Files
fips/docs/tutorials/persistent-identity.md
T
Johnathan Corgan 6305287491 Bring the changelog current and correct four documentation defects
The Unreleased block is rebuilt from a walk of all 117 commits since
v0.4.1 rather than from what the block already held, which is how six
gaps surfaced. Two of them were whole missing effects. The identity
write path discarded six results, so a node configured for a persistent
identity could fall through to an ephemeral one in silence and change
its npub, routing address and mesh address on every start. And the
OpenWrt zig download verification was described only in part.

Chronological fix sequences are collapsed to their net state, and fixes
for bugs introduced and closed inside this cycle are folded away rather
than described, since no user ever saw them. Sixty-one CI and harness
commits are summarized rather than left out, because they change what a
contributor running the local pipeline sees. The flat lists are
reorganized into subsections by area. Everything from 0.4.1 down is
untouched.

Two entries carry effects no commit message mentioned. Clearing every
copy of private key material added Drop to four public types, so their
fields can no longer be moved out, which is source-breaking for anyone
using the crate as a library and is reachable through node.identity on
the public config. And the responder-side rekey narrowing covers five
call sites, not the four the original entry claimed; the ack initiator
arm is the one that deliberately still abandons the whole rekey.

The four test-harness fixes landed since then get entries under the CI
and test-harness heading, written as what a contributor sees: a failing
harness that names the condition instead of exiting bare, dns-resolver
scenarios that stop burning the full boot timeout on a container that
booted correctly, and a chaos harness that checks its teardown and node
stops actually happened rather than assuming it.

Four documentation defects are fixed alongside. Two sent macOS readers
to paths that do not exist there: the configuration reference stated the
highest-priority system config path as /etc/fips/fips.yaml
unconditionally, where the macOS package installs under
/usr/local/etc/fips/, and the persistent-identity tutorial had the same
problem throughout with nothing saying its paths were Linux ones. It now
opens with the substitution table, notes that the daemon derives the key
directory from whichever config it loaded, and points at the migration
recipe for a host already carrying keys at the old path.

The other two described test coverage that does not exist. The testing
readme claimed twenty chaos scenarios where ten exist, and the chaos
readme documented three that are in neither runner nor tree. Both
scenario tables are rewritten from the files, and bloom-storm is
described honestly as retired from both runners with no replacement,
which is a coverage gap rather than a migration to other tests.

The readme's Rust badge asserted 1.85+ while rust-toolchain.toml pins
something else, so the badge no longer carries a version and the
toolchain file is the only place that states one.
2026-08-22 09:34:38 +01:00

