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fr34akyandJohnathan Corgan 957e05b283 feat(netmon): fingerprint the path to each peer, not the host 
The medium-change detector sampled two host-wide signals: the source
address the routing table would pick for an off-link destination, and the
set of up, non-loopback interface addresses. The second one was the
problem. It enumerated every address the host had, so a docker bridge
coming up, a VPN connecting or a container network appearing moved the
fingerprint with no peering affected at all — and the reaction to a moved
fingerprint is to drop every connected UDP socket and heartbeat every
peer. Self-healing, so it cost work rather than connectivity, but on any
host running containers it could fire repeatedly for nothing.

Ask the question per peer instead. For each peer whose transport address
is a numeric IP endpoint, `connect(2)` a UDP socket to it and read back
the local address — the same no-packets operation, aimed at the peers we
actually hold rather than at a documentation prefix. The fingerprint
becomes the set of local addresses the kernel would use to reach our
peers.

That is the quantity the reaction cares about. The stale `connect(2)`
this subsystem exists to repair pinned a local source address chosen for
one destination, so measuring the same thing for the same destinations
asks the kernel the question the bug is about rather than a proxy for it.
Three things follow:

- Interfaces the node does not peer over cannot move it, by construction
  rather than by a filter guessing which interface names are
  infrastructure. `docker compose up` moves nothing.
- On-link peers become visible. A peer on the same LAN is reached by its
  subnet route, and the old probe followed the *default* route by
  construction, so it looked straight past that path.
- A more specific route moving under one peer is representable at all,
  which no single host-wide sample could be.

Samples are compared over the *intersection* of their peer sets, never
the union, so peers joining and leaving cannot fire the fan-out on their
own. The sample is still adopted on the no-change path, or `last` would
freeze on the peer set the detector started with. A peer whose probe
stops answering is a move to "no route" and does count: that peer is
exactly the one now stranded.

**A peer's first sample is judged against its socket, not against
nothing.** The intersection rule skips a peer present in only one sample,
which is right for peer churn and wrong for the sample in which a peer
first appears, because that sample may already be the post-change one.
`last` gains a peer only at the first wake after it shows up in the
entity snapshot, so a medium change inside that window is consumed rather
than delayed: the peer's connected socket stays pinned to the path the
host has just left, and the peering black-holes until the liveness
timeout tears it down. A first-seen peer is therefore compared against
the source its own connected socket is bound to, where it has one.

One residual on that rule, stated exactly rather than understated: the
tick publishes the entity snapshot *before* it installs connected
sockets, so a socket installed on tick N is first visible on tick N+1,
and a peer whose path moves inside that window is first seen with `bound`
still `None` while genuinely holding a pinned socket. About one
`tick_interval_secs` per join. A hole, not a harmless skip.

**The probe binds the way the send path binds.** `open_connected_fd`
binds `local_addr` verbatim before connecting, so the socket keeps a
configured address whatever the route says, while the probe took the
kernel's choice. Under a non-wildcard `bind_addr` the two answered
different questions and every first-seen peer reported a phantom move.
The probe now binds what the transport binds, address only and port 0;
under the default wildcard bind nothing changes.

Operator-facing corrections in the same surface. `PeerSourceMove::before`
was recorded on every move and then wildcarded away by the only thing
that read it, so the log said where a peer moved to but not where from —
and the address it moved *from* is the one the stale `connect(2)` had
pinned. Both ends are rendered now. The peer id used a private four-byte
hex helper that duplicated `NodeAddr::short_hex` and dropped the `...`
suffix every other operator surface prints; the duplicate is gone. The
cost note said three syscalls per target: `UdpSocket::bind` is a
`socket(2)` and a `bind(2)`, and the socket takes a `close(2)` on drop,
so it is five. In the same place, "bounded by `node.limits.max_peers`"
does not hold when that value is 0, which the configuration defines as
unlimited.

This deletes `interface_addrs()`'s only call site, and with it the
`getifaddrs` walk and its `sockaddr` decoding. It therefore absorbs the
Android `getifaddrs` issue rather than leaving it to be fixed separately.

The peer table is reached through `entities_snapshot` rather than a new
sharing primitive, so the detector stays a detached task holding no node
state and taking no node lock. `PeerRow` gains a typed `probe_target`
rather than having the detector re-parse the display string next to it,
so a change to that string's rendering cannot silently leave the detector
with an empty table and no way to notice.

Peers that are not probeable IP destinations contribute nothing and need
no per-transport special-casing here: a MAC on Ethernet or BLE, a .onion
or Nym recipient behind a local proxy, a scoped IPv6 literal, and a peer
still carrying its configured hostname all arrive as `None`. The last is
deliberate — resolving one would put a DNS lookup with its timeouts on
the sample path — and the window is small, since the address is replaced
by the observed numeric source the first time an authenticated packet
arrives. A node with no peers detects nothing, which is right: nothing is
bound to the old path.

Also corrects two doc claims that did not match the code, both in the
text being rewritten: `transport::watcher` has no consumer besides this
module, so it is not "shared with the interface binder"; and a
connection-oriented transport does not "re-dial on send" in the case that
matters, because `send_async` only dials when the pool holds no
connection for the address and a connection stranded by a medium change
is still in the pool — it is evicted after a write to it fails.

Tests, each run against the defect it guards rather than only against the
fix:

- The churn rules are mutation-checked: iterating the union instead of
  the intersection fails four tests, and dropping the sample-adoption
  fails the one that pins a newly joined peer entering the comparison.
- The snapshot seam is table-driven over six address shapes and fails if
  the publish site stops populating `probe_target` — nothing renders that
  field, so nothing else would have caught it.
- A namespace test brings up a dummy interface with its own subnet and
  asserts the fingerprint does not move, then puts a more specific route
  to the peer out of that same interface and asserts it does, so the
  negative half cannot pass because sampling quietly stopped working. The
  same test now asserts that an unconstrained probe answers with the
  carrier and a constrained one with the other address, and that the two
  differ — the disagreement that would otherwise report a phantom move on
  every first-seen peer. Ignoring the constraint in `preferred_source`
  fails it.
- The two links carrying the pinned source were asserted by nothing.
  Substituting `None` where `probe_targets` reads the row, or where
  `sample` writes the fingerprint, left the whole suite green while
  silently restoring the bug the first-sight rule exists to fix. Both are
  asserted now, and both mutations fail.
- Every live-probe test passed if `preferred_source` returned `None` for
  everything: two all-`None` samples are self-consistent, the
  recorded-keys test never inspected a value, and the loopback assertion
  skipped through its `if let`. A probe to loopback must now answer with
  loopback, which holds on any host that can run the suite, including one
  started with `--network none`.
- `reports_are_spaced_out_under_clean_flapping` polled at one second
  against a one-second pacing floor, so the two were indistinguishable
  and deleting the pacing block still passed. The wake is 100ms now.
- The pinned-source publish test was Linux-gated though `open_connected_fd`
  and the field it asserts are available on macOS too. Widened, along
  with the two sibling tests on the same helper.
- The detector's netlink subscription asserts the route groups rather
  than logging a decline, so a wrong group mask reds instead of passing
  quietly.
2026-09-09 18:45:42 +00:00

