_DIR)/miner.c $(SRC_DIR)/selector.c $(SRC_DIR)/enforcement.c $(SRC_DIR)/role_table.c $(SRC_DIR)/mnemonic.c $(SRC_DIR)/secure_mem.c $(SRC_DIR)/policy.c $(SRC_DIR)/otp_pad.c libotppad/libotppad.c -o $(TEST_ALGORITHM_API_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBLIC_KEY_TARGET): $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/get_public_key_client.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/get_public_key_client.c -o $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBLIC_KEY_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
@@ -173,6 +272,18 @@ $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_QREXEC_TARGET): $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/get_pubkey_qrexec.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/get_pubkey_qrexec.c -o $(EXAMPLE_GET_PUBKEY_QREXEC_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(EXAMPLE_PQ_SIGN_TARGET): $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/pq_sign_example.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/pq_sign_example.c -o $(EXAMPLE_PQ_SIGN_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(EXAMPLE_PQ_KEM_TARGET): $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/pq_kem_example.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/pq_kem_example.c -o $(EXAMPLE_PQ_KEM_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(EXAMPLE_SSH_SIGN_TARGET): $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/ssh_sign_example.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(EXAMPLES_DIR)/ssh_sign_example.c -o $(EXAMPLE_SSH_SIGN_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
$(DEMO_C99_TARGET): $(CLIENT_DIR)/demo_c99.c
|
||||
@mkdir -p $(BUILD_DIR)
|
||||
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CLIENT_DIR)/demo_c99.c -o $(DEMO_C99_TARGET) $(LDFLAGS)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ This is a **program, not a daemon**:
|
||||
- purpose/curve enforcement
|
||||
- request dispatch
|
||||
- interactive terminal UI
|
||||
- transport adapter(s)
|
||||
- transport adapter(s) (Unix socket, qrexec, FIPS/TCP, HTTP)
|
||||
- OTP one-time pad encryption (optional, with USB pad)
|
||||
|
||||
You run it when you need signing. You stop it when you are done. Closing the terminal or quitting the program ends the trust session and destroys state.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,42 +29,28 @@ You run it when you need signing. You stop it when you are done. Closing the ter
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Zero filesystem footprint
|
||||
|
||||
At runtime, `n_signer` writes nothing to disk:
|
||||
|
||||
- no config files
|
||||
- no logs
|
||||
- no PID files
|
||||
- no lock files
|
||||
- no socket pathname artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
On Linux desktop, local IPC uses abstract namespace Unix sockets (`@name` semantics) that exist only in kernel memory and disappear with process/kernel namespace lifetime.
|
||||
At runtime, `n_signer` writes nothing to disk: no config files, no logs, no PID files, no lock files, no socket pathname artifacts. On Linux desktop, local IPC uses abstract namespace Unix sockets (`@name` semantics) that exist only in kernel memory and disappear with process/kernel namespace lifetime.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Crash = total wipe
|
||||
|
||||
All sensitive and operational state exists only in-process RAM (mlock'd where applicable):
|
||||
|
||||
- mnemonic-derived key material
|
||||
- role table
|
||||
- policy/approval decisions for the live session
|
||||
- activity display buffer
|
||||
|
||||
If the process dies (fault, kill, exploit, power loss), state is unrecoverable by design. There is no persistence layer to scrape post-crash.
|
||||
All sensitive and operational state exists only in-process RAM (mlock'd where applicable): mnemonic-derived key material, role table, policy/approval decisions for the live session, activity display buffer. If the process dies (fault, kill, exploit, power loss), state is unrecoverable by design.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Single binary, no external dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
Runtime target is one statically-linked musl executable:
|
||||
|
||||
- no shared libraries required at runtime
|
||||
- no interpreter/runtime VM dependency
|
||||
- no sidecar services
|
||||
- no helper daemon binaries
|
||||
|
||||
This reduces deployment variability and shrinks the runtime trust surface.
|
||||
Runtime target is one statically-linked musl executable: no shared libraries required at runtime, no interpreter/runtime VM dependency, no sidecar services, no helper daemon binaries. This reduces deployment variability and shrinks the runtime trust surface.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Always-attended operation
|
||||
|
||||
`n_signer` is intentionally human-attended. It stays attached to a terminal and can require explicit keystroke approval for unknown callers or sensitive actions. Human presence is part of the security model.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.5 Secret memory backing: `mlock` today, `memfd_secret` where supported
|
||||
|
||||
Sensitive buffers (mnemonic, master seed, per-role private keys) live in `mlock`'d RAM via [`secure_buf_alloc`](src/secure_mem.c) and are zeroized with `secure_memzero` on free. This gives swap protection and crash-wipe semantics on every supported platform, including Qubes OS Xen guests.
|
||||
|
||||
`memfd_secret(2)` (Linux `CONFIG_SECRETMEM`) is a stronger backing: pages are invisible to `/proc/pid/mem`, `ptrace`, `kcore`, and hibernation dumps, and are kernel-guaranteed to be wiped on exit. It is the intended tier-1 upgrade for the `secure_buf_alloc` path on hosts that can materialize secretmem pages — bare metal and KVM guests.
|
||||
|
||||
It is **not** used yet because Qubes OS VMs are Xen guests: the `memfd_secret` syscall succeeds and returns a valid `/secretmem` fd, but the first page-fault into the mapping raises `SIGBUS` (the Xen hypervisor cannot back the restricted pages). Since Qubes integration is a primary deployment target, the `mlock` path remains correct and universal. A future implementation will probe `memfd_secret` by writing a canary byte into a trial mapping and fall back to `mlock` on `SIGBUS`/`ENOSYS`, enabling the stronger backing automatically on non-Xen hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. How it works
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Startup phase (TUI input mode)
|
||||
@@ -74,9 +61,12 @@ When started, `n_signer` immediately enters terminal input mode:
|
||||
- On `E`: prompt for mnemonic with terminal echo disabled, then validate.
|
||||
- On `G`: generate a fresh 12-word BIP-39 mnemonic from `getrandom(2)`, display it numbered with a "WRITE THIS DOWN — IT WILL NOT BE SHOWN AGAIN" warning, then continue. There is no confirmation step.
|
||||
2. Build in-memory role/selector state from the mnemonic.
|
||||
3. Pick the abstract socket name (random BIP-39 pair, or `--socket-name` / `--name` / `-n` override).
|
||||
4. Initialize transport endpoints and bind the socket.
|
||||
5. Switch to running status display, with the signer name and socket address shown in the banner.
|
||||
3. **Interactive transport selection** (if no `--listen` flag given and stdin is a TTY): choose one or more of: Local Unix socket, Qubes qrexec bridge, FIPS/TCP listener (framed JSON), HTTP listener (curl-friendly).
|
||||
4. **Index whitelist** (optional): restrict which `nostr_index` values this session can access.
|
||||
5. **OTP pad selection** (optional): auto-scans attached USB drives for OTP pads and offers to bind one. See [`plans/otp_nostr_integration.md`](plans/otp_nostr_integration.md).
|
||||
6. Pick the abstract socket name (random BIP-39 pair, or `--socket-name` / `--name` / `-n` override).
|
||||
7. Initialize transport endpoints and bind the socket.
|
||||
8. Switch to running status display.
|
||||
|
||||
No startup files are read or written. The mnemonic — typed or generated — lives only in `mlock`'d memory and is zeroized on shutdown or crash.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -89,48 +79,56 @@ These modes avoid putting mnemonic material in argv/environment and are designed
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Running phase (status display + signer)
|
||||
|
||||
After unlock, terminal becomes a live status and control console. Example layout:
|
||||
After unlock, the terminal becomes a live status and control console rendered by [`render_status()`](src/main.c). The top frame shows the program name and version; below it are the Roles and Activity sections, followed by a single status line. Connection instructions are not shown by default — press `d` to display them on demand. Example layout:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
n_signer v0.x | foreground session active
|
||||
transport: unix-abstract:@nsigner
|
||||
session: unlocked (RAM-only)
|
||||
n_signer v0.0.53 > Main Menu
|
||||
|
||||
Roles
|
||||
-----
|
||||
main purpose=nostr curve=secp256k1 selector=role:main
|
||||
ops purpose=nostr curve=secp256k1 selector=nostr_index:7
|
||||
backup purpose=bitcoin curve=secp256k1 selector=role_path:m/84'/0'/0'/0/5
|
||||
Roles:
|
||||
Role Purpose Curve Derivation path
|
||||
main nostr secp256k1 m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0
|
||||
nostr_idx_1 nostr secp256k1 m/44'/1237'/1'/0/0
|
||||
backup bitcoin secp256k1 m/84'/0'/0'/0/5
|
||||
|
||||
Pending approvals
|
||||
-----------------
|
||||
(none)
|
||||
Activity (latest first):
|
||||
16:03:11 allow caller=uid:1000 method=nostr_get_public_key role=main
|
||||
16:02:44 prompt caller=uid:1000 method=nostr_sign_event role=ops
|
||||
16:02:46 allow caller=uid:1000 method=nostr_sign_event role=ops
|
||||
15:59:10 deny caller=uid:1001 method=nostr_sign_event error=unauthorized
|
||||
|
||||
Activity (latest first)
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
16:03:11 allow caller=uid:1000 method=get_public_key role=main
|
||||
16:02:44 prompt caller=uid:1000 method=sign_event role=ops
|
||||
16:02:46 allow caller=uid:1000 method=sign_event role=ops
|
||||
15:59:10 deny caller=uid:1001 method=sign_event error=unauthorized
|
||||
session=unlocked (12 words) signer=nsigner_hairy_dog derived=3 auto-approve=OFF
|
||||
|
||||
Hotkeys
|
||||
-------
|
||||
a toggle auto-approve(prompt) for this session
|
||||
r refresh
|
||||
l lock/reunlock session
|
||||
q quit
|
||||
l lock/reunlock
|
||||
r refresh
|
||||
a toggle auto-approve
|
||||
d display connections
|
||||
q/x quit
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The **Derivation path** column shows the full BIP-44 path for each role's key. For `nostr_index` roles this is `m/44'/1237'/<n>'/0/0` (NIP-06); for `role_path` roles it's the explicit path.
|
||||
|
||||
The signer's name (`nsigner_hairy_dog` in this example) appears in the **status line** at the bottom (`signer=nsigner_hairy_dog`). See [§4.1](#41-linux-desktop-abstract-namespace-unix-socket) for how the name is generated.
|
||||
|
||||
### Connection instructions (press `d`)
|
||||
|
||||
Pressing `d` clears the screen and shows each active transport as a titled block with the connection string and an example client command. Press any key to return to the status display.
|
||||
|
||||
Hotkeys (active while the status display is shown):
|
||||
|
||||
- `a` — toggle auto-approve (prompt) for this session
|
||||
- `r` — refresh the display
|
||||
- `d` — display connection instructions (press any key to return)
|
||||
- `l` — lock / re-unlock the session
|
||||
- `q` — quit
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Approval prompts
|
||||
|
||||
When a request needs confirmation, `n_signer` interrupts the status view with a prompt and waits for a local keystroke.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Approval required
|
||||
caller: uid:1000
|
||||
method: sign_event
|
||||
method: nostr_sign_event
|
||||
selector: role=ops
|
||||
purpose/curve: nostr/secp256k1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -145,125 +143,446 @@ No response is emitted to caller until the local user decides.
|
||||
- `l` locks the session in-place: signing stops until mnemonic is re-entered.
|
||||
- terminal close or process termination has the same effect as quit: total state wipe.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Mnemonic-rooted role model
|
||||
## 4. API
|
||||
|
||||
`n_signer` derives many role-scoped keys from one mnemonic root. Requests select a role using explicit selectors, then enforcement checks operation compatibility.
|
||||
`n_signer` exposes a JSON-RPC 2.0-style request/response protocol. Every request is a single JSON object; every response is a single JSON object. This section is the complete, authoritative description of the API.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Nostr shorthand: nostr_index
|
||||
For the migration plan from the legacy verb names, see [`plans/legacy_verb_aliases.md`](plans/legacy_verb_aliases.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Nostr shorthand keeps the explicit index selector:
|
||||
### 4.1 Request format
|
||||
|
||||
`m/44'/1237'/<nostr_index>'/0/0`
|
||||
|
||||
Use `nostr_index` only for Nostr-indexed roles.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Full derivation path: role_path
|
||||
|
||||
For non-Nostr or advanced layouts, caller may use full `role_path` selector.
|
||||
|
||||
Security rule: `role_path` must match a pre-registered role entry. Unregistered ad-hoc derivation requests are rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 What memorizing your seed phrase gets you
|
||||
|
||||
A single memorized mnemonic can deterministically recover multiple key domains through role definitions, not just one identity.
|
||||
|
||||
Examples include Nostr roles, Bitcoin branches, and future application-specific paths. See [`plans/seed_phrase_uses.md`](plans/seed_phrase_uses.md) for the maintained use-case catalog and caveats.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Wire contract (JSON-RPC)
|
||||
|
||||
Request shape is JSON-RPC with NIP-46-style methods and optional trailing selector options.
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{ "id": "1", "method": "get_public_key", "params": [] }
|
||||
{ "id": "2", "method": "sign_event", "params": ["<event_json>", { "role": "main" }] }
|
||||
{ "id": "3", "method": "sign_event", "params": ["<event_json>", { "nostr_index": 7 }] }
|
||||
{ "id": "4", "method": "sign_event", "params": ["<event_json>", { "role_path": "m/84'/0'/0'/0/5", "purpose": "bitcoin", "curve": "secp256k1" }] }
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "<string>", "method": "<verb>", "params": [ <arg0>, <arg1>, ..., { <options> } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented signer verbs in this build:
|
||||
- `id` — caller-supplied string echoed verbatim in the response. Used to match requests to responses.
|
||||
- `method` — the verb name (see [§4.2](#42-verbs)).
|
||||
- `params` — a JSON array. Positional arguments come first; the **last array element** is conventionally an options object. The options object is optional for most verbs.
|
||||
|
||||
- `get_public_key`
|
||||
- `sign_event`
|
||||
- `nip04_encrypt` / `nip04_decrypt`
|
||||
- `nip44_encrypt` / `nip44_decrypt`
|
||||
### 4.2 Response format
|
||||
|
||||
Selector resolution order:
|
||||
Success:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "<string>", "result": <value> }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
1. `role`
|
||||
2. `nostr_index`
|
||||
3. `role_path`
|
||||
4. default role `main`
|
||||
`result` is a JSON string. For structured verbs the string is itself a serialized JSON object — clients should `JSON.parse` it.
|
||||
|
||||
Conflicting selectors are rejected (`ambiguous_role_selector`).
|
||||
Error:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "<string>", "error": { "code": <int>, "message": "<string>" } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Representative error codes:
|
||||
Error codes:
|
||||
|
||||
- `invalid_request`
|
||||
- `method_not_found`
|
||||
- `ambiguous_role_selector`
|
||||
- `unknown_role`
|
||||
- `purpose_mismatch`
|
||||
- `curve_mismatch`
|
||||
- `unauthorized`
|
||||
- `approval_denied`
|
||||
- `internal_error`
|
||||
| Code | Message | Meaning |
|
||||
|-------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| -32700| `parse_error` | Request was not valid JSON. |
|
||||
| -32600| `invalid_request` | Missing `id`, `method`, or `params`, or `params` is not an array. |
|
||||
| -32601| `method_not_found` | Unknown verb, or verb not valid for the selected algorithm. |
|
||||
| -32602| `invalid_params` | Malformed arguments (bad hex, wrong length, missing field, etc.). |
|
||||
| 1001 | `ambiguous_role_selector` | More than one role selector was supplied. |
|
||||
| 1002 | `unknown_role` | No role matched the selector. |
|
||||
| 1003 | `no_default_role` | No selector given and no `main` role exists. |
|
||||
| 1004 | `purpose_mismatch` | Role's purpose is not valid for this verb. |
|
||||
| 1005 | `curve_mismatch` | Role's curve is not valid for this verb. |
|
||||
| 1006 | `mnemonic_not_loaded` | No mnemonic is loaded in the signer. |
|
||||
| 1007 | `no_termination_condition` | `nostr_mine_event` called without `difficulty` or `timeout_sec`. |
|
||||
| 1008 | `mining_failed` | Internal error during proof-of-work mining. |
|
||||
| 1009 | `not_yet_implemented` | Verb+algorithm combination is reserved but not yet implemented. |
|
||||
| 1010 | `algorithm_not_supported_for_verb` | The `algorithm` value is not valid for this verb. |
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Purpose and curve enforcement
|
||||
### 4.3 Verbs
|
||||
|
||||
Selector resolution chooses *which* role. Enforcement decides *whether the requested method is valid* for that role.
|
||||
All verbs take their arguments as positional `params` and their options in a trailing options object. Most verbs select a key via the `algorithm` + `index` options (see [§4.4](#44-algorithms)). The `nostr_*` verbs select a secp256k1 NIP-06 key via `nostr_index` and implement Nostr-protocol-specific serialization on top of the raw crypto.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
| Verb | Algorithms | Positional params | Options |
|
||||
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|
||||
| `get_info` | n/a (metadata) | — | — |
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | all key-deriving algorithms | — | `algorithm`, `index` |
|
||||
| `sign` | secp256k1, ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s | `<message_hex>` | `algorithm`, `index`, `scheme`* |
|
||||
| `verify` | secp256k1, ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s | `<message_hex>`, `<signature_hex>` | `algorithm`, `index`, `scheme`* |
|
||||
| `encapsulate` | ml-kem-768 | `<peer_pubkey_hex>` | `algorithm` |
|
||||
| `decapsulate` | ml-kem-768 | `<ciphertext_hex>` | `algorithm`, `index` |
|
||||
| `derive_shared_secret` | x25519 | `<peer_pubkey_hex>` | `algorithm`, `index` |
|
||||
| `derive` | secp256k1 | `<data>` | `algorithm`, `index` (required) |
|
||||
| `encrypt` | otp | `<plaintext_base64>` | `algorithm`, `encoding` |
|
||||
| `decrypt` | otp | `<ciphertext>` | `algorithm`, `encoding` |
|
||||
| `nostr_get_public_key` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | — | `nostr_index`, `format` |
|
||||
| `nostr_sign_event` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<event_json>` | `nostr_index` |
|
||||
| `nostr_mine_event` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<event_json>` | `nostr_index`, `difficulty`, `timeout_sec`, `threads` |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip04_encrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<peer_pubkey_hex>`, `<plaintext>` | `nostr_index` |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip04_decrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<peer_pubkey_hex>`, `<ciphertext>` | `nostr_index` |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip44_encrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<peer_pubkey_hex>`, `<plaintext>` | `nostr_index` |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip44_decrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) | `<peer_pubkey_hex>`, `<ciphertext>` | `nostr_index` |
|
||||
|
||||
- `sign_event` requires `purpose="nostr"` and `curve="secp256k1"`.
|
||||
- If caller selects a Bitcoin-role key for `sign_event`, request fails with `purpose_mismatch`.
|
||||
\* `scheme` is secp256k1-only: `"schnorr"` (default, BIP-340) or `"ecdsa"`.
|
||||
|
||||
This prevents cross-protocol misuse inside one mnemonic-rooted signer process.
|
||||
#### Enforcement matrix
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Transport
|
||||
| Verb | Valid algorithms |
|
||||
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| `sign` / `verify` | secp256k1, ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s |
|
||||
| `encapsulate` / `decapsulate` | ml-kem-768 |
|
||||
| `derive_shared_secret` | x25519 |
|
||||
| `derive` | secp256k1 |
|
||||
| `encrypt` / `decrypt` | otp |
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | all key-deriving algorithms |
|
||||
| `nostr_*` | secp256k1 (Nostr protocol) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1 Linux desktop: abstract namespace Unix socket
|
||||
Any unlisted `(verb, algorithm)` pair is rejected with `algorithm_not_supported_for_verb` (1010).
|
||||
|
||||
Primary local transport is AF_UNIX abstract namespace.
|
||||
### 4.4 Algorithms
|
||||
|
||||
Each running `nsigner` process binds to a unique abstract name of the form `@nsigner_<word1>_<word2>`, where the two words are picked at random from the BIP-39 English wordlist at startup (e.g. `@nsigner_hairy_dog`). This lets multiple signers coexist on one host.
|
||||
All keys derive deterministically from the loaded BIP-39 mnemonic. The caller selects an algorithm by name and a derivation `index` (an integer `<n>` substituted into the algorithm's derivation path). OTP is the exception — it does not derive a key, it consumes a bound one-time pad (see [§4.4.3](#443-otp)).
|
||||
|
||||
Properties:
|
||||
#### 4.4.1 Algorithm table
|
||||
|
||||
- no pathname in filesystem
|
||||
- endpoint lifetime bound to process/kernel namespace
|
||||
- no stale socket files
|
||||
- caller identity via peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`)
|
||||
- per-launch random name avoids collisions between concurrent instances and leaks no seed-derived identifier
|
||||
| Algorithm | Key type | FIPS standard | Derivation path | Key sizes (priv / pub, bytes) |
|
||||
|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|
||||
| `secp256k1` | Signature | — | `m/44'/1237'/<n>'/0/0` (NIP-06) | 32 / 32 |
|
||||
| `ed25519` | Signature | — | `m/44'/102001'/<n>'/0/0'` (SLIP-0010) | 32 / 32 |
|
||||
| `x25519` | Key agreement | — | `m/44'/102002'/<n>'/0/0'` (SLIP-0010) | 32 / 32 |
|
||||
| `ml-dsa-65` | PQ signature | FIPS 204 | `m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0/0'` → DRBG | 4032 / 1952 |
|
||||
| `slh-dsa-128s` | PQ signature | FIPS 205 | `m/44'/102004'/<n>'/0/0'` → DRBG | 64 / 32 |
|
||||
| `ml-kem-768` | PQ KEM | FIPS 203 | `m/44'/102005'/<n>'/0/0'` → DRBG | 2400 / 1184 |
|
||||
| `otp` | One-time pad | — | (no key — bound USB pad) | n/a |
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4.4.2 Key derivation
|
||||
|
||||
- **secp256k1** uses standard BIP-32/NIP-06 derivation. The 32-byte path output is the private key scalar.
|
||||
- **ed25519 / x25519** use SLIP-0010 HMAC-SHA512 derivation (all-hardened paths, as required by SLIP-0010 for ed25519). The 32-byte output is the private key.
|
||||
- **PQ algorithms** (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s, ML-KEM-768) use a two-stage approach: the mnemonic-derived 32-byte seed feeds a SHAKE-256 DRBG (NIST SP 800-90A style), which replaces PQClean's `randombytes()` callback during keygen. Same mnemonic, same index, same key pair every time.
|
||||
- **otp** does not derive a key. A pad is bound at signer startup (`--otp-pad-dir` + `--otp-pad`); the pad offset advances monotonically across requests.
|
||||
|
||||
The PQ implementations are vendored from [PQClean](https://github.com/PQClean/PQClean) (public domain / CC0). All six algorithms are always compiled in on every target. The three post-quantum algorithms address the **harvest-now-decrypt-later** threat: an adversary recording encrypted traffic today to decrypt it once a quantum computer becomes available.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4.4.3 OTP
|
||||
|
||||
The `otp` algorithm is a stream-style one-time pad, not a key-derivation scheme. It is selected like any other algorithm via `{"algorithm":"otp"}` and works with the `encrypt` / `decrypt` verbs. One pad per session; the pad offset advances monotonically across requests and is reported in every response.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.5 Examples
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_info`
|
||||
|
||||
Returns signer metadata: `name`, `implementation`, `version`, `git_hash` (firmware only), `api`, and the supported `verbs` / `algorithms` arrays. Safe to call before the mnemonic is loaded — clients use it to feature-detect and to confirm which firmware is running on a connected device.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "0", "method": "get_info", "params": [] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response (CYD firmware):
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "0", "result": { "name": "n_signer", "implementation": "cyd_esp32_2432s028", "version": "0.0.2", "git_hash": "dev", "api": "json-rpc-2.0", "verbs": ["get_info", "get_public_key", "sign", "verify", "encapsulate", "decapsulate", "derive_shared_secret", "derive", "encrypt", "decrypt", "nostr_get_public_key", "nostr_sign_event", "nostr_mine_event", "nostr_nip04_encrypt", "nostr_nip04_decrypt", "nostr_nip44_encrypt", "nostr_nip44_decrypt"], "algorithms": ["secp256k1", "ed25519", "x25519", "ml-dsa-65", "slh-dsa-128s", "ml-kem-768", "otp"] } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `get_public_key`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "1", "method": "get_public_key", "params": [ { "algorithm": "ml-dsa-65", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "1", "result": "{\"algorithm\":\"ml-dsa-65\",\"public_key\":\"<hex>\",\"key_id\":\"<16 hex>\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`key_id` is the first 16 hex characters of the public key — a short display identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `sign`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "2", "method": "sign", "params": [ "68656c6c6f", { "algorithm": "ed25519", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "2", "result": "{\"signature\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ed25519\",\"key_id\":\"<16 hex>\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The first positional argument is the message as hex. For `secp256k1` the `scheme` option selects `"schnorr"` (default, BIP-340) or `"ecdsa"`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "3", "method": "sign", "params": [ "68656c6c6f", { "algorithm": "secp256k1", "index": 0, "scheme": "ecdsa" } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `verify`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "4", "method": "verify", "params": [ "<message_hex>", "<signature_hex>", { "algorithm": "ed25519", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "4", "result": "{\"valid\":true,\"algorithm\":\"ed25519\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The signer derives its own public key from `(algorithm, index)` and verifies against it. To verify an arbitrary third-party key, use a client-side library.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `encapsulate` (ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "5", "method": "encapsulate", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", { "algorithm": "ml-kem-768" } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "5", "result": "{\"ciphertext\":\"<hex>\",\"shared_secret\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ml-kem-768\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`peer_pubkey_hex` is the recipient's ML-KEM-768 public key (1184 bytes → 2368 hex chars). Send the returned `ciphertext` to the recipient; both sides end up with the same `shared_secret`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `decapsulate` (ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "6", "method": "decapsulate", "params": [ "<ciphertext_hex>", { "algorithm": "ml-kem-768", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "6", "result": "{\"shared_secret\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ml-kem-768\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### `derive_shared_secret` (X25519)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "7", "method": "derive_shared_secret", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", { "algorithm": "x25519", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "7", "result": "{\"shared_secret\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"x25519\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`peer_pubkey_hex` is the peer's 32-byte X25519 public key (64 hex chars). Feed the returned `shared_secret` into your own symmetric cipher (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305).
|
||||
|
||||
#### `derive` (secp256k1 HMAC-SHA256)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "10", "method": "derive", "params": [ "<data>", { "algorithm": "secp256k1", "index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "10", "result": "{\"algorithm\":\"secp256k1\",\"key_id\":\"<16hex>\",\"digest\":\"<64hex>\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Computes `HMAC-SHA256(privkey, data)` where `privkey` is the secp256k1 private key derived on demand at `(algorithm: "secp256k1", index: N)`. `data` is an arbitrary caller-supplied UTF-8 string. Returns the 32-byte digest as 64 lowercase hex chars.
|
||||
|
||||
`index` is **required** (no default) — forces conscious selection of which derived key to use as the HMAC key. Omitting it returns `missing_index`.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a generic key-derived MAC primitive. Callers domain-separate by prefixing their own label into `data` (e.g. `"myapp/identifier-v1:<path>"`). The private key never leaves the signer; only the digest is returned. Use cases include deterministic, per-user, opaque identifiers for NIP-33 parameterized-replaceable events (e.g. bookmark folder `d` tags) where the same logical name must produce the same `d` tag across devices.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `encrypt` / `decrypt` (OTP)
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "8", "method": "encrypt", "params": [ "<plaintext_base64>", { "algorithm": "otp", "encoding": "ascii" } ] }
|
||||
{ "id": "9", "method": "decrypt", "params": [ "<ciphertext>", { "algorithm": "otp", "encoding": "ascii" } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`encoding` is `"ascii"` (ASCII-armored, default) or `"binary"` (base64-encoded raw `.otp` blob). If omitted on `decrypt`, auto-detection by magic bytes is used.
|
||||
|
||||
`encrypt` response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "8",
|
||||
"result": "{\"ciphertext\":\"<ascii-armor-or-base64-blob>\",\"encoding\":\"ascii\",\"pad_chksum\":\"<64 hex>\",\"pad_offset_before\":288,\"pad_offset_after\":416}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`decrypt` response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "9", "result": "{\"plaintext\":\"<base64>\",\"pad_chksum\":\"<64 hex>\"}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If no pad is bound at startup, the error is `-32601` `otp_pad_not_bound`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `nostr_get_public_key`
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "10", "method": "nostr_get_public_key", "params": [ { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response (default): a plain 64-hex-char secp256k1 public key string.
|
||||
Response with `{"format":"structured"}` in options: `{"algorithm":"secp256k1","public_key":"<hex>","key_id":"<16 hex>"}`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `nostr_sign_event`
|
||||
|
||||
Serializes the event to canonical form (`[0, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content]`), SHA-256 hashes it to produce the event `id`, signs the hash with BIP-340 Schnorr, and returns the complete signed event.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "11", "method": "nostr_sign_event", "params": [ "<event_json>", { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`<event_json>` is the unsigned event object:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "pubkey": "...", "created_at": 1234567890, "kind": 1, "tags": [], "content": "hello" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response: the signed event JSON string, with `id` and `sig` populated.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `nostr_mine_event`
|
||||
|
||||
Mines NIP-13 proof-of-work (adds a `nonce` tag) and signs the event in one step. Mining runs in a detached thread so the signer stays responsive.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "12",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_mine_event",
|
||||
"params": [ "<event_json>", { "difficulty": 20, "threads": 4, "timeout_sec": 30, "nostr_index": 0 } ]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Option | Required | Default | Meaning |
|
||||
|---------------|-------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| `difficulty` | one of `difficulty`/`timeout` | 0 | Target leading zero bits. Stops early if reached. |
|
||||
| `timeout_sec` | one of `difficulty`/`timeout` | 600 | Time budget in seconds. Always returns the best event found. |
|
||||
| `threads` | no | 1 | Mining threads (clamped to 1..32). |
|
||||
|
||||
At least one of `difficulty` or `timeout_sec` must be specified. If both are given, mining stops when **either** condition is met. Timeout is never an error — the best event found is always returned.
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "12",
|
||||
"result": "{\"event\":\"<signed event JSON with nonce tag>\",\"achieved_difficulty\":18,\"target_difficulty\":20,\"target_reached\":false,\"elapsed_sec\":30,\"attempts\":4523456}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Errors:
|
||||
- `1007` `no_termination_condition` — neither `difficulty` nor `timeout_sec` given.
|
||||
- `1008` `mining_failed` — internal mining error.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `nostr_nip04_encrypt` / `nostr_nip04_decrypt`
|
||||
|
||||
NIP-04 encryption (deprecated in Nostr but still widely used): ECDH + AES-256-CBC, base64 payload.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "13", "method": "nostr_nip04_encrypt", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", "<plaintext>", { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
{ "id": "14", "method": "nostr_nip04_decrypt", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", "<ciphertext>", { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`encrypt` returns the NIP-04 ciphertext string; `decrypt` returns the plaintext string.
|
||||
|
||||
#### `nostr_nip44_encrypt` / `nostr_nip44_decrypt`
|
||||
|
||||
NIP-44 encryption (current Nostr standard): ECDH + HKDF + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + specific payload format.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "15", "method": "nostr_nip44_encrypt", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", "<plaintext>", { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
{ "id": "16", "method": "nostr_nip44_decrypt", "params": [ "<peer_pubkey_hex>", "<ciphertext>", { "nostr_index": 0 } ] }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`encrypt` returns the NIP-44 ciphertext string; `decrypt` returns the plaintext string.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.6 Role-based selectors (Nostr verbs)
|
||||
|
||||
The `nostr_*` verbs select a secp256k1 NIP-06 key via the options object. Supported selectors:
|
||||
|
||||
| Selector | Meaning |
|
||||
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| `nostr_index` | NIP-06 index `n` → path `m/44'/1237'/<n>'/0/0` |
|
||||
| `role` | Name of a pre-registered role entry |
|
||||
| `role_path` | Full BIP-44 derivation path (must match a registered role) |
|
||||
|
||||
Selector resolution order: `role` → `nostr_index` → `role_path` → default role `main`. Conflicting selectors are rejected with `ambiguous_role_selector` (1001). The role's `(purpose, curve)` must be `(nostr, secp256k1)` — any other combination is rejected with `purpose_mismatch` (1004) or `curve_mismatch` (1005).
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.7 Pre-approval
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-approval entries skip the interactive prompt for matching requests. They are configured at startup with `--preapprove`.
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithm-based:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --preapprove caller=uid:1000,algorithm=ed25519,index=0-4,verb=sign,verify
|
||||
nsigner --preapprove caller=uid:1000,algorithm=ml-kem-768,index=0,verb=decapsulate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Nostr (role-based):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --preapprove caller=uid:1000,nostr_index=0,verb=nostr_sign_event,nostr_get_public_key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A `*` wildcard matches any caller, role, or verb. Index ranges use `min-max` syntax. Unmatched requests fall through to the default policy (prompt for same-uid, deny for others).
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Transports
|
||||
|
||||
The API is transport-independent. The same JSON request works over every transport; only the framing differs.
|
||||
|
||||
| Transport | `--listen` flag | Framing | Caller identity |
|
||||
|-----------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|
||||
| Unix socket (abstract) | `unix` (default on desktop) | Length-prefixed framed JSON | `SO_PEERCRED` → `uid:<n>` |
|
||||
| stdio | `stdio` | One framed request/response over stdin/stdout | inherited uid |
|
||||
| qrexec | `qrexec` | Same as stdio; caller from `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` | `qubes:<vm>` |
|
||||
| FIPS/TCP | `tcp:[host]:port` | Length-prefixed framed JSON | (transport-defined) |
|
||||
| HTTP | `http:host:port` | Standard HTTP POST, JSON body, no custom framing. CORS enabled. | (transport-defined) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 HTTP examples
|
||||
|
||||
Start the signer:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --listen http:127.0.0.1:11111 --allow-all
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Get a public key:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:11111/ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"id":"1","method":"get_public_key","params":[{"algorithm":"ed25519","index":0}]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Sign a Nostr event:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:11111/ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"id":"1","method":"nostr_sign_event","params":[{"pubkey":"...","created_at":1234567890,"kind":1,"tags":[],"content":"hello"},{"nostr_index":0}]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
OTP encrypt:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:11111/ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"id":"1","method":"encrypt","params":["SGVsbG8sIE9UUCB3b3JsZCE=",{"algorithm":"otp","encoding":"ascii"}]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Unix socket examples (framed mode)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# get_public_key
|
||||
nsigner --socket-name nsigner client \
|
||||
'{"id":"1","method":"get_public_key","params":[{"algorithm":"ed25519","index":0}]}'
|
||||
|
||||
# Sign a Nostr event
|
||||
nsigner --socket-name nsigner client \
|
||||
'{"id":"2","method":"nostr_sign_event","params":[{"pubkey":"...","created_at":1234567890,"kind":1,"tags":[],"content":"hello"},{"nostr_index":0}]}'
|
||||
|
||||
# ed25519 sign
|
||||
nsigner --socket-name nsigner client \
|
||||
'{"id":"3","method":"sign","params":["68656c6c6f",{"algorithm":"ed25519","index":0}]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Linux desktop: abstract namespace Unix socket
|
||||
|
||||
Primary local transport is AF_UNIX abstract namespace. Each running `nsigner` process binds to a unique abstract name of the form `@nsigner_<word1>_<word2>`, where the two words are picked at random from the BIP-39 English wordlist at startup (e.g. `@nsigner_hairy_dog`). This lets multiple signers coexist on one host.
|
||||
|
||||
Properties: no pathname in filesystem; endpoint lifetime bound to process/kernel namespace; no stale socket files; caller identity via peer credentials (`SO_PEERCRED`); per-launch random name avoids collisions and leaks no seed-derived identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
Naming rules:
|
||||
|
||||
- Default: random pick at startup, displayed in the TUI banner.
|
||||
- Override: `--socket-name <name>` (alias: `--name <name>` / `-n <name>`) forces a specific name (useful for scripts and tests).
|
||||
- Collision: if the chosen random name is already bound by another process, `nsigner` retries with a fresh pair up to 8 times before erroring out with a hint to use an explicit name override.
|
||||
- Default: random pick at startup, displayed in the status line.
|
||||
- Override: `--socket-name <name>` (alias: `--name <name>` / `-n <name>`) forces a specific name.
|
||||
- Collision: if the chosen random name is already bound, `nsigner` retries with a fresh pair up to 8 times before erroring out.
|
||||
|
||||
Discovery:
|
||||
|
||||
- `nsigner list` enumerates currently bound `nsigner_*` abstract sockets by reading `/proc/net/unix`.
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen stdio` runs one framed JSON-RPC request/response over stdin/stdout.
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen qrexec` is the same stdio framing mode, but caller identity can be derived from `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` (displayed as `qubes:<source-vm>`).
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen tcp:IPv4:PORT` or `tcp:[IPv6]:PORT` enables TCP listening for non-AF_UNIX clients (for example `tcp:127.0.0.1:8080`, `tcp:[::]:8080`, or `tcp:[fd00::1234]:8080`).
|
||||
- `nsigner bridge --to <socket-name>` is a stateless relay for Qubes qrexec: reads one framed request from stdin, forwards it to a persistent signer's abstract unix socket, and relays the response to stdout. Used as the `qubes.NsignerRpc` service entrypoint. See [§8.3](#83-qubes-os-qube) and [`plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md`](plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md).
|
||||
- `--bridge-source-trusted` (unix listener only): marks the socket as a trusted bridge endpoint. Each connection sends a framed `{"qrexec_source":"<vm>"}` preamble before the request, and the caller identity is composed as `qubes:<vm>` — matching the native qrexec identity path. This enables a persistent signer (mnemonic in mlock'd RAM) to receive qrexec-routed requests without spawning a fresh process per call.
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen qrexec` is the same stdio framing, but caller identity comes from `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN` (displayed as `qubes:<source-vm>`).