341 lines
13 KiB
Markdown

# Make Your Node's Identity Persistent
After completing
[join-the-test-mesh](join-the-test-mesh.md), your daemon is
connected to the public test mesh — but its identity is
ephemeral. Every restart generates a fresh Nostr keypair, so the
npub the rest of the world would use to reach you changes every
time. This tutorial walks through pinning your node to a stable
keypair, locating it on disk, and protecting it.
The whole exercise should take about ten minutes.
## What you'll build
```text
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ /etc/fips/fips.yaml │
│ node: │
│ identity: │
│ persistent: true ← this flag │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────┘
│ daemon reads on start
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ /etc/fips/fips.key 0600 root:root │
│ /etc/fips/fips.pub 0644 root:root │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
your stable nsec / npub
```
The diagram shows the Linux layout. On macOS the same three files
live under `/usr/local/etc/fips/`; read
[Where these files live](#where-these-files-live) before running any
command below.
After this tutorial your node will have:
- A keypair on disk that the daemon reuses across restarts.
- An npub you can hand to other operators so they can add you to
their `peers:` list once and have the entry keep working.
- A clear understanding of which file holds the secret and how
to keep it that way.
## Where these files live
Every path in this tutorial is written in its Linux form. The macOS
package (`.pkg`) installs config and keys under
`/usr/local/etc/fips/` instead of `/etc/fips/`, so on macOS
substitute as you go:
| Linux / other Unix | macOS |
| --- | --- |
| `/etc/fips/fips.yaml` | `/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml` |
| `/etc/fips/fips.key` | `/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key` |
| `/etc/fips/fips.pub` | `/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.pub` |
`fipsctl keygen` writes to `/usr/local/etc/fips/` by default on
macOS. The daemon still probes `/etc/fips/fips.yaml` as a fallback,
so an existing install is not broken by an upgrade, but the macOS
packaging only installs files under `/usr/local/etc/fips/`. If a
macOS host already carries key files at the old `/etc/fips/` path,
the daemon uses the old key and warns rather than minting a new
identity; the migration recipe is in the
[how-to guide](../how-to/persistent-identity.md).
## Why a stable identity matters
In FIPS your Nostr keypair *is* your node's identity in the most
literal sense. Several things derive from it:
- Your `fd97:...` mesh address — derived from the public key.
- Your `<npub>.fips` DNS name — the npub itself with `.fips`
appended.
- Every authenticated connection — Noise IK at the mesh layer,
XK at the session layer, both prove you hold the matching
secret key.
> **A keypair, briefly.** Nostr identities are secp256k1
> keypairs. The private half is the `nsec` (a bech32-encoded
> secret key); the public half is the `npub` (a bech32-encoded
> public key). The daemon needs the `nsec` to sign messages and
> complete handshakes; the rest of the world only sees the
> `npub` and uses it as your address.
The daemon supports two ways of holding that keypair:
> **Ephemeral vs. persistent.**
>
> - *Ephemeral* (the default): the daemon mints a brand-new
> keypair every time it starts, kept only in memory. No
> long-term secret is ever written to disk; nothing on your
> machine ties one run to the next; the npub your daemon
> presents to the network is fresh on every restart. This is
> the safe-by-default posture — your node has no persistent
> identity unless you explicitly ask for one.
> - *Persistent*: the daemon reads (or, on first start,
> generates and writes) a keypair stored at
> `/etc/fips/fips.key` (`/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key` on
> macOS). The npub stays the same across
> restarts, reboots, and reinstalls as long as that file is
> preserved. You take on the cost of protecting an on-disk
> secret in exchange for being addressable by a stable name.
Persistent identity is a deliberate trade. You give up the
ephemeral default's privacy posture — once your npub is stable,
every connection your node makes is correlatable across time —
and you take on a real secret-management responsibility. In
return you get two things you can't get any other way:
1. **Other operators can reference you by npub.** In
[join-the-test-mesh](join-the-test-mesh.md) you added
`test-us01` to your `peers:` list by its npub. That entry
only works because `test-us01`'s npub doesn't change. If
anyone is going to reach you the same way, your npub has to
be just as stable.
2. **Services on your node get a fixed address.** The
[host-a-service](host-a-service.md) tutorial walks through
running an HTTP server addressable as
`<your-npub>.fips`. Clients reach the service by that
name; if your npub changes on every restart, every
client's address book breaks.
Both of these are good reasons. Neither is automatic — if your
node is purely a *client*, reaching out to others without
hosting anything itself, you may legitimately want to stay on
the ephemeral default. The rest of this tutorial assumes you've
decided you want a stable identity.
## Step 1: Note your current ephemeral npub
Before changing anything, capture the npub the daemon is using
right now so you can compare against it after the switch.
```sh
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
```
You'll see one line like:
```text
"npub": "npub1abc...xyz"
```
Make a note of it. We expect this to change.
## Step 2: Enable persistent identity in the config
Open `/etc/fips/fips.yaml` (`/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.yaml` on
macOS) and find the `node:` block. The shipped default has the
relevant fragment commented out; make it look like this:
```yaml
node:
identity:
persistent: true
```
Save the file. That is the only configuration change.
The daemon's behavior on the next restart:
- If `/etc/fips/fips.key` already exists, load it and use that
identity.
- If it does not exist, generate a fresh keypair, write it to