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# FIPS Configuration
FIPS uses YAML-based configuration with a cascading multi-file priority system.
All parameters have sensible defaults; a node can run with no configuration file
at all (it will generate an ephemeral identity and listen on default addresses).
## Configuration Loading
### Search Paths
When started without the `-c` flag, FIPS searches for `fips.yaml` in these
locations, lowest to highest priority:
| Priority | Path | Purpose |
|----------|------|---------|
| 1 (lowest) | `/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml` (macOS, FreeBSD), `/etc/fips/fips.yaml` (other Unix) | System-wide defaults |
| 2 | `~/.config/fips/fips.yaml` | User preferences |
| 3 | `~/.fips.yaml` | Legacy user config |
| 4 (highest) | `./fips.yaml` | Deployment-specific overrides |
All found files are loaded and merged in priority order. Values from higher
priority files override those from lower priority files. This allows a system
administrator to set site-wide defaults in the priority 1 path above,
`/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml` on macOS and FreeBSD and
`/etc/fips/fips.yaml` on other Unix systems, while individual
deployments override specific values in `./fips.yaml`.
On macOS and FreeBSD both directories are probed: `/etc/fips` first,
then `/usr/local/etc/fips`, so the packaged file wins over a leftover
`/etc/fips` copy from an earlier install.
### CLI Option
```text
fips -c /path/to/config.yaml
```
When `-c` is specified, only that file is loaded (search paths are skipped).
### Partial Configuration
Every field has a built-in default. A configuration file only needs to specify
values that differ from defaults. For example, a minimal config might contain
only the identity and peer list, inheriting all other defaults.
## YAML Structure
The configuration is organized into six top-level sections (`gateway:`
is Linux only):
```yaml
node: # Node behavior, protocol parameters, and tuning
tun: # TUN virtual interface
dns: # DNS responder for .fips domain
transports: # Network transports (UDP, Ethernet, Bluetooth, Tor, ...)
peers: # Static peer list
gateway: # LAN gateway service (Linux only)
```
### Control Socket (`node.control.*`)
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.control.enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable the control socket |
| `node.control.socket_path` | string | *(auto)* | **Unix:** Socket file path. Resolution is shared by daemon and clients: `/run/fips/control.sock` when `/run/fips` exists; then `/var/run/fips/control.sock` on macOS/FreeBSD when its private directory exists; then `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/fips/control.sock`; finally `/tmp/fips-control.sock`. A privileged macOS daemon selects `/var/run/fips/control.sock` even when the private directory must be created after boot. **Windows:** TCP port number (default: `21210`); the control socket listens on `127.0.0.1` at this port. |
The control socket provides access to node state and runtime management
via the `fipsctl` command-line tool. In addition to read-only status
queries, `fipsctl connect` and `fipsctl disconnect` enable runtime peer
management. See the [`fipsctl` reference](cli-fipsctl.md) for the
command list.
On Unix, the control socket is a Unix domain socket with filesystem
permissions (mode 0770, group `fips`). On Windows, it is a TCP listener
on localhost. TCP does not provide filesystem-level ACLs, so any local
user can connect to the control port.
> **Security note (Windows):** The TCP control socket on Windows is a
> known limitation. Any process running on the local machine can connect
> to the control port and issue commands, including `disconnect`,
> `connect`, and `inject-config`. This is acceptable for single-user
> workstations but may be inappropriate for shared machines. Future
> improvements may include named pipe support (with Windows ACLs) or an
> authentication token mechanism. On shared Windows systems, consider
> using firewall rules to restrict access to the control port.
All tunable protocol parameters live under `node.*`, organized as sysctl-style
dotted paths. The top-level sections (`tun`, `dns`, `transports`, `peers`)
handle infrastructure concerns only.
## Node Parameters (`node.*`)
### Identity (`node.identity.*`)
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.identity.nsec` | string | *(none)* | Secret key in nsec (bech32) or hex format. If omitted, behavior depends on `persistent`. |
| `node.identity.persistent` | bool | `false` | Persist identity across restarts via key file. |
Identity resolution follows a three-tier priority:
1. **Explicit `nsec`** in config — always used when present, regardless of `persistent`
2. **Persistent key file** — when `persistent: true` and no `nsec`, loads from `fips.key`
adjacent to the config file; if no key file exists, generates a new keypair and saves it
3. **Ephemeral** — when `persistent: false` (default) and no `nsec`, generates a fresh
keypair on each start
Key files (`fips.key` with mode 0600, `fips.pub` with mode 0644) are written adjacent
to the highest-priority config file for operator visibility, even in ephemeral mode.
### General
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.leaf_only` | bool | `false` | Leaf-only mode: node does not forward traffic or participate in routing |
| `node.tick_interval_secs` | u64 | `1` | Periodic maintenance tick interval (retry checks, timeout cleanup, tree refresh) |
| `node.base_rtt_ms` | u64 | `100` | Initial RTT estimate for new links before measurements converge |
| `node.heartbeat_interval_secs` | u64 | `10` | Heartbeat send interval per peer for liveness detection |
| `node.link_dead_timeout_secs` | u64 | `30` | No-traffic timeout before a peer is declared dead and removed |
| `node.drain_timeout_secs` | u64 | `2` | Upper bound in seconds on the `Draining` shutdown phase. On shutdown the node broadcasts Disconnect to its peers and then waits up to this long for the links to clear, exiting as soon as the last peer is gone. `0` skips the wait. The key is absent from a default config file rather than written with its default value, so an unset key and the 2-second default are the same thing |
| `node.log_level` | string | `"info"` | Tracing filter default. Case-insensitive; one of `trace`, `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`. Overridden by the `RUST_LOG` environment variable when set |
### Resource Limits (`node.limits.*`)
Controls capacity for connections, peers, and links.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.limits.max_connections` | usize | `256` | Max handshake-phase connections |
| `node.limits.max_peers` | usize | `128` | Max authenticated peers |
| `node.limits.max_links` | usize | `256` | Max active links |
| `node.limits.max_pending_inbound` | usize | `1000` | Max pending inbound handshakes |
### Rate Limiting (`node.rate_limit.*`)
Handshake rate limiting protects against DoS on the Noise IK handshake path.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_burst` | u32 | `100` | Token bucket burst capacity |
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_rate` | f64 | `10.0` | Tokens per second refill rate |
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_timeout_secs` | u64 | `30` | Stale handshake cleanup timeout |
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_resend_interval_ms` | u64 | `1000` | Initial handshake message resend interval |
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_resend_backoff` | f64 | `2.0` | Resend backoff multiplier (1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s with defaults) |
| `node.rate_limit.handshake_max_resends` | u32 | `5` | Max resends per handshake attempt |
| `node.rate_limit.established_handshake_burst` | u32 | derived | Burst capacity of the established-link bucket. Derived default is `node.limits.max_peers` (128) |
| `node.rate_limit.established_handshake_rate` | f64 | derived | Refill rate of that bucket. Derived default is `(max_peers / max(node.rekey.after_secs, 1)) * (1 + handshake_max_resends)`, floored at 1.0/s — 6.4/s at shipped defaults |
| `node.rate_limit.session_setup_burst` | u32 | `64` | Per-link-peer burst for inbound session-setup messages that would open a new session |
| `node.rate_limit.session_setup_rate` | f64 | `16.0` | Per-link-peer refill rate for those messages, in tokens per second |
Msg1 whose source matches an established link (rekey and restart
maintenance traffic) draws on a second bucket rather than competing with
stranger admission. Both keys are optional; leaving them unset keeps the
derived sizing, which tracks `max_peers` and the rekey period
automatically instead of becoming a constant nobody revisits.
`max_peers: 0` (unlimited) has no peer-count-derived size, so the
derivation falls back to `handshake_burst` / `handshake_rate`.
The node's total admitted msg1 rate is the **sum** of the two buckets: 228
burst and 16.4/s at shipped defaults, of which the established half is
reachable only by a source that already matches a live link. Size against
the sum when budgeting handshake crypto load for a host.
The `session_setup_*` pair is a separate limiter on the session layer, not
the link layer. It is keyed on the authenticated link peer a session datagram
arrived over, so each neighbour gets its own budget and a flood is
attributable. Setup messages naming a peer this node is already established
with (inbound rekey and restart traffic) draw on a second per-link bucket
derived from `max_peers`, `node.rekey.after_secs` and `handshake_max_resends`,
exactly as `established_handshake_*` is, so a stranger flood cannot suppress
rekey traffic sharing the link.
At the defaults one neighbour can force at most
`session_setup_rate * handshake_timeout_secs` half-open entries (480) and
`session_setup_rate * (1 + handshake_max_resends)` acks per second (96). The
node-wide ceiling is still that times the peer count, since the limiter bounds
each neighbour rather than the aggregate. A legitimate peer whose traffic
reaches this node over the *same* link as an attacker's shares that
attacker's stranger bucket, so establishment behind a flooded neighbour is
refused until the bucket refills; the initiator's own resend schedule (1s, 2s,
4s, 8s, 16s) covers a short drain.
### Retry / Backoff (`node.retry.*`)
Connection retry with exponential backoff.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.retry.max_retries` | u32 | `5` | Max connection retry attempts |
| `node.retry.base_interval_secs` | u64 | `5` | Base backoff interval |
