The Unreleased block is rebuilt from a walk of all 117 commits since v0.4.1 rather than from what the block already held, which is how six gaps surfaced. Two of them were whole missing effects. The identity write path discarded six results, so a node configured for a persistent identity could fall through to an ephemeral one in silence and change its npub, routing address and mesh address on every start. And the OpenWrt zig download verification was described only in part. Chronological fix sequences are collapsed to their net state, and fixes for bugs introduced and closed inside this cycle are folded away rather than described, since no user ever saw them. Sixty-one CI and harness commits are summarized rather than left out, because they change what a contributor running the local pipeline sees. The flat lists are reorganized into subsections by area. Everything from 0.4.1 down is untouched. Two entries carry effects no commit message mentioned. Clearing every copy of private key material added Drop to four public types, so their fields can no longer be moved out, which is source-breaking for anyone using the crate as a library and is reachable through node.identity on the public config. And the responder-side rekey narrowing covers five call sites, not the four the original entry claimed; the ack initiator arm is the one that deliberately still abandons the whole rekey. The four test-harness fixes landed since then get entries under the CI and test-harness heading, written as what a contributor sees: a failing harness that names the condition instead of exiting bare, dns-resolver scenarios that stop burning the full boot timeout on a container that booted correctly, and a chaos harness that checks its teardown and node stops actually happened rather than assuming it. Four documentation defects are fixed alongside. Two sent macOS readers to paths that do not exist there: the configuration reference stated the highest-priority system config path as /etc/fips/fips.yaml unconditionally, where the macOS package installs under /usr/local/etc/fips/, and the persistent-identity tutorial had the same problem throughout with nothing saying its paths were Linux ones. It now opens with the substitution table, notes that the daemon derives the key directory from whichever config it loaded, and points at the migration recipe for a host already carrying keys at the old path. The other two described test coverage that does not exist. The testing readme claimed twenty chaos scenarios where ten exist, and the chaos readme documented three that are in neither runner nor tree. Both scenario tables are rewritten from the files, and bloom-storm is described honestly as retired from both runners with no replacement, which is a coverage gap rather than a migration to other tests. The readme's Rust badge asserted 1.85+ while rust-toolchain.toml pins something else, so the badge no longer carries a version and the toolchain file is the only place that states one.
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Make Your Node's Identity Persistent
After completing join-the-test-mesh, your daemon is connected to the public test mesh — but its identity is ephemeral. Every restart generates a fresh Nostr keypair, so the npub the rest of the world would use to reach you changes every time. This tutorial walks through pinning your node to a stable keypair, locating it on disk, and protecting it.
The whole exercise should take about ten minutes.
What you'll build
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ /etc/fips/fips.yaml │
│ node: │
│ identity: │
│ persistent: true ← this flag │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────┘
│ daemon reads on start
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ /etc/fips/fips.key 0600 root:root │
│ /etc/fips/fips.pub 0644 root:root │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
your stable nsec / npub
The diagram shows the Linux layout. On macOS the same three files
live under /usr/local/etc/fips/; read
Where these files live before running any
command below.
After this tutorial your node will have:
- A keypair on disk that the daemon reuses across restarts.
- An npub you can hand to other operators so they can add you to
their
peers:list once and have the entry keep working. - A clear understanding of which file holds the secret and how to keep it that way.
Where these files live
Every path in this tutorial is written in its Linux form. The macOS
package (.pkg) installs config and keys under
/usr/local/etc/fips/ instead of /etc/fips/, so on macOS
substitute as you go:
| Linux / other Unix | macOS |
|---|---|
/etc/fips/fips.yaml |
/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml |
/etc/fips/fips.key |
/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key |
/etc/fips/fips.pub |
/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.pub |
fipsctl keygen writes to /usr/local/etc/fips/ by default on
macOS. The daemon still probes /etc/fips/fips.yaml as a fallback,
so an existing install is not broken by an upgrade, but the macOS
packaging only installs files under /usr/local/etc/fips/. If a
macOS host already carries key files at the old /etc/fips/ path,
the daemon uses the old key and warns rather than minting a new
identity; the migration recipe is in the
how-to guide.