`/etc/fips/fips.{key,pub}` with the correct file modes, and
use that.
The daemon derives the key directory from whichever config file it
loaded, so on macOS both files land in `/usr/local/etc/fips/`.
## Step 3: Restart the daemon
```sh
sudo systemctl restart fips
sudo systemctl status fips
```
Status should show `active (running)` within a couple of
seconds. Confirm the new identity is in use:
```sh
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
```
The npub should be **different** from the one in Step 1 — the
daemon discarded the old in-memory ephemeral keypair and minted
a new one which it has now persisted to disk. From here forward
this is *your* npub.
## Step 4: Locate the keypair on disk
The daemon wrote two files:
```sh
sudo ls -l /etc/fips/fips.key /etc/fips/fips.pub
```
On macOS, list `/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key` and
`/usr/local/etc/fips/fips.pub` instead.
Expect:
```text
-rw------- 1 root root ... fips.key
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root ... fips.pub
```
The public file is safe to share — it is your address:
```sh
sudo cat /etc/fips/fips.pub
```
This must match the `npub` reported by `sudo fipsctl show
status`. Hand this string to anyone you want to be reachable
from; they paste it into their own `peers:` block as the `npub:`
field.
The private file is the secret. **Do not** `cat` or paste its
contents anywhere — there is no reason to see it, and any line
of shell history or screen capture that contains it has captured
the secret.
## Step 5: Verify it survives a restart
Restart once more to confirm the daemon is reading `fips.key`
rather than re-generating it:
```sh
sudo systemctl restart fips
sudo fipsctl show status | grep '"npub"'
```
The npub should match Step 3 exactly. If it does not, the daemon
was unable to read `fips.key` (most likely a permission problem)
— see [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting).
## Step 6: Protect the nsec
`fips.key` is the only thing standing between you and someone
else impersonating your node. The daemon ships it with the right
permissions; the operator's job is to keep them that way.
What that means in practice:
- **Do not loosen the file mode.** `0600` (read/write for owner
only — here `root`) is correct; `chmod 0644` to "fix" a
permission error puts the secret on display to every account
on the host.
- **Do not commit it to source control.** If you maintain
configuration in a Git repo, exclude `fips.key`; if you use
ansible-vault or a similar mechanism, encrypt it. `fips.pub`
may be checked in freely.
- **Do not paste it into chat or email.** Operators sometimes
share config snippets to demonstrate a setup; redact the
contents of `fips.key` to a placeholder before doing so.
- **Back it up the way you back up an SSH host key.** Treat the
file (or its contents) the same way you would treat
`/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key`: encrypted, offline, available
to recover the *same* identity if the host disappears.
There is no in-protocol "key change" message in FIPS. If
`fips.key` is lost, the npub is lost — your node will come back
up with a new identity and every downstream reference to the
old one will be stale.
## What you've learned
- **Identity = keypair.** Every FIPS node is a Nostr keypair;
the npub is its address, the nsec is its credential.
- **The flag.** `node.identity.persistent: true` in
`/etc/fips/fips.yaml` is the difference between ephemeral and
persistent identity.
- **Where it lives.** `/etc/fips/fips.key` and
`/etc/fips/fips.pub`, mode `0600` and `0644`, owned
`root:root`; under `/usr/local/etc/fips/` on macOS.
- **What to share.** `fips.pub` is public; `fips.key` is not.
- **What it buys you.** A npub other operators can add to their
`peers:` list once, and that addresses the services your node
will eventually run.
## Troubleshooting
If the post-restart npub does not match `fips.pub`:
- **Check file permissions.**
`sudo ls -l /etc/fips/fips.key`, or
`sudo ls -l /usr/local/etc/fips/fips.key` on macOS. If the mode
is not `0600` or the owner is not `root:root`, the daemon may
have refused to read it. Restore with
`sudo chmod 0600 /etc/fips/fips.key && sudo chown root:root
/etc/fips/fips.key`, substituting the macOS path where it
applies.
- **Check the journal.** `sudo journalctl -u fips -n 100` after
the restart will show one of:
- `Loaded persistent identity from key file path=...` — good.
- `Generated persistent identity, saved to key file ...` —
also good, but only expected on the first start after the
flag flip.
- `Using ephemeral identity (new keypair each start)` — the
config flag was not picked up; re-check the indentation of
the `persistent: true` line.
If you see `Generated persistent identity...` on every start,
the file is being written but not read on subsequent starts;
this is almost always the same permission/path issue.
## What's next
- **Resolve peer addresses via Nostr.**
[resolve-peers-via-nostr](resolve-peers-via-nostr.md) walks
through the smallest useful step toward Nostr-mediated
discovery: keep your peer entry, drop its hard-coded address,
and let the daemon look up the current endpoint from public
Nostr relays. The first of three tutorials covering Nostr
discovery; advertising your own node and open ambient
discovery come next.
- **Reach services on other mesh nodes.**
[reach-mesh-services](reach-mesh-services.md) drives `nc`,
`traceroute6`, `curl`, and `ssh` at peers by `.fips` name and
shows that the FIPS data plane is just IPv6 from an
application's point of view.
- **Host a service of your own.**
[host-a-service](host-a-service.md) walks through bringing up
an HTTP server addressable as `<your-npub>.fips`, bound to
`fips0` so the exposure is mesh-only, behind the mesh
firewall.
For the alternative provisioning paths — minting a keypair with
`fipsctl keygen` before the daemon ever starts, or importing an
existing Nostr `nsec` — and the key-rotation procedure, see the
operator-style recipe at
[../how-to/persistent-identity.md](../how-to/persistent-identity.md).
For the full identity model:
- [../design/fips-architecture.md](../design/fips-architecture.md)
— how npubs become `NodeAddr`s and IPv6 ULAs.