| `node.retry.max_backoff_secs` | u64 | `300` | Cap on exponential backoff (5 minutes) |
Auto-reconnect (triggered by MMP link-dead removal) uses the same backoff
parameters but bypasses `max_retries`, retrying indefinitely. See
`peers[].auto_reconnect` below.
### Medium-Change Detection (`node.netmon.*`)
Detects that the host moved between transport media — WLAN to LAN, WLAN to 5G,
an interface arriving or leaving — and rebinds the send path immediately.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.netmon.enabled` | bool | `true` | Whether medium-change detection runs |
| `node.netmon.poll_interval_secs` | u64 | `5` | How often the path to each peer is sampled (backstop period where an event-driven backend exists) |
| `node.netmon.debounce_ms` | u64 | `250` | How long to wait for the picture to settle before acting (`0` disables) |
Established UDP peers use a per-peer `connect()`-ed socket for the send fast
path. `connect(2)` makes the kernel resolve the route once and pin the local
source address to whichever interface carried it then; it never re-evaluates.
Without detection, a medium change therefore leaves every peer transmitting
from an abandoned address while the peer answers where it last heard the node —
the peering reports itself connected and carries nothing until
`link_dead_timeout_secs` tears it down, typically 60–90s per switch.
On a detected change the node drops those sockets (the wildcard listen socket
resolves a route per packet, so sends keep working, and a correctly bound
connected socket is reinstalled on a later tick) and heartbeats every peer on a
connectionless transport at once so the far side re-pins to the new source
address. A peer reached over TCP, Tor, Nym or BLE is left to its periodic
heartbeat, since sending to it here would block the node's receive loop on a
stream the medium change has very likely just stranded. No peering is torn
down: sessions, tree positions and routes survive the switch.
**What counts as a change.** For each peer whose transport address is a numeric
IP endpoint, the node asks the kernel which local address it would use to reach
*that peer* — a `connect(2)` on a UDP socket, which resolves the route and sends
nothing. A change is reported when a peer present in two consecutive samples is
now reached from a different local address, or has stopped being reachable at
all.
Because the question is asked per peer, an interface the node does not peer over
cannot trigger anything: a container bridge, a VPN, a `veth` pair or a tunnel
appearing is not the route to any peer, so it does not enter the sample. A peer
on the same LAN, reached by its subnet route rather than the default route, is
covered as well as one across the internet, and so is a more specific route
moving under a single peer.
Peers appearing and leaving are ignored on their own — that is ordinary node
behaviour and says nothing about the medium. A peer seen for the first time is
the one exception, and it is not judged against history but against its own
send path: if its `connect()`-ed socket is pinned to a source the routing table
would no longer choose, it is reported. Without that, a medium change in the
window between a peer authenticating and the detector's next sample would be
the detector's first sight of that peer, and would be adopted silently while
the peer's socket stayed pinned to the path the host had just left. A peer
joining onto a path that has not moved has its socket pinned exactly where its
traffic goes, so it still reports nothing. A peer whose address is not a
probeable IP endpoint contributes nothing: a MAC on Ethernet or BLE, a `.onion`
or Nym recipient reached through a local proxy, an IPv6 literal with a scope
suffix, or a peer still carrying the hostname it was configured with (resolving
one would put a DNS lookup on the sample path; the address becomes numeric as
soon as an authenticated packet arrives from the peer). A node holding no peers
detects nothing, which is correct — it has nothing bound to the old path.
The cost is three syscalls per peer per sample, bounded by
`node.limits.max_peers`, with no packets sent and no name resolution.
Detection uses the best backend the platform has:
| Platform | Backend | Latency |
|----------|---------|---------|
| Linux, Android | `NETLINK_ROUTE` multicast (as `ip monitor`) | kernel event, milliseconds |
| macOS, FreeBSD | `PF_ROUTE` socket | kernel event, milliseconds |
| Windows, iOS | timer | up to `poll_interval_secs` |
Where a backend exists, `poll_interval_secs` is only a backstop: a netlink
socket drops messages under memory pressure and the subscription can fail to
start in a restricted sandbox, so the timer keeps running underneath. A backend
that cannot start is logged once at `warn` and the node falls back to the timer.
None of this covers Bluetooth: a BLE adapter's state is not an IP attachment and
is invisible to this detector. The connected-socket fast path is Linux and macOS
only; elsewhere there are no pinned sockets to rebind, and the heartbeat alone
carries the new address.
### Cache Parameters (`node.cache.*`)
Controls caching of tree coordinates and identity mappings.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.cache.coord_size` | usize | `50000` | Max entries in coordinate cache |
| `node.cache.coord_ttl_secs` | u64 | `300` | Coordinate cache entry TTL (5 minutes) |
| `node.cache.identity_size` | usize | `10000` | Max entries in identity cache (LRU, no TTL) |
### Mesh Lookup (`node.lookup.*`)
Controls bloom-guided mesh lookup (LookupRequest/LookupResponse): finding
the current coordinates of a mesh address the node already knows.
> **Renamed in v0.5.0.** These six keys were `node.discovery.*`. See
> [Deprecated keys](#deprecated-keys) for the full mapping. A deployed
> `node.discovery:` block still loads and still applies, with a one-time
> deprecation warning at startup.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.lookup.ttl` | u8 | `64` | Hop limit for LookupRequest forwarding |
| `node.lookup.attempt_timeouts_secs` | array<u64> | `[1, 2, 4, 8]` | Per-attempt timeouts. Each entry is the deadline for one `LookupRequest` before sending the next attempt with a fresh `request_id`. Length determines total attempt count; default gives 4 attempts and a 15s total budget |
| `node.lookup.recent_expiry_secs` | u64 | `10` | Dedup cache expiry for recent request IDs |
| `node.lookup.backoff_base_secs` | u64 | `0` | Optional post-failure suppression base in seconds; doubles per consecutive failure. `0` disables (default); the per-attempt sequence is the only retry pacing |
| `node.lookup.backoff_max_secs` | u64 | `0` | Cap on optional post-failure backoff |
| `node.lookup.forward_min_interval_secs` | u64 | `2` | Transit-side rate limiting: minimum interval between forwarded lookups for the same target |
### Peer Rendezvous (`node.rendezvous.*`)
How the node finds peers to connect to at all, over the Nostr overlay and
on the local link. Distinct from mesh lookup above, which resolves
coordinates for a mesh address that is already known.
> **Renamed in v0.5.0.** `node.discovery.nostr.*` is now
> `node.rendezvous.nostr.*`, and `node.discovery.lan.*` is now
> `node.rendezvous.lan.*`. See [Deprecated keys](#deprecated-keys).
#### Nostr Rendezvous (`node.rendezvous.nostr.*`)
Optional Nostr-mediated overlay rendezvous. This layer publishes replaceable
endpoint adverts (`fips-overlay-v1`), consumes advert-derived endpoint
fallbacks for configured peers, and can optionally discover non-configured
peers (`policy: open`). `udp:nat` remains the trigger for NAT traversal
offer/answer + punch-through, after which the established UDP socket is handed
into the normal FIPS transport/session stack.
Inbox-relay discovery falls back to the local DM relay list if remote relay
metadata cannot be fetched.
The Nostr discovery runtime is compiled into every build of the crate; it
is enabled at runtime via `node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled: true` and stays
inert otherwise.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable Nostr-mediated overlay discovery |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.policy` | string | `"configured_only"` | Advert discovery policy: `disabled`, `configured_only`, `open` |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.open_discovery_max_pending` | usize | `64` | Max open-discovery peers queued in outbound retry/connection state at once |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.max_concurrent_incoming_offers` | usize | `16` | Max concurrent inbound traversal offers processed at once (rate limit against offer spam) |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.max_concurrent_offers_per_npub` | usize | `4` | Max concurrent inbound traversal offers accepted from any one sender npub, so a single identity cannot hold the whole pool. Sits inside `max_concurrent_incoming_offers`, which stays the outer bound; a larger value is inert. Zero is rejected, since it refuses every inbound offer rather than disabling the limit |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.advert_cache_max_entries` | usize | `2048` | Max cached overlay adverts retained from relay traffic |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.seen_sessions_max_entries` | usize | `2048` | Max seen-session IDs retained for replay detection |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.advertise` | bool | `true` | Publish local endpoint adverts |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.advert_relays` | list[string] | `["wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol", "wss://offchain.pub"]` | Relays used for service adverts |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.dm_relays` | list[string] | `["wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol", "wss://offchain.pub"]` | Relays used for encrypted signaling events |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.stun_servers` | list[string] | `["stun:stun.l.google.com:19302", "stun:stun.cloudflare.com:3478", "stun:global.stun.twilio.com:3478"]` | STUN servers used for local reflexive address discovery |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.share_local_candidates` | bool | `false` | Whether to advertise local (RFC 1918 / ULA) interface addresses as host candidates in the traversal offer. Off by default: in most deployments peers aren't on the same broadcast domain, and sharing private host candidates causes misleading punch successes when an asymmetric L3 path (VPN, Tailscale subnet route, overlapping