Why a stable identity matters
In FIPS your Nostr keypair is your node's identity in the most literal sense. Several things derive from it:
- Your
fd97:...mesh address — derived from the public key. - Your
<npub>.fipsDNS name — the npub itself with.fipsappended. - Every authenticated connection — Noise IK at the mesh layer, XK at the session layer, both prove you hold the matching secret key.
A keypair, briefly. Nostr identities are secp256k1 keypairs. The private half is the
nsec(a bech32-encoded secret key); the public half is thenpub(a bech32-encoded public key). The daemon needs thensecto sign messages and complete handshakes; the rest of the world only sees thenpuband uses it as your address.
The daemon supports two ways of holding that keypair:
Ephemeral vs. persistent.
- Ephemeral (the default): the daemon mints a brand-new keypair every time it starts, kept only in memory. No long-term secret is ever written to disk; nothing on your machine ties one run to the next; the npub your daemon presents to the network is fresh on every restart. This is the safe-by-default posture — your node has no persistent identity unless you explicitly ask for one.
- Persistent: the daemon reads (or, on first start, generates and writes) a keypair stored at
/etc/fips/fips.key(/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.keyon macOS). The npub stays the same across restarts, reboots, and reinstalls as long as that file is preserved. You take on the cost of protecting an on-disk secret in exchange for being addressable by a stable name.
Persistent identity is a deliberate trade. You give up the ephemeral default's privacy posture — once your npub is stable, every connection your node makes is correlatable across time — and you take on a real secret-management responsibility. In return you get two things you can't get any other way:
- Other operators can reference you by npub. In
join-the-test-mesh you added
test-us01to yourpeers:list by its npub. That entry only works becausetest-us01's npub doesn't change. If anyone is going to reach you the same way, your npub has to be just as stable. - Services on your node get a fixed address. The
host-a-service tutorial walks through
running an HTTP server addressable as
<your-npub>.fips. Clients reach the service by that name; if your npub changes on every restart, every client's address book breaks.
Both of these are good reasons. Neither is automatic — if your node is purely a client, reaching out to others without hosting anything itself, you may legitimately want to stay on the ephemeral default. The rest of this tutorial assumes you've decided you want a stable identity.
Step 1: Note your current ephemeral npub
Before changing anything, capture the npub the daemon is using right now so you can compare against it after the switch.
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
You'll see one line like:
"npub": "npub1abc...xyz"
Make a note of it. We expect this to change.
Step 2: Enable persistent identity in the config
Open /etc/fips/fips.yaml (/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml on
macOS) and find the node: block. The shipped default has the
relevant fragment commented out; make it look like this:
node:
identity:
persistent: true
Save the file. That is the only configuration change.
The daemon's behavior on the next restart:
- If
/etc/fips/fips.keyalready exists, load it and use that identity. - If it does not exist, generate a fresh keypair, write it to
/etc/fips/fips.{key,pub}with the correct file modes, and use that.
The daemon derives the key directory from whichever config file it
loaded, so on macOS both files land in /usr/local/etc/fips/.
Step 3: Restart the daemon
sudo systemctl restart fips
sudo systemctl status fips
Status should show active (running) within a couple of
seconds. Confirm the new identity is in use:
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
The npub should be different from the one in Step 1 — the daemon discarded the old in-memory ephemeral keypair and minted a new one which it has now persisted to disk. From here forward this is your npub.
Step 4: Locate the keypair on disk
The daemon wrote two files:
sudo ls -l /etc/fips/fips.key /etc/fips/fips.pub
On macOS, list /usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key and
/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.pub instead.
Expect:
-rw------- 1 root root ... fips.key
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root ... fips.pub
The public file is safe to share — it is your address:
sudo cat /etc/fips/fips.pub
This must match the npub reported by sudo fipsctl show status. Hand this string to anyone you want to be reachable
from; they paste it into their own peers: block as the npub:
field.