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen tcp:IPv4:PORT` or `tcp:[IPv6]:PORT` enables FIPS/TCP listening (framed JSON, not HTTP).
|
||||
- `nsigner --listen http:HOST:PORT` enables HTTP listening for curl-friendly access. CORS headers included for browser access. Defaults to localhost; pass `http:0.0.0.0:PORT` to expose externally.
|
||||
- `nsigner bridge --to <socket-name>` is a stateless relay for Qubes qrexec: reads one framed request from stdin, forwards it to a persistent signer's abstract unix socket, and relays the response to stdout. Used as the `qubes.NsignerRpc` service entrypoint. See [`plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md`](plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md).
|
||||
- `--bridge-source-trusted` (unix listener only): marks the socket as a trusted bridge endpoint. Each connection sends a framed `{"qrexec_source":"<vm>"}` preamble before the request, and the caller identity is composed as `qubes:<vm>`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2 ESP32 MCU: TinyUSB composite (CDC + WebUSB)
|
||||
### 5.4 ESP32 MCU: TinyUSB composite (CDC + WebUSB)
|
||||
|
||||
On Feather S3 TFT, MCU targets run the same core signer modules behind a TinyUSB composite transport:
|
||||
On Feather S3 TFT, MCU targets run the same core signer modules behind a TinyUSB composite transport: CDC-ACM framed JSON-RPC for serial tooling (`/dev/ttyACM*`) and Vendor/WebUSB framed JSON-RPC for browser tooling. Core signer logic stays the same; only transport/UI bindings change.
|
||||
|
||||
- CDC-ACM framed JSON-RPC for serial tooling (`/dev/ttyACM*`)
|
||||
- Vendor/WebUSB framed JSON-RPC for browser tooling
|
||||
|
||||
Core signer logic stays the same; only transport/UI bindings change.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.3 NIP-46 relay flow (both platforms)
|
||||
|
||||
NIP-46 request/response flow can be bridged on both desktop and MCU transports. The JSON-RPC signer contract remains consistent while the outer carrier differs.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.4 Caller verification
|
||||
### 5.5 Caller verification
|
||||
|
||||
Every transport must provide concrete caller identity before policy evaluation.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -273,153 +592,131 @@ Every transport must provide concrete caller identity before policy evaluation.
|
||||
|
||||
Identity verification and interactive approval are separate layers. Passing identity checks does not bypass prompt requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Platform targets
|
||||
## 6. Platform targets
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1 Linux desktop (primary)
|
||||
### 6.1 Linux desktop (primary)
|
||||
|
||||
Primary deployment is a local, foreground terminal program with abstract namespace socket transport.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.2 ESP32 / MCU
|
||||
### 6.2 ESP32 / MCU
|
||||
|
||||
MCU target reuses mnemonic/role/selector/enforcement/dispatcher core and swaps transport/UI for constrained hardware. The Feather path currently uses TinyUSB composite USB (CDC + WebUSB) plus TFT/buttons for attended approvals.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.3 Qubes OS qube
|
||||
### 6.3 Qubes OS qube
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes deployment runs `n_signer` in a dedicated signer qube (e.g. `nostr_signer`) as a foreground process under explicit user session control. The mnemonic lives only in mlock'd RAM in that qube — a compromised agent in a caller qube cannot read it (hypervisor-enforced memory isolation).
|
||||
|
||||
Two transport paths are supported:
|
||||
Three transport paths are supported:
|
||||
|
||||
**FIPS/TCP** — the signer listens on `tcp:[::]:8080` and FIPS carries traffic between qubes as an IPv6 mesh substrate. See [`documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md`](documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md).
|
||||
**FIPS/TCP** — the signer listens on `tcp:[::]:11111` and FIPS carries traffic between qubes as an IPv6 mesh substrate. See [`documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md`](documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md).
|
||||
|
||||
**Qubes qrexec bridge** (recommended for no-network deployments) — a persistent signer listens on an abstract unix socket, and a stateless `nsigner bridge` relay (the `qubes.NsignerRpc` qrexec service) forwards one request per qrexec invocation. No network, no FIPS — pure intra-host IPC. Caller identity is `qubes:<source-vm>` (from `QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN`), relayed via a trusted preamble. See [`plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md`](plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md) for the full design.
|
||||
**HTTP** — the signer listens on `http:127.0.0.1:11111` for curl-friendly access within the same qube. No auth envelopes required (relies on localhost binding + policy/approval prompts).
|
||||
|
||||
**Qubes qrexec bridge** (recommended for no-network deployments) — a persistent signer listens on an abstract unix socket, and a stateless `nsigner bridge` relay (the `qubes.NsignerRpc` qrexec service) forwards one request per qrexec invocation. No network, no FIPS — pure intra-host IPC. Caller identity is `qubes:<source-vm>`. See [`plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md`](plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md) for the full design.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Qrexec bridge setup
|
||||
|
||||
**In the signer qube** (`nostr_signer`):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Install nsigner and the qrexec service
|
||||
bash setup_signer_qube.sh # from packaging/qubes/
|
||||
|
||||
# Start the persistent signer (mnemonic entered at terminal, in mlock'd RAM)
|
||||
~/.local/bin/nsigner --listen unix --socket-name nsigner --bridge-source-trusted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**In dom0**:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Install policy and tag the signer qube
|
||||
bash setup_dom0.sh nostr_signer # from packaging/qubes/
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The dom0 policy allows trusted caller qubes without a popup (memory isolation is the real security boundary) and asks for confirmation from any other qube. The signer's own approval prompt at the `nostr_signer` terminal is the operation-level gate.
|
||||
|
||||
**From a caller qube**:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# JavaScript example (uses qrexec-client-vm, no auth envelope needed)
|
||||
node examples/n_signer_qube_example_qrexec.js nostr_signer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Setup scripts and policy are in [`packaging/qubes/`](packaging/qubes/). See also [`documents/QUBES_OS.md`](documents/QUBES_OS.md) and [`documents/qubes_client_examples.md`](documents/qubes_client_examples.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Usage
|
||||
## 7. Usage
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.1 Run the program
|
||||
### 7.1 Run the program
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Program starts in attached foreground mode and prompts for mnemonic. After mnemonic acceptance, the TUI banner shows the randomly assigned signer name and its abstract socket address.
|
||||
Program starts in attached foreground mode and prompts for mnemonic. After mnemonic acceptance, the running status display shows the randomly assigned signer name and its abstract socket address.
|
||||
|
||||
To force a specific socket name (e.g. for scripted clients):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --name my_test_signer
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes/qrexec service mode (single framed request over stdin/stdout):
|
||||
|
||||
Other transport modes:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --listen qrexec
|
||||
nsigner --listen qrexec # Qubes qrexec (single framed request over stdin/stdout)
|
||||
nsigner --listen stdio # Generic stdio (single framed request over stdin/stdout)
|
||||
nsigner --listen tcp:[::]:11111 # FIPS/TCP (framed JSON, no TUI)
|
||||
nsigner --listen http:127.0.0.1:11111 # HTTP (curl-friendly, no TUI)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Generic stdio transport mode (single framed request over stdin/stdout):
|
||||
|
||||
With OTP pad bound:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --listen stdio
|
||||
nsigner --listen http:127.0.0.1:11111 --otp-pad-dir /media/user/Music/pads --otp-pad 333e9902db839d9d --allow-all
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TCP transport mode (no TUI; serves requests until terminated):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --listen tcp:[::]:8080
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Qrexec bridge mode (stateless relay to a persistent signer's unix socket; used as the `qubes.NsignerRpc` service):
|
||||
|
||||
Qrexec bridge mode (stateless relay to a persistent signer's unix socket):
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner bridge --to nsigner
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Persistent signer for qrexec bridge (unix listener with trusted source-qube preamble):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --listen unix --socket-name nsigner --bridge-source-trusted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.2 Send a request (client mode)
|
||||
### 7.2 Send a request (client mode)
|
||||
|
||||
From another terminal, target the signer by its socket name:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner --socket-name nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"1","method":"get_public_key","params":[]}'
|
||||
nsigner --socket-name nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"1","method":"nostr_get_public_key","params":[]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If only one signer is running you can omit the override and the client will use the default discovery rule.
|
||||
|
||||
Example signing request:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner -n nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"2","method":"sign_event","params":["<event_json>",{"role":"main"}]}'
|
||||
nsigner -n nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"2","method":"nostr_sign_event","params":["<event_json>",{"role":"main"}]}'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.3 List running signers
|
||||
### 7.3 List running signers
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
nsigner list
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Prints the abstract socket names of any currently running `nsigner` instances, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
@nsigner_hairy_dog
|
||||
@nsigner_brave_canyon
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.4 Example session
|
||||
### 7.4 Example session
|
||||
|
||||
Terminal A:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
$ nsigner
|
||||
[unlock] enter mnemonic:
|
||||
[ok] session unlocked
|
||||
signer name : hairy dog
|
||||
socket : @nsigner_hairy_dog
|
||||
[listen] unix-abstract:@nsigner_hairy_dog
|
||||
[prompt] caller=uid:1000 method=sign_event role=main -> allow? (y/n)
|
||||
System is ready and waiting for connections on @nsigner_hairy_dog.
|
||||
[prompt] caller=uid:1000 method=nostr_sign_event role=main -> allow? (y/n)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Terminal B:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
$ nsigner --socket-name nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"2","method":"sign_event","params":["<event_json>",{"role":"main"}]}'
|
||||
$ nsigner --socket-name nsigner_hairy_dog client '{"id":"2","method":"nostr_sign_event","params":["<event_json>",{"role":"main"}]}'
|
||||
{"id":"2","result":"<signed_event_json>"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Build and versioning
|
||||
## 8. Build and versioning
|
||||
|
||||
Build outputs a single executable artifact.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -431,48 +728,13 @@ Build outputs a single executable artifact.
|
||||
- [`src/main.c`](src/main.c): version macros (`NSIGNER_VERSION*`)
|
||||
|
||||
Local dev build:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
make dev
|
||||
./build/nsigner --version
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Static build:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
./build_static.sh
|
||||
./build/nsigner_static_x86_64 --version
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Implemented adjuncts and future work
|
||||
|
||||
### Implemented PoC
|
||||
|
||||
- **MCU / USB signer (Feather ESP32-S3 Reverse TFT).** Working PoC in [`firmware/feather_s3_tft`](firmware/feather_s3_tft). Single TinyUSB composite USB device exposes both CDC-ACM and WebUSB Vendor interfaces. Same dispatcher serves both transports with auth envelope verification, on-device TFT prompts, and physical button approval. See [`firmware/README.md`](firmware/README.md) and [`plans/feather_tinyusb_composite.md`](plans/feather_tinyusb_composite.md).
|
||||
|
||||
### Future work (deferred)
|
||||
|
||||
These items are designed and worth doing, but are not in the current implementation scope. They are listed here so they are not lost.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`--listen http:[addr]:port` mode.** Today the TCP listener speaks 4-byte big-endian length-prefixed framed JSON-RPC, which is correct for low-overhead local IPC but is not directly reachable from web browsers (`fetch`, `XMLHttpRequest`, `curl`). A small additional listener that wraps the same dispatcher in minimal HTTP/1.1 (`POST /rpc`, `Content-Type: application/json`, `Content-Length`-framed body, JSON response) would let standard HTTP clients talk to `nsigner` without any custom framing code. The existing auth envelope (`kind:27235`) and JSON-RPC contract are unchanged; only the outer framing differs. CORS allow on the response would let browser extensions and (with TLS) HTTPS pages reach a remote `nsigner` over FIPS or any other carrier. See the discussion in [`documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md`](documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md) section 9 ("Next hardening steps").
|
||||
- **NIP-46 bunker / relay transport.** Tracked in [`plans/nip46_bunker_mode.md`](plans/nip46_bunker_mode.md).
|
||||
- **Browser extension.** Tracked in [`plans/nsigner_browser_extension.md`](plans/nsigner_browser_extension.md). NIP-07 surface forwarding to a running `nsigner` instance.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Document map
|
||||
|
||||
- [`README.md`](README.md): authoritative behavior specification for the foreground single-program model
|
||||
- [`documents/CLIENT_IMPLEMENTATION.md`](documents/CLIENT_IMPLEMENTATION.md): client integration contract and framing behavior
|
||||
- [`documents/QUBES_OS.md`](documents/QUBES_OS.md): Qubes OS deployment/integration checklist for dedicated signer qubes
|
||||
- [`documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md`](documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md): Tier-1 FIPS deployment runbook using loopback TCP listener
|
||||
- [`plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md`](plans/qrexec_persistent_bridge.md): design for the qrexec → unix-socket bridge transport (persistent signer, no mnemonic on disk)
|
||||
- [`packaging/qubes/`](packaging/qubes/): qrexec service script, dom0 policy, and setup scripts for Qubes deployment
|
||||
- [`examples/n_signer_qube_example_qrexec.js`](examples/n_signer_qube_example_qrexec.js): JavaScript caller example using qrexec (no network, no auth envelope)
|
||||
- [`examples/n_signer_qube_example_fips.js`](examples/n_signer_qube_example_fips.js): JavaScript caller example using FIPS/TCP with auth envelope
|
||||
- [`examples/get_pubkey_tcp.c`](examples/get_pubkey_tcp.c): C caller example using TCP transport with auth envelope
|
||||
- [`plans/nsigner.md`](plans/nsigner.md): implementation plan and sequencing
|
||||
- [`plans/seed_phrase_uses.md`](plans/seed_phrase_uses.md): seed phrase domain/use catalog and caveats
|
||||
- [`firmware/feather_s3_tft`](firmware/feather_s3_tft): Feather ESP32-S3 Reverse TFT firmware (TinyUSB composite CDC + WebUSB signer PoC)
|
||||
- [`plans/feather_tinyusb_composite.md`](plans/feather_tinyusb_composite.md): firmware Phase 7b plan and outcome (TinyUSB composite USB transport)
|
||||
- [`plans/nsigner_browser_extension.md`](plans/nsigner_browser_extension.md): browser extension exposing NIP-07 over `nsigner`
|
||||
- [`plans/nip46_bunker_mode.md`](plans/nip46_bunker_mode.md): deferred NIP-46 relay-mode signer transport
|
||||
- [`firmware/README.md`](firmware/README.md): firmware-side notes for MCU transport/UI integration
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
# n_signer API
|
||||
|
||||
The complete, authoritative API reference is now in [`README.md`](README.md) §4 (API).
|
||||
|
||||
It covers:
|
||||
|
||||
- **§4.1 Request format** — JSON-RPC 2.0-style request shape.
|
||||
- **§4.2 Response format** — success/error shapes and the full error-code table.
|
||||
- **§4.3 Verbs** — the verb table (positional params + options), the `scheme` option for secp256k1, and the enforcement matrix.
|
||||
- **§4.4 Algorithms** — the algorithm table (secp256k1, ed25519, x25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s, ml-kem-768, otp), derivation paths, key sizes, and the OTP one-time-pad model.
|
||||
- **§4.5 Examples** — worked request/response examples for every verb.
|
||||
- **§4.6 Role-based selectors** — `nostr_index` / `role` / `role_path` for the `nostr_*` verbs.
|
||||
- **§4.7 Pre-approval** — `--preapprove` syntax for algorithm-based and Nostr verbs.
|
||||
|
||||
For the security model, transports, and operational behavior, see [`README.md`](README.md) §1–§3 and §5–§8. For the migration plan from the legacy verb names, see [`plans/legacy_verb_aliases.md`](plans/legacy_verb_aliases.md).
|
||||
+71
-2
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ for the full integration contract.
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_t` (stack) | `nsigner_client_t*` (heap) or `nostr_signer_t*` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_init` / `connect_unix` / `close` | `nsigner_transport_open_unix` + `nsigner_client_new` / `nsigner_client_free` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_get_public_key` | `nostr_signer_get_public_key` or `nsigner_client_call(..., "get_public_key", ...)` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_sign_event` | `nostr_signer_sign_event` or `nsigner_client_call(..., "sign_event", ...)` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_get_public_key` | `nostr_signer_get_public_key` or `nsigner_client_call(..., "nostr_get_public_key", ...)` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_sign_event` | `nostr_signer_sign_event` or `nsigner_client_call(..., "nostr_sign_event", ...)` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_set_auth` | `nsigner_client_set_auth` or `nostr_signer_nsigner_set_auth` |
|
||||
| `nsigner_client_request` / `request_raw` | `nsigner_client_call` (returns parsed cJSON result) |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +36,75 @@ for the full integration contract.
|
||||
The `nsigner ... client '<json>'` subcommand in [`src/main.c`](../src/main.c) is
|
||||
unaffected — it has its own raw framing pass-through and never used this directory.
|
||||
|
||||
## Multi-Algorithm and Post-Quantum Verbs
|
||||
|
||||
n_signer supports six algorithms: `secp256k1` (Nostr), `ed25519` (SSH),
|
||||
`x25519` (age/ECDH), `ml-dsa-65` (PQ signatures, FIPS 204), `slh-dsa-128s`
|
||||
(PQ hash-based signatures, FIPS 205), and `ml-kem-768` (PQ KEM, FIPS 203).
|
||||
|
||||
The API has two verb families (see [`README.md`](../README.md#4-api) §4 for the full spec):
|
||||
|
||||
**Algorithm-based verbs** — the caller specifies `algorithm` and `index` in the
|
||||
options object. No role table entry is needed.
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | Algorithms | Description |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | all key-deriving algorithms | Returns the derived public key (structured) |
|
||||
| `sign` | secp256k1, ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s | Sign arbitrary bytes (hex) |
|
||||
| `verify` | secp256k1, ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s | Verify a signature |
|
||||
| `encapsulate` | ml-kem-768 | KEM encapsulation with peer's public key |
|
||||
| `decapsulate` | ml-kem-768 | KEM decapsulation with derived private key |
|
||||
| `derive_shared_secret` | x25519 | ECDH key agreement |
|
||||
| `derive` | secp256k1 | `HMAC-SHA256(privkey, data)` — key-derived MAC for opaque identifiers (`index` required) |
|
||||
| `encrypt` / `decrypt` | otp | One-time pad encrypt/decrypt (`algorithm:"otp"`) |
|
||||
|
||||
**Nostr protocol verbs** — select a secp256k1 NIP-06 key via `nostr_index` (or
|
||||
`role`/`role_path`). These are role-based.
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | Description |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `nostr_get_public_key` | Returns the role's secp256k1 public key |
|
||||
| `nostr_sign_event` | Sign a Nostr event |
|
||||
| `nostr_mine_event` | NIP-13 PoW mining + sign |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip44_encrypt` / `nostr_nip44_decrypt` | NIP-44 encrypt/decrypt |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip04_encrypt` / `nostr_nip04_decrypt` | NIP-04 encrypt/decrypt |
|
||||
|
||||
Example: `nsigner_client_call(client, "sign", "[\"68656c6c6f\",{\"algorithm\":\"ed25519\",\"index\":0}]", &result)`
|
||||
|
||||
For secp256k1, the optional `scheme` parameter selects `"schnorr"` (default) or `"ecdsa"`.
|
||||
|
||||
### `get_public_key` response format
|
||||
|
||||
The algorithm-based `get_public_key` always returns a structured JSON string:
|
||||
`{"algorithm":"<alg>","public_key":"<hex>","key_id":"<16 hex>"}`.
|
||||
|
||||
The role-based `nostr_get_public_key` returns a plain 64-hex-char secp256k1
|
||||
public key by default, or the structured form with `{"format":"structured"}`.
|
||||
|
||||
Clients should parse the `result` string with `cJSON_Parse` to extract the
|
||||
`algorithm`, `public_key`, and `key_id` fields when the result is a JSON object.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key sizes
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Pub key | Priv key | Signature | Ciphertext | Shared secret |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 | 32 B | 32 B | 64 B | — | — |
|
||||
| ed25519 | 32 B | 32 B | 64 B | — | — |
|
||||
| x25519 | 32 B | 32 B | — | — | 32 B |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | 1952 B | 4032 B | 3309 B | — | — |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | 32 B | 64 B | 7856 B | — | — |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | 1184 B | 2400 B | — | 1088 B | 32 B |
|
||||
|
||||
### Example clients
|
||||
|
||||
- [`examples/pq_sign_example.c`](../examples/pq_sign_example.c) — ML-DSA-65 sign
|
||||
- [`examples/pq_kem_example.c`](../examples/pq_kem_example.c) — ML-KEM-768 encaps/decaps
|
||||
- [`examples/ssh_sign_example.c`](../examples/ssh_sign_example.c) — ed25519 SSH sign
|
||||
|
||||
See [`documents/CLIENT_IMPLEMENTATION.md`](../documents/CLIENT_IMPLEMENTATION.md)
|
||||
section 11 for the full multi-algorithm specification, derivation paths, and
|
||||
example request/response transcripts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why
|
||||
|
||||
Per [`plans/nsigner_integration_plan.md`](../resources/nostr_core_lib/plans/nsigner_integration_plan.md)
|
||||
|
||||
+11
-7
@@ -3,8 +3,12 @@
|
||||
* via Qubes qrexec and performing all three core operations:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. get_public_key — retrieve a Nostr public key by nostr_index
|
||||
* 2. sign_event — sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note)
|
||||
* 3. nip44_encrypt — encrypt a message to a peer (and decrypt it back)
|
||||
* 2. nostr_sign_event — sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note)
|
||||
* 3. nostr_nip44_encrypt — encrypt a message to a peer (and decrypt it back)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note: nostr_mine_event (NIP-13 PoW) is also available via the JSON-RPC interface.
|
||||
* See demo_javascript.js and demo_python.py for nostr_mine_event usage examples.
|
||||
* The high-level nostr_signer API does not yet wrap nostr_mine_event.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This uses the high-level nostr_signer API from nostr_core_lib:
|
||||
* - nostr_signer_nsigner_qrexec() — qrexec transport (no network)
|
||||
@@ -128,7 +132,7 @@ static int demo_sign_event(nostr_signer_t *signer, const char *pubkey_hex) {
|
||||
char *signed_json = NULL;
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("\n=== Demo 2: sign_event (kind 1 text note) ===\n");
|
||||
printf("\n=== Demo 2: nostr_sign_event (kind 1 text note) ===\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* Build an unsigned Nostr event (kind 1 text note) */
|
||||
unsigned_event = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
@@ -159,7 +163,7 @@ static int demo_sign_event(nostr_signer_t *signer, const char *pubkey_hex) {
|
||||
/* Sign it */
|
||||
rc = nostr_signer_sign_event(signer, unsigned_event, &signed_event);
|
||||
if (rc != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
print_error("sign_event", rc);
|
||||
print_error("nostr_nostr_sign_event", rc);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(unsigned_event);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -200,14 +204,14 @@ static int demo_nip44(nostr_signer_t *signer, const char *pubkey_hex) {
|
||||
char *decrypted = NULL;
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("\n=== Demo 3: nip44_encrypt / nip44_decrypt ===\n");
|
||||
printf("\n=== Demo 3: nostr_nip44_encrypt / nostr_nip44_decrypt ===\n");
|
||||
printf(" plaintext: \"%s\"\n", plaintext);
|
||||
printf(" peer pubkey: %s (self)\n", pubkey_hex);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encrypt */
|
||||
rc = nostr_signer_nip44_encrypt(signer, pubkey_hex, plaintext, &ciphertext);
|
||||
if (rc != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
print_error("nip44_encrypt", rc);
|
||||
print_error("nostr_nostr_nip44_encrypt", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -216,7 +220,7 @@ static int demo_nip44(nostr_signer_t *signer, const char *pubkey_hex) {
|
||||
/* Decrypt (using our own pubkey as the sender) */
|
||||
rc = nostr_signer_nip44_decrypt(signer, pubkey_hex, ciphertext, &decrypted);
|
||||
if (rc != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
print_error("nip44_decrypt", rc);
|
||||
print_error("nostr_nostr_nip44_decrypt", rc);
|
||||
free(ciphertext);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* demo_javascript.js — comprehensive JavaScript demo for connecting to a
|
||||
* running n_signer via Qubes qrexec and performing all three core operations:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. get_public_key — retrieve a Nostr public key by nostr_index
|
||||
* 2. nostr_sign_event — sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note)
|
||||
* 3. nostr_nip44_encrypt — encrypt a message to a peer (and decrypt it back)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Uses qrexec-client-vm (Qubes OS inter-qube IPC). No auth envelope needed —
|
||||
* identity comes from QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN on the server side.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prerequisites:
|
||||
* - n_signer running in the target qube with --bridge-source-trusted
|
||||
* - qubes.NsignerRpc service installed in the target qube
|
||||
* - dom0 qrexec policy allowing this qube to call the service
|
||||
* - nostr-tools and @noble/secp256k1 npm packages installed
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Install dependencies (from n_signer repo root):
|
||||
* npm install nostr-tools @noble/secp256k1
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage:
|
||||
* node client/demo_javascript.js <target_qube> [nostr_index]
|
||||
* node client/demo_javascript.js nostr_signer 1
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If no nostr_index is given, defaults to 0.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const { spawn } = require("child_process");
|
||||
const crypto = require("crypto");
|
||||
const secp = require("@noble/secp256k1");
|
||||
const { nip19 } = require("nostr-tools");
|
||||
|
||||
// @noble/secp256k1 v3 requires sync sha256/hmacSha256
|
||||
secp.hashes.sha256 = (msg) => new Uint8Array(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(msg).digest());
|
||||
secp.hashes.hmacSha256 = (key, msg) =>
|
||||
new Uint8Array(crypto.createHmac("sha256", key).update(msg).digest());
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Call n_signer via qrexec. Sends one framed JSON-RPC request, receives one
|
||||
* framed response. Each call spawns a fresh qrexec-client-vm process.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Framing: 4-byte big-endian length prefix + JSON payload.
|
||||
* No auth envelope needed for qrexec (identity from QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function callNsigner(targetQube, request) {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(request), "utf8");
|
||||
const header = Buffer.alloc(4);
|
||||
header.writeUInt32BE(payload.length, 0);
|
||||
const framed = Buffer.concat([header, payload]);
|
||||
|
||||
const proc = spawn("qrexec-client-vm", [targetQube, "qubes.NsignerRpc"], {
|
||||
stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const stdoutChunks = [];
|
||||
const stderrChunks = [];
|
||||
|
||||
proc.stdout.on("data", (chunk) => stdoutChunks.push(chunk));
|
||||
proc.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => stderrChunks.push(chunk));
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on("error", (err) => {
|
||||
reject(new Error(`failed to spawn qrexec-client-vm: ${err.message}`));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
proc.on("close", (code) => {
|
||||
if (code !== 0) {
|
||||
const stderr = Buffer.concat(stderrChunks).toString("utf8");
|
||||
reject(new Error(`qrexec-client-vm exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const buf = Buffer.concat(stdoutChunks);
|
||||
if (buf.length < 4) {
|
||||
reject(new Error("short response (missing frame header)"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const len = buf.readUInt32BE(0);
|
||||
const body = buf.subarray(4, 4 + len);
|
||||
if (body.length !== len) {
|
||||
reject(new Error(`short response payload: expected ${len}, got ${body.length}`));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
resolve(JSON.parse(body.toString("utf8")));
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
reject(new Error(`failed to parse response: ${e.message}`));
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
proc.stdin.write(framed);
|
||||
proc.stdin.end();
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Demo 1: Get a public key by nostr_index.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function demoGetPublicKey(targetQube, nostrIndex) {
|
||||
console.log(`\n=== Demo 1: get_public_key (nostr_index=${nostrIndex}) ===`);
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await callNsigner(targetQube, {
|
||||
id: "1",
|
||||
method: "get_public_key",
|
||||
params: [{ nostr_index: nostrIndex }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (response.error) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`get_public_key failed: ${JSON.stringify(response.error)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const pubkeyHex = response.result;
|
||||
const npub = nip19.npubEncode(pubkeyHex);
|
||||
console.log(` pubkey hex: ${pubkeyHex}`);
|
||||
console.log(` npub: ${npub}`);
|
||||
return pubkeyHex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Demo 2: Sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function demoSignEvent(targetQube, nostrIndex, pubkeyHex) {
|
||||
console.log("\n=== Demo 2: nostr_sign_event (kind 1 text note) ===");
|
||||
|
||||
const unsignedEvent = {
|
||||
kind: 1,
|
||||
content: "Hello from n_signer JavaScript demo!",
|
||||
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
|
||||
tags: [],
|
||||
pubkey: pubkeyHex,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(" Unsigned event:");
|
||||
console.log(` ${JSON.stringify(unsignedEvent)}`);
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await callNsigner(targetQube, {
|
||||
id: "2",
|
||||
method: "nostr_nostr_sign_event",
|
||||
params: [JSON.stringify(unsignedEvent), { nostr_index: nostrIndex }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (response.error) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`nostr_sign_event failed: ${JSON.stringify(response.error)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const signedEvent = JSON.parse(response.result);
|
||||
console.log(" Signed event:");
|
||||
console.log(` ${JSON.stringify(signedEvent)}`);
|
||||
console.log(` event id: ${signedEvent.id}`);
|
||||
console.log(` signature: ${signedEvent.sig}`);
|
||||
return signedEvent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Demo 3: NIP-44 encrypt and decrypt.
|
||||
* Encrypts a message to ourselves (using our own pubkey as the peer),
|
||||
* then decrypts it to verify round-trip.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function demoNip44(targetQube, nostrIndex, pubkeyHex) {
|
||||
const plaintext = "Secret message from n_signer JavaScript demo!";
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("\n=== Demo 3: nostr_nip44_encrypt / nostr_nip44_decrypt ===");
|
||||
console.log(` plaintext: "${plaintext}"`);
|
||||
console.log(` peer pubkey: ${pubkeyHex} (self)`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Encrypt
|
||||
const encResponse = await callNsigner(targetQube, {
|
||||
id: "3",
|
||||
method: "nostr_nostr_nip44_encrypt",
|
||||
params: [pubkeyHex, plaintext, { nostr_index: nostrIndex }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (encResponse.error) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`nostr_nip44_encrypt failed: ${JSON.stringify(encResponse.error)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const ciphertext = encResponse.result;
|
||||
console.log(` ciphertext: ${ciphertext}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt
|
||||
const decResponse = await callNsigner(targetQube, {
|
||||
id: "4",
|
||||
method: "nostr_nostr_nip44_decrypt",
|
||||
params: [pubkeyHex, ciphertext, { nostr_index: nostrIndex }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (decResponse.error) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`nostr_nip44_decrypt failed: ${JSON.stringify(decResponse.error)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const decrypted = decResponse.result;
|
||||
console.log(` decrypted: "${decrypted}"`);
|
||||
|
||||
if (plaintext === decrypted) {
|
||||
console.log(" ✓ Round-trip verified: plaintext matches decrypted");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
throw new Error("Round-trip FAILED: plaintext does not match decrypted");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function demoMineEvent(targetQube, nostrIndex) {
|
||||
console.log("\n--- Demo 4: nostr_mine_event (NIP-13 Proof-of-Work) ---");
|
||||
|
||||
const event = {
|
||||
kind: 1,
|
||||
content: "Hello Nostr with PoW!",
|
||||
tags: [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(" Mining with difficulty=4, threads=4, timeout_sec=30...");
|
||||
const response = await callNsigner(targetQube, {
|
||||
id: "5",
|
||||
method: "nostr_nostr_mine_event",
|
||||
params: [JSON.stringify(event), {
|
||||
difficulty: 4,
|
||||
threads: 4,
|
||||
timeout_sec: 30,
|
||||
nostr_index: nostrIndex,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (response.error) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`nostr_mine_event failed: ${JSON.stringify(response.error)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const result = JSON.parse(response.result);
|
||||
console.log(` achieved_difficulty: ${result.achieved_difficulty}`);
|
||||
console.log(` target_reached: ${result.target_reached}`);
|
||||
console.log(` elapsed_sec: ${result.elapsed_sec}`);
|
||||
console.log(` attempts: ${result.attempts}`);
|
||||
|
||||
const minedEvent = JSON.parse(result.event);
|
||||
console.log(` event id: ${minedEvent.id}`);
|
||||
console.log(` nonce tag: ${JSON.stringify(minedEvent.tags[0])}`);
|
||||
|
||||
if (result.target_reached) {
|
||||
console.log(" ✓ Target difficulty reached!");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
console.log(` (Target not reached, best effort: ${result.achieved_difficulty} bits)`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
const targetQube = process.argv[2] || "nostr_signer";
|
||||
const nostrIndex = parseInt(process.argv[3] || "0", 10);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("=== n_signer JavaScript Demo ===");
|
||||
console.log(`Target qube: ${targetQube}`);
|
||||
console.log(`Service: qubes.NsignerRpc`);
|
||||
console.log(`nostr_index: ${nostrIndex}`);
|
||||
console.log("\nConnecting to n_signer via qrexec...");
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const pubkeyHex = await demoGetPublicKey(targetQube, nostrIndex);
|
||||
await demoSignEvent(targetQube, nostrIndex, pubkeyHex);
|
||||
await demoNip44(targetQube, nostrIndex, pubkeyHex);
|
||||
await demoMineEvent(targetQube, nostrIndex);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log("\n=== Summary ===");
|
||||
console.log("All demos completed successfully.");
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
console.error("\n=== Summary ===");
|
||||
console.error(`Demo failed: ${e.message}`);
|
||||
process.exit(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main();
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""
|
||||
demo_python.py — comprehensive Python demo for connecting to a running n_signer
|
||||
via Qubes qrexec and performing all three core operations:
|
||||
|
||||
1. get_public_key — retrieve a Nostr public key by nostr_index
|
||||
2. nostr_sign_event — sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note)
|
||||
3. nostr_nip44_encrypt — encrypt a message to a peer (and decrypt it back)
|
||||
|
||||
Uses qrexec-client-vm (Qubes OS inter-qube IPC). No auth envelope needed —
|
||||
identity comes from QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN on the server side.
|
||||
|
||||
Prerequisites:
|
||||
- n_signer running in the target qube with --bridge-source-trusted
|
||||
- qubes.NsignerRpc service installed in the target qube
|
||||
- dom0 qrexec policy allowing this qube to call the service
|
||||
- Python 3 with no external dependencies (uses only stdlib)
|
||||
|
||||
Usage:
|
||||
python3 client/demo_python.py <target_qube> [nostr_index]
|
||||
python3 client/demo_python.py nostr_signer 1
|
||||
|
||||
If no nostr_index is given, defaults to 0.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import time
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Bech32 encoder (NIP-19 npub conversion, no external dependencies) ---
|
||||
|
||||
CHARSET = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bech32_polymod(values):
|
||||
generator = [0x3B6A57B2, 0x26508E6D, 0x1EA119FA, 0x3D4233DD, 0x2A1462B3]
|
||||
chk = 1
|
||||
for v in values:
|
||||
b = chk >> 25
|
||||
chk = (chk & 0x1FFFFFF) << 5 ^ v
|
||||
for i in range(5):
|
||||
chk ^= generator[i] if ((b >> i) & 1) else 0
|
||||
return chk
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bech32_hrp_expand(hrp):
|
||||
return [ord(x) >> 5 for x in hrp] + [0] + [ord(x) & 31 for x in hrp]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bech32_create_checksum(hrp, data):
|
||||
values = bech32_hrp_expand(hrp) + data
|
||||
polymod = bech32_polymod(values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]) ^ 1
|
||||
return [(polymod >> 5 * (5 - i)) & 31 for i in range(6)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bech32_encode(hrp, data):
|
||||
combined = data + bech32_create_checksum(hrp, data)
|
||||
return hrp + "1" + "".join([CHARSET[d] for d in combined])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def convertbits(data, frombits, tobits, pad=True):
|
||||
acc = 0
|
||||
bits = 0
|
||||
ret = []
|
||||
maxv = (1 << tobits) - 1
|
||||
max_acc = (1 << (frombits + tobits - 1)) - 1
|
||||
for value in data:
|
||||
acc = ((acc << frombits) | value) & max_acc
|
||||
bits += frombits
|
||||
while bits >= tobits:
|
||||
bits -= tobits
|
||||
ret.append((acc >> bits) & maxv)
|
||||
if pad and bits:
|
||||
ret.append((acc << (tobits - bits)) & maxv)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def hex_to_npub(pubkey_hex):
|
||||
"""Convert a 32-byte hex pubkey to bech32 npub format (NIP-19)."""
|
||||
pubkey_bytes = bytes.fromhex(pubkey_hex)
|
||||
data = convertbits(pubkey_bytes, 8, 5)
|
||||
return bech32_encode("npub", data)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- n_signer qrexec client ---
|
||||
|
||||
def call_nsigner(target_qube, request):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Call n_signer via qrexec. Sends one framed JSON-RPC request, receives one
|
||||
framed response. Each call spawns a fresh qrexec-client-vm process.
|
||||
|
||||
Framing: 4-byte big-endian length prefix + JSON payload.
|
||||
No auth envelope needed for qrexec (identity from QREXEC_REMOTE_DOMAIN).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
payload = json.dumps(request, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
frame = struct.pack(">I", len(payload)) + payload
|
||||
|
||||
proc = subprocess.Popen(
|
||||
["qrexec-client-vm", target_qube, "qubes.NsignerRpc"],
|
||||
stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
out, err = proc.communicate(frame)
|
||||
|
||||
if proc.returncode != 0:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(
|
||||
f"qrexec-client-vm exited with code {proc.returncode}: "
|
||||
f"{err.decode('utf-8', 'replace').strip()}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(out) < 4:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("short response (missing frame header)")
|
||||
|
||||
length = struct.unpack(">I", out[:4])[0]
|
||||
body = out[4 : 4 + length]
|
||||
if len(body) != length:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(
|
||||
f"short response payload: expected {length}, got {len(body)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return json.loads(body.decode("utf-8"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Demos ---
|
||||
|
||||
def demo_get_public_key(target_qube, nostr_index):
|
||||
"""Demo 1: Get a public key by nostr_index."""
|
||||
print(f"\n=== Demo 1: get_public_key (nostr_index={nostr_index}) ===")
|
||||
|
||||
response = call_nsigner(
|
||||
target_qube,
|
||||
{"id": "1", "method": "get_public_key", "params": [{"nostr_index": nostr_index}]},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "error" in response:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"get_public_key failed: {json.dumps(response['error'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
pubkey_hex = response["result"]
|
||||
npub = hex_to_npub(pubkey_hex)
|
||||
print(f" pubkey hex: {pubkey_hex}")
|
||||
print(f" npub: {npub}")
|
||||
return pubkey_hex
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def demo_sign_event(target_qube, nostr_index, pubkey_hex):
|
||||
"""Demo 2: Sign a Nostr event (kind 1 text note)."""
|
||||
print("\n=== Demo 2: nostr_sign_event (kind 1 text note) ===")
|
||||
|
||||
unsigned_event = {
|
||||
"kind": 1,
|
||||
"content": "Hello from n_signer Python demo!",
|
||||
"created_at": int(time.time()),
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"pubkey": pubkey_hex,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
print(" Unsigned event:")
|
||||
print(f" {json.dumps(unsigned_event, separators=(',', ':'))}")
|
||||
|
||||
response = call_nsigner(
|
||||
target_qube,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "2",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_nostr_sign_event",
|
||||
"params": [json.dumps(unsigned_event, separators=(",", ":")), {"nostr_index": nostr_index}],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "error" in response:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"nostr_sign_event failed: {json.dumps(response['error'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
signed_event = json.loads(response["result"])
|
||||
print(" Signed event:")
|
||||
print(f" {json.dumps(signed_event, separators=(',', ':'))}")
|
||||
print(f" event id: {signed_event['id']}")
|
||||
print(f" signature: {signed_event['sig']}")
|
||||
return signed_event
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def demo_nip44(target_qube, nostr_index, pubkey_hex):
|
||||
"""Demo 3: NIP-44 encrypt and decrypt."""
|
||||
plaintext = "Secret message from n_signer Python demo!"
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n=== Demo 3: nostr_nip44_encrypt / nostr_nip44_decrypt ===")
|
||||
print(f' plaintext: "{plaintext}"')
|
||||
print(f" peer pubkey: {pubkey_hex} (self)")
|
||||
|
||||
# Encrypt
|
||||
enc_response = call_nsigner(
|
||||
target_qube,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "3",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_nostr_nip44_encrypt",
|
||||
"params": [pubkey_hex, plaintext, {"nostr_index": nostr_index}],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "error" in enc_response:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"nostr_nip44_encrypt failed: {json.dumps(enc_response['error'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
ciphertext = enc_response["result"]
|
||||
print(f" ciphertext: {ciphertext}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Decrypt
|
||||
dec_response = call_nsigner(
|
||||
target_qube,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "4",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_nostr_nip44_decrypt",
|
||||
"params": [pubkey_hex, ciphertext, {"nostr_index": nostr_index}],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "error" in dec_response:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"nostr_nip44_decrypt failed: {json.dumps(dec_response['error'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
decrypted = dec_response["result"]
|
||||
print(f' decrypted: "{decrypted}"')
|
||||
|
||||
if plaintext == decrypted:
|
||||
print(" ✓ Round-trip verified: plaintext matches decrypted")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("Round-trip FAILED: plaintext does not match decrypted")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def demo_nostr_mine_event(target_qube, nostr_index):
|
||||
print("\n--- Demo 4: nostr_mine_event (NIP-13 Proof-of-Work) ---")
|
||||
|
||||
event = {"kind": 1, "content": "Hello Nostr with PoW!", "tags": []}
|
||||
|
||||
print(" Mining with difficulty=4, threads=4, timeout_sec=30...")
|
||||
response = call_nsigner(
|
||||
target_qube,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "5",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_nostr_mine_event",
|
||||
"params": [json.dumps(event), {
|
||||
"difficulty": 4,
|
||||
"threads": 4,
|
||||
"timeout_sec": 30,
|
||||
"nostr_index": nostr_index,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "error" in response:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"nostr_mine_event failed: {json.dumps(response['error'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
result = json.loads(response["result"])
|
||||
print(f" achieved_difficulty: {result['achieved_difficulty']}")
|
||||
print(f" target_reached: {result['target_reached']}")
|
||||
print(f" elapsed_sec: {result['elapsed_sec']}")
|
||||
print(f" attempts: {result['attempts']}")
|
||||
|
||||
mined_event = json.loads(result["event"])
|
||||
print(f" event id: {mined_event['id']}")
|
||||
print(f" nonce tag: {mined_event['tags'][0]}")
|
||||
|
||||
if result["target_reached"]:
|
||||
print(" ✓ Target difficulty reached!")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
print(f" (Target not reached, best effort: {result['achieved_difficulty']} bits)")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Main ---
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
target_qube = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "nostr_signer"
|
||||
nostr_index = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 0
|
||||
|
||||
print("=== n_signer Python Demo ===")
|
||||
print(f"Target qube: {target_qube}")
|
||||
print(f"Service: qubes.NsignerRpc")
|
||||
print(f"nostr_index: {nostr_index}")
|
||||
print("\nConnecting to n_signer via qrexec...")
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pubkey_hex = demo_get_public_key(target_qube, nostr_index)
|
||||
demo_sign_event(target_qube, nostr_index, pubkey_hex)
|
||||
demo_nip44(target_qube, nostr_index, pubkey_hex)
|
||||
demo_nostr_mine_event(target_qube, nostr_index)
|
||||
|
||||
print("\n=== Summary ===")
|
||||
print("All demos completed successfully.")
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print("\n=== Summary ===")
|
||||
print(f"Demo failed: {e}")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
main()
|
||||
@@ -127,6 +127,26 @@ Methods are NIP-46 style verbs.
|
||||
- `nip44_encrypt`
|
||||
- `nip44_decrypt`
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2b Algorithm-based verbs (new)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to the role-based verbs above, the signer supports algorithm-based verbs where the caller specifies `algorithm` and `index` directly:
|
||||
|
||||
- `sign` — sign arbitrary bytes (params: `[message_hex, {algorithm, index, scheme?}]`)
|
||||
- `verify` — verify a signature (params: `[message_hex, signature_hex, {algorithm, index, scheme?}]`)
|
||||
- `encapsulate` — KEM encapsulation (params: `[peer_pubkey_hex, {algorithm}]`)
|
||||
- `decapsulate` — KEM decapsulation (params: `[ciphertext_hex, {algorithm, index}]`)
|
||||
- `derive_shared_secret` — ECDH key agreement (params: `[peer_pubkey_hex, {algorithm, index}]`)
|
||||
- `derive` — `HMAC-SHA256(privkey, data)` key-derived MAC (params: `[data, {algorithm:"secp256k1", index}]`; `index` required). Returns `{algorithm, key_id, digest}` where `digest` is 64 hex chars. Use for deterministic opaque identifiers (e.g. NIP-33 `d` tags) keyed by the derived private key.
|
||||
- `get_public_key` with `algorithm` parameter — returns structured JSON
|
||||
|
||||
Algorithm names: `secp256k1`, `ed25519`, `ml-dsa-65`, `slh-dsa-128s`, `x25519`, `ml-kem-768`
|
||||
|
||||
For secp256k1 `sign`/`verify`, the optional `scheme` parameter selects `"schnorr"` (default, BIP-340) or `"ecdsa"`.
|
||||
|
||||
Old verb aliases (`sign_data`, `ssh_sign`, `verify_signature`, `kem_encapsulate`, `kem_decapsulate`) map to the new verbs when used with the `algorithm` parameter. Without `algorithm`, they fall through to the role-based path.
|
||||
|
||||
See [README.md §4c](../README.md) for full details.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Selector options
|
||||
|
||||
The last param may include selector options:
|
||||
@@ -484,7 +504,228 @@ Decrypt response:
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Compatibility notes
|
||||
## 11. Post-Quantum and Multi-Algorithm Support
|
||||
|
||||
n_signer supports six cryptographic algorithms, all derived deterministically
|
||||
from the same BIP-39 mnemonic via distinct derivation paths:
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Purpose | Curve string | Purpose string | Derivation path |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `secp256k1` | Nostr (sign_event, NIP-04/44) | `secp256k1` | `nostr` | `m/44'/1237'/<n>'/0/0` (NIP-06) |
|
||||
| `ed25519` | SSH signing, general signatures | `ed25519` | `ssh` | `m/44'/102001'/<n>'/0'/0'` (SLIP-0010) |
|
||||
| `x25519` | Key agreement (age, ECDH) | `x25519` | `age` | `m/44'/102002'/<n>'/0'/0'` (SLIP-0010) |
|
||||
| `ml-dsa-65` | Post-quantum signatures (FIPS 204) | `ml-dsa-65` | `pq-sig` | `m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0'/0'` → seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
| `slh-dsa-128s` | Post-quantum hash-based signatures (FIPS 205) | `slh-dsa-128s` | `pq-sig` | `m/44'/102004'/<n>'/0'/0'` → seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
| `ml-kem-768` | Post-quantum key encapsulation (FIPS 203) | `ml-kem-768` | `pq-kem` | `m/44'/102005'/<n>'/0'/0'` → seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
|
||||
The `102XXX` coin types are unregistered in SLIP-44 and reserved by n_signer
|
||||
for PQ/SSH/age algorithm families. All non-secp256k1 paths use SLIP-0010
|
||||
all-hardened derivation.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.1 Algorithm key sizes
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Pub key | Priv key | Signature | Ciphertext | Shared secret |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | 64 bytes | — | — |
|
||||
| ed25519 | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | 64 bytes | — | — |
|
||||
| x25519 | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | — | — | 32 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | 1952 bytes | 4032 bytes | 3309 bytes | — | — |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | 32 bytes | 64 bytes | 7856 bytes | — | — |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | 1184 bytes | 2400 bytes | — | 1088 bytes | 32 bytes |
|
||||
|
||||
PQ public keys and signatures are much larger than classical ones. Clients
|
||||
must allocate buffers accordingly (ML-DSA-65 pubkey hex = 3904 chars;
|
||||
SLH-DSA-128s signature hex = 15712 chars; ML-KEM-768 pubkey hex = 2368 chars).
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.2 New verbs
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | Purpose | Allowed (purpose, curve) | Description |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `sign_data` | pq-sig, ssh | (pq-sig, ml-dsa-65), (pq-sig, slh-dsa-128s), (ssh, ed25519) | Sign arbitrary bytes (not a Nostr event) |
|
||||
| `verify_signature` | pq-sig, ssh | same as `sign_data` | Verify a signature against the role's public key |
|
||||
| `ssh_sign` | ssh | (ssh, ed25519) | Sign an SSH authentication challenge (ed25519) |
|
||||
| `kem_encapsulate` | pq-kem | (pq-kem, ml-kem-768) | Encapsulate: generate ciphertext + shared secret from a peer's ML-KEM public key |
|
||||
| `kem_decapsulate` | pq-kem | (pq-kem, ml-kem-768) | Decapsulate: recover shared secret from ciphertext using the role's ML-KEM private key |
|
||||
|
||||
The existing Nostr verbs (`sign_event`, `nip44_*`, `nip04_*`, `mine_event`)
|
||||
remain restricted to `purpose=nostr + curve=secp256k1`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.3 Structured `get_public_key` response format
|
||||
|
||||
`get_public_key` is a universal verb — it works for all six algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
**For secp256k1 (backward compatibility):** the result is a plain hex string
|
||||
(the existing format). Existing Nostr clients are unaffected.
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "1", "result": "<64-char hex pubkey>" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**For secp256k1 with `format: "structured"` option:** new clients can request
|
||||
the structured format for consistency:
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "1",
|
||||
"method": "get_public_key",
|
||||
"params": [{ "role": "main", "format": "structured" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "1",
|
||||
"result": "{\"algorithm\":\"secp256k1\",\"public_key\":\"<hex>\",\"key_id\":\"<16 hex>\"}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**For all other algorithms (ed25519, x25519, ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s,
|
||||
ML-KEM-768):** the result is always a structured JSON object serialized as a
|
||||
string:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "1",
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"algorithm": "ml-dsa-65",
|
||||
"public_key": "<hex-encoded public key>",
|
||||
"key_id": "<first 16 hex chars of public key>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `key_id` is the first 16 hex characters of the public key — a short
|
||||
display identifier similar to an SSH key fingerprint. The `result` field is a
|
||||
JSON string (the object serialized), so clients must parse it twice: once for
|
||||
the JSON-RPC envelope, once for the result object.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.4 Example: `sign_data` (ML-DSA-65)
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "10",
|
||||
"method": "sign_data",
|
||||
"params": ["68656c6c6f", { "role": "pq_sig" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "10",
|
||||
"result": "{\"signature\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ml-dsa-65\"}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The first param is the message bytes as hex. The signature is hex-encoded
|
||||
(3309 bytes = 6618 hex chars for ML-DSA-65).
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.5 Example: `verify_signature` (ed25519)
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "11",
|
||||
"method": "verify_signature",
|
||||
"params": ["<msg_hex>", "<sig_hex>", { "role": "ssh_main" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "id": "11", "result": "{\"valid\":true}" }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The signature is verified against the role's derived public key.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.6 Example: `ssh_sign` (ed25519)
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "12",
|
||||
"method": "ssh_sign",
|
||||
"params": ["<session_id_hex>", { "role": "ssh_main" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "12",
|
||||
"result": "{\"signature\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ed25519\"}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The first param is the SSH session ID (or challenge) as hex. The signature is
|
||||
a raw ed25519 signature (64 bytes = 128 hex chars).
