TCP, Tor, Nym and BLE wrote to their links from whatever task called `send`. `write_all` on a stream blocks once the peer's receive window and this node's send buffer are both full, and it blocks for as long as that lasts — there is no bound on it. A peer that has stopped reading, or one whose path has just changed medium, produces exactly that state. The callers are the rx loop's tick handlers. The heartbeat sweep is one of them, which is how this surfaced: filtering connection-oriented peers out of the medium-change fan-out took the write out of that handler, but not out of the sweep ten seconds behind it — same peer, same state. And while the rx loop sits in that write it is not serving anything else, so one unresponsive peer stalls every other peer's liveness, the forwarding path, and the control socket. Each connection now owns a writer task holding the write half, and `send` enqueues onto a bounded channel. The only code that can await the wire is a task with nothing else to do, so the property holds by construction rather than by a timeout that has to be tuned against a healthy slow link — a Tor circuit legitimately stalls for seconds, and any budget short enough to protect the rx loop is short enough to kill one of those. `try_send`, not `send`: awaiting a full queue would reinstate the same block one level up. A full queue means the writer has not drained a frame in the time it took to offer 64, which is a peer that is not receiving, so the send fails and the caller's existing retry and liveness handling takes over — the same shape as the connect gate above it, which already refuses rather than waits. Frames are written whole by a single task, so ordering is preserved and the half-written-frame hazard cannot arise: a write error takes the connection down with it, and the peer sees a closed connection rather than a frame it cannot resynchronise from. Teardown mirrors the receive loop's existing contract exactly — the pool entry is removed and the direction counter decremented only when the removal returned `Some`, so a concurrent close or stop of the same address cannot double-count. BLE was the worst of the four. `send_async` awaited the L2CAP write while holding the connection-pool mutex, so a peer that stopped draining its link blocked not only its own sender but every other BLE operation behind that guard: connects, evictions, and each receive loop's teardown. The other three only blocked the caller. The fix is the same shape, and the pooled stream was already an `Arc` with a `Send` future, so the writer task holds a clone and no generic surgery was needed. Queue depth is 16 there rather than 64: a BLE link carries a fraction of the throughput, so the same depth would be seconds of backlog rather than a burst. This also settles the Android backend without changing it. Its `BleStream::send` pushes onto the embedder's queue and waits for a slot rather than dropping, which was an unbounded wait on whatever task called it. That call now happens only in the writer task, where waiting is the job, and the layer above it is the connection's own bounded queue, which fills and refuses without waiting on anything. Two costs, both deliberate. The byte count `send` returns is now what was queued rather than what reached the wire, which is the prediction the UDP fast path already reports when it dispatches to the encrypt workers; bytes actually written are recorded by the writer task as they go. And the frame is copied into the queue, because `write_all` borrows and a queue must own — one memcpy of at most an MTU, against an unbounded stall. Tor and Nym share `socks5::pool`, so the writer loop is written once there and once for TCP, matching each transport's existing receive loop. Both regression tests drive a peer that accepts and then never reads, push far more than any buffer holds, and assert every send returns promptly. Both are mutation-checked: replacing `try_send` with an awaiting `send` fails the TCP one on the timeout, and reinstating the write under the pool guard fails the BLE one, which also asserts the pool stays lockable throughout. What the evidence does and does not cover. The BLE change is exercised through `MockBleIo`, not over the radio, so the argument that a stalled radio link behaves like a stalled mock channel is reasoning rather than measurement. The Android backend is `target_os = "android"` and there is no NDK on the author's host, so it has no local compile evidence; the `android-check` leg is the only one. Integration suites were run one at a time rather than as a single pass, since the full runner exhausts memory there: `chaos-tcp-mesh`, `chaos-congestion-stress` and `chaos-churn-mixed-10` all pass. Folded in on landing, all documentation and no behaviour change. Two doc comments were left attached to the wrong function when the writer loop was inserted above the receive loop, so `tcp_receive_loop` and BLE's `receive_loop` each lost their own documentation to the new function above them; both are moved back, and the TCP section banner now names both loops. The Android backend's safety comment claimed `BleStream::send` is reached from the writer task and from nowhere else, which is not so — `pubkey_exchange` calls it too, safely, because it wraps the call in a timeout — so the comment now names both callers and the reason each is bounded. And the netmon fan-out's filter documented itself by the hazard it avoided, an unbounded `write_all` reached from the rx loop; that hazard is gone, so the rationale and the matching changelog clause now record that the filter has outlived it and that widening the fan-out is open work left out here so the two changes stay separable. Co-authored-by: Johnathan Corgan <johnathan@corganlabs.com>
FIPS: Free Internetworking Peering System
A self-organizing encrypted mesh network built on Nostr identities, capable of operating over arbitrary transports without central infrastructure.