The private file is the secret. Do not cat or paste its
contents anywhere — there is no reason to see it, and any line
of shell history or screen capture that contains it has captured
the secret.
Step 5: Verify it survives a restart
Restart once more to confirm the daemon is reading fips.key
rather than re-generating it:
sudo systemctl restart fips
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
The npub should match Step 3 exactly. If it does not, the daemon
was unable to read fips.key (most likely a permission problem)
— see Troubleshooting.
Step 6: Protect the nsec
fips.key is the only thing standing between you and someone
else impersonating your node. The daemon ships it with the right
permissions; the operator's job is to keep them that way.
What that means in practice:
- Do not loosen the file mode.
0600(read/write for owner only — hereroot) is correct;chmod 0644to "fix" a permission error puts the secret on display to every account on the host. - Do not commit it to source control. If you maintain
configuration in a Git repo, exclude
fips.key; if you use ansible-vault or a similar mechanism, encrypt it.fips.pubmay be checked in freely. - Do not paste it into chat or email. Operators sometimes
share config snippets to demonstrate a setup; redact the
contents of
fips.keyto a placeholder before doing so. - Back it up the way you back up an SSH host key. Treat the
file (or its contents) the same way you would treat
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key: encrypted, offline, available to recover the same identity if the host disappears.
There is no in-protocol "key change" message in FIPS. If
fips.key is lost, the npub is lost — your node will come back
up with a new identity and every downstream reference to the
old one will be stale.
What you've learned
- Identity = keypair. Every FIPS node is a Nostr keypair; the npub is its address, the nsec is its credential.
- The flag.
node.identity.persistent: truein/etc/fips/fips.yamlis the difference between ephemeral and persistent identity. - Where it lives.
/etc/fips/fips.keyand/etc/fips/fips.pub, mode0600and0644, ownedroot:root; under/usr/local/etc/fips/on macOS. - What to share.
fips.pubis public;fips.keyis not. - What it buys you. A npub other operators can add to their
peers:list once, and that addresses the services your node will eventually run.
Troubleshooting
If the post-restart npub does not match fips.pub:
- Check file permissions.
sudo ls -l /etc/fips/fips.key, orsudo ls -l /usr/local/etc/fips/fips.keyon macOS. If the mode is not0600or the owner is notroot:root, the daemon may have refused to read it. Restore withsudo chmod 0600 /etc/fips/fips.key && sudo chown root:root /etc/fips/fips.key, substituting the macOS path where it applies. - Check the journal.
sudo journalctl -u fips -n 100after the restart will show one of:Loaded persistent identity from key file path=...— good.Generated persistent identity, saved to key file ...— also good, but only expected on the first start after the flag flip.Using ephemeral identity (new keypair each start)— the config flag was not picked up; re-check the indentation of thepersistent: trueline.
If you see Generated persistent identity... on every start,
the file is being written but not read on subsequent starts;
this is almost always the same permission/path issue.
What's next
-
Resolve peer addresses via Nostr. resolve-peers-via-nostr walks through the smallest useful step toward Nostr-mediated discovery: keep your peer entry, drop its hard-coded address, and let the daemon look up the current endpoint from public Nostr relays. The first of three tutorials covering Nostr discovery; advertising your own node and open ambient discovery come next.
-
Reach services on other mesh nodes. reach-mesh-services drives
nc,traceroute6,curl, andsshat peers by.fipsname and shows that the FIPS data plane is just IPv6 from an application's point of view. -
Host a service of your own. host-a-service walks through bringing up an HTTP server addressable as
<your-npub>.fips, bound tofips0so the exposure is mesh-only, behind the mesh firewall.
For the alternative provisioning paths — minting a keypair with
fipsctl keygen before the daemon ever starts, or importing an
existing Nostr nsec — and the key-rotation procedure, see the
operator-style recipe at
../how-to/persistent-identity.md.
For the full identity model:
- ../design/fips-architecture.md
— how npubs become
NodeAddrs and IPv6 ULAs.