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.7 Example: `kem_encapsulate` (ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "13",
|
||||
"method": "kem_encapsulate",
|
||||
"params": ["<peer_pubkey_hex>", { "role": "kem_main" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "13",
|
||||
"result": "{\"ciphertext\":\"<hex>\",\"shared_secret\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ml-kem-768\"}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The first param is the peer's ML-KEM-768 public key as hex (1184 bytes = 2368
|
||||
hex chars). The response contains the ciphertext (1088 bytes = 2176 hex chars)
|
||||
and the shared secret (32 bytes = 64 hex chars). The encapsulating party keeps
|
||||
the shared secret; the ciphertext is sent to the decapsulating party.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.8 Example: `kem_decapsulate` (ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
|
||||
Request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "14",
|
||||
"method": "kem_decapsulate",
|
||||
"params": ["<ciphertext_hex>", { "role": "kem_main" }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "14",
|
||||
"result": "{\"shared_secret\":\"<hex>\",\"algorithm\":\"ml-kem-768\"}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The first param is the ciphertext from `kem_encapsulate` (1088 bytes = 2176
|
||||
hex chars). The decapsulated shared secret will match the encapsulating
|
||||
party's shared secret.
|
||||
|
||||
### 11.9 Example clients
|
||||
|
||||
See the `examples/` directory for working C clients demonstrating the new
|
||||
verbs:
|
||||
|
||||
- [`examples/pq_sign_example.c`](../examples/pq_sign_example.c) — ML-DSA-65
|
||||
`get_public_key` + `sign_data`
|
||||
- [`examples/pq_kem_example.c`](../examples/pq_kem_example.c) — ML-KEM-768
|
||||
`get_public_key` + `kem_encapsulate` + `kem_decapsulate` (verifies shared
|
||||
secrets match)
|
||||
- [`examples/ssh_sign_example.c`](../examples/ssh_sign_example.c) — ed25519
|
||||
`get_public_key` + `ssh_sign`
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Compatibility notes
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are writing an autonomous agent client, pin to explicit socket name and explicit role selector.
|
||||
- Keep method support feature-detected (`method_not_found` fallback).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ Operational assumptions:
|
||||
Run `nsigner` in TCP listen mode:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
./build/nsigner --listen tcp:[::]:8080
|
||||
./build/nsigner --listen tcp:[::]:11111
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Or bind to a specific FIPS ULA address:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
./build/nsigner --listen tcp:[fd00::1234]:8080
|
||||
./build/nsigner --listen tcp:[fd00::1234]:11111
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Behavior notes:
|
||||
|
||||
+90
-4
@@ -215,12 +215,18 @@ The signer enforces a strict `(verb, purpose, curve)` matrix:
|
||||
| Verb | Required purpose | Required curve |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `sign_event` | `nostr` | `secp256k1` |
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | `nostr` | `secp256k1` |
|
||||
| `mine_event` | `nostr` | `secp256k1` |
|
||||
| `nip04_encrypt` / `nip04_decrypt` | `nostr` | `secp256k1` |
|
||||
| `nip44_encrypt` / `nip44_decrypt` | `nostr` | `secp256k1` |
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | any | any (must match role's declared curve) |
|
||||
| `sign_data` | `ssh` or `pq-sig` | `ed25519`, `ml-dsa-65`, or `slh-dsa-128s` |
|
||||
| `verify_signature` | `ssh` or `pq-sig` | `ed25519`, `ml-dsa-65`, or `slh-dsa-128s` |
|
||||
| `ssh_sign` | `ssh` | `ed25519` |
|
||||
| `kem_encapsulate` | `pq-kem` | `ml-kem-768` |
|
||||
| `kem_decapsulate` | `pq-kem` | `ml-kem-768` |
|
||||
| Any other verb | rejected | rejected |
|
||||
|
||||
A pre-approval to use a Bitcoin-purposed key for `sign_event` does **not** override the enforcement matrix. The approval grants access to the key; enforcement still gates the verb. **Fail-closed**: unknown verbs are rejected, never passed through.
|
||||
A pre-approval to use a Bitcoin-purposed key for `sign_event` does **not** override the enforcement matrix. The approval grants access to the key; enforcement still gates the verb. **Fail-closed**: unknown verbs and unlisted `(verb, purpose, curve)` combinations are rejected, never passed through.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the layer that prevents (for example) a `bitcoin/secp256k1` key from being used to sign a Nostr event even if some pre-approval entry mistakenly named it. The key's *purpose* is part of its identity; you cannot reuse it across domains.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -508,7 +514,86 @@ If any of these statements becomes false in code, that is a security bug worth f
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 16. References
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 16. Post-Quantum Cryptography
|
||||
|
||||
`n_signer` supports three post-quantum algorithms alongside the classical secp256k1, ed25519, and x25519:
|
||||
|
||||
- **ML-DSA-65** (FIPS 204) — lattice-based post-quantum digital signatures
|
||||
- **SLH-DSA-128s** (FIPS 205) — hash-based post-quantum signatures with minimal trust assumptions
|
||||
- **ML-KEM-768** (FIPS 203) — lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism
|
||||
|
||||
These are additional options, not replacements for secp256k1. Nostr continues to use secp256k1 exclusively. PQ algorithms are opt-in per role via `purpose="pq-sig"` or `purpose="pq-kem"`. See [`README.md`](../README.md) §4b for the full crypto palette.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.1 PQ threat model
|
||||
|
||||
The primary PQ threat is **harvest-now-decrypt-later**: an adversary records encrypted traffic or key agreement exchanges today, stores them, and decrypts them once a sufficiently large quantum computer becomes available. ML-KEM-768 addresses this for key agreement — a session key encapsulated with ML-KEM-768 cannot be recovered by a future quantum adversary.
|
||||
|
||||
For signatures, the future risk is **quantum forgery**: a quantum computer could forge classical signatures (ECDSA, Ed25519) given the public key, undermining authentication retroactively. ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA-128s address this by providing signatures that resist quantum forgery. The urgency is lower than for key agreement (signatures are forged when needed, not retroactively decrypted), but forward-looking deployments may want PQ signature keys now.
|
||||
|
||||
`n_signer` does not claim to defend against all quantum threats. It provides the PQ primitives; the protocol layer (SSH, TLS, Nostr) must adopt them for the protection to be meaningful.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.2 Deterministic PQ key derivation
|
||||
|
||||
PQ private keys are not scalars — they are complex mathematical structures (polynomial matrices for lattice schemes, hypertree seeds for hash-based schemes). You cannot use a 32-byte BIP-32 output directly as a PQ private key.
|
||||
|
||||
`n_signer` uses a **non-standard** approach to derive PQ keys deterministically from the mnemonic:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Derive a 32-byte seed from the mnemonic using BIP-32/SLIP-0010 HMAC-SHA512 at a PQ-specific derivation path (e.g. `m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0'/0'` for ML-DSA-65).
|
||||
2. Feed that seed into a SHAKE-256 DRBG (NIST SP 800-90A style).
|
||||
3. Replace PQClean's `randombytes()` callback with this DRBG so keygen is deterministic.
|
||||
4. The PQ algorithm expands the DRBG output into the full key pair.
|
||||
|
||||
**Security argument:**
|
||||
|
||||
- The 32-byte seed from BIP-32 derivation carries full 256 bits of entropy (assuming the mnemonic has full entropy).
|
||||
- SHAKE-256 is a NIST-approved XOF; using it as a DRBG seeded with 256 bits of entropy is sufficient for all three PQ algorithms.
|
||||
- Each role uses a distinct derivation path (distinct coin types 102003/102004/102005), so compromising one role's PQ key does not compromise others.
|
||||
|
||||
**This is non-standard.** There is no NIST or IETF specification for deriving PQ keys from a BIP-39 mnemonic. The approach preserves `n_signer`'s core crash-equals-wipe model: PQ keys are re-derived from the mnemonic on every startup, same as secp256k1. The alternative (random PQ keys with no mnemonic recovery) would break the model.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk:** If a weakness is found in using DRBG output as PQ keygen randomness, all PQ keys derived this way could be affected. Mitigation: per-role distinct derivation paths limit blast radius. The classical algorithms (secp256k1, ed25519, x25519) are unaffected — they do not use the DRBG.
|
||||
|
||||
Implementation: [`src/pq_drbg.c`](../src/pq_drbg.c), [`src/pq_crypto.c`](../src/pq_crypto.c).
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.3 PQ algorithm maturity
|
||||
|
||||
ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and ML-KEM are FIPS-standardized (FIPS 203, 204, 205) and have undergone extensive NIST scrutiny. However, they are newer than classical algorithms and have less deployment history. They are provided as **additional options**, not replacements. The enforcement matrix (§5.2) ensures PQ keys cannot be used for Nostr operations and vice versa.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.4 SLH-DSA-128s signing latency
|
||||
|
||||
SLH-DSA-128s signing on ESP32 can take **5–30 seconds**. This is a UX consideration, not a security issue. The hash-based signature scheme is intentionally compute-bound (that is its security foundation). On the Feather/CYD firmware, the approval prompt should show a "signing..." indicator during the operation.
|
||||
|
||||
The user should choose whether to use SLH-DSA-128s per role. For interactive use where latency matters, ML-DSA-65 is faster. SLH-DSA-128s is appropriate for low-frequency, high-assurance signing where minimal trust assumptions (hash-based, no number-theoretic hardness assumption) are desired.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.5 Key sizes and memory
|
||||
|
||||
PQ private keys are large compared to classical keys:
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Private key | Public key | Signature / Ciphertext |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | 64 bytes (sig) |
|
||||
| ed25519 | 32 bytes | 32 bytes | 64 bytes (sig) |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | 4032 bytes | 1952 bytes | 3309 bytes (sig) |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | 64 bytes | 32 bytes | 7856 bytes (sig) |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | 2400 bytes | 1184 bytes | 1088 bytes (ciphertext) |
|
||||
|
||||
With `ROLE_TABLE_MAX_ENTRIES` at 256, a full table of ML-DSA-65 keys would use ~1 MB of `mlock`'d memory (4032 × 256 ≈ 1.03 MB for private keys alone). This is acceptable on host. On ESP32 with 512 KB SRAM, this would not fit — on-demand derivation (deriving a PQ key only when a request targets that role) is the recommended pattern. The existing [`crypto_derive_one`](../src/key_store.c) path already supports this.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.6 No hybrid signatures yet
|
||||
|
||||
Hybrid signatures (e.g., ed25519 + ML-DSA combined into one signature object) are **future work**. No standard exists for hybrid SSH signatures yet. `n_signer` provides the individual primitives (`sign_data` for ed25519, ML-DSA-65, and SLH-DSA-128s); a hybrid format can be assembled by the client once standards solidify.
|
||||
|
||||
### 16.7 PQ key persistence
|
||||
|
||||
**PQ keys are NOT persisted.** They are re-derived from the mnemonic on every startup, same as secp256k1. There is no PQ key file, no PQ key database, no PQ key cache on disk. Crash-equals-wipe (§10) applies unchanged: if the process dies, all PQ keys are gone and must be re-derived from the mnemonic on next startup.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a deliberate design choice. The deterministic derivation approach (§16.2) makes it possible to recover PQ keys from the mnemonic alone, so persistence would add risk (key material on disk) without adding capability.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 17. References
|
||||
|
||||
- [`README.md`](../README.md) — authoritative behavior spec.
|
||||
- [`plans/nsigner.md`](../plans/nsigner.md) — root design plan and decisions log.
|
||||
@@ -517,4 +602,5 @@ If any of these statements becomes false in code, that is a security bug worth f
|
||||
- [`documents/QUBES_OS.md`](QUBES_OS.md) — Qubes RPC integration.
|
||||
- [`documents/FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md`](FIPS_DEPLOYMENT.md) — FIPS-mode deployment notes.
|
||||
- [`plans/seed_phrase_uses.md`](../plans/seed_phrase_uses.md) — what one mnemonic can become.
|
||||
- [`src/policy.c`](../src/policy.c), [`src/server.c`](../src/server.c), [`src/dispatcher.c`](../src/dispatcher.c), [`src/role_table.c`](../src/role_table.c), [`src/selector.c`](../src/selector.c), [`src/enforcement.c`](../src/enforcement.c) — the security-related code.
|
||||
- [`plans/post_quantum_crypto.md`](../plans/post_quantum_crypto.md) — post-quantum and multi-algorithm crypto expansion plan.
|
||||
- [`src/policy.c`](../src/policy.c), [`src/server.c`](../src/server.c), [`src/dispatcher.c`](../src/dispatcher.c), [`src/role_table.c`](../src/role_table.c), [`src/selector.c`](../src/selector.c), [`src/enforcement.c`](../src/enforcement.c), [`src/pq_crypto.c`](../src/pq_crypto.c), [`src/pq_drbg.c`](../src/pq_drbg.c) — the security-related code.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,905 @@
|
||||
<!doctype html>
|
||||
<html lang="en">
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<meta charset="utf-8" />
|
||||
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
|
||||
<title>n_signer CYD Web Serial Demo</title>
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
/* §12 Dark mode: set class synchronously before paint. */
|
||||
(function () {
|
||||
if (localStorage.getItem('theme') === 'dark') {
|
||||
document.documentElement.classList.add('dark-mode');
|
||||
}
|
||||
})();
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Two-tier rule block (§13). This is a single-file demo so the "global"
|
||||
* sheet is inlined here, but the same rules apply: variables everywhere,
|
||||
* no hardcoded hex in component rules, spacing on the 5/10/15/20/40 ladder.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §17 Minimum variable set ---- */
|
||||
:root {
|
||||
--font-family: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, Consolas, "Courier New", Courier, monospace;
|
||||
|
||||
--primary-color: #000000;
|
||||
--secondary-color: #ffffff;
|
||||
--accent-color: #ff0000;
|
||||
--muted-color: #dddddd;
|
||||
|
||||
--color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
--background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
--border-color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
|
||||
--border-radius: 5px;
|
||||
--border-width: 1px;
|
||||
--border: var(--border-width) solid var(--border-color);
|
||||
|
||||
--header-height: 2vh;
|
||||
--header-min-height: 60px;
|
||||
--footer-height: 2vh;
|
||||
--footer-min-height: 20px;
|
||||
|
||||
--image-grayscale: 100%;
|
||||
--image-grayscale-hover: 20%;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* §12 Dark mode = swap variables only. */
|
||||
html.dark-mode, body.dark-mode {
|
||||
--primary-color: #ffffff;
|
||||
--secondary-color: #000000;
|
||||
--muted-color: #777777;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §3 Typography / global reset ---- */
|
||||
* {
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-family);
|
||||
margin: 0;
|
||||
padding: 0;
|
||||
box-sizing: border-box;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
html, body {
|
||||
color: var(--color);
|
||||
background-color: var(--background-color);
|
||||
line-height: 1.4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
min-height: 100vh;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
a { color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §4 Layout shell ---- */
|
||||
#divHeader {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
top: 0; left: 0; right: 0;
|
||||
height: var(--header-height);
|
||||
min-height: var(--header-min-height);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
border-bottom: 3px solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
padding: 0 20px;
|
||||
z-index: 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divHeader .divHeaderText {
|
||||
font-size: 200%;
|
||||
font-weight: bold;
|
||||
flex: 1;
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divHeader .divHeaderButtons {
|
||||
width: 40px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
justify-content: flex-start;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Keep the hamburger clickable above the open sidenav (§10 overlay). */
|
||||
#btnHamburger { position: relative; z-index: 4; }
|
||||
|
||||
#divBody {
|
||||
position: relative;
|
||||
top: max(var(--header-height), var(--header-min-height));
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: row;
|
||||
flex-wrap: wrap;
|
||||
justify-content: space-around;
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
padding: 20px;
|
||||
gap: 20px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#divFooter {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
bottom: 0; left: 0; right: 0;
|
||||
height: var(--footer-height);
|
||||
min-height: var(--footer-min-height);
|
||||
border-top: 3px solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: row;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
padding: 0 20px;
|
||||
z-index: 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.divFooterBox {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
text-overflow: ellipsis;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divFooterCenter { text-align: center; flex: 1; }
|
||||
#divFooterRight { text-align: right; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §10 SideNav ---- */
|
||||
#divSideNav {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
top: 0; left: 0;
|
||||
height: 100%;
|
||||
width: 0;
|
||||
transition: width 0.5s;
|
||||
border-right: 3px solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
overflow: hidden;
|
||||
z-index: 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divSideNav.open { width: clamp(400px, 50vw, 600px); }
|
||||
#divSideNavBody {
|
||||
flex: 1;
|
||||
padding: 20px;
|
||||
overflow-y: auto;
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Close button pinned to the top-right of the open sidenav. */
|
||||
#btnCloseSideNav {
|
||||
position: absolute;
|
||||
top: 10px;
|
||||
right: 10px;
|
||||
width: 32px;
|
||||
height: 32px;
|
||||
background: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
border: var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--border-radius);
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
line-height: 1;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: center;
|
||||
transition: border-color 0.2s;
|
||||
z-index: 4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#btnCloseSideNav:hover { border-color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
#divSideNavBody h3 {
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
font-weight: bold;
|
||||
margin-top: 20px;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 10px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divSideNavBody h3:first-child { margin-top: 0; }
|
||||
#divSideNavBody p {
|
||||
margin-bottom: 10px;
|
||||
color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divSideNavBody code {
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
white-space: pre-wrap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#divVersionBar {
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
border-top: 3px solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: space-between;
|
||||
padding: 10px 20px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#versionDisplay { font-size: 14px; }
|
||||
#divVersionBarButtons { display: flex; gap: 10px; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* Hamburger button (§6 icon-only button) */
|
||||
#btnHamburger {
|
||||
width: 32px; height: 32px;
|
||||
background: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
border: var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--border-radius);
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
line-height: 1;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
justify-content: center;
|
||||
transition: border-color 0.2s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#btnHamburger:hover { border-color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §6 Buttons ---- */
|
||||
.btn {
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-family);
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
border: var(--border-width) solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--border-radius);
|
||||
padding: 8px 16px;
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
font-weight: bold;
|
||||
cursor: pointer;
|
||||
transition: border-color 0.2s, background-color 0.2s, color 0.2s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.btn:hover { border-color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
.btn:active {
|
||||
background-color: var(--accent-color);
|
||||
color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
border-color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
}
|
||||
.btn:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
|
||||
.btn.secondary { border-color: var(--muted-color); }
|
||||
.btn.danger { border-color: var(--accent-color); color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
.btn.danger:active { background-color: var(--accent-color); color: var(--secondary-color); }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §7 Forms ---- */
|
||||
.inpStyle {
|
||||
border: var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--border-radius);
|
||||
padding: 10px;
|
||||
font-size: 100%;
|
||||
font-family: var(--font-family);
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.inpStyle:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
textarea.inpStyle { resize: vertical; min-height: 64px; }
|
||||
input[type="number"].inpStyle { max-width: 130px; }
|
||||
label {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
margin: 10px 0 5px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §9 Cards ---- */
|
||||
.divPostItem {
|
||||
padding: 15px;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--primary-color);
|
||||
border-radius: 10px;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 15px;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
}
|
||||
.divPostItem h2 {
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
font-weight: bold;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 10px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.divPostItem .row {
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
gap: 10px;
|
||||
flex-wrap: wrap;
|
||||
align-items: center;
|
||||
margin-top: 10px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.divPostItem .note {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
margin-bottom: 10px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.divPostItem .warn {
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--accent-color);
|
||||
margin-bottom: 10px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Connection card spans full width */
|
||||
.divPostItem.full { width: 100%; }
|
||||
.divPostItem.section { flex: 1 1 320px; min-width: 320px; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- §11 Feedback / state ---- */
|
||||
.status {
|
||||
padding: 5px 10px;
|
||||
border: var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: 999px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
color: var(--muted-color);
|
||||
}
|
||||
.status.ok { border-color: var(--primary-color); color: var(--primary-color); }
|
||||
.status.err { border-color: var(--accent-color); color: var(--accent-color); }
|
||||
|
||||
pre {
|
||||
margin-top: 10px;
|
||||
padding: 10px;
|
||||
border: var(--border);
|
||||
border-radius: var(--border-radius);
|
||||
background-color: var(--secondary-color);
|
||||
color: var(--primary-color);
|
||||
overflow: auto;
|
||||
max-height: 200px;
|
||||
font-size: 12px;
|
||||
white-space: pre-wrap;
|
||||
word-break: break-all;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* §14 reduced motion */
|
||||
@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
|
||||
#divSideNav { transition: none; }
|
||||
.btn, #btnHamburger, img { transition: none; }
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<!-- §16 canonical shell -->
|
||||
<div id="divHeader">
|
||||
<div class="divHeaderButtons">
|
||||
<button id="btnHamburger" title="Menu" aria-label="Open menu">≡</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="divHeaderText">n_signer CYD Web Serial</div>
|
||||
<div class="divHeaderButtons"></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div id="divBody">
|
||||
<!-- Connection card (full width) -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem full">
|
||||
<h2>Connection</h2>
|
||||
<p class="note">Connect to the CYD (CH340 serial) via Web Serial, then exercise every algorithm and verb in the n_signer API. Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera only.</p>
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="connectBtn" class="btn">Connect Web Serial</button>
|
||||
<button id="disconnectBtn" class="btn secondary" disabled>Disconnect</button>
|
||||
<span id="connStatus" class="status">Disconnected</span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="log"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- get_info (metadata) -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>get_info (version / capabilities)</h2>
|
||||
<p class="note">No approval required. Safe to call before the mnemonic is loaded.</p>
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="infoBtn" class="btn" disabled>get_info</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="infoOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Get Public Key (algorithm-based) -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>get_public_key (algorithm)</h2>
|
||||
<label for="gpkAlg">Algorithm</label>
|
||||
<select id="gpkAlg" class="inpStyle">
|
||||
<option>secp256k1</option><option>ed25519</option><option>x25519</option>
|
||||
<option>ml-dsa-65</option><option>slh-dsa-128s</option><option>ml-kem-768</option>
|
||||
</select>
|
||||
<label for="gpkIdx">Index</label>
|
||||
<input id="gpkIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="gpkBtn" class="btn" disabled>get_public_key</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="gpkOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Nostr Get Public Key -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>nostr_get_public_key</h2>
|
||||
<label for="ngpkIdx">nostr_index</label>
|
||||
<input id="ngpkIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="ngpkFmt">format</label>
|
||||
<select id="ngpkFmt" class="inpStyle"><option>bare</option><option>structured</option></select>
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="ngpkBtn" class="btn" disabled>nostr_get_public_key</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="ngpkOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Sign / Verify -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>sign / verify</h2>
|
||||
<label for="signAlg">Algorithm</label>
|
||||
<select id="signAlg" class="inpStyle">
|
||||
<option>secp256k1</option><option>ed25519</option><option>ml-dsa-65</option><option>slh-dsa-128s</option>
|
||||
</select>
|
||||
<label for="signIdx">Index</label>
|
||||
<input id="signIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="signScheme">scheme (secp256k1 only)</label>
|
||||
<select id="signScheme" class="inpStyle"><option>schnorr</option><option>ecdsa</option></select>
|
||||
<label for="signMsg">message (hex — 32 bytes / 64 hex for schnorr)</label>
|
||||
<input id="signMsg" value="2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="signBtn" class="btn" disabled>sign</button>
|
||||
<button id="verifyBtn" class="btn" disabled>verify</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="signOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- KEM encapsulate / decapsulate -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>encapsulate / decapsulate (ml-kem-768)</h2>
|
||||
<label for="kemPeer">peer pubkey hex (1184 bytes / 2368 hex) — leave empty to use self pubkey</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="kemPeer" class="inpStyle" placeholder="auto: uses ml-kem-768 get_public_key"></textarea>
|
||||
<label for="kemIdx">index (for decapsulate)</label>
|
||||
<input id="kemIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="kemCt">ciphertext hex (for decapsulate)</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="kemCt" class="inpStyle" placeholder="filled by encapsulate"></textarea>
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="encapBtn" class="btn" disabled>encapsulate</button>
|
||||
<button id="decapBtn" class="btn" disabled>decapsulate</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="kemOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- derive_shared_secret (x25519) -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>derive_shared_secret (x25519)</h2>
|
||||
<label for="x25519Peer">peer pubkey hex (32 bytes / 64 hex)</label>
|
||||
<input id="x25519Peer" class="inpStyle" placeholder="64 hex chars" />
|
||||
<label for="x25519Idx">index</label>
|
||||
<input id="x25519Idx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="x25519Btn" class="btn" disabled>derive_shared_secret</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="x25519Out"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- derive (HMAC) -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>derive (secp256k1 HMAC-SHA256)</h2>
|
||||
<label for="deriveData">data (UTF-8 string)</label>
|
||||
<input id="deriveData" value="hello-derive" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="deriveIdx">index (required)</label>
|
||||
<input id="deriveIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="deriveBtn" class="btn" disabled>derive</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="deriveOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Nostr Sign Event -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>nostr_sign_event</h2>
|
||||
<label for="nseContent">content</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nseContent" class="inpStyle">hello from cyd webserial demo</textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nseIdx">nostr_index</label>
|
||||
<input id="nseIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="nseBtn" class="btn" disabled>nostr_sign_event</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="nseOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- Nostr Mine Event -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>nostr_mine_event</h2>
|
||||
<p class="warn">Slow on ESP32 — uses single-threaded PoW. Keep difficulty low.</p>
|
||||
<label for="nmeContent">content</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nmeContent" class="inpStyle">mined by cyd</textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nmeIdx">nostr_index</label>
|
||||
<input id="nmeIdx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="nmeDiff">difficulty (leading zero bits)</label>
|
||||
<input id="nmeDiff" type="number" value="4" min="1" max="16" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<label for="nmeTimeout">timeout (sec)</label>
|
||||
<input id="nmeTimeout" type="number" value="30" min="1" max="60" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="nmeBtn" class="btn" disabled>nostr_mine_event</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="nmeOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- NIP-04 -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>nostr_nip04_encrypt / decrypt</h2>
|
||||
<label for="nip04Peer">peer pubkey hex (32-byte x-only)</label>
|
||||
<input id="nip04Peer" class="inpStyle" placeholder="64 hex chars" />
|
||||
<label for="nip04Msg">plaintext</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nip04Msg" class="inpStyle">hello via nip04</textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nip04Cipher">ciphertext (for decrypt)</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nip04Cipher" class="inpStyle" placeholder="ciphertext?iv=..."></textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nip04Idx">nostr_index</label>
|
||||
<input id="nip04Idx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="nip04EncBtn" class="btn" disabled>encrypt</button>
|
||||
<button id="nip04DecBtn" class="btn" disabled>decrypt</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="nip04Out"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- NIP-44 -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>nostr_nip44_encrypt / decrypt</h2>
|
||||
<label for="nip44Peer">peer pubkey hex (32-byte x-only)</label>
|
||||
<input id="nip44Peer" class="inpStyle" placeholder="64 hex chars" />
|
||||
<label for="nip44Msg">plaintext</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nip44Msg" class="inpStyle">hello via nip44</textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nip44Cipher">ciphertext (for decrypt)</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="nip44Cipher" class="inpStyle" placeholder="base64 payload"></textarea>
|
||||
<label for="nip44Idx">nostr_index</label>
|
||||
<input id="nip44Idx" type="number" value="0" min="0" class="inpStyle" />
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="nip44EncBtn" class="btn" disabled>encrypt</button>
|
||||
<button id="nip44DecBtn" class="btn" disabled>decrypt</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="nip44Out"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- OTP encrypt / decrypt -->
|
||||
<section class="divPostItem section">
|
||||
<h2>encrypt / decrypt (otp)</h2>
|
||||
<p class="note">OTP pad is derived from the mnemonic on the CYD. Offset advances monotonically.</p>
|
||||
<label for="otpPlain">plaintext (base64)</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="otpPlain" class="inpStyle">SGVsbG8sIE9UUCB3b3JsZCE=</textarea>
|
||||
<label for="otpCipher">ciphertext (for decrypt, base64)</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="otpCipher" class="inpStyle" placeholder="filled by encrypt"></textarea>
|
||||
<label for="otpEnc">encoding</label>
|
||||
<select id="otpEnc" class="inpStyle"><option>ascii</option><option>binary</option></select>
|
||||
<div class="row">
|
||||
<button id="otpEncBtn" class="btn" disabled>encrypt</button>
|
||||
<button id="otpDecBtn" class="btn" disabled>decrypt</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<pre id="otpOut"></pre>
|
||||
</section>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div id="divFooter">
|
||||
<div id="divFooterLeft" class="divFooterBox">n_signer</div>
|
||||
<div id="divFooterCenter" class="divFooterBox">ready</div>
|
||||
<div id="divFooterRight" class="divFooterBox">Web Serial</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- §10 SideNav -->
|
||||
<div id="divSideNav">
|
||||
<button id="btnCloseSideNav" title="Close menu" aria-label="Close menu">×</button>
|
||||
<div id="divSideNavBody">
|
||||
<h3>n_signer CYD Web Serial Demo</h3>
|
||||
<p>A browser control panel for the CYD (ESP32-2432S028) signer firmware. Speaks the n_signer JSON-RPC protocol over Web Serial at 115200 baud.</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3>Getting started</h3>
|
||||
<p>1. Plug the CYD into a USB port (CH340 enumerates as /dev/ttyUSB*).</p>
|
||||
<p>2. Click <code>Connect Web Serial</code> and pick the CYD port.</p>
|
||||
<p>3. <code>get_info</code> fires automatically and reports firmware version + supported verbs.</p>
|
||||
<p>4. Enter a mnemonic on the CYD touchscreen to enable the signing verbs.</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3>Auth envelope</h3>
|
||||
<p>Every request is signed with a demo secp256k1 key (priv = 0x0102…2020). The CYD verifies the kind-27235 auth event and replays-protects by event id.</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<h3>Transports</h3>
|
||||
<p>Frames are 4-byte big-endian length + UTF-8 JSON payload. Same wire format as the host Unix-socket and TCP transports.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div id="divVersionBar">
|
||||
<span id="versionDisplay">demo v1</span>
|
||||
<div id="divVersionBarButtons">
|
||||
<button id="themeToggleButton" class="btn secondary" title="Toggle theme">theme</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<script type="module">
|
||||
import { schnorr } from "https://esm.sh/@noble/curves@1.5.0/secp256k1?bundle";
|
||||
|
||||
const logEl = document.getElementById("log");
|
||||
const connStatusEl = document.getElementById("connStatus");
|
||||
const footerStatusEl = document.getElementById("divFooterCenter");
|
||||
const connectBtn = document.getElementById("connectBtn");
|
||||
const disconnectBtn = document.getElementById("disconnectBtn");
|
||||
const btnHamburger = document.getElementById("btnHamburger");
|
||||
const divSideNav = document.getElementById("divSideNav");
|
||||
const themeToggleButton = document.getElementById("themeToggleButton");
|
||||
|
||||
let port = null;
|
||||
let reader = null;
|
||||
let writer = null;
|
||||
let readLoopRunning = false;
|
||||
let rxBuffer = new Uint8Array(0);
|
||||
let pendingResolve = null;
|
||||
|
||||
function log(...args) {
|
||||
logEl.textContent += args.join(" ") + "\n";
|
||||
logEl.scrollTop = logEl.scrollHeight;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function setStatus(text, mode = "") {
|
||||
connStatusEl.textContent = text;
|
||||
connStatusEl.className = `status ${mode}`.trim();
|
||||
footerStatusEl.textContent = text;
|
||||
}
|
||||
function hex(bytes) {
|
||||
return Array.from(bytes).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
|
||||
}
|
||||
function utf8(s) { return new TextEncoder().encode(s); }
|
||||
function be32(n) {
|
||||
return new Uint8Array([(n >>> 24) & 0xff, (n >>> 16) & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff, n & 0xff]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
async function sha256Hex(dataBytes) {
|
||||
const h = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", dataBytes);
|
||||
return hex(new Uint8Array(h));
|
||||
}
|
||||
function pretty(value) {
|
||||
try { return JSON.stringify(value, null, 2); } catch { return String(value); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function buildAuth(method, params) {
|
||||
const callerPriv = Uint8Array.from({ length: 32 }, (_, i) => i + 1);
|
||||
const callerPubX = hex(schnorr.getPublicKey(callerPriv));
|
||||
const createdAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
|
||||
const paramsJson = JSON.stringify(params);
|
||||
const bodyHash = await sha256Hex(utf8(paramsJson));
|
||||
const tags = [
|
||||
["nsigner_rpc", "1"],
|
||||
["nsigner_method", method],
|
||||
["nsigner_body_hash", bodyHash],
|
||||
];
|
||||
const content = "cyd-webserial-demo";
|
||||
const ser = JSON.stringify([0, callerPubX, createdAt, 27235, tags, content]);
|
||||
const id = await sha256Hex(utf8(ser));
|
||||
const sigBytes = await schnorr.sign(id, callerPriv, new Uint8Array(32));
|
||||
const sigHex = typeof sigBytes === "string" ? sigBytes : hex(sigBytes);
|
||||
return { id, pubkey: callerPubX, created_at: createdAt, kind: 27235, tags, content, sig: sigHex };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- Web Serial transport ---- */
|
||||
async function readLoop() {
|
||||
readLoopRunning = true;
|
||||
while (readLoopRunning && reader) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const { value, done } = await reader.read();
|
||||
if (done) break;
|
||||
if (value) {
|
||||
const next = new Uint8Array(rxBuffer.length + value.length);
|
||||
next.set(rxBuffer, 0);
|
||||
next.set(value, rxBuffer.length);
|
||||
rxBuffer = next;
|
||||
tryDeliver();
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
log("read error:", e.message);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
readLoopRunning = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function tryDeliver() {
|
||||
if (pendingResolve === null) return;
|
||||
while (rxBuffer.length >= 4) {
|
||||
const len = (rxBuffer[0] << 24) | (rxBuffer[1] << 16) | (rxBuffer[2] << 8) | rxBuffer[3];
|
||||
if (len <= 0 || len > 16384) {
|
||||
rxBuffer = rxBuffer.slice(1);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (rxBuffer.length < 4 + len) return;
|
||||
const payload = rxBuffer.slice(4, 4 + len);
|
||||
rxBuffer = rxBuffer.slice(4 + len);
|
||||
const text = new TextDecoder().decode(payload);
|
||||
let parsed;
|
||||
try { parsed = JSON.parse(text); } catch { parsed = text; }
|
||||
const r = pendingResolve;
|
||||
pendingResolve = null;
|
||||
r(parsed);
|
||||
if (pendingResolve === null) return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function sendRpc(reqObj) {
|
||||
if (!writer) throw new Error("not connected");
|
||||
const body = utf8(JSON.stringify(reqObj));
|
||||
const frame = new Uint8Array(4 + body.length);
|
||||
frame.set(be32(body.length), 0);
|
||||
frame.set(body, 4);
|
||||
await writer.write(frame);
|
||||
const resp = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
pendingResolve = resolve;
|
||||
setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
if (pendingResolve === resolve) {
|
||||
pendingResolve = null;
|
||||
reject(new Error("timeout (30s) — check the CYD screen for an approval prompt"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, 65000);
|
||||
});
|
||||
return resp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function callVerb(method, params, outEl) {
|
||||
outEl.textContent = "→ " + method + " " + JSON.stringify(params);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const auth = await buildAuth(method, params);
|
||||
const req = { id: String(Math.floor(Math.random() * 1e9)), method, params, auth };
|
||||
const resp = await sendRpc(req);
|
||||
outEl.textContent += "\n← " + pretty(resp);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
outEl.textContent += "\n✗ " + e.message;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- SideNav + theme (§10, §12) ---- */
|
||||
function openSideNav() { divSideNav.classList.add("open"); }
|
||||
function closeSideNav() { divSideNav.classList.remove("open"); }
|
||||
|
||||
btnHamburger.addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
if (divSideNav.classList.contains("open")) closeSideNav(); else openSideNav();
|
||||
});
|
||||
document.getElementById("btnCloseSideNav").addEventListener("click", closeSideNav);
|
||||
/* Click on the scrim (the body, outside the sidenav) closes it. */
|
||||
document.getElementById("divBody").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
if (divSideNav.classList.contains("open")) closeSideNav();
|
||||
});
|
||||
/* ESC closes sidenav (§14). */
|
||||
document.addEventListener("keydown", (e) => {
|
||||
if (e.key === "Escape" && divSideNav.classList.contains("open")) {
|
||||
closeSideNav();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
themeToggleButton.addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const isDark = document.documentElement.classList.toggle("dark-mode");
|
||||
localStorage.setItem('theme', isDark ? 'dark' : 'light');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- Connect / Disconnect ---- */
|
||||
connectBtn.addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
port = await navigator.serial.requestPort();
|
||||
await port.open({ baudRate: 115200 });
|
||||
reader = port.readable.getReader();
|
||||
writer = port.writable.getWriter();
|
||||
rxBuffer = new Uint8Array(0);
|
||||
readLoop();
|
||||
setStatus("Connected", "ok");
|
||||
log("Connected to CYD via Web Serial @ 115200 baud");
|
||||
document.querySelectorAll("button[id$='Btn']").forEach(b => {
|
||||
if (b !== connectBtn && b !== disconnectBtn) b.disabled = false;
|
||||
});
|
||||
disconnectBtn.disabled = false;
|
||||
connectBtn.disabled = true;
|
||||
/* Auto-fetch version/capabilities so the user sees what firmware is running. */
|
||||
try { document.getElementById("infoBtn").click(); } catch (e) { log("auto get_info failed:", e.message); }
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
setStatus("Error", "err");
|
||||
log("connect failed:", e.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
disconnectBtn.addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
readLoopRunning = false;
|
||||
try { if (reader) await reader.cancel(); } catch {}
|
||||
try { if (writer) await writer.releaseLock(); } catch {}
|
||||
try { if (port) await port.close(); } catch {}
|
||||
reader = null; writer = null; port = null;
|
||||
setStatus("Disconnected");
|
||||
document.querySelectorAll("button[id$='Btn']").forEach(b => {
|
||||
if (b !== connectBtn) b.disabled = true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
connectBtn.disabled = false;
|
||||
disconnectBtn.disabled = true;
|
||||
log("Disconnected");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---- Verb wiring ---- */
|
||||
const $ = id => document.getElementById(id);
|
||||
|
||||
$("infoBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
callVerb("get_info", [], $("infoOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("gpkBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const alg = $("gpkAlg").value, idx = Number($("gpkIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
callVerb("get_public_key", [{ algorithm: alg, index: idx }], $("gpkOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
$("ngpkBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const idx = Number($("ngpkIdx").value || 0), fmt = $("ngpkFmt").value;
|
||||
const opts = { nostr_index: idx };
|
||||
if (fmt === "structured") opts.format = "structured";
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_get_public_key", [opts], $("ngpkOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("signBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const alg = $("signAlg").value, idx = Number($("signIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
const scheme = $("signScheme").value, msg = $("signMsg").value;
|
||||
const opts = { algorithm: alg, index: idx };
|
||||
if (alg === "secp256k1") opts.scheme = scheme;
|
||||
callVerb("sign", [msg, opts], $("signOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
$("verifyBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
const alg = $("signAlg").value, idx = Number($("signIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
const scheme = $("signScheme").value, msg = $("signMsg").value;
|
||||
const opts = { algorithm: alg, index: idx };
|
||||
if (alg === "secp256k1") opts.scheme = scheme;
|
||||
const outText = $("signOut").textContent;
|
||||
const m = outText.match(/"signature"\s*:\s*"([0-9a-f]+)"/);
|
||||
if (!m) { $("signOut").textContent += "\n✗ no signature found — run sign first"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("verify", [msg, m[1], opts], $("signOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("encapBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
|
||||
let peer = $("kemPeer").value.trim();
|
||||
if (!peer) {
|
||||
const opts = [{ algorithm: "ml-kem-768", index: Number($("kemIdx").value || 0) }];
|
||||
const auth = await buildAuth("get_public_key", opts);
|
||||
const resp = await sendRpc({ id: String(Math.floor(Math.random()*1e9)), method: "get_public_key", params: opts, auth });
|
||||
peer = resp.result && JSON.parse(resp.result).public_key;
|
||||
if (!peer) { $("kemOut").textContent = "✗ could not fetch self pubkey"; return; }
|
||||
$("kemPeer").value = peer;
|
||||
}
|
||||
callVerb("encapsulate", [peer, { algorithm: "ml-kem-768" }], $("kemOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
$("decapBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const ct = $("kemCt").value.trim();
|
||||
const idx = Number($("kemIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!ct) { $("kemOut").textContent = "✗ paste a ciphertext first (from encapsulate)"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("decapsulate", [ct, { algorithm: "ml-kem-768", index: idx }], $("kemOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("x25519Btn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const peer = $("x25519Peer").value.trim();
|
||||
const idx = Number($("x25519Idx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!peer) { $("x25519Out").textContent = "✗ enter peer pubkey"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("derive_shared_secret", [peer, { algorithm: "x25519", index: idx }], $("x25519Out"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("deriveBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const data = $("deriveData").value;
|
||||
const idx = Number($("deriveIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
callVerb("derive", [data, { algorithm: "secp256k1", index: idx }], $("deriveOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("nseBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const content = $("nseContent").value;
|
||||
const idx = Number($("nseIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
const event = { kind: 1, created_at: Math.floor(Date.now()/1000), tags: [], content };
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_sign_event", [event, { nostr_index: idx }], $("nseOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
$("nmeBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const content = $("nmeContent").value;
|
||||
const idx = Number($("nmeIdx").value || 0);
|
||||
const diff = Number($("nmeDiff").value || 4);
|
||||
const timeout = Number($("nmeTimeout").value || 30);
|
||||
const event = { kind: 1, created_at: Math.floor(Date.now()/1000), tags: [], content };
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_mine_event", [event, { nostr_index: idx, difficulty: diff, timeout_sec: timeout }], $("nmeOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const nip04Enc = () => {
|
||||
const peer = $("nip04Peer").value.trim(), msg = $("nip04Msg").value, idx = Number($("nip04Idx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!peer) { $("nip04Out").textContent = "✗ enter peer pubkey"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_nip04_encrypt", [peer, msg, { nostr_index: idx }], $("nip04Out"));
|
||||
};
|
||||
const nip04Dec = () => {
|
||||
const peer = $("nip04Peer").value.trim(), ct = $("nip04Cipher").value, idx = Number($("nip04Idx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!peer || !ct) { $("nip04Out").textContent = "✗ enter peer pubkey + ciphertext"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_nip04_decrypt", [peer, ct, { nostr_index: idx }], $("nip04Out"));
|
||||
};
|
||||
$("nip04EncBtn").addEventListener("click", nip04Enc);
|
||||
$("nip04DecBtn").addEventListener("click", nip04Dec);
|
||||
|
||||
const nip44Enc = () => {
|
||||
const peer = $("nip44Peer").value.trim(), msg = $("nip44Msg").value, idx = Number($("nip44Idx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!peer) { $("nip44Out").textContent = "✗ enter peer pubkey"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_nip44_encrypt", [peer, msg, { nostr_index: idx }], $("nip44Out"));
|
||||
};
|
||||
const nip44Dec = () => {
|
||||
const peer = $("nip44Peer").value.trim(), ct = $("nip44Cipher").value, idx = Number($("nip44Idx").value || 0);
|
||||
if (!peer || !ct) { $("nip44Out").textContent = "✗ enter peer pubkey + ciphertext"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("nostr_nip44_decrypt", [peer, ct, { nostr_index: idx }], $("nip44Out"));
|
||||
};
|
||||
$("nip44EncBtn").addEventListener("click", nip44Enc);
|
||||
$("nip44DecBtn").addEventListener("click", nip44Dec);
|
||||
|
||||
$("otpEncBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const pt = $("otpPlain").value, enc = $("otpEnc").value;
|
||||
callVerb("encrypt", [pt, { algorithm: "otp", encoding: enc }], $("otpOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
$("otpDecBtn").addEventListener("click", () => {
|
||||
const ct = $("otpCipher").value, enc = $("otpEnc").value;
|
||||
if (!ct) { $("otpOut").textContent = "✗ paste ciphertext first (from encrypt)"; return; }
|
||||
callVerb("decrypt", [ct, { algorithm: "otp", encoding: enc }], $("otpOut"));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!("serial" in navigator)) {
|
||||
log("Web Serial not supported in this browser. Use Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera.");
|
||||
connectBtn.disabled = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
@@ -140,11 +140,11 @@ def main() -> int:
|
||||
req = {
|
||||
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
|
||||
"id": "2",
|
||||
"method": "sign_event",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_sign_event",
|
||||
"params": params,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not no_auth:
|
||||
req["auth"] = build_auth_envelope("sign_event", params, caller_priv)
|
||||
req["auth"] = build_auth_envelope("nostr_sign_event", params, caller_priv)
|
||||
|
||||
body = json.dumps(req, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
frame = struct.pack(">I", len(body)) + body
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const params = [unsignedEvent, getIndexOptions()];
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("sign_event", params, "web-sign-kind1");
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nostr_sign_event", params, "web-sign-kind1");
|
||||
signOutEl.textContent = pretty(resp?.result ?? resp);
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
signOutEl.textContent = String(e);
|
||||
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
|
||||
const peer = requirePeerHex(nip04PeerEl.value);
|
||||
const msg = String(nip04MsgEl.value || "");
|
||||
const params = [peer, msg, getIndexOptions()];
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nip04_encrypt", params, "web-nip04-enc");
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nostr_nip04_encrypt", params, "web-nip04-enc");
|
||||
nip04OutEl.textContent = pretty(resp?.result ?? resp);
|
||||
if (resp && typeof resp.result === "string") {
|
||||
nip04DecPeerEl.value = peer;
|
||||
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@
|
||||
const peer = requirePeerHex(nip04DecPeerEl.value);
|
||||
const ciphertext = String(nip04CipherEl.value || "");
|
||||
const params = [peer, ciphertext, getIndexOptions()];
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nip04_decrypt", params, "web-nip04-dec");
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nostr_nip04_decrypt", params, "web-nip04-dec");
|
||||
nip04DecOutEl.textContent = requireStringResult(resp, "NIP-04 decrypt");
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
nip04DecOutEl.textContent = String(e);
|
||||
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@
|
||||
const peer = requirePeerHex(nip44PeerEl.value);
|
||||
const msg = String(nip44MsgEl.value || "");
|
||||
const params = [peer, msg, getIndexOptions()];
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nip44_encrypt", params, "web-nip44-enc");
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nostr_nip44_encrypt", params, "web-nip44-enc");
|
||||
nip44OutEl.textContent = pretty(resp?.result ?? resp);
|
||||
if (resp && typeof resp.result === "string") {
|
||||
nip44DecPeerEl.value = peer;
|
||||
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@
|
||||
const peer = requirePeerHex(nip44DecPeerEl.value);
|
||||
const ciphertext = String(nip44CipherEl.value || "");
|
||||
const params = [peer, ciphertext, getIndexOptions()];
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nip44_decrypt", params, "web-nip44-dec");
|
||||
const resp = await rpcCall("nostr_nip44_decrypt", params, "web-nip44-dec");
|
||||
nip44DecOutEl.textContent = requireStringResult(resp, "NIP-44 decrypt");
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
nip44DecOutEl.textContent = String(e);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import time
|
||||
from coincurve import PrivateKey
|
||||
|
||||
HOST = "npub15uqyclnr3er7r8uhka7f0ae2yt4gkjat8gxdan04q0e6xrnwmtjswcyla3.fips"
|
||||
PORT = 8080
|
||||
PORT = 11111
|
||||
|
||||
# Demo caller key (32 bytes). Replace with your stable caller key in real use.
|
||||
PRIVKEY = bytes(range(1, 33))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@
|
||||
* bech32 npub for each.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is a cross-qube test client for Qubes OS: the signer runs in the
|
||||
* nostr_signer qube listening on tcp:[::]:8080, and this client runs in
|
||||
* nostr_signer qube listening on tcp:[::]:11111, and this client runs in
|
||||
* a different qube connecting to the signer's FIPS address.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage:
|
||||
* ./get_pubkey_tcp <host> <port>
|
||||
* ./get_pubkey_tcp npub1xxx...fips 8080
|
||||
* ./get_pubkey_tcp npub1xxx...fips 11111
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If no arguments are given, defaults to localhost:8080.
|
||||
* If no arguments are given, defaults to localhost:11111.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Output: for each index, prints:
|
||||
* index 0: hex=<64 hex chars> npub=npub1...