FIPS is under active development. The protocol and APIs are not yet stable. See Status & roadmap below.
What FIPS does
A machine running FIPS becomes a node in the mesh with a self-generated cryptographic identity, tunneling existing IPv6 traffic over the mesh or bypassing IP altogether and letting natively written applications communicate directly with each other. In either case all traffic between nodes is end-to-end encrypted and authenticated.
The mesh is self-organizing and permissionless. Any node can join and reach any other node without a central address registry, routing configuration, or coordination server. Peering between nodes can be manually configured or use auto-discovery.
There are two equally-supported deployment modes.
As an overlay on top of existing IP networks, FIPS lets your node reach any other FIPS node wherever it sits: behind a NAT, on a different ISP, on a phone over cellular, on a laptop with only Bluetooth in range, or behind a Tor onion.
Ground up over raw Ethernet, WiFi, or Bluetooth, FIPS provides a complete permissionless network without any pre-existing IP infrastructure, ISP, or DNS. Any node that joins the link gets routable IPv6 addresses, peer discovery, and a path to every other node automatically. Support exists in OpenWrt for turning a router radio into a backhaul link and for creating an open access SSID so a phone or laptop can join without any configuration.
Either way, existing networking software runs over it unchanged — SSH, HTTP servers, file transfer, anything IPv6-native works the same way it would on a local network. Applications written to the FIPS native API skip that layer entirely and address each other by public key, with no IPv6 emulation.
Features
The mesh
- Self-organizing mesh routing. Spanning-tree coordinates with bloom-filter-guided discovery; no global routing tables, no flooding.
- Multi-transport. UDP, TCP, Ethernet, Tor, Nym, and Bluetooth (BLE L2CAP) ship today; transports compose on a single mesh and a node may run several at once.
- Self-assigned cryptographic identity. secp256k1 / schnorr keypairs as node addresses; no registration, no central authority.
- Two-layer encryption. Noise IK between peers (hop-by-hop) and Noise XK between mesh endpoints (independent end-to-end), with periodic rekey for forward secrecy.
- (Optional) Nostr-mediated discovery and NAT traversal. Peers may publish endpoint adverts on public Nostr relays, exchange peering candidates, and establish direct paths through NATs using STUN-assisted hole punching. On the local network, mDNS LAN discovery finds peers directly without relays.
Getting traffic onto it
- IPv6 adapter. A TUN interface maps each remote npub to an
fd00::/8address, so unmodified IPv6 software reaches mesh peers as<npub>.fips. Built-in.fipsDNS resolver, with optional static name mapping via/etc/fips/hosts. - Native datagram API. A local program moves bytes between two
public keys over the mesh, addressing a peer as
npub:portwith no IPv6 emulation and no TUN device in the path.connectandbindtake a key and a port, and from there it is ordinary socket calls. - LAN gateway. Optional
fips-gatewayservice folds an entire unmodified LAN into the mesh: outbound (LAN clients reach mesh destinations through a DNS-allocated virtual IPv6 pool and nftables NAT) and inbound (LAN-side services exposed to the mesh through 1:1 port forwards). - OpenWrt support. FIPS ships as an OpenWrt package. Routers run
802.11s between themselves as a bare L2 link, with FIPS supplying the
encryption, authentication and routing over it. A second helper brings
up an open
!FIPSSSID, the same on every router, which a FIPS client joins over WiFi without configuration.