address space) makes a peer's private IP one-way reachable. Enable only when peers are on the same physical LAN |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.app` | string | `"fips-overlay-v1"` | Traversal application namespace, published in the advert's `protocol` tag (the `d` tag itself is hardcoded to `fips-overlay-v1`) |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.signal_ttl_secs` | u64 | `120` | Signaling TTL in seconds |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.attempt_timeout_secs` | u64 | `10` | Overall traversal attempt timeout in seconds |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.replay_window_secs` | u64 | `300` | Replay tracking retention window in seconds |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.punch_start_delay_ms` | u64 | `2000` | Delay before punch traffic starts |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.punch_interval_ms` | u64 | `200` | Interval between punch packets |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.punch_duration_ms` | u64 | `10000` | How long to keep punching before failure |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.advert_ttl_secs` | u64 | `3600` | Advert TTL in seconds |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.advert_refresh_secs` | u64 | `1800` | How often adverts are refreshed in seconds |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.startup_sweep_delay_secs` | u64 | `5` | Settle delay after Nostr discovery starts before the one-shot startup advert sweep runs (only used under `policy: open`). Allows the relay subscription backlog to populate the in-memory advert cache before the sweep fires |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.startup_sweep_max_age_secs` | u64 | `3600` | Maximum advert age (`now - created_at`) considered by the one-shot startup sweep (only used under `policy: open`). Adverts older than this are skipped on startup; the per-tick sweep still considers them up to `valid_until_ms` |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.failure_streak_threshold` | u32 | `5` | Consecutive NAT-traversal failures against a peer before an extended cooldown is applied. At this threshold the daemon also actively re-fetches the peer's advert from `advert_relays` to evict cache entries for peers that have gone away |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.extended_cooldown_secs` | u64 | `1800` | Cooldown applied to a peer once `failure_streak_threshold` is hit. Suppresses both open-discovery sweep enqueues and per-attempt retry firings until elapsed (30 minutes default) |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.warn_log_interval_secs` | u64 | `300` | Minimum interval between `NAT traversal failed` WARN log lines for the same peer. Subsequent failures inside the window log at DEBUG to reduce log spam on public-test nodes with many cache-learned peers |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.failure_state_max_entries` | usize | `4096` | Maximum entries retained in the per-npub failure-state map. Bounds memory under high cache turnover; oldest entries (by last failure time) are evicted when the cap is exceeded |
| `node.rendezvous.nostr.protocol_mismatch_cooldown_secs` | u64 | `86400` | Cooldown applied after observing a fatal protocol mismatch on a Nostr-adopted bootstrap transport (e.g. `Unknown FMP version` from a peer running a different FMP-protocol version). Independent of `extended_cooldown_secs` and much longer (24 hours default) because the mismatch is structural; re-traversing is wasted effort until one side upgrades |
If `stun_servers` is omitted, the built-in default list above is used. If it is
specified in YAML, the configured list fully overrides the defaults.
Initiators use only this local list for outbound STUN queries; peer-advertised
STUN values are published for diagnostics/interoperability but are not used as
arbitrary egress targets.
The built-in advert and DM relay defaults point at widely-operated public
relays (Damus, nos.lol, Primal) as best-effort endpoints; operators are
encouraged to override them with their own relay preferences for production
deployments.
Advert freshness is enforced semantically: events with expired NIP-40
`expiration` tags are dropped, and adverts are also bounded by a created-at
staleness window derived from `advert_ttl_secs` (with a grace multiplier).
The current in-tree STUN parser handles IPv4 and IPv6 mapped-address
attributes. Local traversal candidates include active non-loopback private
interface addresses (RFC1918 IPv4 and IPv6 ULA) plus probed local egress
addresses for the punch socket port.
During punching, compatible private-subnet candidates and reflexive candidates
are attempted in parallel; the first successful path wins.
#### LAN Rendezvous (`node.rendezvous.lan.*`)
Peer rendezvous on the local link via mDNS / DNS-SD (RFC 6762 / RFC
6763). When enabled, the node publishes a `_fips._udp.local.` service
advert carrying its `npub` (and optional scope) and concurrently
browses for the same service type to learn same-broadcast-domain peers.
The result is sub-second peer pairing with no Nostr-relay roundtrip,
STUN observation, or NAT traversal: the observed endpoint is by
construction routable from the consumer's LAN.
mDNS adverts are unauthenticated, so a LAN advert is treated only as a
routing hint. Identity is still proven end-to-end by the Noise IK
handshake the node initiates against the observed endpoint; a spoofed
advert carrying another peer's npub fails the handshake and is dropped.
LAN discovery requires an active UDP transport (peers dial the
advertised UDP port to begin the handshake).
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.rendezvous.lan.enabled` | bool | `false` | Master switch. Opt-in: enable for sub-second same-LAN pairing. Default-off avoids reintroducing a per-LAN identity broadcast on nodes that have deliberately disabled other discovery channels |
| `node.rendezvous.lan.service_type` | string | `"_fips._udp.local."` | DNS-SD service type. Primarily an override for integration tests running multiple isolated services on one loopback interface; leave at the default in production |
| `node.rendezvous.lan.scope` | string | *(none)* | Optional application/network scope carried in a `scope=<name>` TXT entry. Browsers with a scope set only surface peers advertising the same scope, so nodes on the same physical LAN configured for different mesh networks do not cross-feed. Intentionally separate from `node.rendezvous.nostr.app` so relay-visible adverts can stay generic while LAN discovery is isolated per private network |
### Spanning Tree (`node.tree.*`)
Controls tree construction and parent selection.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|----------------------------------------|-------|---------|--------------------------------------------------|
| `node.tree.announce_min_interval_ms` | u64 | `500` | Per-peer TreeAnnounce rate limit |
| `node.tree.parent_hysteresis` | f64 | `0.2` | Cost improvement fraction required for same-root parent switch (0.0–1.0) |
| `node.tree.hold_down_secs` | u64 | `30` | Suppress non-mandatory re-evaluation after parent switch |
| `node.tree.reeval_interval_secs` | u64 | `60` | Periodic cost-based parent re-evaluation interval (0 = disabled) |
| `node.tree.flap_threshold` | u32 | `4` | Parent switches in window before dampening engages |
| `node.tree.flap_window_secs` | u64 | `60` | Sliding window for counting parent switches |
| `node.tree.flap_dampening_secs` | u64 | `120` | Extended hold-down duration when flap threshold exceeded |
### Bloom Filter (`node.bloom.*`)
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.bloom.update_debounce_ms` | u64 | `500` | Debounce interval for filter update propagation |
| `node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` | f64 | `0.20` | Antipoison cap: reject inbound `FilterAnnounce` frames whose advertised false-positive rate exceeds this value. Valid range `(0.0, 1.0)`. The default `0.20` corresponds to fill 0.7248 at k=5 (≈2,114 entries on the 1 KB filter); a saturated/poisoned filter is still ~100% FPR and rejected |
Bloom filter size (1 KB), hash count (5), and size classes are protocol
constants and not configurable.
### ECN Signaling (`node.ecn.*`)
Controls hop-by-hop ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) signaling. When
enabled, transit nodes detect congestion on outgoing links (via MMP loss/ETX
metrics or kernel buffer drops) and set the CE flag on forwarded FMP frames.
Destination nodes mark ECN-capable IPv6 packets with CE before TUN delivery
per RFC 3168, enabling end-host TCP congestion control to react.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.ecn.enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable ECN congestion signaling (CE flag relay and local congestion detection) |
| `node.ecn.loss_threshold` | f64 | `0.05` | MMP loss rate threshold for CE marking (0.0–1.0). When the outgoing link's loss rate meets or exceeds this value, forwarded packets are CE-marked. |
| `node.ecn.etx_threshold` | f64 | `3.0` | MMP ETX threshold for CE marking (≥1.0). When the outgoing link's ETX meets or exceeds this value, forwarded packets are CE-marked. |
Congestion detection triggers on any of: outgoing link loss ≥ `loss_threshold`,
outgoing link ETX ≥ `etx_threshold`, or kernel receive buffer drops detected on
any local transport. CE is relayed hop-by-hop: once set on any hop, the flag
stays set for all subsequent hops to the destination.
### Rekey (`node.rekey.*`)
Controls periodic Noise rekey for forward secrecy. When enabled, both FMP
(link-layer IK) and FSP (session-layer XK) sessions perform fresh Diffie-Hellman
key exchanges after a time or message count threshold, whichever comes first.
A 10-second drain window keeps the old session active for decryption during
cutover.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.rekey.enabled` | bool | `true` | Initiate periodic Noise rekey on links and sessions. A peer-driven session rekey is still answered when this is off, so session keys can still rotate |
| `node.rekey.after_secs` | u64 | `120` | Initiate rekey after this many seconds on a session |
| `node.rekey.after_messages` | u64 | `65536` | Initiate rekey after this many messages sent on a session |
### Session / Data Plane (`node.session.*`)
Controls end-to-end session behavior and packet queuing.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.session.default_ttl` | u8 | `64` | Default SessionDatagram TTL |