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int query_pubkey(const char *host, int port, int nostr_index,
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "nostr_get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "request failed for index %d: %s\n", nostr_index,
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
params = NULL; /* nsigner_client_call took ownership even on failure */
|
||||
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
const char *host = "127.0.0.1";
|
||||
int port = 8080;
|
||||
int port = 11111;
|
||||
char hex0[65], npub0[128];
|
||||
char hex1[65], npub1[128];
|
||||
int failures = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "nostr_get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %s\n", nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ def cmd_get_public_key(args):
|
||||
|
||||
def cmd_sign_event(args):
|
||||
event = json.loads(args.event)
|
||||
print(json.dumps(rpc(args, "sign_event", {"event": event}), indent=2))
|
||||
print(json.dumps(rpc(args, "nostr_sign_event", {"event": event}), indent=2))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_parser():
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,14 +5,14 @@
|
||||
* and bech32 npub for each.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is a cross-qube test client for Qubes OS: the signer runs in the
|
||||
* nostr_signer qube listening on tcp:[::]:8080, and this client runs in
|
||||
* nostr_signer qube listening on tcp:[::]:11111, and this client runs in
|
||||
* a different qube connecting to the signer's FIPS address.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage:
|
||||
* node n_signer_qube_example.js [host] [port]
|
||||
* node n_signer_qube_example.js fd56:d7c3:f605:719d:15b:18a0:fb06:982f 8080
|
||||
* node n_signer_qube_example.js fd56:d7c3:f605:719d:15b:18a0:fb06:982f 11111
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If no arguments are given, defaults to localhost:8080.
|
||||
* If no arguments are given, defaults to localhost:11111.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Protocol:
|
||||
* - 4-byte big-endian length prefix + JSON payload (TCP framing)
|
||||
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ function hexToNpub(pubkeyHex) {
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
const host = process.argv[2] || "127.0.0.1";
|
||||
const port = parseInt(process.argv[3] || "8080", 10);
|
||||
const port = parseInt(process.argv[3] || "11111", 10);
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(`Connecting to n_signer at ${host}:${port}`);
|
||||
console.log("Querying get_public_key for nostr_index 0 and 1...\n");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""
|
||||
otp_nostr_30078.py — example: encrypt data with OTP, wrap in a Nostr kind 30078
|
||||
event, sign it with n_signer, and print the signed event for publishing.
|
||||
|
||||
Workflow:
|
||||
1. Call n_signer's `otp_encrypt` verb to encrypt plaintext with the bound OTP pad.
|
||||
2. Build a Nostr kind 30078 (replaceable parameterized) event with the ASCII-armored
|
||||
ciphertext as the `content` field.
|
||||
3. Call n_signer's `sign_event` verb to sign the event with the secp256k1 key.
|
||||
4. Print the signed event JSON, ready to publish to Nostr relays.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a demo — it does not actually publish to a relay. To publish, send the
|
||||
signed event to your preferred Nostr relay using a library like nostr-tools,
|
||||
nostril, or nak.
|
||||
|
||||
Usage:
|
||||
python3 examples/otp_nostr_30078.py "Your secret message here"
|
||||
|
||||
Requirements:
|
||||
- n_signer running with --otp-pad-dir / --otp-pad bound, and a secp256k1
|
||||
role (e.g. "main") available for sign_event.
|
||||
- This script connects to n_signer via stdio (one process per request).
|
||||
|
||||
See plans/otp_nostr_integration.md for the full design.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import base64
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import struct
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import time
|
||||
|
||||
NSIGNER = "./build/nsigner"
|
||||
PAD_DIR = "/media/user/Music/pads"
|
||||
PAD_SPEC = "333e9902db839d9d"
|
||||
MNEMONIC_FILE = ".test_mnemonic"
|
||||
MNEMONIC_TMP = ".test_mnemonic_otp_30078.tmp"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def send_framed(proc, obj):
|
||||
payload = json.dumps(obj).encode()
|
||||
proc.stdin.write(struct.pack(">I", len(payload)))
|
||||
proc.stdin.write(payload)
|
||||
proc.stdin.flush()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def recv_framed(proc):
|
||||
"""Read a framed response, skipping any banner text on stdout."""
|
||||
buf = b""
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
b = proc.stdout.read(1)
|
||||
if not b:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
buf = (buf + b)[-4:]
|
||||
if len(buf) < 4:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
(length,) = struct.unpack(">I", buf)
|
||||
if 1 <= length <= 1024 * 1024:
|
||||
peek = proc.stdout.read(1)
|
||||
if peek == b"{":
|
||||
body = peek + proc.stdout.read(length - 1)
|
||||
return json.loads(body.decode())
|
||||
else:
|
||||
buf = (buf + peek)[-4:]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run_one_request(req_obj):
|
||||
"""Run nsigner in stdio mode for a single framed request/response."""
|
||||
shell_cmd = (
|
||||
f"exec 3<{MNEMONIC_TMP}; "
|
||||
f"exec {NSIGNER} --listen stdio --mnemonic-fd 3 "
|
||||
f"--otp-pad-dir {PAD_DIR} --otp-pad {PAD_SPEC} "
|
||||
f"--otp-allow-blkback --allow-all"
|
||||
)
|
||||
proc = subprocess.Popen(
|
||||
["bash", "-c", shell_cmd],
|
||||
stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
import time as _time
|
||||
_time.sleep(1.0)
|
||||
if proc.poll() is not None:
|
||||
err = proc.stderr.read().decode()
|
||||
print(f"ERROR: nsigner exited early (code {proc.returncode})")
|
||||
print(f"stderr: {err}")
|
||||
return None
|
||||
send_framed(proc, req_obj)
|
||||
resp = recv_framed(proc)
|
||||
proc.stdin.close()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
proc.wait(timeout=5)
|
||||
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
|
||||
proc.kill()
|
||||
return resp
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def compute_event_id(event):
|
||||
"""Compute the Nostr event ID (SHA-256 of the canonical serialized event)."""
|
||||
# Nostr event serialization: [0, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content]
|
||||
serialized = json.dumps([
|
||||
0,
|
||||
event["pubkey"],
|
||||
event["created_at"],
|
||||
event["kind"],
|
||||
event["tags"],
|
||||
event["content"],
|
||||
], separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode()).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
plaintext = " ".join(sys.argv[1:]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "Secret OTP message"
|
||||
print(f"Plaintext: {plaintext}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Prepare the mnemonic temp file.
|
||||
with open(MNEMONIC_FILE) as f:
|
||||
mnemonic = f.read().strip()
|
||||
with open(MNEMONIC_TMP, "w") as f:
|
||||
f.write(mnemonic + "\n")
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
# Step 1: Get the public key for the "main" role
|
||||
print("\n=== Step 1: get_public_key ===")
|
||||
resp = run_one_request({
|
||||
"id": "1",
|
||||
"method": "get_public_key",
|
||||
"params": [{"role": "main"}],
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp is None or "result" not in resp:
|
||||
print("ERROR: get_public_key failed")
|
||||
print(f"Response: {resp}")
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
# The result is a plain hex string for secp256k1 backward compat.
|
||||
pubkey_hex = resp["result"].strip('"')
|
||||
print(f"Public key: {pubkey_hex}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 2: Encrypt the plaintext with OTP
|
||||
print("\n=== Step 2: otp_encrypt ===")
|
||||
pt_b64 = base64.b64encode(plaintext.encode()).decode()
|
||||
resp = run_one_request({
|
||||
"id": "2",
|
||||
"method": "encrypt",
|
||||
"params": [pt_b64, {"algorithm": "otp", "encoding": "ascii"}],
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp is None or "result" not in resp:
|
||||
print("ERROR: otp_encrypt failed")
|
||||
print(f"Response: {resp}")
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
enc_result = json.loads(resp["result"])
|
||||
ciphertext = enc_result["ciphertext"]
|
||||
pad_chksum = enc_result["pad_chksum"]
|
||||
pad_offset = enc_result["pad_offset_after"]
|
||||
print(f"Pad checksum: {pad_chksum}")
|
||||
print(f"Pad offset after encrypt: {pad_offset}")
|
||||
print(f"Ciphertext (first 60 chars): {ciphertext[:60]}...")
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 3: Build the Nostr kind 30078 event
|
||||
print("\n=== Step 3: Build kind 30078 event ===")
|
||||
# Use a unique d-tag based on the pad checksum and offset.
|
||||
d_tag = f"otp-{pad_chksum[:16]}-{pad_offset}"
|
||||
event = {
|
||||
"pubkey": pubkey_hex,
|
||||
"created_at": int(time.time()),
|
||||
"kind": 30078,
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
["d", d_tag],
|
||||
["otp-pad", pad_chksum[:16]],
|
||||
["otp-version", "v0.0.2-otp"],
|
||||
["otp-encoding", "ascii"],
|
||||
],
|
||||
"content": ciphertext,
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Compute the event ID.
|
||||
event_id = compute_event_id(event)
|
||||
event["id"] = event_id
|
||||
print(f"Event ID: {event_id}")
|
||||
print(f"d-tag: {d_tag}")
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 4: Sign the event with n_signer
|
||||
print("\n=== Step 4: sign_event ===")
|
||||
# sign_event expects the event JSON as the first param (without id/sig).
|
||||
# The signer computes the id and signature internally.
|
||||
event_for_signing = {
|
||||
"pubkey": event["pubkey"],
|
||||
"created_at": event["created_at"],
|
||||
"kind": event["kind"],
|
||||
"tags": event["tags"],
|
||||
"content": event["content"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
resp = run_one_request({
|
||||
"id": "3",
|
||||
"method": "nostr_sign_event",
|
||||
"params": [json.dumps(event_for_signing), {"role": "main"}],
|
||||
})
|
||||
if resp is None or "result" not in resp:
|
||||
print("ERROR: sign_event failed")
|
||||
print(f"Response: {resp}")
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
sig = resp["result"].strip('"')
|
||||
event["sig"] = sig
|
||||
print(f"Signature: {sig[:60]}...")
|
||||
|
||||
# Step 5: Print the signed event
|
||||
print("\n=== Signed Nostr event (ready to publish) ===")
|
||||
print(json.dumps(event, indent=2))
|
||||
print(f"\nTo publish: send this event to a Nostr relay.")
|
||||
print(f"To decrypt: call otp_decrypt with the content field.")
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
os.unlink(MNEMONIC_TMP)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
sys.exit(main())
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* pq_kem_example.c — connect to a running n_signer over its abstract UNIX
|
||||
* socket and demonstrate post-quantum key encapsulation with ML-KEM-768.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The example:
|
||||
* 1. Sends a get_public_key request for an ML-KEM-768 role ("kem_main").
|
||||
* 2. Prints the structured public key (algorithm, public_key, key_id).
|
||||
* 3. Sends a kem_encapsulate request with the public key, obtaining a
|
||||
* ciphertext + shared secret.
|
||||
* 4. Sends a kem_decapsulate request with the ciphertext, recovering the
|
||||
* shared secret on the signer side.
|
||||
* 5. Prints both shared secrets — they should match.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prerequisites:
|
||||
* - n_signer must be running with a role configured for purpose=pq-kem,
|
||||
* curve=ml-kem-768, named "kem_main" (or pass the role name as the 2nd arg).
|
||||
* - A mnemonic must be loaded in the signer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage: ./pq_kem_example [socket_name] [role_name]
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Default socket_name: nsigner
|
||||
* Default role_name: kem_main
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "nostr_common.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_transport.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_client.h"
|
||||
#include "../cjson/cJSON.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static int get_structured_pubkey(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
char **out_pub_hex) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
*out_pub_hex = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ml-kem-768");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *pk_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "public_key");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(pk_item)) {
|
||||
*out_pub_hex = strdup(pk_item->valuestring);
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* kem_encapsulate: returns ciphertext_hex and shared_secret_hex (newly
|
||||
* allocated, caller frees). */
|
||||
static int kem_encapsulate(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
const char *pub_hex,
|
||||
char **out_ct_hex, char **out_ss_hex) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
*out_ct_hex = NULL;
|
||||
*out_ss_hex = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, cJSON_CreateString(pub_hex));
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ml-kem-768");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "encapsulate", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *ct_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "ciphertext");
|
||||
cJSON *ss_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "shared_secret");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(ct_item) && cJSON_IsString(ss_item)) {
|
||||
*out_ct_hex = strdup(ct_item->valuestring);
|
||||
*out_ss_hex = strdup(ss_item->valuestring);
|
||||
if (*out_ct_hex != NULL && *out_ss_hex != NULL) {
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char *kem_decapsulate(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
const char *ct_hex) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
char *ss_hex = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, cJSON_CreateString(ct_hex));
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ml-kem-768");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "decapsulate", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *ss_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "shared_secret");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(ss_item)) {
|
||||
ss_hex = strdup(ss_item->valuestring);
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return ss_hex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
const char *socket_name = "nsigner";
|
||||
const char *role = "kem_main";
|
||||
nsigner_transport_t *transport = NULL;
|
||||
nsigner_client_t *client = NULL;
|
||||
char *pub_hex = NULL;
|
||||
char *ct_hex = NULL;
|
||||
char *encap_ss_hex = NULL;
|
||||
char *decap_ss_hex = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc > 1 && argv[1] != NULL && argv[1][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
socket_name = argv[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (argc > 2 && argv[2] != NULL && argv[2][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
role = argv[2];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (nostr_init() != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "failed to initialize crypto subsystem\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
transport = nsigner_transport_open_unix(socket_name, 10000);
|
||||
if (transport == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot open unix transport @%s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client = nsigner_client_new(transport);
|
||||
if (client == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot create nsigner client\n");
|
||||
transport->close(transport);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("=== PQ KEM Example (ML-KEM-768) ===\n");
|
||||
printf("socket: %s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
printf("role: %s\n", role);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 1. Get the ML-KEM-768 public key. */
|
||||
if (get_structured_pubkey(client, role, &pub_hex) != 0 || pub_hex == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "get_public_key failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
printf("Public Key:\n");
|
||||
printf(" pub_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(pub_hex), strlen(pub_hex) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" pub_head: %.64s...\n", pub_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 2. Encapsulate with the public key. */
|
||||
printf("Encapsulating with public key...\n");
|
||||
if (kem_encapsulate(client, role, pub_hex, &ct_hex, &encap_ss_hex) != 0) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "kem_encapsulate failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
printf("Ciphertext:\n");
|
||||
printf(" ct_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(ct_hex), strlen(ct_hex) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" ct_head: %.64s...\n", ct_hex);
|
||||
printf("Encapsulated shared secret:\n");
|
||||
printf(" ss: %s\n", encap_ss_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 3. Decapsulate with the ciphertext (uses the role's private key). */
|
||||
printf("Decapsulating ciphertext on signer side...\n");
|
||||
decap_ss_hex = kem_decapsulate(client, role, ct_hex);
|
||||
if (decap_ss_hex == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "kem_decapsulate failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
printf("Decapsulated shared secret:\n");
|
||||
printf(" ss: %s\n", decap_ss_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 4. Verify the shared secrets match. */
|
||||
if (strcmp(encap_ss_hex, decap_ss_hex) == 0) {
|
||||
printf("SUCCESS: shared secrets match!\n");
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
printf("FAILURE: shared secrets do NOT match!\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
free(pub_hex);
|
||||
free(ct_hex);
|
||||
free(encap_ss_hex);
|
||||
free(decap_ss_hex);
|
||||
nsigner_client_free(client);
|
||||
nostr_cleanup();
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* pq_sign_example.c — connect to a running n_signer over its abstract UNIX
|
||||
* socket and demonstrate post-quantum signing with ML-DSA-65.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The example:
|
||||
* 1. Sends a get_public_key request for an ML-DSA-65 role ("pq_sig").
|
||||
* 2. Prints the structured public key (algorithm, public_key, key_id).
|
||||
* 3. Sends a sign_data request with a test message.
|
||||
* 4. Prints the signature (hex) and algorithm.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prerequisites:
|
||||
* - n_signer must be running with a role configured for purpose=pq-sig,
|
||||
* curve=ml-dsa-65, named "pq_sig" (or pass the role name as the 2nd arg).
|
||||
* - A mnemonic must be loaded in the signer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage: ./pq_sign_example [socket_name] [role_name]
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Default socket_name: nsigner
|
||||
* Default role_name: pq_sig
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "nostr_common.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_transport.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_client.h"
|
||||
#include "../cjson/cJSON.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static int get_structured_pubkey(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
cJSON **out_obj) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
*out_obj = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ml-dsa-65");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* result is a cJSON string containing the serialized structured object. */
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL && cJSON_IsObject(parsed)) {
|
||||
*out_obj = parsed;
|
||||
parsed = NULL;
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char *sign_data(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
const char *msg_hex) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
char *sig_hex = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, cJSON_CreateString(msg_hex));
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ml-dsa-65");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "sign", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* result is a string containing {"signature":"<hex>","algorithm":"<alg>"} */
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *sig_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "signature");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(sig_item)) {
|
||||
sig_hex = strdup(sig_item->valuestring);
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return sig_hex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
const char *socket_name = "nsigner";
|
||||
const char *role = "pq_sig";
|
||||
/* "hello post-quantum world" in hex */
|
||||
const char *msg_hex = "68656c6c6f20706f73742d7175616e74756d20776f726c64";
|
||||
nsigner_transport_t *transport = NULL;
|
||||
nsigner_client_t *client = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *pubkey_obj = NULL;
|
||||
char *sig_hex = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc > 1 && argv[1] != NULL && argv[1][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
socket_name = argv[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (argc > 2 && argv[2] != NULL && argv[2][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
role = argv[2];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (nostr_init() != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "failed to initialize crypto subsystem\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
transport = nsigner_transport_open_unix(socket_name, 10000);
|
||||
if (transport == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot open unix transport @%s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client = nsigner_client_new(transport);
|
||||
if (client == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot create nsigner client\n");
|
||||
transport->close(transport);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("=== PQ Sign Example (ML-DSA-65) ===\n");
|
||||
printf("socket: %s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
printf("role: %s\n", role);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 1. Get the structured public key. */
|
||||
if (get_structured_pubkey(client, role, &pubkey_obj) != 0 || pubkey_obj == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "get_public_key failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
cJSON *alg_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(pubkey_obj, "algorithm");
|
||||
cJSON *pk_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(pubkey_obj, "public_key");
|
||||
cJSON *kid_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(pubkey_obj, "key_id");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Public Key:\n");
|
||||
printf(" algorithm: %s\n",
|
||||
(cJSON_IsString(alg_item)) ? alg_item->valuestring : "?");
|
||||
printf(" key_id: %s\n",
|
||||
(cJSON_IsString(kid_item)) ? kid_item->valuestring : "?");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(pk_item)) {
|
||||
/* ML-DSA-65 public key is 3904 hex chars — print length + prefix. */
|
||||
printf(" pub_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(pk_item->valuestring), strlen(pk_item->valuestring) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" pub_head: %.64s...\n", pk_item->valuestring);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
printf(" public_key: (missing)\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 2. Sign a test message. */
|
||||
printf("Signing message (hex): %s\n", msg_hex);
|
||||
sig_hex = sign_data(client, role, msg_hex);
|
||||
if (sig_hex == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "sign_data failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Signature:\n");
|
||||
printf(" sig_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(sig_hex), strlen(sig_hex) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" sig_head: %.64s...\n", sig_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("To verify externally, use ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) verify with the\n");
|
||||
printf("public key above, the message, and this signature.\n");
|
||||
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
free(sig_hex);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(pubkey_obj);
|
||||
nsigner_client_free(client);
|
||||
nostr_cleanup();
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL; /* owned by params now */
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "sign_event", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "nostr_sign_event", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "request failed: %s\n", nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* ssh_sign_example.c — connect to a running n_signer over its abstract UNIX
|
||||
* socket and demonstrate SSH signing with ed25519.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The example:
|
||||
* 1. Sends a get_public_key request for an SSH/ed25519 role ("ssh_main").
|
||||
* 2. Prints the structured public key (algorithm, public_key, key_id).
|
||||
* 3. Sends an ssh_sign request with a test session ID.
|
||||
* 4. Prints the signature (hex) and algorithm.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Prerequisites:
|
||||
* - n_signer must be running with a role configured for purpose=ssh,
|
||||
* curve=ed25519, named "ssh_main" (or pass the role name as the 2nd arg).
|
||||
* - A mnemonic must be loaded in the signer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage: ./ssh_sign_example [socket_name] [role_name]
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Default socket_name: nsigner
|
||||
* Default role_name: ssh_main
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "nostr_common.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_transport.h"
|
||||
#include "nsigner_client.h"
|
||||
#include "../cjson/cJSON.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static int get_structured_pubkey(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
char **out_pub_hex, char **out_key_id) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
*out_pub_hex = NULL;
|
||||
*out_key_id = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ed25519");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "get_public_key", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *pk_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "public_key");
|
||||
cJSON *kid_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "key_id");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(pk_item)) {
|
||||
*out_pub_hex = strdup(pk_item->valuestring);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(kid_item)) {
|
||||
*out_key_id = strdup(kid_item->valuestring);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (*out_pub_hex != NULL) {
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static char *ssh_sign(nsigner_client_t *client, const char *role,
|
||||
const char *msg_hex) {
|
||||
cJSON *params = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *opts = NULL;
|
||||
cJSON *result = NULL;
|
||||
char *sig_hex = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
params = cJSON_CreateArray();
|
||||
if (params == NULL) return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, cJSON_CreateString(msg_hex));
|
||||
|
||||
opts = cJSON_CreateObject();
|
||||
if (opts == NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_AddStringToObject(opts, "algorithm", "ed25519");
|
||||
cJSON_AddNumberToObject(opts, "index", 0);
|
||||
cJSON_AddItemToArray(params, opts);
|
||||
opts = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nsigner_client_call(client, "sign", params, &result) != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
params = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(result)) {
|
||||
cJSON *parsed = cJSON_Parse(result->valuestring);
|
||||
if (parsed != NULL) {
|
||||
cJSON *sig_item = cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(parsed, "signature");
|
||||
if (cJSON_IsString(sig_item)) {
|
||||
sig_hex = strdup(sig_item->valuestring);
|
||||
}
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(parsed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(result);
|
||||
cJSON_Delete(params);
|
||||
return sig_hex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
|
||||
const char *socket_name = "nsigner";
|
||||
const char *role = "ssh_main";
|
||||
/* A fake SSH session ID (32 bytes = 64 hex chars) for demonstration. */
|
||||
const char *session_id_hex =
|
||||
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
|
||||
nsigner_transport_t *transport = NULL;
|
||||
nsigner_client_t *client = NULL;
|
||||
char *pub_hex = NULL;
|
||||
char *key_id = NULL;
|
||||
char *sig_hex = NULL;
|
||||
int rc = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc > 1 && argv[1] != NULL && argv[1][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
socket_name = argv[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (argc > 2 && argv[2] != NULL && argv[2][0] != '\0') {
|
||||
role = argv[2];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (nostr_init() != NOSTR_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "failed to initialize crypto subsystem\n");
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
transport = nsigner_transport_open_unix(socket_name, 10000);
|
||||
if (transport == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot open unix transport @%s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
client = nsigner_client_new(transport);
|
||||
if (client == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "connect failed: cannot create nsigner client\n");
|
||||
transport->close(transport);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
transport = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
printf("=== SSH Sign Example (ed25519) ===\n");
|
||||
printf("socket: %s\n", socket_name);
|
||||
printf("role: %s\n", role);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 1. Get the ed25519 public key. */
|
||||
if (get_structured_pubkey(client, role, &pub_hex, &key_id) != 0 ||
|
||||
pub_hex == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "get_public_key failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
printf("Public Key:\n");
|
||||
printf(" algorithm: ed25519\n");
|
||||
printf(" key_id: %s\n", (key_id != NULL) ? key_id : "?");
|
||||
printf(" pub_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(pub_hex), strlen(pub_hex) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" pubkey: %s\n", pub_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* 2. Sign a test SSH session ID. */
|
||||
printf("Signing SSH session ID (hex): %s\n", session_id_hex);
|
||||
sig_hex = ssh_sign(client, role, session_id_hex);
|
||||
if (sig_hex == NULL) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "ssh_sign failed: %s\n",
|
||||
nsigner_client_last_error(client));
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Signature:\n");
|
||||
printf(" sig_len: %zu hex chars (%zu bytes)\n",
|
||||
strlen(sig_hex), strlen(sig_hex) / 2);
|
||||
printf(" sig: %s\n", sig_hex);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("This ed25519 signature can be verified with the public key above\n");
|
||||
printf("using standard ed25519 verify (e.g. libsodium, OpenSSL EVP_DigestVerify).\n");
|
||||
|
||||
rc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
free(pub_hex);
|
||||
free(key_id);
|
||||
free(sig_hex);
|
||||
nsigner_client_free(client);
|
||||
nostr_cleanup();
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -53,6 +53,26 @@ WebUSB path:
|
||||
- Run `get_public_key`
|
||||
- Confirm pubkey matches CDC result
|
||||
|
||||
## CYD (ESP32-2432S028) validation — Web Serial
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD has no native USB; its CH340 bridge exposes a serial port. The browser
|
||||
transport is **Web Serial** (`navigator.serial`), Chromium-only. A full test
|
||||
page covering every algorithm and verb lives at
|
||||
[`examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html`](../examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html):
|
||||
|
||||
- Open [`examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html`](../examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html) in Chrome/Edge
|
||||
- Click **Connect Web Serial**, select the CH340 port (`1a86:7523`)
|
||||
- Exercise each card: `get_public_key` (all 6 algorithms), `sign`/`verify`,
|
||||
`encapsulate`/`decapsulate`, `derive_shared_secret`, `derive`,
|
||||
`nostr_get_public_key`, `nostr_sign_event`, `nostr_mine_event`,
|
||||
`nostr_nip04`/`nostr_nip44` encrypt+decrypt, and `encrypt`/`decrypt` (otp)
|
||||
- Each request shows the raw JSON-RPC request and response
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD firmware (v0.0.2+) speaks the same algorithm-based API as the host
|
||||
([`README.md`](../README.md) §4). The OTP pad is derived from the mnemonic
|
||||
seed (no USB pad on this board); the offset advances monotonically and is
|
||||
reported in every `encrypt`/`decrypt` response.
|
||||
|
||||
## Linux WebUSB host setup (one-time)
|
||||
|
||||
Chrome and Edge need permission to open the device on Linux. Install a udev rule for the firmware VID:PID and reload rules:
|
||||
@@ -99,3 +119,166 @@ Notes:
|
||||
- Typical working range is ~4.7uF to 22uF; 10uF is recommended
|
||||
- Keep leads short for best stability
|
||||
- Auto-reset behavior for flashing may still work, but if flashing ever becomes unreliable, enter bootloader manually
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-quantum crypto support (Phase 7)
|
||||
|
||||
Both firmware targets (`feather_s3_tft` and `cyd_esp32_2432s028`) now include
|
||||
the three NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithms alongside the existing
|
||||
secp256k1 (Nostr) and new ed25519/x25519 classical algorithms:
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Standard | Purpose | Pub key | Priv key | Sig/Ct |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 | — | Nostr (existing) | 32 B | 32 B | 64 B |
|
||||
| ed25519 | RFC 8032 | SSH signatures | 32 B | 32 B | 64 B |
|
||||
| x25519 | RFC 7748 | Key agreement (age) | 32 B | 32 B | — |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | FIPS 204 | PQ signatures | 1952 B | 4032 B | 3309 B |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | FIPS 205 | PQ hash-based sigs | 32 B | 64 B | 7856 B |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | FIPS 203 | PQ key encapsulation | 1184 B | 2400 B | 1088 B |
|
||||
|
||||
### mbedtls backend (vs OpenSSL on host)
|
||||
|
||||
The host build uses OpenSSL EVP for SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-512,
|
||||
SHAKE-128, and SHAKE-256. On ESP32, OpenSSL is not available. Instead, the
|
||||
firmware uses a **crypto backend abstraction** ([`resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend.h`](../resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend.h))
|
||||
with two implementations:
|
||||
|
||||
- [`resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_openssl.c`](../resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_openssl.c) — host build (OpenSSL EVP)
|
||||
- [`resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c`](../resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c) — ESP32 firmware (mbedtls + vendored Keccak)
|
||||
|
||||
The mbedtls backend uses:
|
||||
- `mbedtls_sha256()` for SHA-256 (ESP32 hardware accelerated where available)
|
||||
- `mbedtls_sha512()` for SHA-512 (ESP32 hardware accelerated where available)
|
||||
- A **self-contained Keccak-f[1600]** implementation (FIPS 202, public domain)
|
||||
for SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, and SHAKE-256. This is vendored directly
|
||||
in `crypto_backend_mbedtls.c` because ESP-IDF v5.x mbedtls does not expose
|
||||
SHAKE (and SHA3 is only available when `CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA3_C` is set) through
|
||||
the `mbedtls_md` API. Carrying the Keccak core avoids any mbedtls config
|
||||
dependency for the PQ algorithms.
|
||||
|
||||
### ed25519 / x25519 via PSA crypto
|
||||
|
||||
ESP-IDF v5.x mbedtls removed the low-level `mbedtls_ed25519_*` functions. The
|
||||
firmware uses the **PSA Crypto API** for ed25519 sign/verify/key-derivation and
|
||||
x25519 key derivation + ECDH. Enable PSA in `sdkconfig.defaults`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C=y
|
||||
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED=y
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### No SHA3/SHAKE menuconfig requirement
|
||||
|
||||
Because SHA3/SHAKE are provided by the vendored Keccak core (not mbedtls), you
|
||||
do **not** need to enable `CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA3_C` or any SHAKE config. The PQ
|
||||
algorithms build and run with the default mbedtls configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
### PQClean component
|
||||
|
||||
The PQClean algorithm code is compiled as an ESP-IDF component at
|
||||
`components/pqclean/`. The component's `CMakeLists.txt` references the shared
|
||||
source files in [`resources/pqclean/`](../resources/pqclean/) via relative
|
||||
paths, so there is a single source of truth for both host and firmware builds.
|
||||
|
||||
The component includes:
|
||||
- ML-DSA-65: `sign.c`, `poly.c`, `ntt.c`
|
||||
- SLH-DSA-128s: `sign.c`, `fors.c`, `wots.c`, `hash.c`, `thash.c`, `address.c`, `utils.c`
|
||||
- ML-KEM-768: `kem.c`, `indcpa.c`, `poly.c`, `ntt.c`, `cbd.c`, `reduce.c`, `symmetric.c`, `verify.c`
|
||||
- Common: `fips202.c`, `sha2.c`, `crypto_backend_mbedtls.c`
|
||||
- Firmware DRBG: `pq_drbg_firmware.c`, `randombytes_mbedtls.c`
|
||||
|
||||
### Flash usage estimates
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Code size (approx) |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | ~150 KB |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | ~80 KB |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | ~120 KB |
|
||||
| Total PQ code | ~350 KB |
|
||||
|
||||
The ESP32-S3 (Feather S3 TFT) has 8 MB flash and the ESP32 (CYD) has 4 MB
|
||||
flash. The PQ code fits comfortably in both, but partition sizes may need
|
||||
adjustment if the total app image exceeds the default partition.
|
||||
|
||||
### RAM usage notes
|
||||
|
||||
PQ key buffers are large compared to classical ECC keys:
|
||||
|
||||
| Buffer | Size |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 private key | 4032 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 public key | 1952 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 signature | 3309 bytes |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s signature | 7856 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 private key | 2400 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 public key | 1184 bytes |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 ciphertext | 1088 bytes |
|
||||
|
||||
The ESP32 has ~320 KB available heap (after WiFi/BT are disabled). These
|
||||
buffers **must not be stack-allocated** — the default task stack is 8 KB.
|
||||
Use `malloc()` or static buffers. The firmware derives PQ keys **on demand**
|
||||
(not all at startup) to keep peak RAM usage low.
|
||||
|
||||
### SLH-DSA-128s signing latency warning
|
||||
|
||||
SLH-DSA-128s (SPHINCS+-128s) is a hash-based signature scheme with a deep
|
||||
hypertree structure (7 layers of WOTS+ + Merkle trees). On the ESP32-S3
|
||||
(240 MHz dual-core), expect:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key generation**: 5–30 seconds
|
||||
- **Signing**: 5–30 seconds
|
||||
- **Verification**: 0.5–2 seconds
|
||||
|
||||
This is inherent to the algorithm — it trades computation for minimal trust
|
||||
assumptions (only SHA-256). The firmware logs a warning before SLH-DSA-128s
|
||||
keygen/signing. Users should choose whether to use SLH-DSA-128s per-role
|
||||
based on their latency tolerance. ML-DSA-65 is much faster (~100 ms for
|
||||
signing on ESP32-S3) and is the recommended PQ signature algorithm for
|
||||
interactive use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Derivation paths
|
||||
|
||||
All algorithms derive from the mnemonic using BIP-32/HMAC-SHA512 with
|
||||
SLIP-0010 all-hardened derivation for ed25519/x25519/PQ:
|
||||
|
||||
| Algorithm | Path | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 (Nostr) | `m/44'/1237'/<n>'/0/0` | NIP-06, existing |
|
||||
| ed25519 (SSH) | `m/44'/102001'/<n>'/0'/0'` | SLIP-0010 |
|
||||
| x25519 (age) | `m/44'/102002'/<n>'/0'/0'` | SLIP-0010 |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 | `m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0'/0'` | seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
| SLH-DSA-128s | `m/44'/102004'/<n>'/0'/0'` | seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
| ML-KEM-768 | `m/44'/102005'/<n>'/0'/0'` | seed → PQClean keygen |
|
||||
|
||||
The PQ derivation produces a 32-byte seed that feeds a deterministic
|
||||
SHAKE-256 DRBG ([`pq_drbg_firmware.c`](feather_s3_tft/components/pqclean/pq_drbg_firmware.c)),
|
||||
which replaces PQClean's `randombytes()` during keygen. This gives
|
||||
deterministic, mnemonic-recoverable PQ keys — same mnemonic, same key pair.
|
||||
|
||||
### Firmware API
|
||||
|
||||
The firmware exposes PQ operations via [`pq_crypto_firmware.h`](feather_s3_tft/main/pq_crypto_firmware.h):
|
||||
|
||||
```c
|
||||
/* Key generation (deterministic from mnemonic-derived seed) */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32], uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32], uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32], uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Signing / verification */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen, ...);
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen, ...);
|
||||
|
||||
/* KEM encaps / decaps */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_encaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_decaps(uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *ct, const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Key derivation from the mnemonic seed is via [`key_derivation.h`](feather_s3_tft/main/key_derivation.h):
|
||||
|
||||
```c
|
||||
int derive_ed25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index, ...);
|
||||
int derive_x25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index, ...);
|
||||
int derive_ml_dsa_65_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index, ...);
|
||||
int derive_slh_dsa_128s_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index, ...);
|
||||
int derive_ml_kem_768_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index, ...);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
||||
# n_signer BLE Wearable Signer
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** Concept — brainstorming. No plan yet.
|
||||
|
||||
A small, battery-powered wearable hardware signer that communicates with a host
|
||||
over **Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)**. The host sends JSON-RPC requests over a
|
||||
BLE GATT characteristic; the signer shows an approval prompt on a tiny display;
|
||||
the user taps a button to approve; the signed response goes back over BLE.
|
||||
|
||||
## Concept
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
Host[Host: phone/laptop<br/>n_signer client] -->|BLE GATT| Signer[Wearable signer<br/>nRF52840 + OLED]
|
||||
Signer -->|approve/deny button| User[User]
|
||||
Signer -->|BLE GATT response| Host
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The signer speaks the same algorithm-based API as the host and the CYD/Teensy
|
||||
firmware ([`README.md`](../../README.md) §4). The auth envelope (kind 27235)
|
||||
protects the BLE wire — even if BLE is sniffed, an attacker can't forge
|
||||
requests without the caller's secp256k1 private key.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why BLE
|
||||
|
||||
- **Wearable form factor** — always with you (wristband, pendant, card)
|
||||
- **No physical connection** — no USB cable, no host-side driver, no dongle
|
||||
- **Universal host support** — phones, laptops, tablets all have BT
|
||||
- **Low power** — nRF52840 draws ~5 mA active, ~1 µA sleep
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardware (preliminary)
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | **nRF52840** (Nordic) | Cortex-M4 @ 64 MHz, 1 MB flash, 256 KB RAM, BT 5.0, hardware AES/ECC, USB device, NFC-A. ~$5-8. |
|
||||
| Display | 0.96" or 1.3" SSD1306 OLED (I2C) or 1.02" e-paper | Small is fine — only shows "approve kind 1 from <caller>?" |
|
||||
| Input | 2-3 tactile buttons (approve/deny/back) | No touch at this size |
|
||||
| Power | 200 mAh coin cell or small LiPo | Weeks of battery life |
|
||||
| Mnemonic entry | Buttons (scroll words), NFC from phone, or generate-on-device | The hard UX problem |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security considerations
|
||||
|
||||
- **BT stack attack surface:** BLE has a large stack (pairing, GATT, L2CAP, SMP).
|
||||
A stack bug could allow code execution. Mitigations: use Nordic's audited
|
||||
SoftDevice, disable unnecessary services, require LE Secure Connections pairing.
|
||||
- **Radio range (~10 m):** an attacker in the same room could potentially
|
||||
interact with the signer. The auth envelope + approval prompt protect against
|
||||
this, but the radio is omnidirectional.
|
||||
- **Pairing UX:** BT pairing can be frustrating. LE Secure Connections (Numeric
|
||||
Comparison) is the most secure and user-friendly pairing method.
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions
|
||||
|
||||
- **Mnemonic entry on a tiny screen:** scroll through 2048 BIP-39 words with
|
||||
up/down buttons (like Coldcard)? Load via NFC from a phone? Generate on-device
|
||||
and display for the user to write down?
|
||||
- **PQ crypto on nRF52840:** 256 KB RAM is enough for ML-DSA-65 (~6 KB heap)
|
||||
but SLH-DSA-128s is heavy. May need to limit the PQ algorithm set or stream
|
||||
the keygen.
|
||||
- **Display choice:** OLED (fast refresh, high power) vs e-paper (slow refresh,
|
||||
zero power when static, persistent display).
|
||||
- **Form factor:** wristband? pendant? card? What's the target use case —
|
||||
daily signing, emergency key access, or a backup signer?
|
||||
|
||||
## Comparison to the IR air-gap signer
|
||||
|
||||
| | BLE wearable | IR air-gap |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Air-gap | Medium (radio, ~10 m, omnidirectional) | High (light, line-of-sight, ~1 m) |
|
||||
| Attack surface | Large (BT stack) | Small (no BT, dumb dongle) |
|
||||
| Host compatibility | Universal (phones, laptops) | Requires USB dongle |
|
||||
| Form factor | Wearable | Handheld (point at dongle) |
|
||||
| Throughput | ~250 KB/s (BLE 5) | ~11 KB/s (raw IR) or ~400 KB/s (IrDA) |
|
||||
| Novelty | Conventional | Novel (no hardware wallet uses IR) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Next steps
|
||||
|
||||
- Decide on the MCU (nRF52840 vs RP2040+BT-module)
|
||||
- Decide on mnemonic entry method
|
||||
- Decide on display (OLED vs e-paper)
|
||||
- Write a port plan (similar to [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
|
||||
# n_signer CYD Firmware (ESP32-2432S028)
|
||||
|
||||
The **Cheap Yellow Display** (ESP32-2432S028) is a $15 ESP32-WROOM-32 board with
|
||||
a 2.8" 320×240 ILI9341 resistive-touch display, CH340 USB-UART bridge, and a
|
||||
Micro SD card slot. This firmware turns it into a hardware n_signer that speaks
|
||||
the same algorithm-based API as the host ([`README.md`](../../README.md) §4).
|
||||
|
||||
**Firmware version:** 0.0.2 (algorithm-based API)
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardware summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Concern | Value |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | ESP32-WROOM-32 (classic, dual-core Xtensa, 512 KB SRAM, no PSRAM) |
|
||||
| USB-UART | CH340 (`1a86:7523`) → `/dev/ttyUSB0` |
|
||||
| Flash | 4 MB |
|
||||
| Display | 2.8" 320×240 ILI9341 (HSPI: DC=IO2, CS=IO15, SCK=IO14, MOSI=IO13, MISO=IO12, BL=IO21) |
|
||||
| Touch | XPT2046 resistive (bit-banged SPI: CLK=IO25, MOSI=IO32, CS=IO33, MISO=IO39, IRQ=IO36) |
|
||||
| SD card | Micro SD, VSPI (CS=IO5, SCK=IO18, MISO=IO19, MOSI=IO23) |
|
||||
| RGB LED | R=IO4, G=IO16, B=IO17 (active LOW) |
|
||||
| LDR | IO34 |
|
||||
| Speaker | IO26 (DAC) |
|
||||
| BOOT button | IO0 |
|
||||
| GUI | LVGL 8.3 |
|
||||
|
||||
For the full pin map, connectors (P1/P3/CN1), and add-ons, see the upstream
|
||||
hardware docs copied to [`docs/`](docs/) — especially
|
||||
[`docs/PINS.md`](docs/PINS.md) and [`docs/SETUP.md`](docs/SETUP.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## SD card — size limits and OTP pad storage
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD's Micro SD slot is wired to VSPI (IO5/18/19/23). ESP-IDF drives it via
|
||||
the SDSPI host + FATFS filesystem. The proven bring-up example is
|
||||
`07_sd_card` in the `esp32_playground/cyb-esp32-2432s028/` workspace.
|
||||
|
||||
**Size limits:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **SDSC (≤ 2 GB):** supported.
|
||||
- **SDHC (2 GB – 32 GB):** supported — this is the recommended range. The
|
||||
Makerfabs CYD ships with a 16 GB card, which works.
|
||||
- **SDXC (> 32 GB):** **not supported** out of the box. SDXC cards ship
|
||||
formatted as exFAT, and ESP-IDF's FATFS does not include exFAT. An SDXC card
|
||||
reformatted to FAT32 will work up to 32 GB; beyond that, FAT32's 32 GB limit
|
||||
applies. For OTP pad storage, 32 GB is vastly more than enough (see below).