Running a node
- Operator visibility.
fipsctlCLI for control and inspection with time-series stats history queryable for any metric,fipstopTUI for live status with inline sparkline dashboards, and a JSON-line control socket on each binary for direct programmatic access. - Per-link metrics. RTT, loss, jitter, and goodput on every hop, plus mesh-size estimation, via the Metrics Measurement Protocol.
- ECN congestion signaling. Hop-by-hop CE-flag relay with RFC 3168 IPv6 marking and transport kernel-drop detection.
- Mesh-interface security baseline. Optional default-deny
nftables policy for
fips0shipped as a packaged conffile (/etc/fips/fips.nft) with an operator drop-in directory (/etc/fips/fips.d/) and a disabled-by-defaultfips-firewall.service. The baseline polices only the mesh interface, leaving Docker, Tor, and the host firewall untouched. - Reproducible builds with toolchain pinning and
SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH.
Quick start
Start from a released package. Every packaged platform in the table below gets an installer built and published per release, with checksums, on the releases page. Building from source produces the same artifacts and the same post-install state, so it is the path to take when you want to modify FIPS rather than run it.
On Debian or Ubuntu, download fips_<version>_amd64.deb (or
_arm64.deb) and install it:
sudo dpkg -i fips_<version>_amd64.deb
sudo systemctl start fips fips-dns
This installs the daemon, CLI tools (fipsctl, fipstop), the
fips-dns service that wires .fips name resolution into the host
resolver, the optional fips-gateway service, systemd units, and a
default /etc/fips/fips.yaml you can edit before starting. The package
enables fips and fips-dns but starts neither, which is why the
second command is there.
For macOS, Windows, FreeBSD, OpenWrt, the systemd tarball or a Nix flake, see docs/getting-started.md for the full multi-platform installation guide.
To join a live mesh and reach your first peer, follow the new-user tutorial progression starting at docs/tutorials/join-the-test-mesh.md.
Building from source
To build the Debian package yourself rather than downloading it:
git clone https://github.com/jmcorgan/fips.git
cd fips
cargo install cargo-deb
cargo deb
sudo dpkg -i target/debian/fips_*.deb
For the binaries alone, without an installer:
cargo build --release
Requires Rust 1.94.1+ (edition 2024). Linux, macOS, FreeBSD, and Windows
run as standalone daemons. FreeBSD is packaged for x86_64 only;
no aarch64 FreeBSD artifact is built or tested. Android is supported as
an embedded crate rather than as a standalone daemon: a
compile-gated library surface where the host app owns the TUN (a
VpnService, for example) and reaches the built-in resolver through
Node::dns_local_addr(). There is no Android daemon artifact and no
host-app guide. Transport and feature availability varies by platform.
| Feature | Debian/Ubuntu | Arch | NixOS | macOS | OpenWrt | FreeBSD | Android | Windows |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UDP | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| TCP | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Tor | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Nym | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Ethernet | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ |
| BLE | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ |
| Native API | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| Package format | .deb |
AUR | flake | .pkg |
.ipk / .apk |
.pkg |
❌ | ZIP |
A column records what builds and runs in a packaged daemon, FreeBSD on
x86_64 only. Native API is the native datagram API, which is off by
default; Windows cannot carry it, because it has no SCM_RIGHTS with
which to pass a descriptor. Package format names the artifact you install,
and a ❌ there means the platform ships none. Windows is the odd one:
its ZIP is an archive you unpack yourself rather than a package an
installer consumes, and there is no MSI.