| `node.session.pending_packets_per_dest` | usize | `16` | Queue depth per destination during session establishment |
| `node.session.pending_max_destinations` | usize | `256` | Max destinations with pending packets |
| `node.session.idle_timeout_secs` | u64 | `90` | Idle session timeout; established sessions with no application data for this duration are removed. MMP reports (SenderReport, ReceiverReport, PathMtuNotification) do not count as activity |
| `node.session.coords_warmup_packets` | u8 | `5` | Number of initial data packets per session that include the CP flag for transit cache warmup; also the reset count on CoordsRequired/PathBroken receipt |
| `node.session.coords_response_interval_ms` | u64 | `2000` | Minimum interval (ms) between standalone CoordsWarmup responses to CoordsRequired/PathBroken signals per destination |
The anti-replay window size (2048 packets) is a compile-time constant and not
configurable.
### Link-Layer MMP (`node.mmp.*`)
Metrics Measurement Protocol for per-peer link measurement. See
[../design/fips-mesh-layer.md](../design/fips-mesh-layer.md) for behavioral details.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.mmp.mode` | string | `"full"` | Operating mode: `full` (sender + receiver reports), `lightweight` (receiver reports only), or `minimal` (spin bit + CE echo only, no reports) |
| `node.mmp.log_interval_secs` | u64 | `30` | Periodic operator log interval for link metrics |
| `node.mmp.owd_window_size` | usize | `32` | One-way delay trend ring buffer size |
### Session-Layer MMP (`node.session_mmp.*`)
Metrics Measurement Protocol for end-to-end session measurement. Configured
independently from link-layer MMP because session reports are routed through
every transit link, consuming bandwidth proportional to path length.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.session_mmp.mode` | string | `"full"` | Operating mode: `full`, `lightweight`, or `minimal` |
| `node.session_mmp.log_interval_secs` | u64 | `30` | Periodic operator log interval for session metrics |
| `node.session_mmp.owd_window_size` | usize | `32` | One-way delay trend ring buffer size |
### Internal Buffers (`node.buffers.*`)
Channel sizes affecting throughput and memory. Primarily useful for performance
tuning under high load or on memory-constrained devices.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.buffers.packet_channel` | usize | `1024` | Transport to Node packet channel capacity |
| `node.buffers.tun_channel` | usize | `1024` | TUN to Node outbound channel capacity |
| `node.buffers.dns_channel` | usize | `64` | DNS to Node identity channel capacity |
### Native Datagram API (`node.native_api.*`)
**Experimental, off by default, and built on Linux, FreeBSD and macOS only.** A
client process connects to a Unix socket and asks either to open a flow to a
remote pubkey or to hold a local port. Both answers carry a file descriptor:
a flow's, which the client sends and receives datagrams on, or a listener's,
which arriving flows are delivered on. There is no IPv6 emulation and no TUN
device on this path.
The surface is not stable, is not a reliability layer, and is not the v2
external process API. No compatibility promise is made about it: the keys
below, the line protocol behind them, and the Rust client that hides it may
change or be withdrawn in any release.
The listener is not built on macOS or Windows, and this section is ignored
there. Two separate things bound that: Windows has no `SCM_RIGHTS` and so no
way to hand a file descriptor to another process at all, while macOS has
`SCM_RIGHTS` but does not implement `SOCK_SEQPACKET` for `AF_UNIX`.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `node.native_api.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable the native API socket |
| `node.native_api.socket_path` | string | *(auto)* | Socket file path. Resolved the same way as the control socket, with the filename `api.sock`: `/run/fips/api.sock` when `/run/fips` exists; then `/var/run/fips/api.sock` on FreeBSD when its private directory exists; then `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/fips/api.sock`; finally `/tmp/fips-api.sock` |
| `node.native_api.pending_per_flow` | usize | `16` | Datagrams held for one flow while it waits to be accepted, or while an established flow's client is slow to read. Refused above 64 at startup: the whole batch is written onto a socket pair the client cannot read yet. Refused below 1: a flow that can hold nothing loses its peer's opening datagram between the arrival being announced and the client taking the flow |
| `node.native_api.backlog` | usize | `16` | Flows announced on one listener and not yet taken by its task. Refused below 1 at startup: a listener with no backlog admits no flow, so every arrival would be dropped |
| `node.native_api.max_flows` | usize | `256` | Flows this node holds at once |
| `node.native_api.debug_commands` | bool | `false` | Answer the `inject`, `stats` and `arrive` debug commands. Not a supported interface |
> **Security note:** the socket is mode `0770`, owned by group `fips`, and
> that is the whole of the authorization model. **Any user in the `fips` group
> can impersonate this node on the mesh.** A process that can open the socket
> can send datagrams under this node's identity to any peer it names, and can
> hold a port and receive mesh traffic addressed to this node on it. There is
> no per-client authentication, no capability check and no audit trail beyond
> the daemon's own logs. On a node with the native API enabled, treat `fips`
> group membership exactly as you would treat the node's private key. This is
> why the API is disabled by default, and why enabling it is an explicit
> operator decision rather than something a package turns on. See
> [security.md](security.md#native-datagram-api).
A client may hold ports 1024 through 65535. Ports 0 through 255 are reserved
for protocol use and 256 through 1023 for FIPS standard services (the IPv6
shim among them), and the daemon refuses both ranges by name. A client that
names no local port is given one from 49152 upward.
`debug_commands` is a separate gate on three commands that exist only so the
test harness can drive the receive and dispatch paths without a wire.
`inject` makes the daemon write bytes the client chose into one of that
client's own flows, and `arrive` makes it dispatch a datagram as though a peer
had sent it, reaching any listener this node holds. A node with the key off
refuses each by name, so a client can tell "this node will not do that" from
"this build has no such command". Leave it off outside the test harness.
`fipsctl show native-flows` reports the open and pending flows, the bound
listeners and the `native` counters; see the [`fipsctl`
reference](cli-fipsctl.md) and
[control-socket.md](control-socket.md#read-only-queries). A Rust program links
the crate and speaks the API through the `fips::native::client` module, which
hides the line protocol; see
[../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md](../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md).
## TUN Interface (`tun.*`)
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `tun.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable TUN virtual interface |
| `tun.name` | string | `"fips0"` | Interface name |
| `tun.mtu` | u16 | `1280` | Interface MTU (IPv6 minimum) |
## DNS Responder (`dns.*`)
Resolves `<npub>.fips` queries to FIPS IPv6 addresses. Resolution is pure
computation (npub to public key to address); resolved identities are registered
with the node for routing.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `dns.enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable DNS responder |
| `dns.bind_addr` | string | `"::1"` | Bind address. Default is IPv6 loopback only; the shipped `fips-dns-setup` configures systemd-resolved to forward `.fips` queries to `[::1]:5354`. To expose the responder to mesh peers (or to the gateway over IPv4), override (e.g., `"::"` for all interfaces). |
| `dns.port` | u16 | `5354` | Listen port |
| `dns.ttl` | u32 | `300` | AAAA record TTL in seconds |
The `dns.ttl` value should not exceed `node.cache.coord_ttl_secs` to avoid
stale address mappings.
### Host Mapping
The DNS resolver checks a host map before falling back to direct npub
resolution, enabling names like `gateway.fips` instead of `npub1...fips`.
The host map is populated from two sources:
1. **Peer aliases** — the `alias` field on configured peers in `peers:`.
2. **Hosts file** — `/etc/fips/hosts`, one `hostname npub1...` per line.
Blank lines and `#` comments are allowed.
On conflict, hosts-file entries take precedence over peer aliases. The
hosts file is auto-reloaded on modification (mtime change) without
restarting the daemon. Hostnames are case-insensitive.
The installer ships `/etc/fips/hosts` pre-populated with the public test
mesh roster (`test-us01` … `test-uk01`). Operator-style guide for
adding entries and the precedence rules:
[../how-to/host-aliases.md](../how-to/host-aliases.md).
## Transports (`transports.*`)
### UDP (`transports.udp.*`)
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `transports.udp.bind_addr` | string | `"0.0.0.0:2121"` | UDP bind address and port. Ignored when `outbound_only: true` (kernel-assigned ephemeral port is used regardless). |
| `transports.udp.mtu` | u16 | `1280` | Transport MTU |
| `transports.udp.recv_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | UDP socket receive buffer size in bytes (2 MB). Linux kernel doubles the requested value internally. Host `net.core.rmem_max` must be >= this value. |
| `transports.udp.send_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | UDP socket send buffer size in bytes (2 MB). Host `net.core.wmem_max` must be >= this value. |
| `transports.udp.advertise_on_nostr` | bool | `false` | Include this UDP transport in Nostr endpoint adverts. Implicitly forced false when `outbound_only: true`. |
| `transports.udp.public` | bool | `false` | If advertised: `true` publishes direct `host:port`; `false` publishes `udp:nat` rendezvous |
| `transports.udp.external_addr` | string | *(none)* | Explicit advertise-as override. Bare IP (`"203.0.113.45"` — bind port is appended) or full `host:port`. Takes precedence over the bound address and STUN autodiscovery. Useful when the public IP isn't on a local interface (cloud 1:1 NAT, EIP) or to skip STUN for a deterministic value. |
| `transports.udp.outbound_only` | bool | `false` | Pure-client posture. When `true`, the transport binds to `0.0.0.0:0` (kernel-assigned ephemeral port) regardless of `bind_addr`, refuses inbound handshake msg1, and is never advertised on Nostr regardless of `advertise_on_nostr`. |