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommendation:** use any **SDHC card from 4–32 GB** formatted **FAT32**.
|
||||
|
||||
### Using the SD card for the OTP pad
|
||||
|
||||
The current v0.0.2 firmware derives the OTP pad from the mnemonic seed via
|
||||
HKDF-SHA256 into a 1024-byte in-RAM pad (no SD card required). This keeps the
|
||||
wire contract identical to the host's `encrypt`/`decrypt` (algorithm:"otp")
|
||||
verbs but limits the pad to 1024 bytes per session.
|
||||
|
||||
To hold a **large OTP pad** (the original n_signer host design binds a pad file
|
||||
from `--otp-pad-dir`), the SD card is the right storage. The plan:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Format the SD card as FAT32.
|
||||
2. Place a pad file (e.g. `nsigner.pad`) on it — any size up to the card's free
|
||||
space. A 1 GB pad gives ~1 billion one-time-pad bytes before exhaustion.
|
||||
3. The firmware mounts the SD card at boot via `esp_vfs_fat_sdmmc_mount()` on
|
||||
the SDSPI host, opens the pad file, and reads pad bytes on demand into a
|
||||
small ring buffer, advancing a persistent offset (stored in a small
|
||||
`nsigner.offset` file on the SD so the offset survives power cycles).
|
||||
4. The `encrypt`/`decrypt` verbs XOR against the SD-backed pad instead of the
|
||||
HKDF-derived in-RAM pad.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a planned enhancement (see [`plans/cyd_algorithm_api_upgrade.md`](../../plans/cyd_algorithm_api_upgrade.md)
|
||||
§13 — the current implementation uses the mnemonic-derived pad as the embedded
|
||||
fallback). The SD card slot is confirmed working and the pin map is in
|
||||
[`docs/PINS.md`](docs/PINS.md).
|
||||
|
||||
**Note on simultaneous display + touch + SD:** The CYD's display (HSPI), touch
|
||||
(bit-banged), and SD (VSPI) use three different SPI buses. All three can run at
|
||||
the same time — the touch is bit-banged precisely so it doesn't contend with
|
||||
the other two hardware SPI buses (see [`docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md`](docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
## Building and flashing
|
||||
|
||||
Requires ESP-IDF v5.x (tested with v5.4.2). The classic ESP32 target uses the
|
||||
`xtensa-esp-elf` unified toolchain.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
source /home/user/esp/esp-idf/export.sh
|
||||
cd firmware/cyd_esp32_2432s028
|
||||
idf.py build
|
||||
idf.py -p /dev/ttyUSB0 flash
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If flashing fails with `Wrong boot mode detected (0x13)`, see the serial-reset
|
||||
hardware note below.
|
||||
|
||||
## Validation — Web Serial
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD has no native USB; the CH340 bridge exposes a serial port. The browser
|
||||
transport is **Web Serial** (`navigator.serial`), Chromium-only. A full test
|
||||
page covering every algorithm and verb lives at
|
||||
[`examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html`](../../examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html):
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open [`examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html`](../../examples/cyd_webserial_demo.html) in Chrome/Edge.
|
||||
2. Click **Connect Web Serial**, select the CH340 port (`1a86:7523`).
|
||||
3. On the CYD touchscreen, enter or generate a mnemonic to reach the "ready" state.
|
||||
4. Exercise each card: `get_public_key` (all 6 algorithms), `sign`/`verify`,
|
||||
`encapsulate`/`decapsulate`, `derive_shared_secret`, `derive`,
|
||||
`nostr_get_public_key`, `nostr_sign_event`, `nostr_mine_event`,
|
||||
`nostr_nip04`/`nostr_nip44` encrypt+decrypt, and `encrypt`/`decrypt` (otp).
|
||||
|
||||
## API
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD firmware speaks the same algorithm-based API as the host n_signer
|
||||
([`README.md`](../../README.md) §4). Supported verbs:
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | Algorithms |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `get_public_key` | secp256k1, ed25519, x25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s, ml-kem-768 |
|
||||
| `sign` / `verify` | secp256k1 (schnorr/ecdsa), ed25519, ml-dsa-65, slh-dsa-128s |
|
||||
| `encapsulate` / `decapsulate` | ml-kem-768 |
|
||||
| `derive_shared_secret` | x25519 |
|
||||
| `derive` | secp256k1 (HMAC-SHA256) |
|
||||
| `encrypt` / `decrypt` | otp |
|
||||
| `nostr_get_public_key` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) |
|
||||
| `nostr_sign_event` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) |
|
||||
| `nostr_mine_event` | secp256k1 (NIP-06, single-threaded PoW) |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip04_encrypt` / `decrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) |
|
||||
| `nostr_nip44_encrypt` / `decrypt` | secp256k1 (NIP-06) |
|
||||
|
||||
All requests require an auth envelope (kind 27235). The `key_id` in every
|
||||
structured result is the first 16 hex characters of the public key, matching
|
||||
the host. Invalid `(verb, algorithm)` pairs return error `1010`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Embedded-specific notes
|
||||
|
||||
- **OTP pad:** derived from the mnemonic seed (HKDF-SHA256, 1024 bytes) in
|
||||
v0.0.2. The offset advances monotonically and is reported in every
|
||||
`encrypt`/`decrypt` response. SD-card-backed pad is a planned enhancement
|
||||
(see above).
|
||||
- **`nostr_mine_event`:** single-threaded, hard 30 s default timeout, shows a
|
||||
"mining…" screen. Keep difficulty low (≤ 8) on ESP32.
|
||||
- **SLH-DSA-128s:** keygen and signing take 5–30 s. The UI shows a "deriving
|
||||
key…" / "signing…" indicator. ML-DSA-65 is much faster (~100 ms) and is the
|
||||
recommended PQ signature algorithm for interactive use.
|
||||
|
||||
## Crypto backend
|
||||
|
||||
- **SHA-256 / SHA-512:** mbedtls (ESP32 hardware accelerated).
|
||||
- **SHA3 / SHAKE-128 / SHAKE-256:** vendored Keccak-f[1600] (FIPS 202) in
|
||||
[`resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c`](../../resources/pqclean/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c).
|
||||
No `CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA3_C` or SHAKE menuconfig dependency.
|
||||
- **ed25519 / x25519:** PSA Crypto API (`psa_import_key`, `psa_sign_message`,
|
||||
`psa_raw_key_agreement`, etc.) — ESP-IDF v5.x mbedtls removed the
|
||||
`mbedtls_ed25519_*` functions. Requires `CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C=y`
|
||||
(set in [`sdkconfig.defaults`](sdkconfig.defaults)).
|
||||
- **secp256k1:** the vendored secp256k1 component (schnorr + ECDSA).
|
||||
- **PQ (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s, ML-KEM-768):** PQClean via the
|
||||
[`components/pqclean/`](components/pqclean/) component.
|
||||
|
||||
## Serial-reset hardware note (CH340 auto-reset)
|
||||
|
||||
Opening `/dev/ttyUSB0` can reset the ESP32 because the CH340's DTR/RTS lines
|
||||
are wired into the ESP32 auto-reset circuit. Symptoms: the device returns to
|
||||
the startup menu when a host app opens the serial port.
|
||||
|
||||
**Mitigation:** add a **10 µF capacitor between EN and GND** on the CYD board
|
||||
(negative leg to GND). Typical working range is 4.7–22 µF. This also fixes the
|
||||
`Wrong boot mode detected (0x13)` flashing error. See
|
||||
[`docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md`](docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md) and the
|
||||
[`firmware/README.md`](../README.md) CYD section for details.
|
||||
|
||||
## Reference documentation
|
||||
|
||||
- [`docs/`](docs/) — upstream CYD hardware docs (PINS, SETUP, TROUBLESHOOTING, ADDONS, etc.)
|
||||
- [`plans/cyd_signer_port.md`](../../plans/cyd_signer_port.md) — original port plan (hardware comparison, architecture, UI flow)
|
||||
- [`plans/cyd_algorithm_api_upgrade.md`](../../plans/cyd_algorithm_api_upgrade.md) — v0.0.2 API upgrade plan
|
||||
- [`firmware/README.md`](../README.md) — shared firmware README (PQ crypto, mbedtls backend, feather target)
|
||||
- [`README.md`](../../README.md) §4 — the authoritative n_signer API reference
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
# CMakeLists.txt — ESP-IDF component for PQClean post-quantum algorithms.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Compiles the three PQ algorithms (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s, ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
# from the shared resources/pqclean/ source tree, using the mbedtls
|
||||
# crypto backend (crypto_backend_mbedtls.c) for SHA-2/SHA3/SHAKE.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The source files are referenced via relative paths back to the shared
|
||||
# resources/pqclean/ directory so there is a single source of truth.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# mbedtls requirements:
|
||||
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA3_C=y (for SHA3-256, SHA3-512)
|
||||
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHAKE_C=y (for SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256)
|
||||
# Enable these in menuconfig under Component config -> mbedTLS ->
|
||||
# Hash functions -> SHA-3 and SHAKE.
|
||||
|
||||
set(PQCLEAN_ROOT "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/../../../../resources/pqclean")
|
||||
|
||||
idf_component_register(
|
||||
SRCS
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/sign.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/poly.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/ntt.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/sign.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/fors.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/wots.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/hash.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/thash.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/address.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/utils.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/kem.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/indcpa.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/poly.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/ntt.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/cbd.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/reduce.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/symmetric.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/verify.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/fips202.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/sha2.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c"
|
||||
"randombytes_mbedtls.c"
|
||||
"pq_drbg_firmware.c"
|
||||
INCLUDE_DIRS
|
||||
"include"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768"
|
||||
REQUIRES
|
||||
mbedtls
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Suppress warnings from the PQClean code (it uses C99 patterns that
|
||||
# trigger -Wextra warnings under ESP-IDF's default flags).
|
||||
target_compile_options(${COMPONENT_LIB} PRIVATE
|
||||
-Wno-unused-parameter
|
||||
-Wno-sign-compare
|
||||
-Wno-unused-variable
|
||||
-Wno-unused-but-set-variable
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* ml_dsa_65_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_ML_DSA_65_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_ML_DSA_65_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* ml_kem_768_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_ML_KEM_768_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_ML_KEM_768_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
/* pqclean.h — Umbrella include for the ESP32 firmware PQClean component.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Exposes the three post-quantum algorithms (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s,
|
||||
* ML-KEM-768) and the deterministic DRBG used for mnemonic-recoverable
|
||||
* key generation.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* On ESP32 the underlying hash/SHAKE primitives are provided by the
|
||||
* mbedtls backend (crypto_backend_mbedtls.c) instead of OpenSSL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, lattice signatures) --- */
|
||||
#include "ml_dsa_65_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s (FIPS 205, hash-based signatures) --- */
|
||||
#include "slh_dsa_128s_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203, lattice KEM) --- */
|
||||
#include "ml_kem_768_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Deterministic DRBG (replaces randombytes() for keygen) --- */
|
||||
/* Initializes the DRBG with a 32-byte mnemonic-derived seed. Subsequent
|
||||
* randombytes() calls will produce a deterministic byte stream. */
|
||||
void pq_drbg_init(const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Zeroizes the DRBG state (call after keygen to wipe sensitive material). */
|
||||
void pq_drbg_zeroize(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/* randombytes() — called by the PQClean algorithm code.
|
||||
* On firmware this is provided by randombytes_mbedtls.c (deterministic DRBG
|
||||
* for keygen, or mbedtls_ctr_drbg for real randomness during encaps). */
|
||||
int randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H */
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* slh_dsa_128s_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_SLH_DSA_128S_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_SLH_DSA_128S_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
||||
/* pq_drbg_firmware.c — Deterministic PRNG for PQ key generation on ESP32.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Same algorithm as the host's src/pq_drbg.c but uses the crypto backend
|
||||
* abstraction (which resolves to mbedtls on ESP32) for SHAKE-256 instead
|
||||
* of OpenSSL EVP. This allows deterministic PQ key generation from a
|
||||
* mnemonic-derived seed: same seed -> same randombytes output sequence.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The PRNG: SHAKE-256(seed || counter) produces a stream of pseudo-random
|
||||
* bytes. The counter is a 64-bit little-endian integer that increments
|
||||
* each time we need more output.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include "crypto_backend.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- DRBG state --- */
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char g_seed[32];
|
||||
static int g_seed_len = 0;
|
||||
static uint64_t g_counter = 0;
|
||||
static unsigned char g_buffer[168]; /* SHAKE-256 rate = 136, 168 for safety */
|
||||
static size_t g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
static int g_initialized = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- internal: squeeze more bytes from SHAKE-256 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
static void drbg_refill(void) {
|
||||
unsigned char seed_block[32 + 8]; /* seed + counter (8 bytes LE) */
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(seed_block, g_seed, (size_t)g_seed_len);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 0] = (unsigned char)(g_counter & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 1] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 8) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 2] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 16) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 3] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 24) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 4] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 32) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 5] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 40) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 6] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 48) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 7] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 56) & 0xFF);
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_backend_shake256(seed_block, (size_t)g_seed_len + 8,
|
||||
g_buffer, sizeof(g_buffer));
|
||||
|
||||
g_counter++;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- public API --- */
|
||||
|
||||
void pq_drbg_init(const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || seed_len == 0) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(g_seed, 0, sizeof(g_seed));
|
||||
if (seed_len > sizeof(g_seed)) {
|
||||
seed_len = sizeof(g_seed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(g_seed, seed, seed_len);
|
||||
g_seed_len = (int)sizeof(g_seed); /* always use 32-byte seed (zero-padded) */
|
||||
|
||||
g_counter = 0;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
g_initialized = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void pq_drbg_zeroize(void) {
|
||||
crypto_backend_cleanse(g_seed, sizeof(g_seed));
|
||||
crypto_backend_cleanse(g_buffer, sizeof(g_buffer));
|
||||
g_seed_len = 0;
|
||||
g_counter = 0;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
g_initialized = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Returns 1 if the DRBG has been initialized (keygen mode), 0 otherwise.
|
||||
* Used by randombytes_mbedtls.c to decide between deterministic DRBG and
|
||||
* hardware RNG. */
|
||||
int pq_drbg_is_initialized(void) {
|
||||
return g_initialized;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* pq_drbg_randombytes is called by randombytes() below. */
|
||||
int pq_drbg_randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) {
|
||||
if (buf == NULL || !g_initialized) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (len > 0) {
|
||||
size_t avail;
|
||||
size_t to_copy;
|
||||
|
||||
if (g_buffer_pos >= sizeof(g_buffer)) {
|
||||
drbg_refill();
|
||||
if (g_buffer_pos >= sizeof(g_buffer)) {
|
||||
return -1; /* refill failed */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
avail = sizeof(g_buffer) - g_buffer_pos;
|
||||
to_copy = (len < avail) ? len : avail;
|
||||
memcpy(buf, g_buffer + g_buffer_pos, to_copy);
|
||||
g_buffer_pos += to_copy;
|
||||
buf += to_copy;
|
||||
len -= to_copy;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
/* randombytes_mbedtls.c — randombytes() implementation for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PQClean's algorithm code calls randombytes() for:
|
||||
* 1. Key generation (keygen) — must be deterministic from the mnemonic
|
||||
* seed so keys are recoverable. The DRBG is initialized via
|
||||
* pq_drbg_init() before keygen, so randombytes() draws from the
|
||||
* deterministic stream.
|
||||
* 2. Encapsulation (ML-KEM enc) — needs real cryptographic randomness.
|
||||
* When the DRBG is NOT initialized, randombytes() falls back to
|
||||
* esp_fill_random() which uses the ESP32 hardware RNG.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This dual-mode behavior matches the host build (src/pq_drbg.c) where
|
||||
* the DRBG is initialized for keygen and randombytes() returns -1 if
|
||||
* called without initialization. On firmware we allow the fallback to
|
||||
* hardware RNG for encaps, which is the correct behavior.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include "esp_random.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* Defined in pq_drbg_firmware.c */
|
||||
extern int pq_drbg_randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the DRBG is initialized (declared in pq_drbg_firmware.c).
|
||||
* We use a helper to avoid exposing the static directly. */
|
||||
extern int pq_drbg_is_initialized(void);
|
||||
|
||||
int randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) {
|
||||
if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If the deterministic DRBG is active (keygen mode), use it. */
|
||||
if (pq_drbg_is_initialized()) {
|
||||
return pq_drbg_randombytes(buf, len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Otherwise, use the ESP32 hardware RNG for real randomness (encaps). */
|
||||
esp_fill_random(buf, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
# Add-Ons
|
||||
|
||||
Here is a list of additional hardware add-ons that can add functionality to your CYD
|
||||
|
||||
## SD Card Sniffer
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to use the pins of the SD card for a different purpose, the easiest way to do that is with an "SD card sniffer", which basically plugs into the SD card slot and breaks out the pins. It's particularly useful for SPI devices.
|
||||
|
||||
## Pin-out of the Sniffer board
|
||||
|
||||
| Sniffer Board Label | ESP32 Pin | SPI Use |
|
||||
| ------------------- | --------- | --------- |
|
||||
| DAT2 | - | - |
|
||||
| CD | IO5 | CS |
|
||||
| CMD | IO23 | DI / MOSI |
|
||||
| GND | GND | - |
|
||||
| VCC | 3.3V | - |
|
||||
| CLK | IO18 | SCLK |
|
||||
| DAT0 | IO19 | DO / MISO |
|
||||
| DAT1 | - | - |
|
||||
|
||||
### Links
|
||||
|
||||
- [Micro SD Card Sniffer - Aliexpress\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_Ddwcy9h)
|
||||
|
||||
## Nintendo Wii Nunchuck
|
||||
|
||||
A Nunchuck controller from a Nintendo Wii is a great input device for CYD projects as they are inexpensive and, since they use i2c for communication, they only require 2 GPIO pins to connect them up.
|
||||
|
||||
For these two pins you get:
|
||||
|
||||
- An analog stick
|
||||
- 2 Buttons
|
||||
- An accelerometer
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware Required
|
||||
|
||||
#### Nunchuck controllers
|
||||
|
||||
Official Nintendo ones are generally better (maybe try second-hand options), but third-party ones also work fine.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Amazon.co.uk Search\*](https://amzn.to/3nQrXcE)
|
||||
- [Amazon.com Search\*](https://amzn.to/3nRJTUd)
|
||||
- [Aliexpress (Third Party)\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_AaQbXh)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Nunchuck Adaptors
|
||||
|
||||
There are many different options available for these, even the cheap ones from Aliexpress work perfectly.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Aliexpress](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_AEEtc3)
|
||||
- [My Open source one from Oshpark](https://oshpark.com/shared_projects/RcIxSx2D)
|
||||
- [Adafaruit](https://www.adafruit.com/product/4836)
|
||||
|
||||
### Wiring
|
||||
|
||||
The easiest way to wire this up is to use the wire that came with the CYD and the **CN1** JST connector (the one closest to the Micro SD card slot)
|
||||
|
||||
Connect the wire to your breakout board as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
| CYD CN1 | Adapter | Note |
|
||||
| ------- | ----------- | ------------------ |
|
||||
| GND | - (AKA GND) | Black wire for me |
|
||||
| 3.3V | + (AKA 3V) | Red wire for me |
|
||||
| IO22 | d (AKA SDA) | Blue wire for me |
|
||||
| IO27 | c (AKA SCL) | Yellow wire for me |
|
||||
|
||||
Note: I have found pull-ups resistors are not required on SDA and SCL
|
||||
|
||||
### Example
|
||||
|
||||
Check out the [NunchuckTest](/Examples/InputTests/NunchuckTest) example for code how to use it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Speakers
|
||||
|
||||
A speaker can be attached to the display with a 1.25mm JST connector to the connector labeled "SPEAK" (or soldered)
|
||||
|
||||
Check out the [HelloRadio](/Examples/Basics/7-HelloRadio) example for the code on how to use it.
|
||||
|
||||
Most small 8 Ohm speakers should work. Maybe worth adding a 1.25mm JST connector to it to make it easy to add remove.
|
||||
|
||||
### Links
|
||||
|
||||
- [Speaker with 1.25mm JST connector (2pcs) - Aliexpress\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_DBOJoh7) - Tested, works right out of the package.
|
||||
- [2pin 1.25mm JST connectors - Aliexpress\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_DlbPkWH) - Not purchased by me, but should work
|
||||
|
||||
\* = Affiliate Link - It doesn't cost you any extra but I receive a small portion of the sale.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
# Media and Mentions
|
||||
|
||||
This page can document any times the CYD project was mentioned somewhere!
|
||||
|
||||
## Videos
|
||||
|
||||
- [Brian Lough (hey, thats me!) - Cheap and Easy to Use ESP32 Screen!](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0AVyvwv0agk)
|
||||
- [Talking Sasquach - Don't be Fooled!! This Cheap Yellow Display Can Do a LOT!!](https://youtu.be/PsqMCoCTgTg?feature=shared)
|
||||
- [Teaching Tech - Cheap and easy Klipper touch interface with CYD Klipper](https://youtu.be/R3o0MGYW1ZU?feature=shared)
|
||||
|
||||
## Articles
|
||||
|
||||
- [Hackaday.com - “Cheap Yellow Display” Builds Community Through Hardware](https://hackaday.com/2023/10/28/cheap-yellow-display-builds-community-through-hardware/)
|
||||
- [Hackster.io - Brian Lough Looks to Build a Community Around the Espressif ESP32-Powered "Cheap Yellow Display"](https://www.hackster.io/news/brian-lough-looks-to-build-a-community-around-the-espressif-esp32-powered-cheap-yellow-display-66d23972910d)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
|
||||
# Pins
|
||||
|
||||
This page talks about the pins on the CYD.
|
||||
|
||||
## Connector types
|
||||
|
||||
The connectors are often called "1.25mm JST" but the correct name is "Molex PicoBlade".
|
||||
Chinese clones are sometimes called "mx1.25".
|
||||
|
||||
|Connector|Type |Note |
|
||||
|--- |--- |---- |
|
||||
|[**P1**](#p1) |4P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade|Serial |
|
||||
|[**P3**](#p3) |4P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade|GPIO |
|
||||
|[**P4**](#p4) |2P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade|Speaker |
|
||||
|[**CN1**](#cn1)|4P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade|GPIO (I2C) |
|
||||
|
||||
## What pins are available on the CYD?
|
||||
|
||||
There are 3 easily accessible GPIO pins
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Location|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO35|**P3** Molex PicoBlade connector|Input only pin, no internal pull-ups available|
|
||||
|IO22|**P3** and **CN1** Molex PicoBlade connector||
|
||||
|IO27|**CN1** Molex PicoBlade connector||
|
||||
|
||||
If you need more than that, you need to start taking them from something else. An SD Card sniffer like mentioned in the [Add-ons](/ADDONS.md) is probably the next easiest.
|
||||
|
||||
After that you're probably de-soldering something!
|
||||
|
||||
## Broken Out Pins
|
||||
|
||||
There are three 4P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade connectors on the board.
|
||||
|
||||
### P3
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|GND|||
|
||||
|IO35||Input only pin, no internal pull-ups available|
|
||||
|IO22||Also on the **CN1** connector|
|
||||
|IO21||Used for the TFT Backlight, so not really usable|
|
||||
|
||||
### CN1
|
||||
This is a great candidate for I2C devices
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|GND|||
|
||||
|IO22||Also on **P3** connector|
|
||||
|IO27|||
|
||||
|3.3V|||
|
||||
|
||||
### P1
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|VIN|||
|
||||
|IO1(?)|TX|Maybe possible to use as a GPIO?|
|
||||
|IO3(?)|RX|Maybe possible to use as a GPIO?|
|
||||
|GND|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Buttons
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD has two buttons, reset and boot.
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO0|BOOT|Can be used as an input in sketches|
|
||||
|
||||
## Speaker
|
||||
|
||||
The speaker connector is a 2P 1.25mm Molex PicoBlade connector that is connected to the amplifier, so not usable as GPIO at the speaker connector
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO26|Connected to amp|`i2s_set_dac_mode(I2S_DAC_CHANNEL_LEFT_EN);`|
|
||||
|
||||
## RGB LED
|
||||
|
||||
If your project requires additional pins to what is available elsewhere, this might be a good candidate to sacrifice.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: LEDs are "active low", meaning HIGH == off, LOW == on
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO4|Red LED||
|
||||
|IO16|Green LED||
|
||||
|IO17|Blue LED||
|
||||
|
||||
## SD Card
|
||||
Uses the VSPI
|
||||
Pin names are predefined in SPI.h
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO5|SS||
|
||||
|IO18|SCK||
|
||||
|IO19|MISO||
|
||||
|IO23|MOSI||
|
||||
|
||||
## Touch Screen
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO25|XPT2046_CLK||
|
||||
|IO32|XPT2046_MOSI||
|
||||
|IO33|XPT2046_CS||
|
||||
|IO36|XPT2046_IRQ||
|
||||
|IO39|XPT2046_MISO||
|
||||
|
||||
## LDR (Light Sensor)
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO34|||
|
||||
|
||||
## Display
|
||||
Uses the HSPI
|
||||
|
||||
|Pin|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|IO2|TFT_RS|AKA: TFT_DC|
|
||||
|IO12|TFT_SDO|AKA: TFT_MISO|
|
||||
|IO13|TFT_SDI|AKA: TFT_MOSI|
|
||||
|IO14|TFT_SCK||
|
||||
|IO15|TFT_CS||
|
||||
|IO21|TFT_BL|Also on P3 connector, for some reason|
|
||||
|
||||
## Test points
|
||||
|Pad|Use|Note|
|
||||
|---|---|----|
|
||||
|S1|GND|near USB-SERIAL|
|
||||
|S2|3.3v|for ESP32|
|
||||
|S3|5v|near USB-SERIAL|
|
||||
|S4|GND|for ESP32|
|
||||
|S5|3.3v|for TFT|
|
||||
|JP0 (pad nearest USB socket)|5v|TFT LDO|
|
||||
|JP0|3.3v|TFT LDO|
|
||||
|JP3 (pad nearest USB socket)|5v|ESP32 LDO|
|
||||
|JP3|3.3v|ESP32 LDO|
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
# Projects
|
||||
|
||||
Because the CYD is a common platform, it makes it really useful for sharing projects. This page will be a list of projects that are available on the CYD.
|
||||
|
||||
## Disclaimer!
|
||||
|
||||
Projects appearing on here is not necessarily a seal of approval from me, I will not be test each project that gets added, so please install these projects at your own risk!
|
||||
|
||||
## Projects
|
||||
|
||||
| Name | Description | Author | Additional Hardware? | Project Page | WebFlash |
|
||||
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| Spotify DIY Thing | A device for displaying your currently playing Spotify track | [Brian Lough](https://github.com/witnessmenow) | | [Github](https://github.com/witnessmenow/Spotify-Diy-Thing) | [WebFlash](https://witnessmenow.github.io/Spotify-Diy-Thing/) |
|
||||
| F1 Notifier | Displays and notifies you of the F1 session times(in your local timezone) | [Brian Lough](https://github.com/witnessmenow) | | [Github](https://github.com/witnessmenow/F1-Arduino-Notifications) | [WebFlash](https://witnessmenow.github.io/F1-Arduino-Notifications/) |
|
||||
| Tetris with Nunchuck | A version of Tetris using a Nintendo wii Nunchuck | [Brian Lough](https://github.com/witnessmenow) | A nunchuck and an adaptor for connecting it | [Code](/Examples/Projects/TetrisWithNunchuck) | |
|
||||
| Galagino | An emulator for some classic arcade games (Galaga, Donkey Kong, Pacman, Digdug and Frogger) | [Till Harbaum](https://github.com/harbaum) | A nunchuck and an adaptor for connecting it. Speaker if you want sound | [Github](https://github.com/harbaum/galagino) | |
|
||||
| ESP32-fluid-simulation | A small fluid simulation with touch input | [Kenny Peng](https://github.com/colonelwatch) | | [Github](https://github.com/colonelwatch/ESP32-fluid-simulation) | |
|
||||
| ESP32-TV | Play Video Files on the ESP32 | [atomic14](https://github.com/atomic14) | Speaker if you want sound and possibly an IR receiver | [Github](https://github.com/atomic14/esp32-tv) | |
|
||||
| xtouch | "The xtouch screen is a revolutionary addition to your BambuLab Printer" | [xperiments-in](https://github.com/xperiments-in) (\#) | | [Github](https://github.com/xperiments-in/xtouch) | [Webflash](https://github.com/xperiments-in/xtouch#online-web-installer) |
|
||||
| CYD-Klipper | An implementation of a wireless Klipper status display on an ESP32 + screen | [Sims](https://github.com/suchmememanyskill) | | [Github](https://github.com/suchmememanyskill/CYD-Klipper) | [Webflash](https://suchmememanyskill.github.io/CYD-Klipper/) |
|
||||
| DRO (for lathe / mill) | A DRO (digital readout) for your lathe or mill | [Alanesq](https://github.com/alanesq) | It uses cheap digital caliper, requires a very basic interface | [Github](https://github.com/alanesq/DRO) | |
|
||||
| ESP32Marauder-CYD | A suite of WiFi/Bluetooth offensive and defensive tools for the ESP32 | [Fr4nkFletcher](https://github.com/Fr4nkFletcher) | GPS if you want BT/Wifi wardriving options | [Github](https://github.com/Fr4nkFletcher/ESP32-Marauder-Cheap-Yellow-Display) | [Webflash](https://fr4nkfletcher.github.io/Adafruit_WebSerial_ESPTool/) |
|
||||
| NerdMiner_v2 | A project that lets you try to solve a bitcoin block with a small piece of hardware. | [Fr4nkFletcher](https://github.com/Fr4nkFletcher) | | [Github](https://github.com/Fr4nkFletcher/NerdMiner_v2-Cheap-Yellow-Display) | [Webflash](https://fr4nkfletcher.github.io/NerdMiner_v2-Cheap-Yellow-Display/flash.html) |
|
||||
| Tasmota | Tasmota (with UI) on the CYD | ? (\#) | | [Templates](https://templates.blakadder.com/sunton_ESP32-2432S028.html) | [Webflash](https://tasmota.github.io/install/) |
|
||||
| BAM | A game engine featuring smooth scrolling tile map, sprites in layers with pixel precision on-screen collision detection, intuitive definition of game objects and logic, decent performance, ~30 frames per second on the device | [calint](https://github.com/calint) | | [Github](https://github.com/calint/bam) | |
|
||||
|London Underground Arrivals| A highly configurable application that replicates the train arrivals boards found in [TFL](https://tfl.gov.uk/) stations. All variable data is encoded in a json file that may be updated at any time without the need to recompile the application e.g. the station to be displayed or the time to refresh data from TFL. The source code already supports 2 variants of CYD and, I hope, contains clear instructions how to handle any other variant.| [David Henry](https://github.com/mgaman) | | [Github](https://github.com/mgaman/TFL-tube-arrivals-board-ESP32-TFT-Arduino) |
|
||||
|GitHub-Stats| This Arduino project fetches and displays GitHub repository statistics such as star count, open issues, forks and notifactions on a CYD or via serial communication. Ideal for developers to monitor project metrics in real time.| [ATOMNFT](https://github.com/ATOMNFT) | | [Github](https://github.com/ATOMNFT/ESP32-CYD-Projects/tree/main/GitHub-Stats) | |
|
||||
| Midbar-Firebase-Edition | An advanced password vault that stores the encrypted data in the cloud while keeping the cryptographic keys on the edge! | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) | PS/2 keyboard and an optional STM32F103C8T6 (if you want it to emulate the USB keyboard) | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/midbar-firebase-edition/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/Midbar-Firebase-Edition)
|
||||
| Electronic-Shelf-Label-Management-System | A simple device for displaying relevant product information. It gets the encrypted images via UDP. | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix)| | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/esl-management-system/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/Electronic-Shelf-Label-Management-System)
|
||||
| ESP32-Tetris-With-Nintendo-64-Controller | Tetris for ESP32 with Nintendo 64 controller support | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) | Nintendo 64 Controller and Arduino Nano | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/esp32-tetris/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/ESP32-Tetris-With-Nintendo-64-Controller)
|
||||
| Midbar ESP32 CYD | A version of Midbar data vault tweaked specifically for the ESP32 Cheap Yellow Display. | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) | PS/2 Keyboard | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/midbar-esp32-cyd/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/Midbar-ESP32-CYD)
|
||||
| ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display-Electronic-Shelf-Label-with-Google-Firebase | An ESP32 CYD-based Electronic Shelf Label that makes use of the Google Firebase and AES-256. | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) | | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/esp32-cyd-esl-with-firebase/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display-Electronic-Shelf-Label-with-Google-Firebase) | [WebFlash](https://northstrix.github.io/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display-Electronic-Shelf-Label-with-Google-Firebase/flash.html) </br>!!! Format Flash area designated for SPIFFS with [ESP32 Filesystem Uploader](https://github.com/me-no-dev/arduino-esp32fs-plugin/releases/) after using the WebFlash
|
||||
| Addressable RGB LED Strip Controller (The Lantern Project) | DIY Addressable RGB LED Strip Controller that utilizes the ESP32, ESP8266, and the WS2812 LED Strip. | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) | Nintendo Wii Nunchuk, WiiChuck Nunchuck Adapter (PCB Board), ESP8266, 580 Ohm resistor, WS2812 LED Strip | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/the-lantern-project/) [Github](https://github.com/Northstrix/Lantern)
|
||||
| Midbar ESP32 CYD Firebase Edition | A version of Midbar data vault adapted for the ESP32 CYD and WebFlash. It keeps the cryptographic keys in the ESP32 RAM and stores the ciphertexts (encrypted data) in the Google Firebase. | [Northstrix](https://github.com/Northstrix) (Adapted for CYD2USB by [Rovel](https://github.com/Rovel))| PS2 Keyboard, PS2 Port *optional | [SourceForge](https://sourceforge.net/projects/midbar-esp32-cyd-firebase/) [Github (CYD)](https://github.com/Northstrix/Midbar-ESP32-CYD-Firebase-Edition) [Github (CYD2USB)](https://github.com/Northstrix/Midbar-ESP32-CYD2USB-Firebase-Edition) | [WebFlash (CYD)](https://northstrix.github.io/Midbar-ESP32-CYD-Firebase-Edition/flash) [WebFlash (CYD2USB)](https://northstrix.github.io/Midbar-ESP32-CYD2USB-Firebase-Edition/flash)
|
||||
| cydOS (WIP) | cydOS is a GUI app that is able to manage various aspects of the CYD, like SD browsing and file mangement, on board flashing of .bin files for rapid firmware switching, on board device settings(WIP) | [orlandobianco](https://github.com/orlandobianco) | | [Github]((https://github.com/orlandobianco/cydOS)) | |
|
||||
| ESP32 MFA Authenticator | Turn the CYD into a MFA Authenticator | [AllanOricil](https://github.com/AllanOricil) | | [Github](https://github.com/AllanOricil/esp32-mfa-authenticator) | [Webflash](https://allanoricil.github.io/esp32-mfa-authenticator/)
|
||||
| cydWeatherStation | cyd Weather station | [gustheseventh](https://github.com/gustheseventh) (#) | | [Github](https://github.com/gustheseventh/cyd-Weather-Station) | |
|
||||
| PhilRadio | CYD Wifi Radio project. Re-using an old radio as hardware. Exposing a webserver on local network to configure the radio stations. Persistent storage. | [mogrikid](https://github.com/mogrikid) | Required: A speaker. Recommended: Speaker, potentiometer, 10kohm resistor, female usb port, switch | [Github](https://github.com/mogrikid/PhilRadio)
|
||||
| cydWeeWX | Simple CYD Weather Display for the open source [WeeWX](https://www.weewx.com/) weather station server. | [hcomet](https://hcomet.github.io/) | | [Github](https://github.com/hcomet/cydWeeWX)| [Webflash](https://hcomet.github.io/cydWeeWX/cydWeeWXFlash.html) |
|
||||
| CYD Stream Deck | A customizable touch-based Bluetooth HID controller using CYD. | [gahingwoo](https://github.com/gahingwoo) | | [GitHub](https://github.com/gahingwoo/cyd-stream-deck) | [Webflash](https://gahingwoo.github.io/cyd-stream-deck/webflash/index.html) |
|
||||
| CYD DHT22 Weather Clock | A weather and time display using CYD. | [gahingwoo](https://github.com/gahingwoo) | DHT22 sensor | [GitHub](https://github.com/gahingwoo/cyd-dht22-weather-clock) | |
|
||||
| ESP CYD MCP | Model Context Protocol (MCP) server implementation for the ESP32 CYD | [OfryL](https://github.com/OfryL) | | [Github](https://github.com/OfryL/esp-cyd-mcp) | |
|
||||
| Aura | Smart weather forecast device (OpenMeteo) | [Surrey-Homeware](https://github.com/Surrey-Homeware/) (\#) | [3D printed case](https://makerworld.com/en/models/1382304-aura-smart-weather-forecast-display#profileId-1430951) | [Github](https://github.com/Surrey-Homeware/Aura) | [Webflash](https://surrey-homeware.github.io/aura-installer/) |
|
||||
| SmartEnergyMeter | An ESPHome display for Energy in the house (solar, battery, etc) | [anthony-spruyt](https://github.com/anthony-spruyt) (#) | | [Github](https://github.com/anthony-spruyt/ESPHOME-ESP32_CYD_V2-SmartEnergyMeter) | |
|
||||
| Navi Phone | Relica of the Mobile Phones used int the anime Serial Experments Lain | [Aquafrostbyte](https://github.com/AquaFrostByte) (#) | A Sd card is required, Speaker and Wifi is optional | [Github](https://github.com/AquaFrostByte/Navi-Phone) | |
|
||||
| OASMan | Open-source Air Suspension Management - Worlds first DIY Digital Air suspension controller for your car! | [gopro_2027](https://github.com/gopro2027/) | Ideally you would build the manifold and install it in your car, but if you just want to test the connection you can use an original esp32 dev board and flash the manifold code through platformio. We also have a [3d printable case](https://github.com/gopro2027/ArduinoAirSuspensionController/blob/main/3d%20Prints/other/3.2%20inch%20screen%20case/3.2%20inch%20CYD%20screen%20container%20v19%20-%20gopro_2027's%20design.stl) | [Github](https://github.com/gopro2027/ArduinoAirSuspensionController) | [Webflash](https://oasman.dev/oasman/flash/) |
|
||||
| Sonos Remote Control | Use your Sonos Speakers as Internet Radio with Station Buttons | Florian Lenz | https://github.com/SpringTideSystems | [GitHub](https://github.com/SpringTideSystems/CYD_Sonos-RemoteControl) | |
|
||||
|
||||
(\#) = Project not added by original author
|
||||
|
||||
## Adding a project
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a project that you would like to add, please feel free to add it to the list!
|
||||
|
||||
New projects should be added to bottom of the list.
|
||||
|
||||
Some rules:
|
||||
|
||||
- Project must be open source
|
||||
- Project must be functional - It's ok for it to not be finished, but it should do what it says!