Five of these columns are Linux: Debian/Ubuntu, Arch, NixOS, OpenWrt
and Android. Linux is not one target. Debian, Ubuntu, Arch and NixOS
are the same glibc build, and what
differs is the packaging: Debian and Ubuntu take the same .deb, Arch
takes fips from the AUR, and NixOS uses the Nix flake described
below. Only the .deb is exercised by an install test, by the
deb-install suite across debian12, debian13, ubuntu22, ubuntu24 and
ubuntu26; neither the AUR package nor the flake is. That suite runs on
every push and pull request, on x86_64, against a .deb built by the same
pinned container as the released one. It does not run at a tag, and the
arm64 package is install-tested by nothing: no workflow installs a published
artifact, so the released packages are checked by
hand. OpenWrt is a musl
target rather than glibc, and it takes an .ipk on 24.x and earlier or
an .apk on 25 and later; both carry the fips-mesh-setup and
fips-ap-setup helpers.
Android records what compiles for aarch64-linux-android under the
CI cross-check and nothing more: no transport in that column is
exercised on a device or an emulator, so read it as "compiles", not
"verified here". Being an embedded crate rather than a daemon platform, it
has nothing to
install, which is what its ❌ package format records. The BLE cell is
narrower still: the transport compiles, but the radio behind it is
supplied by the embedding application rather than by FIPS, and no part
of that path is device-tested.
On Linux, a source build requires libclang — the LAN gateway's
nftables bindings are generated by bindgen at build time, which
needs libclang.so on the build host. Install it before building
(sudo apt install libclang-dev on Debian / Ubuntu); without it the
build fails inside the rustables crate with an "Unable to find
libclang" error. This is a build-time prerequisite only — it is not a
runtime dependency, and the pre-built .deb artifacts do not need it.
BLE compiles on every glibc Linux target and on Android, and is
excluded on musl. On glibc Linux, libdbus is a hard build prerequisite
(sudo apt install libdbus-1-dev pkg-config on Debian / Ubuntu) —
without it the build fails inside libdbus-sys rather than skipping
BLE. The BlueZ daemon itself is a runtime dependency, not a build one.
The OpenWrt ipk is a musl target, so it omits BLE.
Nym (mixnet) transport builds on all desktop platforms. The OpenWrt
❌ is provisional, pending verification of nym-socks5-client
availability on the target; it will flip to ✅ only if confirmed
buildable there.
Alternatively, the repo ships a Nix flake: nix develop
drops you into a shell with the pinned toolchain and every build
prerequisite (libclang, dbus, pkg-config) already provided, and
nix build .#fips builds all four binaries with no host setup. See the
Nix / NixOS section of packaging/README.md.
Documentation
docs/ is organised by reader purpose:
- Tutorials — hand-held walk-throughs from a fresh install through to a participating mesh node, plus advanced deployments (gateway on OpenWrt, hosting services, ground-up two-device mesh).
- How-to guides — operator recipes for specific tasks: firewall activation, Nostr discovery, Tor onion service, Bluetooth peering, 802.11s mesh backhaul and the open access SSID on OpenWrt, LAN gateway deployment and troubleshooting, MTU diagnostics, host aliases, persistent identity, unprivileged-user setup, UDP buffer tuning.
- Reference —
fips.yamlconfiguration, wire formats, control-socket protocol, CLI references for each binary, security posture matrix, Nostr events catalog, transport statistics inventory. - Design — protocol-level architecture and layer specifications. Start with fips-concepts.md for the framing, then fips-architecture.md for the protocol stack.
- Release notes — per-version notes, including v0.5.1.
If you want to contribute, see CONTRIBUTING.md and testing/README.md.
Examples
- examples/sidecar-nostr-relay/ — Run a strfry Nostr relay reachable exclusively over the FIPS mesh. The relay container shares the FIPS sidecar's network namespace and is isolated from the host network.
- examples/sidecar-nostr-mixnet-relay/ — Single-container demo of FIPS peering through a mixnet (implemented with Nym): the FIPS daemon, the mixnet proxy, and a strfry Nostr relay all in one isolated container, with the direct route to the peer firewalled off so traffic provably crosses the mixnet.
- examples/k8s-sidecar/ — Run FIPS as
a Kubernetes Pod sidecar. The sidecar creates
fips0in the Pod's shared network namespace so every other container in the Pod gets mesh access without modification. - examples/wireguard-sidecar-macos/ —
Reach the FIPS mesh from a macOS host through a local Docker
container over a WireGuard tunnel. Only traffic destined for
fd00::/8transits the sidecar; regular internet traffic continues to use the host network.