| `transports.udp.accept_connections` | bool | `true` | Accept inbound handshake msg1 from new peers. Combine with `outbound_only: false` and `accept_connections: false` (plus `auto_connect` on peer entries) for a node that initiates outbound links but rejects fresh inbound handshakes. The handshake handler carves out msg1 from peers already established on this transport so rekey continues to work. |
### Ethernet (`transports.ethernet.*`)
Ethernet transport sends raw frames over the platform's raw-frame
socket: AF_PACKET SOCK_DGRAM on Linux, BPF (`/dev/bpf*`) on macOS.
Linux and macOS only. On Linux it requires `CAP_NET_RAW` or running as
root; on macOS it requires read/write access to a `/dev/bpf*` device.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `interface` | string | *(required)* | Network interface name (e.g., `"eth0"`, `"enp3s0"`) |
| `ethertype` | u16 | `0x2121` | EtherType |
| `mtu` | u16 | *(auto)* | Override MTU. Default: interface MTU minus 3 (for frame type + length prefix) |
| `recv_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | Socket receive buffer size in bytes (2 MB) |
| `send_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | Socket send buffer size in bytes (2 MB) |
| `listen` | bool | `true` | Listen for neighbor beacons from other nodes. Renamed from `discovery` in v0.5.0; the old key is still accepted as an alias, so a deployed config loads unchanged |
| `announce` | bool | `false` | Broadcast announcement beacons on the LAN |
| `auto_connect` | bool | `false` | Auto-connect to discovered peers |
| `accept_connections` | bool | `false` | Accept incoming connection attempts from discovered peers |
| `beacon_interval_secs` | u64 | `30` | Announcement beacon interval in seconds (minimum 10) |
**Named instances.** Multiple Ethernet interfaces can be configured by
using named sub-keys instead of flat parameters:
```yaml
transports:
ethernet:
lan:
interface: "eth0"
listen: true
announce: true
backbone:
interface: "eth1"
announce: false
```
Each named instance operates independently with its own socket and
neighbor state. The instance name is used in log messages and the
`name()` method on the Transport trait.
### TCP (`transports.tcp.*`)
TCP transport enables firewall traversal on networks that block UDP but
allow TCP (e.g., port 443). Uses FMP header-based framing with zero
overhead.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `transports.tcp.bind_addr` | string | *(none)* | Listen address (e.g., `"0.0.0.0:8443"`). If omitted, outbound-only mode. |
| `transports.tcp.mtu` | u16 | `1400` | Default MTU. Per-connection MTU derived from `TCP_MAXSEG` when available. |
| `transports.tcp.connect_timeout_ms` | u64 | `5000` | Outbound connect timeout in milliseconds |
| `transports.tcp.nodelay` | bool | `true` | `TCP_NODELAY` (disable Nagle for low latency) |
| `transports.tcp.keepalive_secs` | u64 | `30` | TCP keepalive interval in seconds (0 = disabled) |
| `transports.tcp.recv_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | Socket receive buffer size in bytes (2 MB) |
| `transports.tcp.send_buf_size` | usize | `2097152` | Socket send buffer size in bytes (2 MB) |
| `transports.tcp.max_inbound_connections` | usize | `256` | Maximum simultaneous inbound connections |
| `transports.tcp.advertise_on_nostr` | bool | `false` | Include this TCP transport in Nostr endpoint adverts |
| `transports.tcp.external_addr` | string | *(none)* | Explicit advertise-as override. Bare IP or full `host:port`. **Required** when `bind_addr` is wildcard (e.g. `"0.0.0.0:443"`) and `advertise_on_nostr: true`, since TCP has no STUN equivalent for autodiscovery. Common on cloud 1:1 NAT / EIP setups where the public IP isn't bindable on the host. |
**Named instances.** Like other transports, multiple TCP instances can
be configured with named sub-keys:
```yaml
transports:
tcp:
public:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:443"
internal:
bind_addr: "10.0.0.1:8443"
max_inbound_connections: 64
```
### Tor (`transports.tor.*`)
Tor transport routes FIPS traffic through the Tor network for anonymity.
Requires an external Tor daemon providing a SOCKS5 proxy. Three modes:
`socks5` for outbound-only, `control_port` for outbound + monitoring,
`directory` for outbound + inbound via Tor-managed onion service.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `transports.tor.mode` | string | `"socks5"` | Tor access mode: `socks5` (outbound only), `control_port` (outbound + monitoring), or `directory` (outbound + inbound onion service) |
| `transports.tor.socks5_addr` | string | `"127.0.0.1:9050"` | SOCKS5 proxy address (host:port) |
| `transports.tor.connect_timeout_ms` | u64 | `120000` | Connect timeout in milliseconds. Tor circuits take 10–60s. |
| `transports.tor.mtu` | u16 | `1400` | Default MTU |
| `transports.tor.control_addr` | string | `"/run/tor/control"` | Tor control port address: Unix socket path or host:port. Used in `control_port` mode; optional in `directory` mode for monitoring. |
| `transports.tor.control_auth` | string | `"cookie"` | Control port authentication: `"cookie"`, `"cookie:/path/to/cookie"`, or `"password:<secret>"`. |
| `transports.tor.cookie_path` | string | `"/var/run/tor/control.authcookie"` | Path to Tor control cookie file. Used when `control_auth` is `"cookie"`. |
| `transports.tor.max_inbound_connections` | usize | `64` | Maximum inbound connections via onion service. |
| `transports.tor.directory_service.hostname_file` | string | `"/var/lib/tor/fips_onion_service/hostname"` | Path to Tor-managed hostname file containing the `.onion` address. |
| `transports.tor.directory_service.bind_addr` | string | `"127.0.0.1:8443"` | Local bind address for the listener that Tor forwards inbound connections to. Must match `HiddenServicePort` target in `torrc`. |
| `transports.tor.advertise_on_nostr` | bool | `false` | Include this Tor transport in Nostr endpoint adverts. Requires `node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled: true`; setting it while Nostr rendezvous is disabled is a config-load error. `advertised_port` has no effect unless this is `true`. |
| `transports.tor.advertised_port` | u16 | `443` | Public-facing onion port published in Nostr overlay adverts. Must match the virtual port in torrc's `HiddenServicePort <port> 127.0.0.1:<bind_port>` directive — that is the port other peers will use to reach this onion. |
**Named instances.** Like other transports, multiple Tor instances can
be configured with named sub-keys for different SOCKS5 proxy endpoints.
**Directory mode** (recommended for production). Tor manages the onion
service via `HiddenServiceDir` in `torrc`. FIPS reads the `.onion`
address from the hostname file and binds a local TCP listener. This
enables Tor's `Sandbox 1` (seccomp-bpf). If `control_addr` is also
set, the transport connects to the control port for daemon monitoring
(non-fatal on failure).
**Control port mode.** Connects to the Tor daemon's control port for
monitoring only (bootstrap status, circuit health, traffic stats).
No inbound connections. Both `control_addr` and `control_auth` are
required.
### UDP + Tor Bridge Example
A node bridging clearnet (UDP) and anonymous (Tor) portions of the mesh:
```yaml
node:
identity:
persistent: true
tun:
enabled: true
transports:
udp:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:2121"
mtu: 1472
tor:
socks5_addr: "127.0.0.1:9050"
peers:
- npub: "npub1abc..."
alias: "clearnet-peer"
addresses:
- transport: udp
addr: "203.0.113.5:2121"
- npub: "npub1def..."
alias: "anonymous-peer"
addresses:
- transport: tor
addr: "abc123...xyz.onion:2121"
```
### Tor Directory Mode Example
A node accepting inbound connections via Tor-managed onion service
(recommended for production — enables Sandbox 1):
```yaml
node:
identity:
persistent: true
tun:
enabled: true
transports:
tor:
mode: "directory"
socks5_addr: "127.0.0.1:9050"
control_addr: "/run/tor/control" # optional, for monitoring
control_auth: "cookie"
directory_service:
hostname_file: "/var/lib/tor/fips/hostname"
bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:8444"
peers:
- npub: "npub1abc..."
alias: "tor-peer"
addresses:
- transport: tor
addr: "abcdef...xyz.onion:8443"
```
Requires a corresponding `torrc`:
```text
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/fips
HiddenServicePort 8443 127.0.0.1:8444
```
### Nym (`transports.nym.*`)
Nym transport routes FIPS traffic through the Nym mixnet for
metadata-resistant anonymity. Outbound-only: connections are made
through a `nym-socks5-client` SOCKS5 proxy that must be running
separately (e.g. as a service running alongside the fips daemon or as a
container). There is no inbound listener — a Nym-only node initiates
outbound links but is not reachable for unsolicited inbound handshakes.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `transports.nym.socks5_addr` | string | `"127.0.0.1:1080"` | `nym-socks5-client` SOCKS5 proxy address (host:port) |
| `transports.nym.connect_timeout_ms` | u64 | `300000` | Outbound connect timeout in milliseconds. Mixnet SOCKS5 connections traverse 3 mix nodes with timing obfuscation and can take several minutes, so this is generous (300s). |
| `transports.nym.mtu` | u16 | `1400` | Default MTU |
| `transports.nym.startup_timeout_secs` | u64 | `120` | Seconds to wait for `nym-socks5-client` to become ready at startup before giving up |
**Named instances.** Like other transports, multiple Nym instances can
be configured with named sub-keys for different SOCKS5 proxy endpoints.
### BLE (`transports.ble.*`)
Bluetooth Low Energy transport using L2CAP Connection-Oriented Channels.
Compiled on glibc Linux and on Android. At build time, `build.rs` sets
`bluer_available` from the target triple (Linux and not musl) and sets
`ble_available` for that or Android; the BLE runtime is gated behind
`#[cfg(ble_available)]`, with `bluer_available` gating only the BlueZ
backend inside it. There is no Cargo feature flag to toggle. On musl
Linux or any other platform, BLE config still parses but the transport
runtime is absent and config entries become no-ops. On glibc Linux the
transport communicates with BlueZ via D-Bus through the `bluer` crate;
on Android the radio is supplied by the embedding application.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `transports.ble.adapter` | string | `"hci0"` | HCI adapter name |
| `transports.ble.psm` | u16 | `0x0085` (133) | L2CAP Protocol/Service Multiplexer |
| `transports.ble.mtu` | u16 | `2048` | Default MTU. Actual MTU is negotiated per-link during L2CAP connection setup. |