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
||||
# ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display
|
||||
|
||||
There is an ESP32 with a built in 320 x 240 2.8" LCD display with a touch screen called the "ESP32-2432S028R", since this doesn't roll of the tongue, I propose it should be renamed the "Cheap Yellow Display" or CYD for short. This display is only about $15 delivered so I think it's really good value.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Features
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD has the following features:
|
||||
|
||||
- ESP32 (With Wifi and Bluetooth)
|
||||
- 320 x 240 LCD Display (2.8")
|
||||
- Touch Screen (Resistive)
|
||||
- USB for powering and programming
|
||||
- SD Card Slot, LED and some additional pins broken out
|
||||
|
||||
## Who is it good for?
|
||||
|
||||
I think it's useful for the following types of people:
|
||||
|
||||
- **People just getting started with working hardware** - as everything is already connected, there is no soldering or additional components required
|
||||
- **People who are familiar with working with hardware, but are lazy** - (like me) Sometimes you just want to build a project without having to assemble any hardware
|
||||
- **People who aren't really looking to learn anything, but just want to build some cool things** - More about this later.
|
||||
|
||||
## What is the purpose of this page?
|
||||
|
||||
So this is pretty nice hardware and a cheap price, but the software instructions/support around it is pretty poor. Just a single link to a zip file on a random website.
|
||||
|
||||
A couple of years ago I released the [ESP32 Trinity](https://github.com/witnessmenow/ESP32-Trinity), which is an open source ESP32 board for controlling Matrix panels. I think the main benefit people get out of the work I did on the Trinity is not the hardware, but the documentation, example code and ready to go projects.
|
||||
|
||||
I'm no longer creating hardware products, but I think it would be interesting if we could create the same kind of community around this display, where people can share examples and projects made for this display.
|
||||
|
||||
## How do I know if a display is a CYD?
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Where to buy?
|
||||
|
||||
Buy from wherever works out cheapest for you:
|
||||
|
||||
- [Aliexpress\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_DkSpIjB)
|
||||
- [Aliexpress\*](https://s.click.aliexpress.com/e/_DkcmuCh)
|
||||
- [Aliexpress](https://www.aliexpress.com/item/1005004502250619.html)
|
||||
- [Makerfabs](https://www.makerfabs.com/sunton-esp32-2-8-inch-tft-with-touch.html) - Seems to come with a 16GB SD card. Makerfabs also stock my [ESP32 Trinity](https://github.com/witnessmenow/ESP32-Trinity) (NOTE there will be import due in the EU from makerfabs)
|
||||
|
||||
\* = Affiliate Link
|
||||
|
||||
## Getting Started With Your CYD
|
||||
|
||||
For details on how to get started with your CYD, please check out the [Setup and Configuration](/SETUP.md) page
|
||||
|
||||
## Code Examples
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A collection of examples demonstrating how to use the different features of the CYD, this is a good place to get started. [Check them out here.](/Examples/Basics)
|
||||
|
||||
### Alternative Display Libraries
|
||||
|
||||
The basics examples are based on the TFT_eSPI display library, but the CYD also works with other display libraries too. Here is some example code if you prefer to use an alternative Arduino library. [Check them out here.](/Examples/AlternativeLibraries)
|
||||
|
||||
### ESPHome
|
||||
|
||||
Some examples for using the CYD in ESPHome. [Check them out here.](/Examples/ESPHome)
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Info and Links
|
||||
|
||||
### Discord
|
||||
|
||||
Join the CYD discussion on [my Discord channel](https://discord.gg/nnezpvq)
|
||||
|
||||
### 3DPrinting
|
||||
|
||||
Some examples of 3D printed stands and cases. [Check them out here.](/3dModels)
|
||||
|
||||
### Pin Information
|
||||
|
||||
[This page](/PINS.md) contains information about what pins are used where, and what ones are free to use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Add-ons
|
||||
|
||||
[This page](/ADDONS.md) contains information about additional hardware add-ons that can add functionality to your CYD
|
||||
|
||||
### Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
[This page](/TROUBLESHOOTING.md) contains information about how to troubleshoot your CYD device
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware Mods
|
||||
|
||||
[This page](/Mods/README.md) contains information about some hardware mods that can be performed on the CYD to improve or change some of its functionality
|
||||
|
||||
### Media and Video Mentions
|
||||
|
||||
[This page](/MEDIA.md) lists any times the CYD project was mentioned somewhere!
|
||||
|
||||
## License Info
|
||||
|
||||
This project is licensed as MIT as per the [license file](/LICENSE)
|
||||
|
||||
The one exception to this is the [OriginalDocumentation](/OriginalDocumentation/) folder, that I do not have the right to license
|
||||
|
||||
## Other Languages
|
||||
|
||||
Some members of the community have ported some of this information to other languages!
|
||||
|
||||
Please note: I can't gaurantee the accuracy of the translation, how up to date they are or the content on them in general.
|
||||
|
||||
- [French / Française](https://github.com/usini/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display-Documentation-FR)
|
||||
- [German / Deutsch](https://github.com/paelzer/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display-Documentation-DE)
|
||||
|
||||
If you would like to contribure a translation, please name the repo with the language name or code in the repo name and you can link it here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Help Support what I do!
|
||||
|
||||
[If you enjoy my work, please consider becoming a Github sponsor!](https://github.com/sponsors/witnessmenow/)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
||||
# Setup and Configuration options
|
||||
|
||||
This page will cover the basics of setting up the CYD
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardware Setup
|
||||
|
||||
There really is nothing to setup here, just connect the CYD to a computer using a micro USB cable (it even comes with one)
|
||||
|
||||
## Software Setup
|
||||
|
||||
The driver needs to be setup for uploading to the CYD, including webflashing projects.
|
||||
|
||||
### Driver
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD uses the CH340 USB to UART chip. If you do not have a driver already installed for this chip you may need to install one. Check out [Sparkfun's guide for installation instruction](https://learn.sparkfun.com/tutorials/how-to-install-ch340-drivers/all)
|
||||
|
||||
## Coding Setup
|
||||
|
||||
Follow these instructions if you want to write new code for the CYD
|
||||
|
||||
### Board definition
|
||||
|
||||
You will need to have the ESP32 setup for your Arduino IDE, [instructions can be found here](https://docs.espressif.com/projects/arduino-esp32/en/latest/installing.html).
|
||||
|
||||
You can then select basically any ESP32 board in the boards menu. (I usually use "ESP32 Dev Module", but it doesn't really matter)
|
||||
|
||||
If you see errors uploading a sketch, try setting board upload speed to `115200`
|
||||
|
||||
### Library Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The CYD can work with a selection of different libraries, but the main one this repo will focus on is [TFT_eSPI](https://github.com/Bodmer/TFT_eSPI) as it is a fairly popular library for working with these types of displays and there are lots of examples.
|
||||
|
||||
This can be installed from the library manager by searching for "TFT_eSPI".
|
||||
|
||||
> Note: After install of the library, copy the file [User_Setup.h](https://github.com/witnessmenow/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display/blob/main/DisplayConfig/User_Setup.h) to the `libraries\TFT_eSPI` Arduino folder. This sets up the library for use with this display.
|
||||
|
||||
### Examples
|
||||
|
||||
I have provided examples for you to try out to get some ideas or inspiration. [Check them out here.](/Examples/)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
|
||||
# First, Make sure it's a CYD!
|
||||
|
||||
If you are having any issues, this is the first thing I would check!
|
||||
|
||||
The examples and information contained on this repo are for the **ESP32-2432S028** display only. The model number is written on the back of the display in gold writting, beside the speaker connector.
|
||||
|
||||
# Display is not turning on
|
||||
|
||||
If you are having issues getting the display working, the first thing I would try is [webflashing an existing project](/PROJECTS.md#projects-1). These will be known working code, and if it works correctly, it points to a software issue, not a hardware one.
|
||||
|
||||
## If the webflash project displays something on the screen
|
||||
|
||||
- Make sure you have put the [User_Setup.h](DisplayConfig/User_Setup.h) file in the correct location [as described here](/SETUP.md#library-configuration)
|
||||
- Pin 21 is the backlight pin, make sure you are not using it for something else in your sketch.
|
||||
|
||||
## The webflash project doesn't display on screen
|
||||
|
||||
- Make sure you are not connecting Pin 21 to anything. It is broken out on the connector labeled `P3`
|
||||
- Try a different USB supply and or cable
|
||||
- If nothing else worked, your CYD could be faulty. Contact the seller.
|
||||
|
||||
# Display, Touch and SD card are not working at the same time
|
||||
|
||||
The ESP32 offers two usable hardware SPI buses, but on the CYD each of display, touch and SD card use a different bus. To use all three devices at the same time, for one of them the SPI has to be "simulated" in software. Usually this is done for the touch device, since it doesn't require a high bandwidth. Therefor use a software SPI implementation like [XPT2046_Bitbang_Slim](https://github.com/TheNitek/XPT2046_Bitbang_Arduino_Library) and follow the [button example](https://github.com/witnessmenow/ESP32-Cheap-Yellow-Display/tree/main/Examples/Basics/8-Buttons)
|
||||
|
||||
# Display is flickering
|
||||
|
||||
- Try a different USB supply and or cable
|
||||
- Go through the [Display is not turning on](#display-is-not-turning-on) steps
|
||||
- If nothing else worked, your CYD could be faulty. Contact the seller.
|
||||
|
||||
# Cannot upload
|
||||
- On Ubuntu and flavors disable or uninstall service `brltty` and make sure user is in group `dialout`
|
||||
|
||||
# Automatic flash with esptool failed: Wrong boot mode detected (0x13)
|
||||
|
||||
This is the well-known problem of flashing ESP32 through USB-UART converter, when DTR and RTS signals are used to switch the chip to the bootloader mode (with additional 2xNPN transistor digital protection logic). On some PC, OS, driver version it works, on another it doesn't:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
A fatal error occurred: Failed to connect to ESP32: Wrong boot mode detected (0x13)! The chip needs to be in download mode. For troubleshooting steps visit: https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esptool/en/latest/troubleshooting.html
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The solution is to replace a capacitor between EN (RST) and GND from 0.1uF, installed on CYD, to something in range 1uF and 10uF.
|
||||
|
||||
**NOTE:** In schematic, this is C4, but at least on Type-C version of CYD it is C5 actually.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
## What is a Cheap Yellow Display (CYD)?
|
||||
|
||||
A CYD is a ESP32-2432S028, an ESP32 development board with a 2.8" display with a resistive touch screen,
|
||||
|
||||
There are other boards with different sizes displays that look similar but **are not** a CYD. This isn't to try exclude anyone, but there so many different displays and types that it would be incredibly difficult and very confusing to support all of them.
|
||||
|
||||
You can verify you have the correct board by checking the number on the back of the display.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## My CYD has two USB ports
|
||||
|
||||
The original CYD only has a micro USB port, but there is a device that is also labelled a _ESP32-2432S028_ that has two USB ports, one micro USB and one USB-C.
|
||||
|
||||
Having an additional USB port would be a minor problem if that was the only difference, but unfortunately the display also works differently, the colours are inverted on the display.
|
||||
|
||||
It can be fixed in a couple of ways:
|
||||
|
||||
- Use platformio - The examples on the Github have all been updated so they can be used with platformio, and you can simply select CYD or CYD2USB and it will just work
|
||||
- Use the [CYD2USB specific User_setup.h](/DisplayConfig/CYD2USB/) that is on the repo, you can now use all the examples like normal
|
||||
- Invert the display at the code level using the `tft.invertDisplay(1);` method
|
||||
|
||||
### The USB-C port doesn't work
|
||||
|
||||
The USB-C port has a flaw in it, it doesn’t have the resistors on the CC lines. This means it will not work with USB-C to USB-C cables. If your computer only has USB-C ports, you can use it through a USB-C to USB-A adaptor.
|
||||
|
||||
### The Display doesn't look as good
|
||||
|
||||
There seems to be a gamma issue with the CYD2USB (I don't even know what gamma is)
|
||||
|
||||
Adding this to the code seems to help
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
tft.writecommand(ILI9341_GAMMASET); //Gamma curve selected
|
||||
tft.writedata(2);
|
||||
delay(120);
|
||||
tft.writecommand(ILI9341_GAMMASET); //Gamma curve selected
|
||||
tft.writedata(1);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ idf_component_register(
|
||||
"bech32.c"
|
||||
"mnemonic.c"
|
||||
"key_derivation.c"
|
||||
"pq_crypto_firmware.c"
|
||||
"secure_mem.c"
|
||||
"../../../resources/nostr_core_lib/nostr_core/nip004.c"
|
||||
"../../../resources/nostr_core_lib/nostr_core/nip044.c"
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ idf_component_register(
|
||||
esp_driver_uart
|
||||
mbedtls
|
||||
secp256k1
|
||||
pqclean
|
||||
json)
|
||||
|
||||
target_compile_definitions(${COMPONENT_LIB} PUBLIC LV_CONF_INCLUDE_SIMPLE=1)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
|
||||
#include "key_derivation.h"
|
||||
#include "pq_crypto_firmware.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "esp_random.h"
|
||||
#include "esp_log.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
|
||||
#include "psa/crypto.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "secp256k1.h"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *KD_TAG = "key_derivation";
|
||||
|
||||
#define BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG 0x80000000u
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
@@ -253,3 +261,351 @@ int schnorr_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32], uint8_t s
|
||||
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ====================================================================
|
||||
* Phase 7: ed25519, x25519, and post-quantum key derivation
|
||||
* ==================================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 all-hardened derivation for ed25519/x25519.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* SLIP-0010 uses HMAC-SHA512 with a "ed25519 seed" or curve-specific key
|
||||
* for the master key, and all derivation steps are hardened (the parent
|
||||
* private key is prepended to the index data).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For ed25519/x25519, the derived 512-bit HMAC output is split:
|
||||
* - first 32 bytes = private key (the scalar)
|
||||
* - last 32 bytes = chain code
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The private key IS the ed25519/x25519 secret — no tweak-add is needed
|
||||
* (unlike secp256k1 BIP-32 where the child priv = parent_priv + HMAC).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 master key from seed: HMAC-SHA512(key="ed25519 seed", data=seed) */
|
||||
static int slip10_master_from_seed(const uint8_t seed[64],
|
||||
uint8_t priv[32], uint8_t chain[32]) {
|
||||
static const uint8_t kEd25519Seed[] = "ed25519 seed";
|
||||
uint8_t i64[64] = {0};
|
||||
|
||||
if (hmac_sha512(kEd25519Seed, sizeof(kEd25519Seed) - 1,
|
||||
seed, 64, i64) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(priv, i64, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(chain, i64 + 32, 32);
|
||||
memset(i64, 0, sizeof(i64));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 hardened child derivation:
|
||||
* HMAC-SHA512(key=chain, data=0x00 || priv || index_be32) */
|
||||
static int slip10_ckd_priv(const uint8_t parent_priv[32],
|
||||
const uint8_t parent_chain[32],
|
||||
uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t child_priv[32],
|
||||
uint8_t child_chain[32]) {
|
||||
uint8_t data[37];
|
||||
uint8_t i64[64] = {0};
|
||||
|
||||
/* Hardened derivation: 0x00 || priv || index (big-endian) */
|
||||
data[0] = 0x00;
|
||||
memcpy(data + 1, parent_priv, 32);
|
||||
data[33] = (uint8_t)((index >> 24) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[34] = (uint8_t)((index >> 16) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[35] = (uint8_t)((index >> 8) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[36] = (uint8_t)(index & 0xFF);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hmac_sha512(parent_chain, 32, data, sizeof(data), i64) != 0) {
|
||||
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(child_priv, i64, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(child_chain, i64 + 32, 32);
|
||||
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
||||
memset(i64, 0, sizeof(i64));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Derive a 32-byte seed via SLIP-0010 all-hardened path.
|
||||
* path[] is an array of hardened indices (the caller sets the hardened flag).
|
||||
* Returns the final 32-byte private material in `out_seed`. */
|
||||
static int slip10_derive_seed(const uint8_t seed[64],
|
||||
const uint32_t *path, size_t path_len,
|
||||
uint8_t out_seed[32]) {
|
||||
uint8_t priv[32], chain[32], next_priv[32], next_chain[32];
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_master_from_seed(seed, priv, chain) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < path_len; i++) {
|
||||
if (slip10_ckd_priv(priv, chain, path[i],
|
||||
next_priv, next_chain) != 0) {
|
||||
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(priv));
|
||||
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(chain));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(priv, next_priv, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(chain, next_chain, 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(out_seed, priv, 32);
|
||||
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(priv));
|
||||
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(chain));
|
||||
memset(next_priv, 0, sizeof(next_priv));
|
||||
memset(next_chain, 0, sizeof(next_chain));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ed25519 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ed25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102001'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102001u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t derived_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, derived_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The SLIP-0010 derived 32 bytes IS the ed25519 private key. */
|
||||
memcpy(privkey, derived_seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Derive the ed25519 public key via PSA crypto (IDF v5.x mbedtls has no
|
||||
* mbedtls_ed25519_make_public). Import the private key, export the pub. */
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
|
||||
psa_key_attributes_t attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
||||
size_t pub_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS));
|
||||
psa_set_key_bits(&attrs, 255);
|
||||
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attrs, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE);
|
||||
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attrs, PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA);
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attrs, privkey, 32, &key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 psa_import failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
memset(privkey, 0, 32);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pubkey, 32, &pub_len);
|
||||
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || pub_len != 32) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 psa_export_public failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
memset(privkey, 0, 32);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ed25519 sign via PSA (PureEdDSA — signs the raw message, not pre-hashed). */
|
||||
int ed25519_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32],
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]) {
|
||||
return ed25519_sign_msg(privkey, msg32, 32, sig64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ed25519_sign_msg(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]) {
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
|
||||
psa_key_attributes_t attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
||||
size_t sig_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS));
|
||||
psa_set_key_bits(&attrs, 255);
|
||||
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attrs, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE);
|
||||
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attrs, PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA);
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attrs, privkey, 32, &key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 sign psa_import failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = psa_sign_message(key_id, PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA,
|
||||
msg, msg_len, sig64, 64, &sig_len);
|
||||
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || sig_len != 64) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 psa_sign_message failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ed25519_verify_msg(const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len,
|
||||
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
||||
const uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
|
||||
psa_key_attributes_t attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
||||
|
||||
psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS));
|
||||
psa_set_key_bits(&attrs, 255);
|
||||
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attrs, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
|
||||
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attrs, PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA);
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attrs, pubkey, 32, &key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 verify psa_import failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = psa_verify_message(key_id, PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA,
|
||||
msg, msg_len, sig, sig_len);
|
||||
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
||||
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? 0 : -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- x25519 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_x25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102002'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102002u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t derived_seed[32];
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
|
||||
psa_key_attributes_t attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
||||
size_t pub_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, derived_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The SLIP-0010 derived 32 bytes IS the x25519 private key.
|
||||
* PSA imports it and exports the public key (PSA handles clamping). */
|
||||
memcpy(privkey, derived_seed, 32);
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
|
||||
psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY));
|
||||
psa_set_key_bits(&attrs, 255);
|
||||
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attrs, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
|
||||
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attrs, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attrs, privkey, 32, &key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 psa_import failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
memset(privkey, 0, 32);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pubkey, 32, &pub_len);
|
||||
psa_destroy_key(key_id);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || pub_len != 32) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 psa_export_public failed: %d", (int)status);
|
||||
memset(privkey, 0, 32);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ml_dsa_65_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102003'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102003u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_slh_dsa_128s_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102004'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102004u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ESP_LOGW(KD_TAG, "SLH-DSA-128s keygen: this takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32");
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ml_kem_768_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102005'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102005u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,70 @@
|
||||
#pragma once
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- secp256k1 (Nostr, existing) --- */
|
||||
int derive_nostr_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
int derive_nostr_key_index(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t nostr_index, uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
int schnorr_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32], uint8_t sig64[64]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ed25519 (SSH signatures) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ed25519 keypair from the mnemonic seed using SLIP-0010
|
||||
* all-hardened derivation: m/44'/102001'/<n>'/0'/0'
|
||||
* privkey: 32-byte ed25519 private scalar
|
||||
* pubkey: 32-byte ed25519 public key
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ed25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Signs a 32-byte message digest with ed25519 (PureEdDSA, raw message).
|
||||
* sig: 64-byte ed25519 signature
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int ed25519_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32],
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Signs a variable-length message with ed25519 (PureEdDSA). */
|
||||
int ed25519_sign_msg(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verifies an ed25519 signature over a variable-length message. */
|
||||
int ed25519_verify_msg(const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len,
|
||||
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
||||
const uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- x25519 (age encryption / key agreement) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an x25519 keypair from the mnemonic seed using SLIP-0010
|
||||
* all-hardened derivation: m/44'/102002'/<n>'/0'/0'
|
||||
* privkey: 32-byte x25519 private scalar
|
||||
* pubkey: 32-byte x25519 public key
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_x25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum signatures, FIPS 204) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ML-DSA-65 keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN (1952) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* sk: FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN (4032) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ml_dsa_65_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s (post-quantum hash-based signatures, FIPS 205) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an SLH-DSA-128s keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102004'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN (32) bytes
|
||||
* sk: FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN (64) bytes
|
||||
* WARNING: Takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_slh_dsa_128s_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum KEM, FIPS 203) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ML-KEM-768 keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102005'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN (1184) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* sk: FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN (2400) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ml_kem_768_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
+1706
-402
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
/* pq_crypto_firmware.c — Post-quantum crypto wrappers for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Wraps the PQClean algorithm API (via the pqclean component) with
|
||||
* firmware-friendly functions that handle the deterministic DRBG setup
|
||||
* for keygen and provide clean sign/verify/encaps/decaps interfaces.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The PQ key buffers are large (ML-DSA-65 priv = 4032 bytes, SLH-DSA-128s
|
||||
* sig = 7856 bytes). Callers must allocate these on the heap or as static
|
||||
* buffers — stack allocation on ESP32 (8KB task stack default) will overflow
|
||||
* for the larger buffers.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include "pq_crypto_firmware.h"
|
||||
#include "pqclean.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key generation (deterministic from seed) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Initialize the deterministic DRBG with the mnemonic-derived seed */
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run PQClean keygen — randombytes() draws from the DRBG */
|
||||
int ret = crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Wipe the DRBG state — the seed material is sensitive */
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* WARNING: This call takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32 due to the
|
||||
* hypertree construction (7 layers of WOTS+ + Merkle trees). */
|
||||
int ret = slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Signing --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || siglen == NULL || m == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return crypto_sign(sig, siglen, m, mlen, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || m == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* crypto_sign_open expects (m_out, mlen_out, sm, smlen, pk) where sm
|
||||
* is the signed message. For detached signatures we reconstruct: the
|
||||
* PQClean API uses crypto_sign_open with sm = sig || m. */
|
||||
/* For firmware use, we provide a simple verify by re-signing is not
|
||||
* possible (non-deterministic). The PQClean crypto_sign_open expects
|
||||
* the concatenated sig||msg format. Callers should use the PQClean
|
||||
* API directly for verification, or we build the sm buffer here. */
|
||||
uint8_t *sm = (uint8_t *)malloc(siglen + mlen);
|
||||
if (sm == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(sm, sig, siglen);
|
||||
memcpy(sm + siglen, m, mlen);
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t *m_out = (uint8_t *)malloc(mlen);
|
||||
if (m_out == NULL) {
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_t mlen_out = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = crypto_sign_open(m_out, &mlen_out, sm, siglen + mlen, pk);
|
||||
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
free(m_out);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || siglen == NULL || m == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* WARNING: This call takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32. */
|
||||
return slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign(sig, siglen, m, mlen, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || m == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
uint8_t *sm = (uint8_t *)malloc(siglen + mlen);
|
||||
if (sm == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(sm, sig, siglen);
|
||||
memcpy(sm + siglen, m, mlen);
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t *m_out = (uint8_t *)malloc(mlen);
|
||||
if (m_out == NULL) {
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_t mlen_out = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign_open(m_out, &mlen_out, sm,
|
||||
siglen + mlen, pk);
|
||||
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
free(m_out);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- KEM --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_encaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (ct == NULL || ss == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* encaps uses real randomness (hardware RNG) — the DRBG is not
|
||||
* initialized, so randombytes() falls back to esp_fill_random(). */
|
||||
return crypto_kem_enc(ct, ss, pk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_decaps(uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *ct, const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (ss == NULL || ct == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return crypto_kem_dec(ss, ct, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
||||
/* pq_crypto_firmware.h — Post-quantum crypto wrappers for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Provides firmware-friendly wrappers around the PQClean algorithms:
|
||||
* - ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204 signatures)
|
||||
* - SLH-DSA-128s (FIPS 205 hash-based signatures)
|
||||
* - ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203 key encapsulation)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Key generation is deterministic from a 32-byte seed (derived from the
|
||||
* mnemonic via BIP-32/HMAC-SHA512). The seed feeds the deterministic DRBG
|
||||
* (pq_drbg_firmware.c) which replaces PQClean's randombytes() during keygen.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ed25519 and x25519 are handled separately via mbedtls (see
|
||||
* key_derivation.c) and are not part of this PQClean component.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Algorithm identifiers --- */
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_ML_DSA_65 = 0,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_SLH_DSA_128S,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_ML_KEM_768,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_UNKNOWN
|
||||
} fw_pq_alg_t;
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key sizes (compile-time constants, matching PQClean api.h) --- */
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN 1952
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN 4032
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_SIG_LEN 3309
|
||||
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN 32
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN 64
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_SIG_LEN 7856
|
||||
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN 1184
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN 2400
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN 1088
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN 32
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key generation (deterministic from seed) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an SLH-DSA-128s keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
|
||||
* WARNING: SLH-DSA-128s keygen takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an ML-KEM-768 keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Signing (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sign a message with ML-DSA-65.
|
||||
* sig must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_SIG_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify an ML-DSA-65 signature.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on valid, -1 on invalid. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sign a message with SLH-DSA-128s.
|
||||
* sig must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_SIG_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* WARNING: SLH-DSA-128s signing takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify an SLH-DSA-128s signature.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on valid, -1 on invalid. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- KEM (ML-KEM-768) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encapsulate: generate ciphertext + shared secret from a public key.
|
||||
* Uses real randomness (ESP32 hardware RNG) — not the deterministic DRBG.
|
||||
* ct must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* ss must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_encaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Decapsulate: recover shared secret from secret key + ciphertext.
|
||||
* ss must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_decaps(uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *ct, const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H */
|
||||
@@ -8,3 +8,8 @@ CONFIG_PARTITION_TABLE_FILENAME="partitions.csv"
|
||||
CONFIG_FREERTOS_HZ=1000
|
||||
CONFIG_ESP_MAIN_TASK_STACK_SIZE=16384
|
||||
CONFIG_COMPILER_OPTIMIZATION_SIZE=y
|
||||
|
||||
# PSA crypto for ed25519 sign/verify (IDF v5.x mbedtls has no mbedtls_ed25519_*).
|
||||
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C=y
|
||||
# Curve25519 / Ed25519 ECP domain parameter (already enabled, kept for clarity).
|
||||
CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED=y
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
# CMakeLists.txt — ESP-IDF component for PQClean post-quantum algorithms.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Compiles the three PQ algorithms (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s, ML-KEM-768)
|
||||
# from the shared resources/pqclean/ source tree, using the mbedtls
|
||||
# crypto backend (crypto_backend_mbedtls.c) for SHA-2/SHA3/SHAKE.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The source files are referenced via relative paths back to the shared
|
||||
# resources/pqclean/ directory so there is a single source of truth.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# mbedtls requirements:
|
||||
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHA3_C=y (for SHA3-256, SHA3-512)
|
||||
# CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SHAKE_C=y (for SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256)
|
||||
# Enable these in menuconfig under Component config -> mbedTLS ->
|
||||
# Hash functions -> SHA-3 and SHAKE.
|
||||
|
||||
set(PQCLEAN_ROOT "${CMAKE_CURRENT_LIST_DIR}/../../../../resources/pqclean")
|
||||
|
||||
idf_component_register(
|
||||
SRCS
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/sign.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/poly.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/ntt.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/sign.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/fors.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/wots.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/hash.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/thash.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/address.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/utils.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/kem.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/indcpa.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/poly.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/ntt.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/cbd.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/reduce.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/symmetric.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/verify.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/fips202.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/sha2.c"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common/crypto_backend_mbedtls.c"
|
||||
"randombytes_mbedtls.c"
|
||||
"pq_drbg_firmware.c"
|
||||
INCLUDE_DIRS
|
||||
"include"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/common"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s"
|
||||
"${PQCLEAN_ROOT}/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768"
|
||||
REQUIRES
|
||||
mbedtls
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Suppress warnings from the PQClean code (it uses C99 patterns that
|
||||
# trigger -Wextra warnings under ESP-IDF's default flags).
|
||||
target_compile_options(${COMPONENT_LIB} PRIVATE
|
||||
-Wno-unused-parameter
|
||||
-Wno-sign-compare
|
||||
-Wno-unused-variable
|
||||
-Wno-unused-but-set-variable
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* ml_dsa_65_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_ML_DSA_65_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_ML_DSA_65_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/ml-dsa-65/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* ml_kem_768_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_ML_KEM_768_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_ML_KEM_768_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_kem/ml-kem-768/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
/* pqclean.h — Umbrella include for the ESP32 firmware PQClean component.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Exposes the three post-quantum algorithms (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s,
|
||||
* ML-KEM-768) and the deterministic DRBG used for mnemonic-recoverable
|
||||
* key generation.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* On ESP32 the underlying hash/SHAKE primitives are provided by the
|
||||
* mbedtls backend (crypto_backend_mbedtls.c) instead of OpenSSL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, lattice signatures) --- */
|
||||
#include "ml_dsa_65_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s (FIPS 205, hash-based signatures) --- */
|
||||
#include "slh_dsa_128s_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203, lattice KEM) --- */
|
||||
#include "ml_kem_768_api.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Deterministic DRBG (replaces randombytes() for keygen) --- */
|
||||
/* Initializes the DRBG with a 32-byte mnemonic-derived seed. Subsequent
|
||||
* randombytes() calls will produce a deterministic byte stream. */
|
||||
void pq_drbg_init(const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Zeroizes the DRBG state (call after keygen to wipe sensitive material). */
|
||||
void pq_drbg_zeroize(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/* randombytes() — called by the PQClean algorithm code.
|
||||
* On firmware this is provided by randombytes_mbedtls.c (deterministic DRBG
|
||||
* for keygen, or mbedtls_ctr_drbg for real randomness during encaps). */
|
||||
int randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* FIRMWARE_PQCLEAN_H */
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/* slh_dsa_128s_api.h — firmware wrapper that includes the real PQClean header. */
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_SLH_DSA_128S_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_SLH_DSA_128S_API_WRAPPER_H
|
||||
#include "../../../../resources/pqclean/crypto_sign/slh-dsa-128s/api.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
||||
/* pq_drbg_firmware.c — Deterministic PRNG for PQ key generation on ESP32.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Same algorithm as the host's src/pq_drbg.c but uses the crypto backend
|
||||
* abstraction (which resolves to mbedtls on ESP32) for SHAKE-256 instead
|
||||
* of OpenSSL EVP. This allows deterministic PQ key generation from a
|
||||
* mnemonic-derived seed: same seed -> same randombytes output sequence.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The PRNG: SHAKE-256(seed || counter) produces a stream of pseudo-random
|
||||
* bytes. The counter is a 64-bit little-endian integer that increments
|
||||
* each time we need more output.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include "crypto_backend.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- DRBG state --- */
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char g_seed[32];
|
||||
static int g_seed_len = 0;
|
||||
static uint64_t g_counter = 0;
|
||||
static unsigned char g_buffer[168]; /* SHAKE-256 rate = 136, 168 for safety */
|
||||
static size_t g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
static int g_initialized = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- internal: squeeze more bytes from SHAKE-256 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
static void drbg_refill(void) {
|
||||
unsigned char seed_block[32 + 8]; /* seed + counter (8 bytes LE) */
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(seed_block, g_seed, (size_t)g_seed_len);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 0] = (unsigned char)(g_counter & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 1] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 8) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 2] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 16) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 3] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 24) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 4] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 32) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 5] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 40) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 6] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 48) & 0xFF);
|
||||
seed_block[g_seed_len + 7] = (unsigned char)((g_counter >> 56) & 0xFF);
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_backend_shake256(seed_block, (size_t)g_seed_len + 8,
|
||||
g_buffer, sizeof(g_buffer));
|
||||
|
||||
g_counter++;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- public API --- */
|
||||
|
||||
void pq_drbg_init(const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || seed_len == 0) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(g_seed, 0, sizeof(g_seed));
|
||||
if (seed_len > sizeof(g_seed)) {
|
||||
seed_len = sizeof(g_seed);
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(g_seed, seed, seed_len);
|
||||
g_seed_len = (int)sizeof(g_seed); /* always use 32-byte seed (zero-padded) */
|
||||
|
||||
g_counter = 0;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
g_initialized = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void pq_drbg_zeroize(void) {
|
||||
crypto_backend_cleanse(g_seed, sizeof(g_seed));
|
||||
crypto_backend_cleanse(g_buffer, sizeof(g_buffer));
|
||||
g_seed_len = 0;
|
||||
g_counter = 0;
|
||||
g_buffer_pos = sizeof(g_buffer);
|
||||
g_initialized = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Returns 1 if the DRBG has been initialized (keygen mode), 0 otherwise.
|
||||
* Used by randombytes_mbedtls.c to decide between deterministic DRBG and
|
||||
* hardware RNG. */
|
||||
int pq_drbg_is_initialized(void) {
|
||||
return g_initialized;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* pq_drbg_randombytes is called by randombytes() below. */
|
||||
int pq_drbg_randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) {
|
||||
if (buf == NULL || !g_initialized) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (len > 0) {
|
||||
size_t avail;
|
||||
size_t to_copy;
|
||||
|
||||
if (g_buffer_pos >= sizeof(g_buffer)) {
|
||||
drbg_refill();
|
||||
if (g_buffer_pos >= sizeof(g_buffer)) {
|
||||
return -1; /* refill failed */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
avail = sizeof(g_buffer) - g_buffer_pos;
|
||||
to_copy = (len < avail) ? len : avail;
|
||||
memcpy(buf, g_buffer + g_buffer_pos, to_copy);
|
||||
g_buffer_pos += to_copy;
|
||||
buf += to_copy;
|
||||
len -= to_copy;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
/* randombytes_mbedtls.c — randombytes() implementation for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PQClean's algorithm code calls randombytes() for:
|
||||
* 1. Key generation (keygen) — must be deterministic from the mnemonic
|
||||
* seed so keys are recoverable. The DRBG is initialized via
|
||||
* pq_drbg_init() before keygen, so randombytes() draws from the
|
||||
* deterministic stream.
|
||||
* 2. Encapsulation (ML-KEM enc) — needs real cryptographic randomness.
|
||||
* When the DRBG is NOT initialized, randombytes() falls back to
|
||||
* esp_fill_random() which uses the ESP32 hardware RNG.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This dual-mode behavior matches the host build (src/pq_drbg.c) where
|
||||
* the DRBG is initialized for keygen and randombytes() returns -1 if
|
||||
* called without initialization. On firmware we allow the fallback to
|
||||
* hardware RNG for encaps, which is the correct behavior.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include "esp_random.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* Defined in pq_drbg_firmware.c */
|
||||
extern int pq_drbg_randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if the DRBG is initialized (declared in pq_drbg_firmware.c).
|
||||
* We use a helper to avoid exposing the static directly. */
|
||||
extern int pq_drbg_is_initialized(void);
|
||||
|
||||
int randombytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) {
|
||||
if (buf == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If the deterministic DRBG is active (keygen mode), use it. */
|
||||
if (pq_drbg_is_initialized()) {
|
||||
return pq_drbg_randombytes(buf, len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Otherwise, use the ESP32 hardware RNG for real randomness (encaps). */
|
||||
esp_fill_random(buf, len);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ idf_component_register(
|
||||
"display.c"
|
||||
"mnemonic.c"
|
||||
"key_derivation.c"
|
||||
"pq_crypto_firmware.c"
|
||||
"bech32.c"
|
||||
"usb_transport.c"
|
||||
"buttons.c"
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ idf_component_register(
|
||||
REQUIRES
|
||||
mbedtls
|
||||
secp256k1
|
||||
pqclean
|
||||
json
|
||||
espressif__esp_tinyusb
|
||||
espressif__tinyusb
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
|
||||
#include "key_derivation.h"
|
||||
#include "pq_crypto_firmware.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "esp_random.h"
|
||||
#include "esp_log.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/ed25519.h"
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "secp256k1.h"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
|
||||
#include "secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *KD_TAG = "key_derivation";
|
||||
|
||||
#define BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG 0x80000000u
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
@@ -253,3 +261,316 @@ int schnorr_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32], uint8_t s
|
||||
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ====================================================================
|
||||
* Phase 7: ed25519, x25519, and post-quantum key derivation
|
||||
* ==================================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 all-hardened derivation for ed25519/x25519.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* SLIP-0010 uses HMAC-SHA512 with a "ed25519 seed" or curve-specific key
|
||||
* for the master key, and all derivation steps are hardened (the parent
|
||||
* private key is prepended to the index data).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For ed25519/x25519, the derived 512-bit HMAC output is split:
|
||||
* - first 32 bytes = private key (the scalar)
|
||||
* - last 32 bytes = chain code
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The private key IS the ed25519/x25519 secret — no tweak-add is needed
|
||||
* (unlike secp256k1 BIP-32 where the child priv = parent_priv + HMAC).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 master key from seed: HMAC-SHA512(key="ed25519 seed", data=seed) */
|
||||
static int slip10_master_from_seed(const uint8_t seed[64],
|
||||
uint8_t priv[32], uint8_t chain[32]) {
|
||||
static const uint8_t kEd25519Seed[] = "ed25519 seed";
|
||||
uint8_t i64[64] = {0};
|
||||
|
||||
if (hmac_sha512(kEd25519Seed, sizeof(kEd25519Seed) - 1,
|
||||
seed, 64, i64) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(priv, i64, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(chain, i64 + 32, 32);
|
||||
memset(i64, 0, sizeof(i64));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* SLIP-0010 hardened child derivation:
|
||||
* HMAC-SHA512(key=chain, data=0x00 || priv || index_be32) */
|
||||
static int slip10_ckd_priv(const uint8_t parent_priv[32],
|
||||
const uint8_t parent_chain[32],
|
||||
uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t child_priv[32],
|
||||
uint8_t child_chain[32]) {
|
||||
uint8_t data[37];
|
||||
uint8_t i64[64] = {0};
|
||||
|
||||
/* Hardened derivation: 0x00 || priv || index (big-endian) */
|
||||
data[0] = 0x00;
|
||||
memcpy(data + 1, parent_priv, 32);
|
||||
data[33] = (uint8_t)((index >> 24) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[34] = (uint8_t)((index >> 16) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[35] = (uint8_t)((index >> 8) & 0xFF);
|
||||
data[36] = (uint8_t)(index & 0xFF);
|
||||
|
||||
if (hmac_sha512(parent_chain, 32, data, sizeof(data), i64) != 0) {
|
||||
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(child_priv, i64, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(child_chain, i64 + 32, 32);
|
||||
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
|
||||
memset(i64, 0, sizeof(i64));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Derive a 32-byte seed via SLIP-0010 all-hardened path.
|
||||
* path[] is an array of hardened indices (the caller sets the hardened flag).
|
||||
* Returns the final 32-byte private material in `out_seed`. */
|
||||
static int slip10_derive_seed(const uint8_t seed[64],
|
||||
const uint32_t *path, size_t path_len,
|
||||
uint8_t out_seed[32]) {
|
||||
uint8_t priv[32], chain[32], next_priv[32], next_chain[32];
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_master_from_seed(seed, priv, chain) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < path_len; i++) {
|
||||
if (slip10_ckd_priv(priv, chain, path[i],
|
||||
next_priv, next_chain) != 0) {
|
||||
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(priv));
|
||||
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(chain));
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(priv, next_priv, 32);
|
||||
memcpy(chain, next_chain, 32);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(out_seed, priv, 32);
|
||||
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(priv));
|
||||
memset(chain, 0, sizeof(chain));
|
||||
memset(next_priv, 0, sizeof(next_priv));
|
||||
memset(next_chain, 0, sizeof(next_chain));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ed25519 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ed25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102001'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102001u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t derived_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, derived_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The SLIP-0010 derived 32 bytes IS the ed25519 private key.
|
||||
* Use mbedtls to derive the public key. */
|
||||
memcpy(privkey, derived_seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* mbedtls_ed25519_make_public: derive pub from priv */
|
||||
/* Note: mbedtls ed25519 API may vary by version. The ESP-IDF mbedtls
|
||||
* component provides mbedtls_ed25519_make_public (or via the PK API).
|
||||
* We use the low-level function if available. */
|
||||
int ret = mbedtls_ed25519_make_public((unsigned char *)pubkey, 32,
|
||||
(const unsigned char *)privkey, 32);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 make_public failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
memset(privkey, 0, 32);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ed25519_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32],
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]) {
|
||||
/* mbedtls_ed25519_sign: sign a message (not pre-hashed) */
|
||||
int ret = mbedtls_ed25519_sign((unsigned char *)sig64, 64,
|
||||
(const unsigned char *)msg32, 32,
|
||||
(const unsigned char *)privkey, 32,
|
||||
NULL, NULL);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "ed25519 sign failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- x25519 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_x25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102002'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102002u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t derived_seed[32];
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi d;
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_point Q;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, derived_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The SLIP-0010 derived 32 bytes IS the x25519 private key.
|
||||
* Clamp it per RFC 7748 and derive the public key via mbedtls ECDH. */
|
||||
memcpy(privkey, derived_seed, 32);
|
||||
memset(derived_seed, 0, sizeof(derived_seed));
|
||||
|
||||
/* x25519 clamping: priv[0] &= 248, priv[31] &= 127, priv[31] |= 64 */
|
||||
privkey[0] &= 248;
|
||||
privkey[31] &= 127;
|
||||
privkey[31] |= 64;
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi_init(&d);
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q);
|
||||
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 group load failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(d, privkey, 32);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 mpi read failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, d, &grp.G, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 ecp_mul failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Serialize the public key as raw 32 bytes (little-endian) */
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t olen = 0;
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&grp, &Q,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED,
|
||||
&olen, pubkey, 32);
|
||||
if (ret != 0 || olen != 32) {
|
||||
ESP_LOGE(KD_TAG, "x25519 pub serialize failed: %d", ret);
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
|
||||
mbedtls_mpi_free(&d);
|
||||
mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q);
|
||||
return (ret == 0) ? 0 : -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ml_dsa_65_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102003'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102003u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_slh_dsa_128s_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102004'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102004u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ESP_LOGW(KD_TAG, "SLH-DSA-128s keygen: this takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32");
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int derive_ml_kem_768_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
/* m/44'/102005'/<index>'/0'/0' — all hardened (SLIP-0010) -> 32-byte seed */
|
||||
const uint32_t path[5] = {
|
||||
44u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
102005u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
index | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
0u | BIP32_HARDENED_FLAG,
|
||||
};
|
||||
uint8_t pq_seed[32];
|
||||
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (slip10_derive_seed(seed, path, 5, pq_seed) != 0) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(pq_seed, pk, sk);
|
||||
memset(pq_seed, 0, sizeof(pq_seed));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,61 @@
|
||||
#pragma once
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- secp256k1 (Nostr, existing) --- */
|
||||
int derive_nostr_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
int derive_nostr_key_index(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t nostr_index, uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
int schnorr_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32], uint8_t sig64[64]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ed25519 (SSH signatures) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ed25519 keypair from the mnemonic seed using SLIP-0010
|
||||
* all-hardened derivation: m/44'/102001'/<n>'/0'/0'
|
||||
* privkey: 32-byte ed25519 private scalar
|
||||
* pubkey: 32-byte ed25519 public key
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ed25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Signs a 32-byte message digest with ed25519.
|
||||
* sig: 64-byte ed25519 signature
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int ed25519_sign32(const uint8_t privkey[32], const uint8_t msg32[32],
|
||||
uint8_t sig64[64]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- x25519 (age encryption / key agreement) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an x25519 keypair from the mnemonic seed using SLIP-0010
|
||||
* all-hardened derivation: m/44'/102002'/<n>'/0'/0'
|
||||
* privkey: 32-byte x25519 private scalar
|
||||
* pubkey: 32-byte x25519 public key
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_x25519_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t privkey[32], uint8_t pubkey[32]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum signatures, FIPS 204) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ML-DSA-65 keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102003'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN (1952) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* sk: FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN (4032) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ml_dsa_65_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- SLH-DSA-128s (post-quantum hash-based signatures, FIPS 205) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an SLH-DSA-128s keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102004'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN (32) bytes
|
||||
* sk: FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN (64) bytes
|
||||
* WARNING: Takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_slh_dsa_128s_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum KEM, FIPS 203) --- */
|
||||
/* Derives an ML-KEM-768 keypair from the mnemonic seed.
|
||||
* Path: m/44'/102005'/<n>'/0'/0' -> 32-byte seed -> PQClean keygen
|
||||
* pk: FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN (1184) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* sk: FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN (2400) bytes — caller must allocate
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int derive_ml_kem_768_key(const uint8_t seed[64], uint32_t index,
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
/* pq_crypto_firmware.c — Post-quantum crypto wrappers for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Wraps the PQClean algorithm API (via the pqclean component) with
|
||||
* firmware-friendly functions that handle the deterministic DRBG setup
|
||||
* for keygen and provide clean sign/verify/encaps/decaps interfaces.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The PQ key buffers are large (ML-DSA-65 priv = 4032 bytes, SLH-DSA-128s
|
||||
* sig = 7856 bytes). Callers must allocate these on the heap or as static
|
||||
* buffers — stack allocation on ESP32 (8KB task stack default) will overflow
|
||||
* for the larger buffers.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include "pq_crypto_firmware.h"
|
||||
#include "pqclean.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key generation (deterministic from seed) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Initialize the deterministic DRBG with the mnemonic-derived seed */
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run PQClean keygen — randombytes() draws from the DRBG */
|
||||
int ret = crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Wipe the DRBG state — the seed material is sensitive */
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
/* WARNING: This call takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32 due to the
|
||||
* hypertree construction (7 layers of WOTS+ + Merkle trees). */
|
||||
int ret = slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (seed == NULL || pk == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_init(seed, 32);
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk);
|
||||
|
||||
pq_drbg_zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Signing --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || siglen == NULL || m == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return crypto_sign(sig, siglen, m, mlen, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || m == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* crypto_sign_open expects (m_out, mlen_out, sm, smlen, pk) where sm
|
||||
* is the signed message. For detached signatures we reconstruct: the
|
||||
* PQClean API uses crypto_sign_open with sm = sig || m. */
|
||||
/* For firmware use, we provide a simple verify by re-signing is not
|
||||
* possible (non-deterministic). The PQClean crypto_sign_open expects
|
||||
* the concatenated sig||msg format. Callers should use the PQClean
|
||||
* API directly for verification, or we build the sm buffer here. */
|
||||
uint8_t *sm = (uint8_t *)malloc(siglen + mlen);
|
||||
if (sm == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(sm, sig, siglen);
|
||||
memcpy(sm + siglen, m, mlen);
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t *m_out = (uint8_t *)malloc(mlen);
|
||||
if (m_out == NULL) {
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_t mlen_out = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = crypto_sign_open(m_out, &mlen_out, sm, siglen + mlen, pk);
|
||||
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
free(m_out);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || siglen == NULL || m == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* WARNING: This call takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32. */
|
||||
return slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign(sig, siglen, m, mlen, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (sig == NULL || m == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
uint8_t *sm = (uint8_t *)malloc(siglen + mlen);
|
||||
if (sm == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(sm, sig, siglen);
|
||||
memcpy(sm + siglen, m, mlen);
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t *m_out = (uint8_t *)malloc(mlen);
|
||||
if (m_out == NULL) {
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
size_t mlen_out = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
int ret = slh_dsa_128s_crypto_sign_open(m_out, &mlen_out, sm,
|
||||
siglen + mlen, pk);
|
||||
|
||||
free(sm);
|
||||
free(m_out);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- KEM --- */
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_encaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *pk) {
|
||||
if (ct == NULL || ss == NULL || pk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* encaps uses real randomness (hardware RNG) — the DRBG is not
|
||||
* initialized, so randombytes() falls back to esp_fill_random(). */
|
||||
return crypto_kem_enc(ct, ss, pk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_decaps(uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *ct, const uint8_t *sk) {
|
||||
if (ss == NULL || ct == NULL || sk == NULL) {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return crypto_kem_dec(ss, ct, sk);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
||||
/* pq_crypto_firmware.h — Post-quantum crypto wrappers for ESP32 firmware.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Provides firmware-friendly wrappers around the PQClean algorithms:
|
||||
* - ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204 signatures)
|
||||
* - SLH-DSA-128s (FIPS 205 hash-based signatures)
|
||||
* - ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203 key encapsulation)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Key generation is deterministic from a 32-byte seed (derived from the
|
||||
* mnemonic via BIP-32/HMAC-SHA512). The seed feeds the deterministic DRBG
|
||||
* (pq_drbg_firmware.c) which replaces PQClean's randombytes() during keygen.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ed25519 and x25519 are handled separately via mbedtls (see
|
||||
* key_derivation.c) and are not part of this PQClean component.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifndef FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H
|
||||
#define FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stddef.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Algorithm identifiers --- */
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_ML_DSA_65 = 0,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_SLH_DSA_128S,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_ML_KEM_768,
|
||||
FW_PQ_ALG_UNKNOWN
|
||||
} fw_pq_alg_t;
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key sizes (compile-time constants, matching PQClean api.h) --- */
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN 1952
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN 4032
|
||||
#define FW_ML_DSA_65_SIG_LEN 3309
|
||||
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN 32
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN 64
|
||||
#define FW_SLH_DSA_128S_SIG_LEN 7856
|
||||
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN 1184
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN 2400
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN 1088
|
||||
#define FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN 32
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Key generation (deterministic from seed) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an SLH-DSA-128s keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error.
|
||||
* WARNING: SLH-DSA-128s keygen takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Generate an ML-KEM-768 keypair from a 32-byte seed.
|
||||
* pk must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_PUBKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* sk must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_PRIVKEY_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32],
|
||||
uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- Signing (ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-128s) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sign a message with ML-DSA-65.
|
||||
* sig must be at least FW_ML_DSA_65_SIG_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify an ML-DSA-65 signature.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on valid, -1 on invalid. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_dsa_65_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sign a message with SLH-DSA-128s.
|
||||
* sig must be at least FW_SLH_DSA_128S_SIG_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* WARNING: SLH-DSA-128s signing takes 5-30 seconds on ESP32.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_sign(uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify an SLH-DSA-128s signature.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on valid, -1 on invalid. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_slh_dsa_128s_verify(const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen,
|
||||
const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- KEM (ML-KEM-768) --- */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encapsulate: generate ciphertext + shared secret from a public key.
|
||||
* Uses real randomness (ESP32 hardware RNG) — not the deterministic DRBG.
|
||||
* ct must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* ss must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_encaps(uint8_t *ct, uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *pk);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Decapsulate: recover shared secret from secret key + ciphertext.
|
||||
* ss must be at least FW_ML_KEM_768_SHARED_SECRET_LEN bytes.
|
||||
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error. */
|
||||
int fw_pq_ml_kem_768_decaps(uint8_t *ss, const uint8_t *ct, const uint8_t *sk);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* FIRMWARE_PQ_CRYPTO_H */
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
# n_signer FPGA Signing Core
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** Concept — brainstorming. No plan yet.
|
||||
|
||||
An FPGA-based secp256k1 signing core that provides the **maximum physical
|
||||
security** possible for Nostr signing: constant-time crypto (no instruction
|
||||
timing leakage), key material in FPGA fabric (no bus access to the key), and no
|
||||
firmware (no malware injection surface). The FPGA is a **signing oracle** — a
|
||||
small, auditable hardware module that does one thing (secp256k1 schnorr/ECDSA
|
||||
signing) with side-channel resistance that software on an MCU cannot match.
|
||||
|
||||
## The secure element gap
|
||||
|
||||
Commercial secure elements (NXP JCOP, Infineon, Microchip ATECC) support NIST
|
||||
curves (P-256, P-384) and RSA, but **not secp256k1** — the smart card industry
|
||||
standardized on NIST curves, and secp256k1 was treated as a "Bitcoin curve"
|
||||
that didn't get hardware support. This is why every Nostr/Bitcoin hardware
|
||||
wallet (Coldcard, Ledger, Trezor, Keystone) uses a **general-purpose MCU**
|
||||
running software secp256k1, not a secure element.
|
||||
|
||||
An FPGA fills this gap: it gives us **hardware-level secp256k1** without relying
|
||||
on a secure element vendor to support the curve. We write the secp256k1 core
|
||||
ourselves in Verilog, with full control over the timing, the key storage, and
|
||||
the side-channel resistance.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why an FPGA
|
||||
|
||||
| Property | MCU (software) | FPGA (hardware) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Timing leakage | Branch prediction, cache, instruction timing | **None** — fixed datapath, every op takes the same cycles |
|
||||
| Key storage | RAM (accessible via bus/debug) | **FPGA fabric / BRAM** (no external bus access) |
|
||||
| Firmware attacks | OS, USB stack, BT stack = injection surface | **No firmware** — bitstream is the entire program |
|
||||
| Debug access | JTAG/SWD can read RAM | **No debug path to key** if not routed |
|
||||
| Auditability | Large codebase (thousands of lines of C) | **Small Verilog core** (~2000 lines, auditable) |
|
||||
| PQ crypto | Yes (software) | No (too complex for FPGA) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture: hybrid FPGA + MCU
|
||||
|
||||
The practical design is a **two-chip hybrid**: the FPGA is the signing oracle,
|
||||
the MCU handles the protocol/UI/transport. The MCU sends a message hash + key
|
||||
index to the FPGA over SPI; the FPGA signs with the key in fabric; the FPGA
|
||||
returns the 64-byte signature. The private key never leaves the FPGA.