Project structure
src/ Rust source: library + fips, fipsctl, fipstop, fips-gateway binaries
docs/ Documentation: tutorials, how-to, reference, design
packaging/ Debian, AUR, systemd tarball, OpenWrt ipk/apk,
macOS .pkg, FreeBSD .pkg, Windows ZIP
examples/ Deployment examples (Nostr relay, K8s sidecar, macOS WireGuard)
testing/ Docker-based integration test harnesses + chaos simulation
Status & roadmap
FIPS is at v0.6.0-dev on the master branch.
v0.5.1 is the
current release, a maintenance release on the v0.5.x line that makes the
Linux packages install and run on Debian 12 and Ubuntu 22.04, where every
artifact from v0.3.0 through v0.5.0 installed and then could not start.
v0.5.0 was the last
feature release; this development line continues the testing-and-polishing
track toward v0.6.0. The core protocol works end-to-end over
UDP, TCP, Ethernet, Tor, Nym, and Bluetooth on a global, public test
mesh of thousands of nodes. v0.5.0 added FreeBSD as a packaged platform,
OpenWrt setup helpers for an 802.11s mesh backhaul and an open client
SSID, an Android embedding interface, a native datagram API addressed by
public key, and published node health with a bounded shutdown drain.
New wire-format work continues to be staged on the next branch for the
subsequent release line.
What works today
- Spanning-tree construction with greedy coordinate routing.
- Bloom-filter-guided destination discovery (no flooding, single-path with retry).
- Two-layer Noise encryption (IK at the link, XK at the session) with periodic hitless rekey for forward secrecy at both layers.
- Persistent or ephemeral node identity with key-file management.
- IPv6 TUN adapter with built-in
.fipsDNS resolver and multi-backend auto-configuration (systemd dns-delegate, systemd-resolved, dnsmasq, NetworkManager). - Native datagram API for FIPS-aware applications (npub:port addressing without the IPv6-shim path): off by default, with a surface that may still change.
- Static hostname mapping (
/etc/fips/hosts) with auto-reload. - Per-link metrics (RTT, loss, jitter, goodput) and mesh size estimation.
- ECN congestion signaling (hop-by-hop CE relay, IPv6 CE marking, kernel-drop detection).
- UDP, TCP, Ethernet, Tor, Nym (mixnet), and BLE transports (BLE via L2CAP CoC with per-link MTU negotiation).
- Nostr-mediated overlay endpoint discovery and UDP hole punching for NAT traversal, plus mDNS LAN discovery for local peers.
- LAN gateway (
fips-gateway) with both outbound (LAN-to-mesh) and inbound (mesh-to-LAN port-forwarding) modes. - Peer ACL: per-npub allow / deny admission control at the link
layer; opt-in mesh-firewall baseline at
fips0ingress. - Runtime inspection and peer management via
fipsctl(includingfipsctl probefor reachability diagnosis andfipsctl addressfor mesh-address derivation) andfipstop. - Reproducible builds with toolchain pinning and
SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH. - Node lifecycle and health reporting (
Starting,Running,Degraded,Failed,Draining) with a fatal start when no transport comes up and a bounded shutdown drain window. - OpenWrt setup helpers for an 802.11s mesh between routers
(
fips-mesh-setup) and for the open!FIPSclient SSID (fips-ap-setup). - Linux (Debian, systemd tarball, OpenWrt
.ipkand.apk, AUR), macOS (.pkg), FreeBSD (.pkg, x86_64 only), and Windows (ZIP, service) packaging. - Docker-based integration and chaos testing.
Near-term priorities
- Security audit of the cryptographic protocols.
Longer-term
- Packaged mobile applications: an Android host app, and iOS. The Android embedding interface ships today (see Building from source); what is absent is a packaged app on either platform.
- Bandwidth-aware routing and QoS.
- Protocol stability and a versioned wire format.
- Published crate.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