| `transports.ble.max_connections` | usize | `7` | Maximum concurrent BLE connections |
| `transports.ble.connect_timeout_ms` | u64 | `10000` | Outbound connect timeout in milliseconds |
| `transports.ble.advertise` | bool | `true` | Broadcast BLE beacon advertisements for peer discovery |
| `transports.ble.scan` | bool | `true` | Listen for BLE beacon advertisements from other nodes |
| `transports.ble.auto_connect` | bool | `false` | Automatically connect to discovered peers |
| `transports.ble.accept_connections` | bool | `true` | Accept incoming L2CAP connections |
| `transports.ble.probe_cooldown_secs` | u64 | `30` | Cooldown before re-probing the same BLE address |
**Address format.** BLE peer addresses use the form
`"adapter/device_address"` — for example, `"hci0/AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF"`.
**Advertising and scanning.** When `advertise` is enabled, the transport
advertises the FIPS service UUID continuously so that nearby nodes can
discover and connect via L2CAP, plus the L2CAP PSM its listener actually
bound, as a service-data structure (see `src/transport/ble/psm.rs` for the
wire layout and why platforms with OS-assigned PSMs need it). The
advertisement carries no device name — alongside the PSM a name no longer
fits the 31-byte legacy PDU, so the node shows up in generic Bluetooth
scanners as an unnamed device with the FIPS UUID. When `scan` is enabled,
the transport continuously scans for other FIPS nodes' advertisements and
learns each peer's advertised PSM; a peer that advertises none is dialled
at the configured `psm`. Discovered
peers are probed immediately (L2CAP connect + pubkey exchange) with a
cooldown (`probe_cooldown_secs`) to prevent rapid re-probing of the same
address. If two nodes probe each other at the same time (cross-probe),
a deterministic tie-breaker based on NodeAddr comparison ensures only
one connection is established.
**Connection pool.** The `max_connections` parameter limits the number of
concurrent BLE connections. When the pool is full, the least-recently-used
connection is evicted to make room for new connections.
### BLE Example
A node using BLE for local mesh discovery alongside UDP for internet peers:
```yaml
node:
identity:
persistent: true
tun:
enabled: true
transports:
udp:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:2121"
ble:
adapter: "hci0"
advertise: true
scan: true
auto_connect: true
accept_connections: true
peers:
- npub: "npub1abc..."
alias: "internet-peer"
addresses:
- transport: udp
addr: "203.0.113.5:2121"
connect_policy: auto_connect
```
BLE peers on the local radio range are discovered automatically via
beacons — no static peer entries needed. Internet peers still require
explicit configuration.
## Peers (`peers[]`)
Static peer list. Each entry defines a peer to connect to.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `peers[].npub` | string | *(required)* | Peer's Nostr public key (npub-encoded) |
| `peers[].alias` | string | *(none)* | Human-readable name for logging |
| `peers[].addresses` | list | `[]` | Transport addresses for the peer. May be left empty (or omitted) when `via_nostr: true`, in which case the daemon resolves endpoints from the peer's Nostr advert at dial time. |
| `peers[].addresses[].transport` | string | *(required)* | Transport type: `udp`, `tcp`, `ethernet`, `tor`, `nym`, or `ble`. A `udp` entry may be qualified with a named instance as `udp/<instance>` (see below). |
| `peers[].addresses[].addr` | string | *(required)* | Transport address. UDP/TCP: `"host:port"` (IP or DNS hostname). Ethernet: `"interface/mac"` (e.g., `"eth0/aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff"`). BLE: `"adapter/device_address"` (e.g., `"hci0/AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF"`). Tor: `".onion:port"` or `"host:port"` |
| `peers[].addresses[].priority` | u8 | `100` | Address priority (lower = preferred) |
| `peers[].connect_policy` | string | `"auto_connect"` | Connection policy: `auto_connect`, `on_demand`, or `manual`. Note: `on_demand` and `manual` are reserved for future use; the only policy currently honored at runtime is `auto_connect`. |
| `peers[].auto_reconnect` | bool | `true` | Automatically reconnect after MMP link-dead removal (exponential backoff, unlimited retries) |
| `peers[].via_nostr` | bool | `false` | Append Nostr advert-derived endpoints after static addresses for this peer |
**Named UDP instances.** Where several UDP transports are configured
under named sub-keys, a peer address can name the one it belongs to by
writing the transport field as `udp/<instance>`, for example
`udp/aware`. A bare `udp` matches any instance. The qualifier resolves
only for `udp`: writing it on any other transport type, or naming a UDP
instance that is not configured, fails config load with a validation
error rather than falling back to another instance.
## Gateway (`gateway.*`)
The `gateway.*` block configures the optional `fips-gateway`
service, which lets unmodified LAN hosts reach mesh destinations
through DNS proxy + virtual-IP NAT (and, optionally, exposes
LAN-side services back into the mesh through inbound port forwards).
The gateway is a separate service from the FIPS daemon but reads the
same `fips.yaml` file. The block is read only when `fips-gateway` is
running; the `fips` daemon ignores it. Linux only — the field is
gated behind `#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]`. For setup, see
[../how-to/deploy-gateway.md](../how-to/deploy-gateway.md); for the
end-to-end design, see
[../design/fips-gateway.md](../design/fips-gateway.md).
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `gateway.enabled` | bool | `false` | Enable the gateway. Must be `true` for `fips-gateway` to start. |
| `gateway.pool` | string | *(required)* | Virtual IPv6 pool CIDR (e.g., `"fd01::/112"`). Must not overlap with the FIPS mesh address space (`fd00::/8`) or any address space already in use on the LAN. The `/112` size yields 65 535 usable virtual IPs (address 0 in the pool is skipped), which is the gateway's hard cap regardless of CIDR width. |
| `gateway.lan_interface` | string | *(required)* | LAN-facing network interface name (e.g., `"enp3s0"`). Used for proxy-NDP entry installation so LAN clients can resolve the link-layer address of allocated virtual IPs. |
| `gateway.pool_grace_period` | u64 | `60` | Seconds a virtual-IP allocation is retained after its last referencing session ends, before the address is returned to the free pool. Larger values reduce churn for short-lived flows; smaller values reclaim addresses faster. |
### Gateway DNS (`gateway.dns.*`)
Settings for the gateway's DNS listener and its upstream link to the
FIPS daemon's `.fips` resolver. The gateway proxies `.fips` queries to
the daemon's resolver, which returns mesh addresses; the gateway then
allocates a virtual IP from the pool and rewrites the response.
Non-`.fips` queries are answered with `REFUSED`.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `gateway.dns.listen` | string | `"[::1]:5353"` | DNS listen address. The default binds IPv6 loopback on an unprivileged port, matching the canonical deployment where another resolver on the host (dnsmasq, systemd-resolved, BIND) holds port 53 and forwards `.fips` queries to the gateway over loopback. Bind on the LAN-side IP (e.g., `"192.168.1.1:53"`) or wildcard (`"[::]:53"`) only on hosts with no other resolver on 53 and where LAN clients query the gateway directly. See [../how-to/troubleshoot-gateway.md](../how-to/troubleshoot-gateway.md). |
| `gateway.dns.upstream` | string | `"[::1]:5354"` | Upstream FIPS daemon resolver. **Must match the daemon's `dns.bind_addr` and `dns.port`.** Defaults match the daemon defaults (`::1:5354`). A v4 upstream (`"127.0.0.1:5354"`) cannot reach a daemon bound on `[::1]:5354` — Linux IPv6 sockets bound to explicit `::1` do not accept v4-mapped traffic. If you change the daemon's `dns.bind_addr`, update this field accordingly. |
| `gateway.dns.ttl` | u32 | `60` | TTL in seconds on AAAA responses returned to LAN clients. Smaller values let the gateway recycle pool addresses faster; larger values reduce LAN-side query traffic. |
### Conntrack (`gateway.conntrack.*`)
Linux conntrack timeout overrides for the gateway's NAT table. These
adjust the kernel-default timeouts for NAT sessions installed by the
gateway. All values are in seconds; omit any field to inherit the
gateway's built-in default (which itself usually matches the kernel
default for that protocol).
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `gateway.conntrack.tcp_established` | u64 | `432000` | TCP established-state timeout (5 days). Long-lived TCP flows (SSH, persistent HTTP) keep their NAT mapping alive for at least this long without traffic. |
| `gateway.conntrack.udp_timeout` | u64 | `30` | UDP unreplied timeout. Applied until reply traffic is observed in the reverse direction. |
| `gateway.conntrack.udp_assured` | u64 | `180` | UDP assured (bidirectional) timeout. Applied once reply traffic has been observed. |
| `gateway.conntrack.icmp_timeout` | u64 | `30` | ICMP echo / error timeout. |
### Inbound Port Forwards (`gateway.port_forwards[]`)
Optional list of inbound port-forward rules. Each rule maps a TCP or
UDP port on the gateway's `fips0` mesh-side address to a `host:port`
on the LAN. Mesh peers connect to the gateway's mesh address on the
listen port; the gateway terminates the connection and forwards the
payload to the LAN target. This is the inverse of the outbound mode:
the LAN service is exposed to the mesh, not the other way around. See
[../how-to/deploy-gateway.md](../how-to/deploy-gateway.md) for the
operator recipe.
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `gateway.port_forwards[].listen_port` | u16 | *(required)* | Port on `fips0` that mesh peers connect to. Must be non-zero. The `(listen_port, proto)` pair must be unique across the list. |
| `gateway.port_forwards[].proto` | string | *(required)* | Transport protocol: `tcp` or `udp`. |
| `gateway.port_forwards[].target` | string | *(required)* | LAN destination as IPv6 `[addr]:port` (e.g., `"[fd12:3456::10]:80"`). IPv4 targets are rejected at config-load time. |
### Gateway Example
A typical gateway with both outbound (LAN-to-mesh) and inbound
(mesh-to-LAN) modes enabled:
```yaml
gateway:
enabled: true
pool: "fd01::/112"
lan_interface: "enp3s0"
dns:
listen: "[::1]:5353"
upstream: "[::1]:5354"
ttl: 60
pool_grace_period: 60
conntrack:
tcp_established: 432000
udp_assured: 180
port_forwards:
- listen_port: 8080
proto: tcp
target: "[fd12:3456::10]:80"
- listen_port: 5353
proto: udp
target: "[fd12:3456::10]:53"
```
## Minimal Example
A typical node configuration enabling TUN, DNS, and a single peer:
```yaml
node:
identity:
nsec: "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20"
tun:
enabled: true
name: fips0
mtu: 1280
dns:
enabled: true
bind_addr: "127.0.0.1"
port: 53
transports:
udp:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:2121"
mtu: 1472
peers:
- npub: "npub1tdwa4vjrjl33pcjdpf2t4p027nl86xrx24g4d3avg4vwvayr3g8qhd84le"
alias: "node-b"
addresses:
- transport: udp
addr: "172.20.0.11:2121"
connect_policy: auto_connect
```
### Mixed UDP + Ethernet Example
A node bridging internet peers (UDP) and a local Ethernet segment with
neighbor beacons:
```yaml
node:
identity:
nsec: "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20"
tun:
enabled: true
transports:
udp:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:2121"
mtu: 1472
ethernet:
interface: "eth0"
listen: true
announce: true
auto_connect: true
accept_connections: true
peers:
- npub: "npub1tdwa4vjrjl33pcjdpf2t4p027nl86xrx24g4d3avg4vwvayr3g8qhd84le"
alias: "internet-peer"
addresses:
- transport: udp
addr: "203.0.113.5:2121"
connect_policy: auto_connect
```
Ethernet peers on the local segment are discovered automatically via
beacons — no static peer entries needed. Internet peers still require
explicit configuration.
All `node.*` parameters use their defaults. To override specific values, add
only the relevant sections:
```yaml
node:
identity:
nsec: "..."
limits:
max_peers: 64
retry:
max_retries: 10
max_backoff_secs: 600
cache:
coord_size: 100000
```
## Deprecated Keys
Every key below still loads. Nothing has been removed, so a config file
written against v0.4.x keeps working after an upgrade. The old spellings
are scheduled for removal at the next wire-protocol cutover, so migrate
when convenient rather than urgently.
### `node.discovery.*` split into `node.lookup.*` and `node.rendezvous.*`
The single `node.discovery` table mixed two unrelated jobs: resolving
coordinates for a mesh address already known (lookup), and finding peers
to connect to in the first place (rendezvous). It is now two tables.
| Deprecated key | Replacement |
|----------------|-------------|
| `node.discovery.ttl` | `node.lookup.ttl` |
| `node.discovery.attempt_timeouts_secs` | `node.lookup.attempt_timeouts_secs` |
| `node.discovery.recent_expiry_secs` | `node.lookup.recent_expiry_secs` |
| `node.discovery.backoff_base_secs` | `node.lookup.backoff_base_secs` |
| `node.discovery.backoff_max_secs` | `node.lookup.backoff_max_secs` |
| `node.discovery.forward_min_interval_secs` | `node.lookup.forward_min_interval_secs` |
| `node.discovery.nostr.*` (whole sub-table) | `node.rendezvous.nostr.*` |
| `node.discovery.lan.*` (whole sub-table) | `node.rendezvous.lan.*` |
Behaviour of a deployed `node.discovery:` block: each config file is
folded as it is parsed, before the cross-file merge, and a single warning
is logged on the `fips::config` target naming the move. Only the keys
actually present in the old block are applied; the rest keep their
defaults. The compat block is never written back out, so anything that
re-serializes the configuration emits the new spelling only.
**Mixing the two spellings inside one file is not a merge.** The fold
runs after that file is parsed, so a value under `node.discovery`
overwrites whatever the corresponding `node.lookup` or `node.rendezvous`
key held in the same file. Use one spelling per file.
### `transports.ethernet.discovery` renamed to `transports.ethernet.listen`
| Deprecated key | Replacement |
|----------------|-------------|
| `transports.ethernet.discovery` | `transports.ethernet.listen` |
This one is a plain alias rather than a compat fold, so both spellings
parse into the same field and no warning is logged. The name changed
because the key never controlled discovery in the `node.discovery`
sense: it decides whether the interface listens for neighbour beacons.
## Complete Reference
The full YAML structure with all defaults:
```yaml
node:
identity:
nsec: null # secret key in nsec or hex (null = depends on persistent)
persistent: false # true = load/save fips.key; false = ephemeral each start
leaf_only: false
tick_interval_secs: 1
base_rtt_ms: 100
heartbeat_interval_secs: 10
link_dead_timeout_secs: 30
# drain_timeout_secs: 2 # bounded Draining phase; absent = 2s
limits:
max_connections: 256
max_peers: 128
max_links: 256
max_pending_inbound: 1000
rate_limit:
handshake_burst: 100
handshake_rate: 10.0
handshake_timeout_secs: 30
handshake_resend_interval_ms: 1000
handshake_resend_backoff: 2.0
handshake_max_resends: 5
session_setup_burst: 64
session_setup_rate: 16.0
retry:
max_retries: 5
base_interval_secs: 5
max_backoff_secs: 300
netmon:
enabled: true
poll_interval_secs: 5
debounce_ms: 250
cache:
coord_size: 50000
coord_ttl_secs: 300
identity_size: 10000
lookup:
ttl: 64
attempt_timeouts_secs: [1, 2, 4, 8]
recent_expiry_secs: 10
backoff_base_secs: 0
backoff_max_secs: 0
forward_min_interval_secs: 2
rendezvous:
# nostr: # uncomment to enable Nostr rendezvous
# enabled: true # opt-in, default false
# policy: configured_only # disabled | configured_only | open
# lan: # uncomment to enable mDNS LAN rendezvous
# enabled: true # opt-in, default false
# scope: "my-mesh" # optional per-network scope filter
tree:
announce_min_interval_ms: 500
parent_hysteresis: 0.2 # cost improvement fraction for parent switch
hold_down_secs: 30 # suppress re-evaluation after switch
reeval_interval_secs: 60 # periodic cost-based re-evaluation (0 = disabled)
flap_threshold: 4 # parent switches before dampening
flap_window_secs: 60 # sliding window for flap detection
flap_dampening_secs: 120 # extended hold-down on flap
bloom:
update_debounce_ms: 500
max_inbound_fpr: 0.20 # antipoison cap on inbound FilterAnnounce FPR
session:
default_ttl: 64
pending_packets_per_dest: 16
pending_max_destinations: 256
idle_timeout_secs: 90
coords_warmup_packets: 5
coords_response_interval_ms: 2000
mmp:
mode: full # full | lightweight | minimal
log_interval_secs: 30
owd_window_size: 32
session_mmp:
mode: full # full | lightweight | minimal
log_interval_secs: 30
owd_window_size: 32
ecn:
enabled: true # ECN congestion signaling (CE flag relay)
loss_threshold: 0.05 # MMP loss rate threshold for CE marking (5%)
etx_threshold: 3.0 # MMP ETX threshold for CE marking
rekey:
enabled: true # periodic Noise rekey for forward secrecy
after_secs: 120 # rekey interval (seconds)
after_messages: 65536 # rekey after N messages sent
control:
enabled: true
socket_path: null # null = auto (platform runtime dir → XDG → /tmp)
# native_api: # uncomment to enable the experimental native datagram API
# enabled: true # opt-in, default false; not on Windows
# socket_path: /run/fips/api.sock # omit the key for the resolution above
# pending_per_flow: 16 # datagrams held for one flow; 1..=64
# backlog: 16 # flows announced on one listener, awaiting its task; at least 1
# max_flows: 256 # flows this node holds at once
# debug_commands: false # inject/stats/arrive; test harness only
buffers:
packet_channel: 1024
tun_channel: 1024
dns_channel: 64
tun:
enabled: false
name: "fips0"
mtu: 1280
dns:
enabled: true
bind_addr: "::1"
port: 5354
ttl: 300
transports:
udp:
bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:2121"
mtu: 1280
recv_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB (kernel doubles to 4 MB actual)
send_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB
# ethernet: # uncomment to enable (requires CAP_NET_RAW)
# interface: "eth0" # required: network interface name
# ethertype: 0x2121 # default EtherType
# mtu: null # null = interface MTU - 3 (typically 1497)
# recv_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB
# send_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB
# listen: true # listen for beacons
# announce: false # broadcast beacons
# auto_connect: false # connect to discovered peers
# accept_connections: false # accept inbound handshakes
# beacon_interval_secs: 30 # beacon interval (min 10)
# tcp: # uncomment to enable TCP transport
# bind_addr: "0.0.0.0:8443" # listen address (omit for outbound-only)
# mtu: 1400 # default MTU
# connect_timeout_ms: 5000 # outbound connect timeout
# nodelay: true # TCP_NODELAY
# keepalive_secs: 30 # keepalive interval (0 = disabled)
# recv_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB
# send_buf_size: 2097152 # 2 MB
# max_inbound_connections: 256 # resource protection limit
# tor: # uncomment to enable Tor transport
# mode: "socks5" # "socks5", "control_port", or "directory"
# socks5_addr: "127.0.0.1:9050" # SOCKS5 proxy address
# connect_timeout_ms: 120000 # connect timeout (120s for Tor circuits)
# mtu: 1400 # default MTU
# # monitoring (control_port mode, or optional in directory mode):
# # control_addr: "/run/tor/control" # Unix socket or host:port
# # control_auth: "cookie" # "cookie" or "password:<secret>"
# # cookie_path: "/var/run/tor/control.authcookie"
# # directory mode (inbound via Tor-managed onion service):
# # directory_service:
# # hostname_file: "/var/lib/tor/fips_onion_service/hostname"
# # bind_addr: "127.0.0.1:8443"
# # max_inbound_connections: 64
# # advertise_on_nostr: false # publish this onion in Nostr adverts
# # # (requires node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled)
# # advertised_port: 443 # public-facing onion port for Nostr adverts
# nym: # uncomment to enable Nym mixnet transport (outbound-only)
# socks5_addr: "127.0.0.1:1080" # nym-socks5-client SOCKS5 proxy address
# connect_timeout_ms: 300000 # connect timeout (300s for mixnet)
# mtu: 1400 # default MTU
# startup_timeout_secs: 120 # wait for nym-socks5-client to be ready
# ble: # uncomment to enable BLE transport (Linux only, requires BlueZ)
# adapter: "hci0" # HCI adapter name
# psm: 0x0085 # L2CAP PSM (133)
# mtu: 2048 # default MTU (negotiated per-link)
# max_connections: 7 # max concurrent BLE connections
# connect_timeout_ms: 10000 # outbound connect timeout
# advertise: true # broadcast BLE beacons
# scan: true # listen for BLE beacons
# auto_connect: false # connect to discovered peers
# accept_connections: true # accept incoming L2CAP connections
# probe_cooldown_secs: 30 # cooldown before re-probing same address
peers: # static peer list
# - npub: "npub1..."
# alias: "node-b"
# addresses:
# - transport: udp
# addr: "10.0.0.2:2121"
# priority: 100
# connect_policy: auto_connect
# auto_reconnect: true # reconnect after link-dead removal
```
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