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart TD
|
||||
subgraph Host_Side
|
||||
Host[Host: laptop/phone<br/>n_signer client]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph Signer_Device
|
||||
MCU[MCU: RP2040 or nRF52840<br/>protocol + UI + transport<br/>PQ crypto in software]
|
||||
FPGA[FPGA: iCE40-UP5K<br/>secp256k1 signing core<br/>ed25519 signing core<br/>SHA-256/512 cores<br/>key in BRAM]
|
||||
Display[OLED / e-paper display]
|
||||
Buttons[approve / deny buttons]
|
||||
end
|
||||
Host -->|USB / IR / NFC / BLE| MCU
|
||||
MCU -->|SPI: msg_hash + key_index| FPGA
|
||||
FPGA -->|SPI: 64-byte signature| MCU
|
||||
MCU --> Display
|
||||
Buttons --> MCU
|
||||
MCU -->|response| Host
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Division of labor
|
||||
|
||||
| Function | Chip | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Transport (USB/IR/NFC/BLE) | MCU | Ported from CYD/Teensy firmware |
|
||||
| JSON-RPC dispatch | MCU | Ported from `handle_request()` |
|
||||
| Auth envelope verify | MCU | secp256k1 schnorr verify (software) |
|
||||
| Approval UI (display + buttons) | MCU | Ported from CYD UI |
|
||||
| Mnemonic entry | MCU | BIP-39 wordlist + entry UI |
|
||||
| BIP-32 / SLIP-0010 key derivation | **FPGA** | SHA-512 HMAC core + derivation FSM |
|
||||
| secp256k1 schnorr sign | **FPGA** | Constant-time scalar multiply + schnorr |
|
||||
| secp256k1 ECDSA sign | **FPGA** | Same scalar multiply + RFC 6979 nonce |
|
||||
| ed25519 sign | **FPGA** | Curve25519 arithmetic core |
|
||||
| x25519 ECDH | **FPGA** | Same curve as ed25519 |
|
||||
| SHA-256 | **FPGA** | Hardware core (~1000 LUTs) |
|
||||
| SHA-512 | **FPGA** | Hardware core (~2000 LUTs) — needed for BIP-32 |
|
||||
| HMAC-SHA-256 | **FPGA** | SHA-256 core + FSM — for the `derive` verb |
|
||||
| NIP-04 / NIP-44 encryption | MCU | AES + ChaCha20 in software |
|
||||
| ML-DSA-65 / SLH-DSA-128s / ML-KEM-768 | MCU | PQClean in software (too complex for FPGA) |
|
||||
| nostr_mine_event (PoW) | MCU | SHA-256 hash loop in software (or offload to FPGA) |
|
||||
|
||||
### Key storage in the FPGA
|
||||
|
||||
The mnemonic seed (64 bytes) is loaded into the FPGA's BRAM at boot (sent by
|
||||
the MCU after the user enters the mnemonic). The FPGA derives secp256k1/ed25519/
|
||||
x25519 keys on demand using its SHA-512 + modular arithmetic cores. The derived
|
||||
private keys live in FPGA registers/BRAM and are **never readable from the SPI
|
||||
interface** — the SPI interface only accepts "sign this hash with key index N"
|
||||
commands and returns signatures. There is no "read key" command.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the key security property: **the private key is physically unreachable
|
||||
from any external interface.** On an MCU, the key is in RAM and can be read via
|
||||
JTAG/SWD or a firmware exploit. On the FPGA, the key is in fabric and there is
|
||||
no path to it.
|
||||
|
||||
## FPGA board options
|
||||
|
||||
| Board | FPGA | LUTs | Toolchain | Price | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **iCE40-UP5K** (e.g. iCEBreaker, Fomu) | iCE40UP5K | 5,300 | **Yosys + nextpnr** (open-source) | ~$15-20 | Best DIY choice. Open-source toolchain, DSP blocks, 128 KB BRAM, SPI flash. |
|
||||
| **Gowin Tang Nano 9K** | GW1NR-9 | 8,640 | Yosys + nextpnr (open-source) | ~$8 | Cheapest. Newer open-source support. |
|
||||
| **Lattice ECP5** (OrangeCrab, ULX3S) | LFE5U-12F / 25F / 45F | 12K-45K | Yosys + nextpnr (open-source) | ~$30-50 | More room. Supports **bitstream encryption** (important for production). |
|
||||
| **Xilinx Artix-7** (Arty A7) | XC7A35T | 33,280 | Vivado (proprietary) | ~$100 | Professional. Overkill for a signer. |
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommendation: Lattice iCE40-UP5K for prototyping, ECP5 for production.**
|
||||
The iCE40 has the most mature open-source toolchain (Yosys + nextpnr) and is
|
||||
cheap. The ECP5 adds bitstream encryption (prevents bitstream cloning) for a
|
||||
production device.
|
||||
|
||||
## The secp256k1 core (the hard part)
|
||||
|
||||
The secp256k1 signing core is the main development effort. It needs:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **256-bit modular arithmetic** over the secp256k1 prime field (p = 2²⁵⁶ - 2³² - 977):
|
||||
- Modular add, subtract, multiply (Montgomery multiplication for performance)
|
||||
- Modular inversion (Fermat's little theorem: a^(p-2) mod p, or extended Euclidean)
|
||||
2. **Point operations** on the secp256k1 curve (y² = x³ + 7):
|
||||
- Point addition (Jacobian coordinates)
|
||||
- Point doubling
|
||||
- Scalar multiplication (constant-time double-and-add, no conditional branches)
|
||||
3. **Schnorr sign** (BIP-340):
|
||||
- Deterministic nonce: k = HMAC-SHA256(d, x) where d is the key, x is the message hash
|
||||
- R = k·G (point multiplication)
|
||||
- e = tagged hash(R.x || P || m) (SHA-256)
|
||||
- s = (k + e·x) mod n (scalar multiply + modular add)
|
||||
- Signature = (R.x, s)
|
||||
4. **ECDSA sign** (for the `scheme:"ecdsa"` option):
|
||||
- RFC 6979 deterministic nonce: k = HMAC-SHA256(x, m) with rejection sampling
|
||||
- R = k·G
|
||||
- r = R.x mod n
|
||||
- s = k⁻¹ · (m + r·x) mod n
|
||||
- Signature = (r, s)
|
||||
|
||||
**Estimated size:** ~2000-5000 LUTs for the modular arithmetic + point
|
||||
multiplication + schnorr/ECDSA FSM. Fits comfortably in an iCE40-UP5K (5,300
|
||||
LUTs) alongside the SHA-256/512 cores and the SPI interface.
|
||||
|
||||
**Estimated sign time:** ~1-5 ms at 12 MHz (iCE40-UP5K typical clock). The
|
||||
bottleneck is the 256-bit modular multiplication (~0.5-2 ms per multiply, ~256
|
||||
multiplies per scalar multiplication). This is **much faster than software**
|
||||
(the CYD's software schnorr sign takes ~10-50 ms).
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions
|
||||
|
||||
- **Pure FPGA vs hybrid?** A pure-FPGA signer (no MCU) would implement the
|
||||
entire dispatch + transport + UI in Verilog. This is extremely secure but
|
||||
very hard to build (JSON parsing in Verilog is painful). The hybrid (FPGA
|
||||
signing oracle + MCU protocol) is practical and still gives the key-isolation
|
||||
benefit. **Lean toward hybrid.**
|
||||
- **Which MCU?** RP2040 (cheap, no WiFi) or nRF52840 (low power, NFC, BLE)?
|
||||
This determines the transport options (USB, IR, NFC, BLE).
|
||||
- **Bitstream security:** iCE40 doesn't support bitstream encryption. If an
|
||||
attacker reads the SPI flash, they get the bitstream (but not the key — the
|
||||
key is loaded at runtime by the MCU, not stored in the bitstream). For
|
||||
production, use ECP5 with bitstream encryption.
|
||||
- **Key loading:** the MCU sends the mnemonic seed to the FPGA at boot over
|
||||
SPI. Is this SPI transfer vulnerable to sniffing? It happens once, at boot,
|
||||
inside the device. If the device is physically sealed, the SPI bus is not
|
||||
accessible. For higher security, the FPGA could derive the key from the
|
||||
mnemonic internally (the MCU sends the mnemonic string, the FPGA does
|
||||
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 + BIP-32 derivation in hardware).
|
||||
- **ed25519 core:** worth implementing, or secp256k1-only? ed25519 is the same
|
||||
field size (256-bit) but a different curve (Curve25519 vs secp256k1). The
|
||||
modular arithmetic is similar but the curve operations differ. Adding
|
||||
ed25519 roughly doubles the core size.
|
||||
- **Open-source secp256k1 FPGA cores:** are there existing Verilog secp256k1
|
||||
cores we can reuse or adapt? (There are Bitcoin mining cores, but those do
|
||||
double-SHA256, not ECDSA. Academic ECDSA-on-FPGA papers exist but the code
|
||||
is rarely open-sourced. We'd likely write the core from scratch.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Comparison to the other concepts
|
||||
|
||||
| | FPGA signer (hybrid) | MCU-only (CYD/Teensy) | Secure element |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| secp256k1 side-channel resistance | **Best** (constant-time, key in fabric) | Medium (software, timing leakage) | N/A (no secp256k1 support) |
|
||||
| Key isolation | **Best** (no bus access to key) | Low (RAM, JTAG/SWD accessible) | Best (tamper-resistant) |
|
||||
| Firmware attack surface | **Minimal** (no firmware on FPGA) | Large (OS, USB, BT stacks) | Minimal (fixed function) |
|
||||
| PQ crypto | On MCU (software) | On MCU (software) | N/A |
|
||||
| Development effort | **High** (Verilog secp256k1 core) | Low (port existing C code) | High (NDA + Java Card) |
|
||||
| Cost | ~$15 FPGA + ~$4 MCU = ~$20 | ~$4-27 (MCU only) | ~$3-5 (chip only) |
|
||||
| Auditability | **High** (small Verilog core, open toolchain) | Medium (large C codebase) | Low (proprietary, NDA) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Next steps
|
||||
|
||||
- Decide: hybrid (FPGA + MCU) vs pure FPGA
|
||||
- Decide: iCE40-UP5K (prototype) vs ECP5 (production)
|
||||
- Decide: secp256k1-only vs secp256k1 + ed25519
|
||||
- Survey existing open-source secp256k1 / ECDSA FPGA cores
|
||||
- Write a Verilog secp256k1 modular arithmetic core (the foundation)
|
||||
- Write a plan (similar to [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
|
||||
# n_signer IR Air-Gap Signer
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** Concept — brainstorming. No plan yet.
|
||||
|
||||
A hardware signer that communicates with the host via **infrared light** —
|
||||
line-of-sight, short-range, physically directional. The signer never touches
|
||||
the host electrically: no wire, no radio, no shared ground. The only channel
|
||||
is modulated light through air. A small **USB receiver dongle** on the host
|
||||
decodes the IR signal and presents it as a CDC-ACM serial port.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the strongest air-gap model in the n_signer family: the signer is
|
||||
electrically isolated from the host, and the receiver dongle is a dumb
|
||||
IR-to-serial bridge with no crypto, no keys, and ~200 lines of auditable
|
||||
firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
## Concept
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
Host[Host: laptop<br/>n_signer client] -->|USB CDC| Dongle[USB IR receiver dongle<br/>RP2040 + IR receiver]
|
||||
Dongle -->|IR light<br/>line-of-sight| Signer[IR signer<br/>RP2040 + OLED + buttons]
|
||||
Signer -->|approve/deny button| User[User]
|
||||
Signer -->|IR light response| Dongle
|
||||
Dongle -->|USB CDC| Host
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The signer speaks the same algorithm-based API as the host and the CYD/Teensy
|
||||
firmware ([`README.md`](../../README.md) §4). The auth envelope (kind 27235)
|
||||
protects the IR wire. The receiver dongle is a transparent byte pipe — it has
|
||||
no knowledge of the protocol, no keys, and no state beyond the IR-to-USB
|
||||
bridge.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why IR
|
||||
|
||||
- **True air-gap** — the signer is electrically isolated from the host. No wire,
|
||||
no radio, no shared ground. Host-side malware cannot reach the signer's
|
||||
firmware through the communication channel.
|
||||
- **Line-of-sight required** — you point the signer at the receiver. An attacker
|
||||
would need to be in the same room, in the line of sight, with their own IR
|
||||
transmitter. Much smaller attack surface than BT (which broadcasts
|
||||
omnidirectionally to ~10 m).
|
||||
- **Dumb dongle** — the USB receiver is a simple IR-to-serial bridge. ~200
|
||||
lines of firmware, no crypto, no keys, fully auditable in an afternoon. If
|
||||
compromised, it can only MITM the IR stream (which is already protected by the
|
||||
auth envelope).
|
||||
- **No BT stack** — much smaller firmware attack surface on the signer. No
|
||||
pairing, no GATT, no L2CAP, no SMP.
|
||||
- **Novel** — no hardware wallet uses IR for host communication. It's a
|
||||
creative solution to the air-gap problem that avoids both the wire (USB) and
|
||||
the radio (BT/NFC) attack surfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardware (preliminary)
|
||||
|
||||
### Signer
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | **RP2040** (Raspberry Pi Pico) | $4, Cortex-M0+ @ 133 MHz, 264 KB SRAM, no WiFi/BT (perfect for air-gap). Enough RAM for secp256k1 + ed25519. ML-DSA-65 fits (~6 KB heap). |
|
||||
| | or **nRF52840** | If you want NFC for mnemonic loading + lower power. |
|
||||
| IR transceiver | **38 kHz IR LED + TSOP38238** (raw async, 115200 baud, ~$1) | Simplest. ~11 KB/s. Fine for Nostr events (~500 bytes). Slow for PQ sigs (3-8 KB → 0.3-0.7 s). |
|
||||
| | or **TFBS4711 IrDA module** (~$2, up to 4 Mbps) | Faster (~400 KB/s) but harder to source + more complex protocol. |
|
||||
| Display | 0.96" SSD1306 OLED (I2C, ~$2) or 1.54" e-paper | Small is fine — shows "approve kind 1 from <caller>?" |
|
||||
| Input | 2-3 tactile buttons (approve/deny/back) | |
|
||||
| Power | Coin cell or small LiPo | RP2040 + OLED + IR = very low power |
|
||||
|
||||
### USB receiver dongle
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | **RP2040** (Pico) or **ATmega32U4** (Arduino Micro) | $4-8. Native USB device. |
|
||||
| IR receiver | Matching TSOP38238 or IrDA module | Must match the signer's IR modulation. |
|
||||
| USB | Native USB CDC-ACM | Presents as `/dev/ttyACM0` to the host. |
|
||||
| Firmware | ~200 lines | Read IR → write USB CDC; read USB CDC → transmit IR. A dumb pipe. No crypto, no keys, no state. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Throughput
|
||||
|
||||
| IR mode | Baud | Throughput | sign_event (500 B req + 600 B resp) | ML-DSA-65 sign (3.3 KB sig) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Raw 38 kHz async | 115200 | ~11 KB/s | ~100 ms | ~300 ms |
|
||||
| Raw 38 kHz async | 230400 | ~23 KB/s | ~50 ms | ~150 ms |
|
||||
| IrDA | 4 Mbps | ~400 KB/s | ~3 ms | ~8 ms |
|
||||
|
||||
**Recommendation:** start with raw 38 kHz IR at 115200 baud (simplest, cheapest,
|
||||
works with any IR LED + TSOP receiver). Upgrade to 230400 or IrDA if PQ
|
||||
signature throughput is a bottleneck.
|
||||
|
||||
## Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
The IR link is **half-duplex** — the signer and receiver take turns
|
||||
transmitting. The protocol is simple:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Host sends JSON-RPC request → USB CDC → dongle transmits IR.
|
||||
2. Signer receives IR, parses the request, shows approval prompt.
|
||||
3. User approves/denies.
|
||||
4. Signer transmits IR response → dongle → USB CDC → host.
|
||||
|
||||
The 4-byte big-endian length-prefix framing (same as the CYD/feather) works
|
||||
over IR as-is. The auth envelope protects against MITM on the IR stream.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security model
|
||||
|
||||
- **Electrical isolation:** the signer has no electrical connection to the host.
|
||||
The IR link is a one-way-at-a-time optical channel.
|
||||
- **Line-of-sight:** an attacker must be in the same room, in the line of sight,
|
||||
with their own IR transmitter. The auth envelope + approval prompt protect
|
||||
against a MITM even if the attacker intercepts the IR stream.
|
||||
- **Dumb dongle:** the USB receiver has no crypto, no keys, no protocol
|
||||
knowledge. It's a byte pipe. If compromised, it can only MITM the IR stream
|
||||
(already protected by the auth envelope). The dongle's firmware is small
|
||||
enough to audit in an afternoon.
|
||||
- **No radio:** no BT, no WiFi, no NFC (unless you add NFC for mnemonic loading).
|
||||
The signer emits no RF — only modulated IR light when actively transmitting.
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions
|
||||
|
||||
- **IR modulation:** raw 38 kHz async (simplest) vs IrDA (faster, more complex)?
|
||||
- **Mnemonic entry:** buttons (scroll BIP-39 words) vs NFC from phone vs
|
||||
generate-on-device? On a 0.96" OLED, scrolling 2048 words is tedious but
|
||||
secure.
|
||||
- **PQ crypto on RP2040:** 264 KB SRAM is enough for ML-DSA-65 but SLH-DSA-128s
|
||||
is tight. May need to limit the PQ algorithm set.
|
||||
- **Dongle design:** separate RP2040 Pico, or integrate the IR receiver into a
|
||||
custom PCB with a USB-A plug for a compact dongle?
|
||||
- **Range:** raw IR with an IR LED + TSOP38238 reaches ~1-2 m line-of-sight.
|
||||
Enough for "point at the dongle on your desk" but not across a room.
|
||||
- **Bidirectional IR:** the signer needs both an IR LED (transmit) and a TSOP
|
||||
receiver (receive). Two modules, or an IrDA transceiver module that does both?
|
||||
|
||||
## Comparison to the BLE wearable signer
|
||||
|
||||
| | IR air-gap | BLE wearable |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Air-gap | **High (light, line-of-sight, ~1 m)** | Medium (radio, ~10 m, omnidirectional) |
|
||||
| Attack surface | **Small (no BT, dumb dongle)** | Large (BT stack) |
|
||||
| Host compatibility | Requires USB dongle | Universal (phones, laptops) |
|
||||
| Form factor | Handheld (point at dongle) | Wearable |
|
||||
| Throughput | ~11 KB/s (raw IR) or ~400 KB/s (IrDA) | ~250 KB/s (BLE 5) |
|
||||
| Novelty | **Novel (no hardware wallet uses IR)** | Conventional |
|
||||
| Cost | ~$10 signer + ~$8 dongle | ~$10-15 (nRF52840 + OLED) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Next steps
|
||||
|
||||
- Decide on IR modulation (raw 38 kHz vs IrDA)
|
||||
- Decide on MCU (RP2040 vs nRF52840)
|
||||
- Decide on mnemonic entry method
|
||||
- Decide on display (OLED vs e-paper)
|
||||
- Prototype the IR link: two RP2040 Picos + IR LEDs + TSOP38238, bidirectional
|
||||
byte pipe at 115200 baud
|
||||
- Write a port plan (similar to [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md))
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
|
||||
# n_signer NFC Card / Ring Signer
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** Concept — open-ended brainstorming. No plan yet.
|
||||
|
||||
A contactless signer in a **card or ring form factor** that is powered and
|
||||
communicates via **NFC (13.56 MHz)**. You place it on a reader (USB NFC reader
|
||||
or a phone); the reader's RF field powers the device and exchanges data. No
|
||||
battery, no wire, no radio beyond the 4 cm NFC zone.
|
||||
|
||||
This directory also explores **passive RFID/NFC tag ideas** that don't do
|
||||
signing on-device — they store keys or seed material that a host reads and uses.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Concept A: NFC-powered active signer (card with display + button)
|
||||
|
||||
```mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
Host[Host: laptop/phone<br/>n_signer client] -->|USB or built-in NFC| Reader[NFC reader<br/>ACR122U or phone]
|
||||
Reader -->|13.56 MHz RF field<br/>powers + communicates| Card[Signer card<br/>nRF52840 + e-paper + button]
|
||||
Card -->|NFC response| Reader
|
||||
Reader -->|USB| Host
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The card has a tiny e-paper display + one button. The reader powers the card;
|
||||
the card shows the approval prompt on its own display; the user presses the
|
||||
button to approve; the card signs and sends the response over NFC. The card
|
||||
does not trust the reader for display — it shows what it's signing.
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware (preliminary)
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | **nRF52840** (WLCSP) | Cortex-M4, NFC-A tag mode built in, secp256k1/ed25519 in software. Needs a thin-film battery (not fully passive). |
|
||||
| | or **NXP JCOP 4** (Java Card) | Fully passive, hardware secp256k1, tamper-resistant. Requires NDA + Java Card applet. Not DIY. |
|
||||
| Display | 1.1" e-paper segment display | Shows "approve kind 1? caller: <hex>". Zero power when static. |
|
||||
| Input | One capacitive touch button | Press to approve, timeout = deny. |
|
||||
| Power | Thin-film battery (like payment cards with displays) + NFC harvesting | |
|
||||
| Antenna | Etched into flex PCB around card perimeter | Standard smart card manufacturing. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
|
||||
- **Attack radius ~4 cm** — an attacker must touch your card with their reader.
|
||||
- **No emissions when not on a reader** — the card is invisible to remote attackers.
|
||||
- **Self-contained approval** — the card's display shows what it's signing. The reader can't lie.
|
||||
- **Physical possession = authorization** — same model as a payment card.
|
||||
|
||||
### Build difficulty
|
||||
|
||||
- **DIY prototype:** nRF52840 dev board + wire-wound NFC antenna + ACR122U reader + small OLED. Prove NFC-powered signing works.
|
||||
- **Production:** custom flex PCB + etched antenna + thin battery + e-paper segment. Standard smart card manufacturing, but not DIY.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Concept B: NFC ring (tap-to-sign, no display)
|
||||
|
||||
A ring with an NFC tag + MCU inside. No display, no button. You tap it on a
|
||||
reader; the reader displays the approval prompt; you tap again to confirm
|
||||
(two-tap protocol) or the ring signs immediately (single-tap, trusts the reader).
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | Secure element (JCOP / Infineon) or nRF52840 (WLCSP) | Must be tiny (2×3 mm package). |
|
||||
| Power | **Fully passive** (harvested from reader) if using a secure element. nRF52840 needs a battery. |
|
||||
| Antenna | Coil wound into the ring body | Custom manufacturing. |
|
||||
| Display | **None** | No room. |
|
||||
| Input | **None** | Pure tap-to-sign. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
|
||||
- **Two-tap protocol:** tap to receive the request, reader displays it, tap again to sign. Forces deliberate action but still trusts the reader's display.
|
||||
- **Single-tap:** anyone who taps your ring with a reader can sign. Only safe if the ring is always in your physical possession and the reader is trusted.
|
||||
- **No display = reader-trusted approval.** Weaker than Concept A but much more portable.
|
||||
|
||||
### Build difficulty
|
||||
|
||||
- **Very hard** — custom antenna winding, tiny chip placement, ring-form-factor PCB. Not DIY without specialized equipment.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Concept C: Passive NFC tag that stores keys (no on-device signing)
|
||||
|
||||
This is a fundamentally different idea: the tag **does not sign anything**. It
|
||||
stores key material (a mnemonic seed, a private key, or a derived key) that a
|
||||
host reads over NFC and uses to sign. The tag is a **portable key storage
|
||||
device**, not a signer.
|
||||
|
||||
### How it would work
|
||||
|
||||
1. The user taps the tag on a phone or USB NFC reader.
|
||||
2. The host reads the stored key material over NFC (ISO 14443 / NDEF).
|
||||
3. The host uses the key material to sign (the host runs the n_signer crypto).
|
||||
4. The tag is just storage — it has no MCU, no crypto, no battery.
|
||||
|
||||
### What the tag stores (options)
|
||||
|
||||
| Storage model | What's on the tag | Security | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **Encrypted seed** | The mnemonic seed, encrypted with a passphrase (BIP-39 password). The host decrypts after the user types the passphrase. | Medium — if the tag is stolen, the attacker needs the passphrase. | Like an encrypted paper backup, but in NFC form. |
|
||||
| **Raw private key** | The secp256k1 private key (32 bytes), stored in the tag's EEPROM. | **Low** — anyone who reads the tag has the key. Only safe if the tag is PIN-protected (needs a secure element, not a dumb tag). | Like storing a private key on a USB stick. |
|
||||
| **NDEF URI** | A URI like `nostr:npub1...` (just the public key). The host uses it to identify which key to use (the actual private key is elsewhere). | High (it's just a pubkey) | Not a signer — just an identity token. |
|
||||
| **Shamir shard** | One share of a Shamir's Secret Sharing split of the seed. The tag holds 1 of N shares; you need M tags to reconstruct. | **High** — a single tag is useless. | Like a metal seed backup but in NFC form. Multiple tags = multiple shares. |
|
||||
| **HD wallet derivation path** | Just the derivation path + a reference to a master seed stored elsewhere. The tag tells the host *which* key to derive. | Medium | The tag is a pointer, not the key itself. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Hardware
|
||||
|
||||
| Component | Candidate | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **NTAG215** (NXP) | 504 bytes user memory, no crypto, ~$0.10 | The cheapest option. Stores an encrypted seed or NDEF URI. No MCU. |
|
||||
| **NTAG424 DNA** (NXP) | 4 KB, AES-128, tamper detection, ~$0.50 | Has crypto — can do authenticated read (the host must present a key to read the data). Better security. |
|
||||
| **MIFARE DESFire EV3** | 32 KB, AES, secure applets, ~$1 | Smart card chip. Can store encrypted key material with PIN/mutual auth. |
|
||||
| **Java Card (JCOP)** | Full smart card, runs applets, ~$3-5 | Could run a "key storage" applet that only releases the seed after a PIN is verified on the host. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Security analysis
|
||||
|
||||
The **passive tag as key storage** is the weakest signer model (the host does
|
||||
the signing, so a compromised host can steal the key), but it has interesting
|
||||
niche uses:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Encrypted seed backup:** an NTAG215 storing an encrypted seed is a
|
||||
convenient portable backup — tap your phone to read it, type the passphrase
|
||||
to decrypt. More convenient than a metal plate, less secure than a hardware
|
||||
signer.
|
||||
- **Shamir shard carrier:** each tag holds one SSS share. You need M of N tags
|
||||
to reconstruct the seed. Distribute the tags to different locations/people.
|
||||
A single stolen tag is useless. This is a **key-recovery** tool, not a signer.
|
||||
- **Identity token:** an NDEF URI tag with your npub. Tap to share your Nostr
|
||||
identity with a phone. Not a signer — just a business card for Nostr.
|
||||
- **PIN-protected key release:** a DESFire or JCOP tag that only releases the
|
||||
seed after the host verifies a PIN. The host never sees the key until the PIN
|
||||
is correct. Better than a raw tag, but the host still gets the key after the
|
||||
PIN — so a compromised host can still steal it.
|
||||
|
||||
### The fundamental limitation
|
||||
|
||||
A passive tag that stores keys **cannot protect the key from a compromised
|
||||
host**. Once the host reads the key, the host has it. This is the same problem
|
||||
as storing a private key in a file — the OS can steal it. The only way to
|
||||
protect the key from the host is to **never release the raw key** — which means
|
||||
the tag must do the signing itself (Concept A or B), or the tag must participate
|
||||
in a protocol where the host sends a hash to sign and the tag returns a
|
||||
signature (which requires an MCU + crypto = not a passive tag).
|
||||
|
||||
**The one exception:** a **secure element** (JCOP / Infineon) can do
|
||||
"sign inside, never release the key." The host sends the message hash; the
|
||||
secure element signs it internally and returns the signature. The private key
|
||||
never leaves the chip. This is how smart card signing works (e.g. FIDO2 keys,
|
||||
PIV cards). But this is Concept A (active signer), not a passive tag.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Open questions (all concepts)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Is the goal a signer (does crypto on-device) or a key carrier (stores keys for a host to use)?**
|
||||
- Signer → Concept A (card with display) or B (ring). The key never leaves the device.
|
||||
- Key carrier → Concept C (passive tag). The host gets the key. Simpler but less secure.
|
||||
- **Form factor:** card (credit card size, room for display) vs ring (tiny, no display)?
|
||||
- **Power:** passive (secure element, no battery) vs semi-passive (nRF52840 + thin battery)?
|
||||
- **Approval model:** on-device display (secure, needs a screen) vs reader display (trusts the reader, no screen needed) vs two-tap (medium security, no screen)?
|
||||
- **Host reader:** USB NFC reader (ACR122U, ~$15) vs phone NFC (universal, no dongle)?
|
||||
- **MCU/toolchain:** nRF52840 + C (DIY-friendly) vs JCOP + Java Card (production, NDA)?
|
||||
- **Could a passive tag + a host-side n_signer be a useful "portable encrypted seed backup" even if it's not a signer?** (Yes — for key recovery / Shamir shard distribution.)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Comparison across all three concepts (NFC, BLE, IR)
|
||||
|
||||
| | NFC card (A) | NFC ring (B) | NFC tag (C) | BLE wearable | IR air-gap |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Does signing on-device? | **Yes** | **Yes** | No (host signs) | Yes | Yes |
|
||||
| Key leaves device? | **No** | **No** | Yes (host reads it) | No | No |
|
||||
| Power | Reader + thin battery | Reader (passive) or battery | **Reader (passive)** | Battery | Battery |
|
||||
| Display | Tiny e-paper | None | None | Tiny OLED | Tiny OLED/e-paper |
|
||||
| Approval | On-card display + button | Reader display (two-tap) | N/A (host decides) | On-device display + buttons | On-device display + buttons |
|
||||
| Attack radius | ~4 cm | ~4 cm | ~4 cm | ~10 m | ~1 m (line-of-sight) |
|
||||
| Host needs | NFC reader or phone NFC | NFC reader or phone NFC | NFC reader or phone NFC | BT (universal) | USB IR dongle |
|
||||
| Form factor | Card | Ring | Tag/card/sticker | Wristband/pendant | Handheld |
|
||||
| Build difficulty | Hard (flex PCB) | Very hard (custom ring) | **Easy (off-the-shelf tag)** | Moderate | Moderate |
|
||||
| Best for | Daily signing | Quick tap-to-sign | Key backup / recovery | Wearable daily use | High-security air-gap |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Next steps
|
||||
|
||||
- Decide: signer (A/B) vs key carrier (C) vs both
|
||||
- Decide: card vs ring vs tag
|
||||
- Decide: DIY prototype (nRF52840 + ACR122U) vs production (secure element)
|
||||
- Explore the Shamir-shard-on-NFC-tags idea as a key-recovery tool
|
||||
- Explore the encrypted-seed-on-NTAG215 idea as a portable backup
|
||||
- Write a plan for the chosen direction
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
||||
# n_signer Teensy 4.1 Firmware
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** In progress — Phase 0 + SD + TFT + touch all verified on hardware
|
||||
(toolchain, blink, USB CDC serial, 4-bit SDMMC card read, ST7796S 480×320 TFT
|
||||
landscape fill + text, XPT2046 touch calibrated + live dot-draw verified). See
|
||||
[`plans/teensy41_bringup.md`](../../plans/teensy41_bringup.md) for the bring-up
|
||||
log, [`firmware/teensy41/WIRING.md`](WIRING.md) for the display wiring, and
|
||||
[`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md) for the
|
||||
full port plan. Next: exFAT re-test on the 1 TB SDXC card, then port the CYD
|
||||
display/touch/UI code.
|
||||
|
||||
The **Teensy 4.1** (NXP i.MX RT1062, Cortex-M7 @ 600 MHz) is the high-capacity
|
||||
OTP pad target. Its built-in SD slot supports **1 TB SDXC cards (exFAT)** via
|
||||
PJRC's SdFat library, making it the ideal hardware signer for large one-time-pad
|
||||
storage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why the Teensy 4.1
|
||||
|
||||
| Concern | Teensy 4.1 | CYD (ESP32) | Feather S3 TFT (ESP32-S3) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| MCU | 600 MHz Cortex-M7 | 240 MHz Xtensa LX6 | 240 MHz Xtensa LX7 |
|
||||
| SRAM | 1 MB + 16 MB PSRAM | 512 KB (no PSRAM) | 512 KB + quad PSRAM |
|
||||
| SD slot | **4-bit SDMMC, exFAT, up to 2 TB** | 1-bit SDSPI, FAT32, up to 32 GB | — |
|
||||
| USB | Hi-Speed (480 Mbps) device + host | CH340 UART only | Full-Speed USB |
|
||||
| WiFi | **None** | Yes (unused) | Yes (unused) |
|
||||
| Ethernet | 10/100 PHY (optional) | — | — |
|
||||
| PQ crypto speed | ~1-2 s SLH-DSA-128s | 5-30 s SLH-DSA-128s | 5-30 s SLH-DSA-128s |
|
||||
|
||||
## SD card size support
|
||||
|
||||
| Card type | Size | Works? |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| SDSC | ≤ 2 GB | Yes (FAT16/32) |
|
||||
| SDHC | 2 – 32 GB | Yes (FAT32) |
|
||||
| **SDXC** | **32 GB – 2 TB** | **Yes (exFAT via SdFat)** |
|
||||
| SDUC | 2 – 128 TB | No |
|
||||
|
||||
**1 TB SDXC cards work** — SdFat has native exFAT support, and the Teensy's
|
||||
4-bit SDMMC bus runs at ~20-40 MB/s. No reformatting needed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Display + touch
|
||||
|
||||
**4.0" ST7796S 480×320 SPI TFT with XPT2046 resistive touch** (Hosyond or
|
||||
equivalent, ~$12-15). Specs: 4-wire SPI, RGB 65K, 3.3V~5V (works at the Teensy's
|
||||
3.3V logic), XPT2046 resistive touch, includes touch pen + on-module SD slot.
|
||||
|
||||
Resistive touch is the right choice for a hardware signer (deliberate physical
|
||||
activation, stylus-compatible, simple driver). The XPT2046 driver ports from
|
||||
the CYD's [`touch.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c) with 480×320
|
||||
resolution constants. The ST7796S display driver is new code (different init
|
||||
sequence than the CYD's ILI9341).
|
||||
|
||||
Wiring: TFT SPI on pins 11/12/13 (hardware SPI0), CS=5, DC=7, RESET=6, BL=8;
|
||||
touch shares the SPI bus with T_CS=9, T_IRQ=2. See
|
||||
[`WIRING.md`](WIRING.md) for the full pin table and wire-by-wire chart.
|
||||
|
||||
## Calibrated values & settings (verified on hardware)
|
||||
|
||||
These are the values to use when porting the CYD display/touch/UI code to the
|
||||
Teensy 4.1. They were measured on the actual Elecrow 4.0" ST7796S + XPT2046
|
||||
module during bring-up (see [`plans/teensy41_bringup.md`](../../plans/teensy41_bringup.md)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Display
|
||||
|
||||
| Setting | Value | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Orientation | **Landscape 480×320** | Wider than tall. |
|
||||
| `tft.init()` | `tft.init(320, 480)` | Pass the *native* (portrait) dims so the library takes its zero-offset branch. Do NOT use `init(480, 320)` — that computes a negative `_colstart` and offsets the image. |
|
||||
| `tft.setRotation()` | `setRotation(1)` | Produces landscape 480×320 from the `init(320, 480)` base. |
|
||||
| `SCREEN_W` / `SCREEN_H` | `480` / `320` | Use these constants for all drawing coordinates. **Do not use `tft.width()` / `tft.height()`** — the `ST7796_t3` accessors are broken and always return 480×320 regardless of rotation. |
|
||||
| Library | `ST7796_t3` (in Teensy's `ST7735_t3` library) | Hardware SPI0. |
|
||||
| `drawPixel()` | **Avoid near edges** | Use `fillRect(x, y, 1, n, c)` / `fillRect(x, y, n, 1, c)` for crosshairs and thin lines — `drawPixel` mispositions near the right/bottom edges. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Touch (XPT2046)
|
||||
|
||||
| Setting | Value | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `T_CS` | pin 9 | Touch chip select (active low). |
|
||||
| `T_IRQ` | **pin 2** | Touch interrupt. **Must not be pin 10** — pin 10 is SPI0 CS0, and `pinMode(10, INPUT)` corrupts the SPI engine and reverts the display to the wrong orientation. |
|
||||
| SPI clock | 2 MHz | XPT2046 max is ~2.5 MHz; drop the clock before every touch read (`SPI.beginTransaction(SPISettings(2000000, MSBFIRST, SPI_MODE0))`). |
|
||||
| Axis swap | **Yes** | In landscape rotation 1, raw Y → screen X, raw X → screen Y. The calibration struct + `raw_to_screen()` handle this (see below). |
|
||||
| Control bytes | `0xD0` = X, `0x90` = Y, `0xB0`/`0xC0` = Z1/Z2 | Same as the CYD's [`touch.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c). |
|
||||
| Pressure threshold | 80 | Reject readings with `pressure < 80` (stylus not pressing hard enough). Same as CYD. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Touch calibration constants (measured 2026-07-26)
|
||||
|
||||
```c
|
||||
static TouchCal s_cal = {
|
||||
/* x_min = */ 207,
|
||||
/* x_max = */ 1909,
|
||||
/* y_min = */ 168,
|
||||
/* y_max = */ 1798,
|
||||
/* invert_x = */ 1,
|
||||
/* invert_y = */ 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
With the axis swap, `x_min/x_max` is the range of **raw Y** that maps to screen
|
||||
X, and `y_min/y_max` is the range of **raw X** that maps to screen Y. The
|
||||
`raw_to_screen()` function swaps accordingly:
|
||||
|
||||
```c
|
||||
*sx = map_clamped((int)raw_y, s_cal.x_min, s_cal.x_max,
|
||||
s_cal.invert_x ? (SCREEN_W - 1) : 0,
|
||||
s_cal.invert_x ? 0 : (SCREEN_W - 1));
|
||||
*sy = map_clamped((int)raw_x, s_cal.y_min, s_cal.y_max,
|
||||
s_cal.invert_y ? (SCREEN_H - 1) : 0,
|
||||
s_cal.invert_y ? 0 : (SCREEN_H - 1));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These constants are for the specific panel we calibrated. If you swap a
|
||||
display module, re-run [`firmware/teensy41/touch_cal/touch_cal.ino`](touch_cal/touch_cal.ino)
|
||||
and paste the new constants.
|
||||
|
||||
## Build (planned)
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Arduino CLI / Teensyduino
|
||||
arduino-cli compile --fqbn teensy:avr:teensy41 firmware/teensy41
|
||||
arduino-cli upload -p /dev/ttyACM0 --fqbn teensy:avr:teensy41 firmware/teensy41
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
See the port plan: [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md).
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
|
||||
# Wiring: 4.0" ST7796S 480×320 SPI TFT + XPT2046 Touch → Teensy 4.1
|
||||
|
||||
This document describes how to wire the **Elecrow/Hosyond 4.0" 480×320 SPI TFT
|
||||
module with ST7796S driver and XPT2046 resistive touch** to the **Teensy 4.1**.
|
||||
|
||||
It is the reference for Phase 1 of [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md)
|
||||
(display + touch bring-up). Source documents for the pinout live in
|
||||
[`firmware/teensy41/documents/`](documents/):
|
||||
|
||||
- [`ST7796S_Datasheet.pdf`](documents/ST7796S_Datasheet.pdf) — display controller
|
||||
- [`4.0inch_SPI_Module_User_Manual.pdf`](documents/4.0inch_SPI_Module_User_Manual.pdf) — module manual
|
||||
- [`4.0 Inch 480_320 SPI TFT LCD Module with ST7796 Driver_With Touch Function - Elecrow Wiki.html`](documents/4.0%20Inch%20480_320%20SPI%20TFT%20LCD%20Module%20with%20ST7796%20Driver_With%20Touch%20Function%20-%20Elecrow%20Wiki.html)
|
||||
- [`Teensy® 4.1.html`](documents/Teensy%C2%AE%204.1.html) — PJRC pinout reference
|
||||
|
||||
## Module pinout
|
||||
|
||||
The module breaks out 14 pins along one long edge. The labels below are the
|
||||
**silk-screen names on the actual Elecrow/Hosyond board** (read in order from
|
||||
one end of the header to the other). Alternate names in parentheses are the
|
||||
ones used in some other vendors' docs.
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Silkscreen | Alt name | Function |
|
||||
|----|------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|
|
||||
| 1 | t_irq | | Touch interrupt (active low) |
|
||||
| 2 | t_do | T_MISO | Touch SPI MISO (shared bus) |
|
||||
| 3 | t_din | T_MOSI | Touch SPI MOSI (shared bus) |
|
||||
| 4 | t_cs | | Touch chip select (active low) |
|
||||
| 5 | t_clk | T_SCK | Touch SPI clock (shared bus) |
|
||||
| 6 | sdo (miso) | SDO / MISO | TFT SPI MISO (shared with touch) |
|
||||
| 7 | led | BL / BKL | Backlight (high = on; PWM-able) |
|
||||
| 8 | sck | CLK / SCL | TFT SPI clock (shared with touch) |
|
||||
| 9 | sdi (mosi) | SDI / SDA | TFT SPI MOSI (shared with touch) |
|
||||
| 10 | dc/rs | DC / A0 | TFT data/command select |
|
||||
| 11 | reset | RST | TFT reset (active low) |
|
||||
| 12 | cs | LCD_CS | TFT chip select (active low) |
|
||||
| 13 | gnd | | Ground |
|
||||
| 14 | vcc | | Power (3.3V–5V) |
|
||||
|
||||
> The module has a **second SD card slot** on the PCB (separate from the
|
||||
> Teensy's built-in slot). Its pins are not broken out on the 14-pin header —
|
||||
> they go to the SD contacts on the back of the module. We **do not use** the
|
||||
> module's SD slot; the 1 TB OTP pad lives in the Teensy's built-in SDMMC slot
|
||||
> (4-bit bus, ~20–40 MB/s, exFAT). See [`README.md`](README.md) §SD card size support.
|
||||
|
||||
## Connection chart (wire-by-wire)
|
||||
|
||||
This is the simple "connect this Teensy pin to that module pin" list. **Power
|
||||
first, then signals.**
|
||||
|
||||
### By display header position (use this when the silkscreen is hidden)
|
||||
|
||||
When the display is plugged into a breadboard, you can't read the silkscreen.
|
||||
This table is indexed by **physical position on the display header**, counting
|
||||
from the end with `t_irq` (pin 1) to the end with `vcc` (pin 14). Hold the
|
||||
display with the header at the bottom and the screen facing you; pin 1 is the
|
||||
leftmost pin (the `t_irq` end), pin 14 is the rightmost (the `vcc` end).
|
||||
|
||||
| Display header pos | Silkscreen | → | Teensy 4.1 pin | Function |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | t_irq | → | 2 | Touch interrupt (active low) — see note below on why not pin 10 |
|
||||
| 2 | t_do | → | 12 | SPI0 MISO (shared) |
|
||||
| 3 | t_din | → | 11 | SPI0 MOSI (shared) |
|
||||
| 4 | t_cs | → | 9 | Touch chip select (active low) |
|
||||
| 5 | t_clk | → | 13 | SPI0 SCK (shared) — opposite edge |
|
||||
| 6 | sdo (miso) | → | 12 | SPI0 MISO (same wire as pos 2) |
|
||||
| 7 | led | → | 8 | Backlight (PWM-able) |
|
||||
| 8 | sck | → | 13 | SPI0 SCK (same wire as pos 5) |
|
||||
| 9 | sdi (mosi) | → | 11 | SPI0 MOSI (same wire as pos 3) |
|
||||
| 10 | dc/rs | → | 7 | TFT data/command |
|
||||
| 11 | reset | → | 6 | TFT reset (active low) |
|
||||
| 12 | cs | → | 5 | TFT chip select (software CS) |
|
||||
| 13 | gnd | → | GND | Ground (opposite edge, next to pin 13) |
|
||||
| 14 | vcc | → | 3V3 | 3.3V power (long edge, past pin 12) — **NOT 5V** |
|
||||
|
||||
**Shared pins (pos 2↔6, 3↔9, 5↔8):** these pairs are tied together on the
|
||||
display PCB, so you only need to wire **one of each pair** to the Teensy. The
|
||||
table shows both for completeness, but in practice you can wire pos 2, 3, 5
|
||||
and leave pos 6, 8, 9 floating (or wire them to the same Teensy pin —
|
||||
harmless). That brings it to **11 wires** total (8 unique signals + 3V3 + GND
|
||||
+ the 3 shared-pair duplicates you choose to wire).
|
||||
|
||||
### By Teensy pin number (for lookup at the Teensy)
|
||||
|
||||
Sorted by Teensy pin number for easy lookup at the Teensy end of the wires.
|
||||
|
||||
| Teensy 4.1 pin | → | Module silkscreen | What it does |
|
||||
|----------------|---|-------------------|--------------|
|
||||
| GND | → | gnd | Ground (GND is on the opposite edge, next to pin 13) |
|
||||
| 3V3 | → | vcc | 3.3V power (**not 5V**) — the 3V3 pin is on the long edge, just past pin 12 |
|
||||
| 2 | → | t_irq | Touch interrupt (active low) — **not pin 10** (see note below) |
|
||||
| 5 | → | cs | TFT chip select (software CS — see note below) |
|
||||
| 6 | → | reset | TFT reset (active low) |
|
||||
| 7 | → | dc/rs | TFT data/command |
|
||||
| 8 | → | led | Backlight (HIGH = on; PWM-able) |
|
||||
| 9 | → | t_cs | Touch chip select (active low) |
|
||||
| 11 | → | sdi (mosi) | SPI0 MOSI (also wires to `t_din`) |
|
||||
| 12 | → | sdo (miso) | SPI0 MISO (also wires to `t_do`) |
|
||||
| 13 | → | sck | SPI0 SCK (also wires to `t_clk`) — **pin 13 is on the opposite edge**, route via a short jumper |
|
||||
|
||||
That's **11 wires** total, all in the pins 5-13 range plus 3V3 and GND. The
|
||||
three shared SPI lines (`sdi (mosi)`, `sdo (miso)`, `sck`) each fan out to two
|
||||
module pins — see the next section for why and how.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Why `cs` is on pin 5 (software CS) and `t_irq` is on pin 2 (not pin 10):**
|
||||
> Pin 10 is the hardware CS0 for SPI0. **Do not use pin 10 for anything else** —
|
||||
> calling `pinMode(10, ...)` (e.g. for `t_irq` as an input) corrupts the SPI0
|
||||
> engine state and reverts the ST7796S display to landscape mode after
|
||||
> `setRotation()`. This is a hard-won lesson documented in
|
||||
> [`plans/teensy41_bringup.md`](../../plans/teensy41_bringup.md). So:
|
||||
> - `cs` is on pin 5 (software CS via `SPI.beginTransaction()`) — the speed
|
||||
> difference vs hardware CS0 is negligible for a signer UI.
|
||||
> - `t_irq` is on pin 2 (long edge, before pin 5) — keeps it off pin 10 and
|
||||
> out of the SPI0 CS0 conflict.
|
||||
> If you want hardware CS0 for the TFT, you can put `cs` on pin 10, but then
|
||||
> `t_irq` must stay on pin 2 (or be dropped entirely in favor of polling).
|
||||
|
||||
> **Shared-bus shortcut:** `sdi (mosi)` and `t_din` are the same net on the
|
||||
> module PCB, `sdo (miso)` and `t_do` are the same net, and `sck` and `t_clk`
|
||||
> are the same net. So for each shared pair you can either (a) wire the Teensy
|
||||
> pin to **both** module pins (harmless, just a Y-jumper), or (b) wire the
|
||||
> Teensy pin to **one** module pin and leave the other floating (it's tied
|
||||
> internally on the PCB). The connection chart above wires each Teensy SPI pin
|
||||
> to the TFT-side silkscreen; the touch-side silkscreen of each pair is tied to
|
||||
> the same net on the board.
|
||||
|
||||
## Teensy 4.1 pin assignments
|
||||
|
||||
The Teensy 4.1 has 3 hardware SPI ports. We use **SPI0** (the primary port with
|
||||
the FIFO) on pins 11/12/13. The TFT and the XPT2046 share this bus; each has its
|
||||
own CS. All pins are 3.3V — the module is 3.3V-logic compatible, so no level
|
||||
shifting is needed.
|
||||
|
||||
| Silkscreen | Teensy 4.1 pin | Teensy function | Notes |
|
||||
|------------|----------------|--------------------------|-------|
|
||||
| gnd | GND | Ground | GND is on the opposite edge, next to pin 13. |
|
||||
| vcc | 3V3 | 3.3V output | **Use 3.3V, not 5V/VIN.** The 3V3 pin is on the long edge, just past pin 12. The Teensy's 3.3V regulator can supply up to ~250 mA; the display + backlight draw ~80–120 mA, well within budget. |
|
||||
| cs | 5 | GPIO (software CS) | TFT chip select (active low). Software CS via `SPI.beginTransaction()` — see the note in the connection chart about why we didn't use hardware CS0 on pin 10. |
|
||||
| reset | 6 | GPIO | TFT reset. Drive low for >10 µs to reset; pull high (or set as OUTPUT HIGH) for normal operation. Can also be tied to a 10 kΩ pull-up and left floating if you don't need software reset. |
|
||||
| dc/rs | 7 | GPIO | TFT data/command. High = data (pixel/command param), Low = command. |
|
||||
| led | 8 | GPIO / PWM | Backlight. Drive HIGH for full brightness, or use `analogWrite(8, 0..255)` for dimming. Can also be tied to 3.3V through a ~100 Ω resistor for always-on. |
|
||||
| t_cs | 9 | GPIO | Touch chip select. Active low. Must be HIGH when talking to the TFT, LOW when reading the touch. |
|
||||
| t_irq | 2 | GPIO (input + interrupt) | Touch interrupt. Pulled high by the XPT2046 internally; goes low when touch pressure is detected. Optional — can be left unconnected and polled, but wiring it lets us sleep until a touch happens. **Must not be pin 10** (SPI0 CS0 — `pinMode(10, INPUT)` corrupts the SPI engine and reverts the display to landscape). |
|
||||
| sdi (mosi) | 11 | SPI0 MOSI | Shared with touch `t_din`. |
|
||||
| sdo (miso) | 12 | SPI0 MISO | Shared with touch `t_do`. The TFT rarely drives MISO (most ST7796S commands are write-only), but the XPT2046 reads return on this line. |
|
||||
| sck | 13 | SPI0 SCK | Shared with touch `t_clk`. **Pin 13 is on the opposite edge** of the Teensy (next to GND), so route it via a short jumper across the board. Pin 13 also drives the onboard orange LED — that's fine, the LED just blinks during SPI activity. |
|
||||
| t_clk | 13 | SPI0 SCK (shared) | Same wire as `sck`. |
|
||||
| t_do | 12 | SPI0 MISO (shared) | Same wire as `sdo (miso)`. |
|
||||
| t_din | 11 | SPI0 MOSI (shared) | Same wire as `sdi (mosi)`. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Pin map summary (Teensy side)
|
||||
|
||||
Wires, listed in the same order as the module's silkscreen header (pin 1 → 14):
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Teensy 4.1 Silkscreen Function
|
||||
----------- ----------- ------------------------------------------
|
||||
pin 2 t_irq Touch interrupt (active low — NOT pin 10, see note)
|
||||
pin 12 t_do Touch MISO (shared SPI0 MISO)
|
||||
pin 11 t_din Touch MOSI (shared SPI0 MOSI)
|
||||
pin 9 t_cs Touch chip select (active low)
|
||||
pin 13 t_clk Touch SCK (shared SPI0 SCK — opposite edge)
|
||||
pin 12 sdo (miso) TFT MISO (shared SPI0 MISO — same wire as t_do)
|
||||
pin 8 led Backlight (HIGH = on; analogWrite for dimming)
|
||||
pin 13 sck TFT SCK (shared SPI0 SCK — same wire as t_clk)
|
||||
pin 11 sdi (mosi) TFT MOSI (shared SPI0 MOSI — same wire as t_din)
|
||||
pin 7 dc/rs TFT data/command
|
||||
pin 6 reset TFT reset (active low)
|
||||
pin 5 cs TFT chip select (software CS)
|
||||
GND gnd Ground (opposite edge, next to pin 13)
|
||||
3V3 vcc Power (3.3V — NOT 5V; long edge, past pin 12)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Shared-bus note: `t_do` and `sdo (miso)` are the **same electrical net** on the
|
||||
module (both connect to the SPI MISO line), and `t_din`/`sdi (mosi)` and
|
||||
`t_clk`/`sck` are likewise the same nets. You only need to wire one of each
|
||||
shared pair to the Teensy — but on this module the header brings both out, so
|
||||
you can either wire both to the same Teensy pin (harmless) or wire one and leave
|
||||
the other floating (also fine, since they're tied together on the PCB). The
|
||||
table above wires both to the same Teensy pin for clarity.
|
||||
|
||||
## SPI bus sharing
|
||||
|
||||
The TFT and the XPT2046 share MOSI / SCK / MISO. The rule for sharing:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Only one CS is low at a time.** Before talking to the TFT, set `t_cs` HIGH
|
||||
and `cs` LOW. Before reading the touch, set `cs` HIGH and `t_cs` LOW.
|
||||
2. **Use `SPI.beginTransaction(SPISettings(spi_speed, MSBFIRST, SPI_MODE0))` /
|
||||
`SPI.endTransaction()`** around each device's access. The TFT and the XPT2046
|
||||
both use SPI mode 0, but they may want different clock speeds:
|
||||
- TFT: up to 40 MHz (the ST7796S supports 1-line SPI up to ~62 MHz; 40 MHz is
|
||||
a safe conservative choice on the Teensy's SPI0).
|
||||
- XPT2046: 2–2.5 MHz max (the XPT2046 datasheet specifies a max serial clock
|
||||
of ~2.5 MHz). **Always drop the clock before reading the touch.**
|
||||
3. **The XPT2046 control byte** is `0x90` for X read (channel 5) and `0xD0` for
|
||||
Y read (channel 1), 8-bit, MSB first, with the start bit set. See
|
||||
[`firmware/cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c)
|
||||
`xpt2046_transfer_12b()` for the bit-banged reference; on the Teensy we can
|
||||
use the hardware SPI engine instead of bit-banging.
|
||||
|
||||
## Routing notes (trace-crossing analysis)
|
||||
|
||||
This assignment uses **hardware SPI0** (MOSI=11, MISO=12, SCK=13) for maximum
|
||||
display throughput (FIFO + DMA, up to 40 MHz), with all display pins in a
|
||||
contiguous block on the Teensy's long edge (pins 5-12) plus SCK=13 on the
|
||||
opposite edge. The display module's silkscreen pin order doesn't match the
|
||||
Teensy's SPI0 pin order, so a small number of trace crossings are unavoidable.
|
||||
This is fine for jumper wires and trivial on a 2-layer PCB.
|
||||
|
||||
**Teensy 4.1 physical layout (relevant part):**
|
||||
- **Long edge:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 3V3, 24, 25, ...
|
||||
- **Opposite edge:** 0, 13, 14, ... with GND in the middle
|
||||
|
||||
So pins 5-12 are contiguous on the long edge, 3V3 is right past pin 12, and
|
||||
pin 13 (SCK) + GND are on the opposite edge. All display signals fit in the
|
||||
pins 5-13 range plus 3V3 and GND — no need to reach up to pins 24+.
|
||||
|
||||
**Crossings (2 on the long edge + 1 SCK via):**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **MOSI/MISO swap.** Display order is MISO(`t_do`/`sdo`, pos 2/6) then
|
||||
MOSI(`t_din`/`sdi`, pos 3/9); Teensy SPI0 is MOSI(11) then MISO(12). One
|
||||
crossing — unavoidable given the fixed SPI0 pin assignments.
|
||||
2. **`t_cs` jumps over the SPI pins.** Display pos 3-4-5 is
|
||||
MOSI-`t_cs`-SCK; Teensy pins 11-12-13 are MOSI-MISO-SCK with no free pin
|
||||
between MOSI(11) and SCK(13). `t_cs` (Teensy pin 9) routes below the SPI
|
||||
block, crossing the MOSI/MISO pair. One crossing.
|
||||
3. **SCK via to the opposite edge.** SCK is on pin 13, which is on the
|
||||
opposite edge of the Teensy from pins 5-12. This is a via (a short jumper
|
||||
across the board), not a trace crossing on the long edge.
|
||||
|
||||
The remaining GPIOs (`led`=8, `dc/rs`=7, `reset`=6, `cs`=5) run monotonically
|
||||
down the long edge below `t_cs`=9 — zero crossings among them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why not zero crossings?** A zero-crossing assignment is possible by
|
||||
bit-banging SPI on Teensy pins in exact display order, but it loses the
|
||||
hardware SPI engine — display refresh drops to ~0.2-0.5 s per full 480×320
|
||||
frame. We chose hardware SPI0 for a snappy UI and accepted 2 crossings + 1
|
||||
via, which is trivial for jumper wires or a 2-layer PCB.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why `cs`=5 (software CS) and `t_irq`=2?** Pin 10 is the hardware CS0 for
|
||||
SPI0, but **pin 10 cannot be used for `t_irq`** — calling `pinMode(10, INPUT)`
|
||||
corrupts the SPI0 engine and reverts the display to landscape after
|
||||
`setRotation()` (verified during bring-up, see
|
||||
[`plans/teensy41_bringup.md`](../../plans/teensy41_bringup.md)). So `t_irq` is
|
||||
on pin 2 (long edge, before pin 5), and `cs` is on pin 5 (software CS via
|
||||
`SPI.beginTransaction()`). The speed difference vs hardware CS0 is negligible
|
||||
for a signer UI. If you want hardware CS0 for the TFT, put `cs` on pin 10 and
|
||||
leave `t_irq` on pin 2 (or drop `t_irq` and poll).
|
||||
|
||||
## Power notes
|
||||
|
||||
- **3.3V only.** The Teensy 4.1's pins are **not 5V tolerant**. The display
|
||||
module is rated 3.3V–5V and works at 3.3V logic — power it from the Teensy's
|
||||
`3V3` pin, **not** `VIN`/`VUSB` (5V). Driving VCC with 5V while the signal
|
||||
pins are at 3.3V can back-power the ST7796S level shifters and is unnecessary.
|
||||
- **Backlight current.** The LED pin on these modules is typically driven
|
||||
through a transistor on the module; a direct 3.3V GPIO high is enough to turn
|
||||
it on. If the backlight flickers or the GPIO can't hold high, drive `LED` from
|
||||
3.3V through a ~100 Ω resistor instead and skip PWM dimming.
|
||||
- **Total draw.** Display + backlight + touch ≈ 80–120 mA at 3.3V. The Teensy's
|
||||
onboard regulator is rated for ~250 mA external use, so this is within budget.
|
||||
If you add other peripherals (Ethernet PHY, etc.), re-check the budget.
|
||||
|
||||
## Wiring checklist (do this before powering on)
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] VCC → **3V3** (not 5V/VIN).
|
||||
- [ ] GND → GND.
|
||||
- [ ] All SPI signal pins (`cs`, `dc/rs`, `reset`, `sdi (mosi)`, `sck`,
|
||||
`sdo (miso)`, `t_cs`, `t_irq`) go to the Teensy pins listed above —
|
||||
confirm none are swapped. The easy one to get backwards is
|
||||
`sdi (mosi)` ↔ `sdo (miso)`: on this module **`sdi (mosi)` = Teensy pin 11
|
||||
(MOSI)** and **`sdo (miso)` = Teensy pin 12 (MISO)**.
|
||||
- [ ] The shared-bus pairs (`t_do`/`sdo (miso)`, `t_din`/`sdi (mosi)`,
|
||||
`t_clk`/`sck`) are tied together on the module PCB — wire one of each
|
||||
pair to the Teensy pin and the other can go to the same pin or float.
|
||||
Don't wire them to *different* Teensy pins.
|
||||
- [ ] No 5V signal reaches any Teensy pin.
|
||||
- [ ] The Teensy's built-in SD slot is **not** wired to the display — the
|
||||
module's SD slot is unused. The 1 TB pad goes in the Teensy's built-in
|
||||
slot only.
|
||||
|
||||
## Bring-up order (Phase 1)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **TFT only first.** Wire `vcc`, `gnd`, `cs`, `reset`, `dc/rs`, `sdi (mosi)`,
|
||||
`sck`, `led`, `sdo (miso)`. Leave `t_cs`, `t_irq` floating for now. Run a
|
||||
fill-screen + draw-text sketch. Exit criterion: solid color fill + readable
|
||||
text.
|
||||
2. **Touch second.** Add `t_cs`, `t_clk` (shared with `sck`), `t_din` (shared
|
||||
with `sdi (mosi)`), `t_do` (shared with `sdo (miso)`), `t_irq`. Run a
|
||||
touch-read sketch that prints raw X/Y + mapped pixel coords. Exit criterion:
|
||||
stylus press prints coordinates that track the stylus position across the
|
||||
full 480×320 area.
|
||||
3. **Calibration.** The XPT2046 raw readings need a 2-point calibration per
|
||||
axis (min/max raw → 0/480 and 0/320). Port the calibration struct from
|
||||
[`firmware/cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c)
|
||||
`s_cal` and re-calibrate on the Teensy (the CYD's numbers won't match —
|
||||
different panel, different controller).
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- Port plan: [`plans/teensy41_signer_port.md`](../../plans/teensy41_signer_port.md)
|
||||
- Bring-up log: [`plans/teensy41_bringup.md`](../../plans/teensy41_bringup.md)
|
||||
- CYD display driver to port: [`firmware/cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/ili9341.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/ili9341.c)
|
||||
- CYD touch driver to port: [`firmware/cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c`](../cyd_esp32_2432s028/main/touch.c)
|
||||
- ST7796S datasheet: [`firmware/teensy41/documents/ST7796S_Datasheet.pdf`](documents/ST7796S_Datasheet.pdf)
|
||||
- Module user manual: [`firmware/teensy41/documents/4.0inch_SPI_Module_User_Manual.pdf`](documents/4.0inch_SPI_Module_User_Manual.pdf)
|
||||
- Teensy 4.1 pinout: [`firmware/teensy41/documents/Teensy® 4.1.html`](documents/Teensy%C2%AE%204.1.html)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
// Teensy 4.1 bring-up: blink the onboard red LED on pin 13 at 1 Hz.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Phase 0 of plans/teensy41_signer_port.md. First sketch to load after the
|
||||
// board's application flash was erased (board enumerates as Halfkay bootloader
|
||||
// 16c0:0478 with no /dev/ttyACMx and no LED activity). A successful upload +
|
||||
// visible 1 Hz blink confirms the toolchain, the FQBN, and the USB upload path.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Build / upload:
|
||||
// arduino-cli compile --fqbn teensy:avr:teensy41 firmware/teensy41/blink
|
||||
// arduino-cli upload -p /dev/ttyACM0 --fqbn teensy:avr:teensy41 firmware/teensy41/blink
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Exit criterion: the red LED near the USB connector toggles at exactly 1 Hz
|
||||
// (slower than the PJRC factory blink, which is ~5 Hz, so the change is obvious).
|
||||
|
||||
void setup() {
|
||||
pinMode(LED_BUILTIN, OUTPUT); // LED_BUILTIN == 13 on Teensy 4.1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void loop() {
|
||||
digitalWrite(LED_BUILTIN, HIGH);
|
||||
delay(500);
|
||||
digitalWrite(LED_BUILTIN, LOW);
|
||||
delay(500);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Executable
+99
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
# build_signer.sh — reproducible build + optional flash for the Teensy 4.1 n_signer.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# ./firmware/teensy41/build_signer.sh # compile only
|
||||
# ./firmware/teensy41/build_signer.sh --flash # compile + upload
|
||||
# ./firmware/teensy41/build_signer.sh --test # compile + upload + run test suite
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This script handles:
|
||||
# - Copying lv_conf.h to the Arduino libraries directory (where LVGL's
|
||||
# lv_conf_internal.h searches for it via ../../lv_conf.h).
|
||||
# - Passing the custom linker script (imxrt1062_t41_flashmem.ld) that routes
|
||||
# crypto code to FLASH instead of ITCM, freeing stack space.
|
||||
# - Printing the memory usage report.
|
||||
# - Optionally uploading to the first discovered Teensy port.
|
||||
# - Optionally running the hardware test suite.
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
|
||||
SIGNER_DIR="$SCRIPT_DIR/signer"
|
||||
FQBN="teensy:avr:teensy41"
|
||||
LV_CONF_SRC="$SIGNER_DIR/lv_conf.h"
|
||||
LV_CONF_DST="$HOME/Arduino/libraries/lv_conf.h"
|
||||
LINKER_SCRIPT="$SIGNER_DIR/imxrt1062_t41_flashmem.ld"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 1: Copy lv_conf.h to the Arduino libraries directory ---
|
||||
if [ -f "$LV_CONF_SRC" ]; then
|
||||
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$LV_CONF_DST")"
|
||||
cp "$LV_CONF_SRC" "$LV_CONF_DST"
|
||||
echo "[build] Copied lv_conf.h to $LV_CONF_DST"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "[build] WARNING: $LV_CONF_SRC not found — LVGL may use default config."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 2: Compile with the custom linker script ---
|
||||
echo "[build] Compiling..."
|
||||
LINKER_FLAG="-Wl,--gc-sections,--relax,--no-warn-rwx-segments -T${LINKER_SCRIPT}"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -f "$LINKER_SCRIPT" ]; then
|
||||
arduino-cli compile \
|
||||
--fqbn "$FQBN" \
|
||||
--build-property "build.flags.ld=${LINKER_FLAG}" \
|
||||
"$SIGNER_DIR" || true # size-determination step may error with custom .ld
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "[build] WARNING: Linker script not found at $LINKER_SCRIPT — using default."
|
||||
arduino-cli compile --fqbn "$FQBN" "$SIGNER_DIR"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 2b: FlexRAM stack gauge ---
|
||||
# arduino-cli's "Error while determining sketch size" with a custom linker
|
||||
# script is non-fatal (the ELF is produced), but it means we lose the built-in
|
||||
# memory report. Run our own gauge against the ELF to catch DTCM stack
|
||||
# overflows that the linker cannot detect (the ITCM/DTCM split is computed at
|
||||
# boot, not link time).
|
||||
ELF_FILE=$(find "$HOME/.cache/arduino/sketches" -name "signer.ino.elf" -newer "$LINKER_SCRIPT" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
|
||||
if [ -z "$ELF_FILE" ]; then
|
||||
ELF_FILE=$(find "$HOME/.cache/arduino/sketches" -name "signer.ino.elf" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ -n "$ELF_FILE" ] && [ -f "$ELF_FILE" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[build] Running FlexRAM stack gauge..."
|
||||
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/check_stack.sh" "$ELF_FILE" 16384 || {
|
||||
echo "[build] ❌ Stack gauge FAILED — refusing to flash. See check_stack.sh output above."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "[build] WARNING: could not find signer.ino.elf for stack gauge — skipping."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[build] Compilation successful."
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 3: Find the Teensy port ---
|
||||
find_teensy_port() {
|
||||
arduino-cli board list 2>/dev/null | grep 'teensy Teensy Ports' | awk '{print $1}' | head -1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 4: Flash (if --flash or --test) ---
|
||||
if [ "$1" = "--flash" ] || [ "$1" = "--test" ]; then
|
||||
PORT=$(find_teensy_port)
|
||||
if [ -z "$PORT" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[flash] No Teensy found. Press the PROGRAM button on the Teensy."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "[flash] Uploading to $PORT..."
|
||||
arduino-cli upload -p "$PORT" --fqbn "$FQBN" "$SIGNER_DIR"
|
||||
echo "[flash] Upload complete."
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Step 5: Run test suite (if --test) ---
|
||||
if [ "$1" = "--test" ]; then
|
||||
echo "[test] Waiting for device to boot..."
|
||||
sleep 4
|
||||
PORT_DEV=$(arduino-cli board list 2>/dev/null | grep 'ttyACM' | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)
|
||||
if [ -z "$PORT_DEV" ]; then
|
||||
PORT_DEV="/dev/ttyACM0"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "[test] Running test suite on $PORT_DEV..."
|
||||
python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/test_signer.py" --port "$PORT_DEV" || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
Executable
+107
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
# check_stack.sh — Teensy 4.1 FlexRAM stack gauge.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Computes the same ITCM/DTCM split the i.MX RT1062 boot ROM will perform, and
|
||||
# fails if the resulting free stack is below a threshold. The linker cannot
|
||||
# catch this because the split is computed at reset from _itcm_block_count,
|
||||
# not at link time.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage: check_stack.sh <signer.ino.elf> [min_stack_bytes]
|
||||
# min_stack_bytes defaults to 16384 (16 KB).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Exits 0 if the stack is above the threshold, 1 if below (with a diagnostic).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The arithmetic (from imxrt1062_t41_flashmem.ld:215-217):
|
||||
# itcm_banks = ceil((.text.itcm + .ARM.exidx) / 32768)
|
||||
# dtcm_total = (16 - itcm_banks) * 32768
|
||||
# free_stack = dtcm_total - .data - .bss
|
||||
# _estack = ORIGIN(DTCM) + dtcm_total (stack grows down from here)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note: .bss here is the DTCM .bss (RAM1), NOT .bss.dma (RAM2/OCRAM). The
|
||||
# .bss.dma section lives in a separate 512 KB region and does not affect the
|
||||
# stack.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
ELF="${1:-}"
|
||||
MIN_STACK="${2:-16384}"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -z "$ELF" ] || [ ! -f "$ELF" ]; then
|
||||
echo "check_stack: usage: $0 <signer.ino.elf> [min_stack_bytes]" >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Locate the arm-none-eabi-size tool from the Teensy toolchain.
|
||||
SIZE_BIN=""
|
||||
for candidate in \
|
||||
/home/user/.arduino15/packages/teensy/tools/teensy-compile/*/arm/bin/arm-none-eabi-size \
|
||||
"$(dirname "$0")/../.arduino15/packages/teensy/tools/teensy-compile/*/arm/bin/arm-none-eabi-size"; do
|
||||
if [ -x "$candidate" ]; then SIZE_BIN="$candidate"; break; fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
# Fall back to PATH
|
||||
if [ -z "$SIZE_BIN" ]; then SIZE_BIN="$(command -v arm-none-eabi-size || true)"; fi
|
||||
if [ -z "$SIZE_BIN" ]; then
|
||||
echo "check_stack: cannot find arm-none-eabi-size" >&2
|
||||
exit 2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# We need per-section sizes, not the aggregate. Use objdump -h.
|
||||
OBJDUMP_BIN="${SIZE_BIN%size}objdump"
|
||||
|
||||
# Extract section sizes (in bytes, decimal) by name.
|
||||
get_section_size() {
|
||||
local section="$1"
|
||||
# objdump -h prints: idx Name Size VMA LMA File-off Al
|
||||
"$OBJDUMP_BIN" -h "$ELF" 2>/dev/null \
|
||||
| awk -v sec="$section" '$2 == sec { print strtonum("0x"$3); exit }'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT_ITCM=$(get_section_size ".text.itcm")
|
||||
ARM_EXIDX=$(get_section_size ".ARM.exidx")
|
||||
DATA_SEC=$(get_section_size ".data")
|
||||
BSS_SEC=$(get_section_size ".bss")
|
||||
BSS_DMA=$(get_section_size ".bss.dma")
|
||||
|
||||
# Guard against missing sections (e.g. exidx may be 0/absent).
|
||||
: "${TEXT_ITCM:=0}"
|
||||
: "${ARM_EXIDX:=0}"
|
||||
: "${DATA_SEC:=0}"
|
||||
: "${BSS_SEC:=0}"
|
||||
: "${BSS_DMA:=0}"
|
||||
|
||||
BANK=32768
|
||||
ITCM_BYTES=$(( TEXT_ITCM + ARM_EXIDX ))
|
||||
ITCM_BANKS=$(( (ITCM_BYTES + BANK - 1) / BANK ))
|
||||
DTCM_TOTAL=$(( (16 - ITCM_BANKS) * BANK ))
|
||||
DATA_BSS=$(( DATA_SEC + BSS_SEC ))
|
||||
FREE_STACK=$(( DTCM_TOTAL - DATA_BSS ))
|
||||
|
||||
# Also report RAM2 (OCRAM) usage for completeness.
|
||||
RAM2_TOTAL=$(( 512 * 1024 ))
|
||||
RAM2_FREE=$(( RAM2_TOTAL - BSS_DMA ))
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=== Teensy 4.1 FlexRAM stack gauge ==="
|
||||
echo " .text.itcm : $(printf '%7d' $TEXT_ITCM) bytes"
|
||||
echo " .ARM.exidx : $(printf '%7d' $ARM_EXIDX) bytes"
|
||||
echo " ITCM total : $(printf '%7d' $ITCM_BYTES) bytes -> $ITCM_BANKS banks ($(( ITCM_BANKS * BANK )) bytes)"
|
||||
echo " .data (DTCM) : $(printf '%7d' $DATA_SEC) bytes"
|
||||
echo " .bss (DTCM) : $(printf '%7d' $BSS_SEC) bytes"
|
||||
echo " DTCM total : $(printf '%7d' $DTCM_TOTAL) bytes ($(( 16 - ITCM_BANKS )) banks)"
|
||||
echo " data + bss : $(printf '%7d' $DATA_BSS) bytes"
|
||||
echo " FREE STACK : $(printf '%7d' $FREE_STACK) bytes (threshold: $MIN_STACK)"
|
||||
echo " ---"
|
||||
echo " .bss.dma RAM2: $(printf '%7d' $BSS_DMA) / $RAM2_TOTAL bytes (free: $RAM2_FREE)"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$FREE_STACK" -lt "$MIN_STACK" ]; then
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo " ❌ FAIL: free stack $FREE_STACK < threshold $MIN_STACK"
|
||||
echo " The boot ROM will allocate $ITCM_BANKS ITCM banks, leaving only"
|
||||
echo " $DTCM_TOTAL bytes of DTCM. .data+.bss needs $DATA_BSS bytes."
|
||||
echo " Reduce ITCM (route more code to FLASH) or reduce .data/.bss"
|
||||
echo " (move .rodata to FLASH)."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo " ✅ OK: free stack $FREE_STACK >= threshold $MIN_STACK"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
+105
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 9.8 KiB |
+16
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+756
@@ -0,0 +1,756 @@
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkC3kaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkAnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkenkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkaHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBnka.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkC3kaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkAnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkenkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkaHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBnka.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkC3kaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkAnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCnkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkenkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkaHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCXkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkCHkaWzU.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO5CnqEu92Fr1Mu53ZEC9_Vu3r1gIhOszmkBnka.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3GUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3iUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3CUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3-UBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMawCUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMaxKUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3OUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3KUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 300;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3yUBA.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3GUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3iUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3CUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3-UBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMawCUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMaxKUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3OUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3KUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3yUBA.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3GUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3iUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3CUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+1F00-1FFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3-UBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* math */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMawCUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0302-0303, U+0305, U+0307-0308, U+0310, U+0312, U+0315, U+031A, U+0326-0327, U+032C, U+032F-0330, U+0332-0333, U+0338, U+033A, U+0346, U+034D, U+0391-03A1, U+03A3-03A9, U+03B1-03C9, U+03D1, U+03D5-03D6, U+03F0-03F1, U+03F4-03F5, U+2016-2017, U+2034-2038, U+203C, U+2040, U+2043, U+2047, U+2050, U+2057, U+205F, U+2070-2071, U+2074-208E, U+2090-209C, U+20D0-20DC, U+20E1, U+20E5-20EF, U+2100-2112, U+2114-2115, U+2117-2121, U+2123-214F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-21AE, U+21B0-21E5, U+21F1-21F2, U+21F4-2211, U+2213-2214, U+2216-22FF, U+2308-230B, U+2310, U+2319, U+231C-2321, U+2336-237A, U+237C, U+2395, U+239B-23B7, U+23D0, U+23DC-23E1, U+2474-2475, U+25AF, U+25B3, U+25B7, U+25BD, U+25C1, U+25CA, U+25CC, U+25FB, U+266D-266F, U+27C0-27FF, U+2900-2AFF, U+2B0E-2B11, U+2B30-2B4C, U+2BFE, U+3030, U+FF5B, U+FF5D, U+1D400-1D7FF, U+1EE00-1EEFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* symbols */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMaxKUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0001-000C, U+000E-001F, U+007F-009F, U+20DD-20E0, U+20E2-20E4, U+2150-218F, U+2190, U+2192, U+2194-2199, U+21AF, U+21E6-21F0, U+21F3, U+2218-2219, U+2299, U+22C4-22C6, U+2300-243F, U+2440-244A, U+2460-24FF, U+25A0-27BF, U+2800-28FF, U+2921-2922, U+2981, U+29BF, U+29EB, U+2B00-2BFF, U+4DC0-4DFF, U+FFF9-FFFB, U+10140-1018E, U+10190-1019C, U+101A0, U+101D0-101FD, U+102E0-102FB, U+10E60-10E7E, U+1D2C0-1D2D3, U+1D2E0-1D37F, U+1F000-1F0FF, U+1F100-1F1AD, U+1F1E6-1F1FF, U+1F30D-1F30F, U+1F315, U+1F31C, U+1F31E, U+1F320-1F32C, U+1F336, U+1F378, U+1F37D, U+1F382, U+1F393-1F39F, U+1F3A7-1F3A8, U+1F3AC-1F3AF, U+1F3C2, U+1F3C4-1F3C6, U+1F3CA-1F3CE, U+1F3D4-1F3E0, U+1F3ED, U+1F3F1-1F3F3, U+1F3F5-1F3F7, U+1F408, U+1F415, U+1F41F, U+1F426, U+1F43F, U+1F441-1F442, U+1F444, U+1F446-1F449, U+1F44C-1F44E, U+1F453, U+1F46A, U+1F47D, U+1F4A3, U+1F4B0, U+1F4B3, U+1F4B9, U+1F4BB, U+1F4BF, U+1F4C8-1F4CB, U+1F4D6, U+1F4DA, U+1F4DF, U+1F4E3-1F4E6, U+1F4EA-1F4ED, U+1F4F7, U+1F4F9-1F4FB, U+1F4FD-1F4FE, U+1F503, U+1F507-1F50B, U+1F50D, U+1F512-1F513, U+1F53E-1F54A, U+1F54F-1F5FA, U+1F610, U+1F650-1F67F, U+1F687, U+1F68D, U+1F691, U+1F694, U+1F698, U+1F6AD, U+1F6B2, U+1F6B9-1F6BA, U+1F6BC, U+1F6C6-1F6CF, U+1F6D3-1F6D7, U+1F6E0-1F6EA, U+1F6F0-1F6F3, U+1F6F7-1F6FC, U+1F700-1F7FF, U+1F800-1F80B, U+1F810-1F847, U+1F850-1F859, U+1F860-1F887, U+1F890-1F8AD, U+1F8B0-1F8BB, U+1F8C0-1F8C1, U+1F900-1F90B, U+1F93B, U+1F946, U+1F984, U+1F996, U+1F9E9, U+1FA00-1FA6F, U+1FA70-1FA7C, U+1FA80-1FA89, U+1FA8F-1FAC6, U+1FACE-1FADC, U+1FADF-1FAE9, U+1FAF0-1FAF8, U+1FB00-1FBFF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3OUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3KUBGEe.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-stretch: 100%;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/roboto/v51/KFO7CnqEu92Fr1ME7kSn66aGLdTylUAMa3yUBA.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3CWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3mWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm36WWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3KWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3OWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm32WWg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3CWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3mWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm36WWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3KWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm3OWWoKC.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: italic;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x7DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhOm32WWg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhGq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhPq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhIq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhEq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhFq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 400;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhLq38.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhGq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0460-052F, U+1C80-1C8A, U+20B4, U+2DE0-2DFF, U+A640-A69F, U+FE2E-FE2F;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* cyrillic */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhPq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0301, U+0400-045F, U+0490-0491, U+04B0-04B1, U+2116;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* greek */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhIq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0370-0377, U+037A-037F, U+0384-038A, U+038C, U+038E-03A1, U+03A3-03FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* vietnamese */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhEq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0102-0103, U+0110-0111, U+0128-0129, U+0168-0169, U+01A0-01A1, U+01AF-01B0, U+0300-0301, U+0303-0304, U+0308-0309, U+0323, U+0329, U+1EA0-1EF9, U+20AB;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin-ext */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhFq3-OXg.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0100-02BA, U+02BD-02C5, U+02C7-02CC, U+02CE-02D7, U+02DD-02FF, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+1D00-1DBF, U+1E00-1E9F, U+1EF2-1EFF, U+2020, U+20A0-20AB, U+20AD-20C0, U+2113, U+2C60-2C7F, U+A720-A7FF;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* latin */
|
||||
@font-face {
|
||||
font-family: 'Roboto Mono';
|
||||
font-style: normal;
|
||||
font-weight: 700;
|
||||
font-display: fallback;
|
||||
src: url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/robotomono/v31/L0x5DF4xlVMF-BfR8bXMIjhLq38.woff2) format('woff2');
|
||||
unicode-range: U+0000-00FF, U+0131, U+0152-0153, U+02BB-02BC, U+02C6, U+02DA, U+02DC, U+0304, U+0308, U+0329, U+2000-206F, U+20AC, U+2122, U+2191, U+2193, U+2212, U+2215, U+FEFF, U+FFFD;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+11
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
.md-header{
|
||||
background-color:#172360 !important;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.md-typeset mark{
|
||||
background-color:blue;
|
||||
color: #fff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.md-typeset table:not([class]) td{
|
||||
vertical-align: middle;
|
||||
word-break: break-all;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1084
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+5
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
(function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':
|
||||
new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],
|
||||
j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src=
|
||||
'https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);
|
||||
})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-KRSVT6V');
|
||||
+887
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1084
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1594
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+1
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
"use strict";(()=>{function c(s,n){parent.postMessage(s,n||"*")}function d(...s){return s.reduce((n,e)=>n.then(()=>new Promise(r=>{let t=document.createElement("script");t.src=e,t.onload=r,document.body.appendChild(t)})),Promise.resolve())}var o=class extends EventTarget{constructor(e){super();this.url=e;this.m=e=>{e.source===this.w&&(this.dispatchEvent(new MessageEvent("message",{data:e.data})),this.onmessage&&this.onmessage(e))};this.e=(e,r,t,i,m)=>{if(r===`${this.url}`){let a=new ErrorEvent("error",{message:e,filename:r,lineno:t,colno:i,error:m});this.dispatchEvent(a),this.onerror&&this.onerror(a)}};let r=document.createElement("iframe");r.hidden=!0,document.body.appendChild(this.iframe=r),this.w.document.open(),this.w.document.write(`<html><body><script>postMessage=${c};importScripts=${d};addEventListener("error",({error})=>{parent.dispatchEvent(new ErrorEvent("error",{filename:"${e}",error}))})<\/script><script src=${e}?${+Date.now()}><\/script></body></html>`),this.w.document.close(),onmessage=this.m,onerror=this.e,this.r=new Promise((t,i)=>{this.w.onload=t,this.w.onerror=i})}terminate(){this.iframe.remove(),onmessage=onerror=null}postMessage(e){this.r.catch().then(()=>{this.w.dispatchEvent(new MessageEvent("message",structuredClone({data:e})))})}get w(){return this.iframe.contentWindow}};window.IFrameWorker=o;location.protocol==="file:"&&(window.Worker=o);})();
|
||||
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 33 KiB |
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
Binary file not shown.
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 31 KiB |
+5
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 48 KiB |
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 12 KiB |
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 53 KiB |
BIN
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 90 KiB |
+1
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user