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Johnathan Corgan 6a564e26ac Prepare the v0.5.0 release content 
Everything the release needs except the version number, which stays at
0.5.0-dev until the tag.

The changelog entry covers only the work that is new on this line. The
point release's forty-six entries arrived under their own heading with the
forward merge and are left alone; the twenty that remained are regrouped by
topic and eight more added for changes no entry covered. Three of those
eight matter to someone upgrading. Five root modules and four re-exports
left the public library surface and Node::connections narrowed, none of it
recorded anywhere; the entry names what to use instead and distinguishes
the removed connection-phase enum from the Noise type of the same name,
which is a different type that still exists. Tracing targets moved, so an
existing RUST_LOG filter stops matching rather than erroring. And the
handshake resend interval key no longer governs the first resend, which is
now a constant, though it still governs later ones.

Seven more entries cover the work that landed after the first content pass
was written: the experimental native datagram API, the fipsctl probe
diagnostic, per-instance transport addressing, the app-owned UDP socket
seam, and the connect, disconnect and path-MTU fixes. The four bug fixes
among them all reach the deployed line, so the release notes no longer
claim this release carries exactly one fix for a shipped bug; it carries
four.

There is no security section, because after the split every security entry
belongs to the point release. The release notes say so plainly rather than
leaving a reader upgrading across both releases to conclude this one
carries no security work.

The notes are organized by audience, since the release spans OpenWrt
routers, embedders, FreeBSD, and the existing platforms, and a single list
serves none of them. The native datagram API is given a section of its own
rather than folded into the embedding seam: it is a client-facing API
rather than a way to host a node, and its one rule with no Berkeley-socket
counterpart, that the v1 wire carries no half-close, needs to be somewhere
a client author will read it. FreeBSD is advertised as supported on x86_64
only, stated wherever the platform appears. Android is advertised as an
embedding seam and not as a supported platform: a compile-gated library
surface with no artifact and no host application guide.

The configuration table rename is carried through every shipped file that
taught the old spelling: nine documentation files, the OpenWrt sample
config and a test generator, twenty-two sites in all. Guides written this
same cycle were among them, which is how the omission was found. The
documentation that arrived with the native API was checked for the same
omission and was already clean. The compatibility tests keep the old
spelling deliberately, since they exist to test the fold.

The changelog section is the fold of master's [Unreleased], not a snapshot
of it. An earlier version of this commit took a copy that then drifted, so
each section ended up holding a bullet the other did not and re-folding
them would have picked a winner silently. Both causes were fixed on master
instead — the NixOS module had never been recorded there, and the
pre-release batch of fixes was new — so [Unreleased] is a strict superset
and this is a copy rather than a merge. [0.5.0] carries all forty-six
bullets byte for byte, [Unreleased] is empty, and [0.4.2] is untouched,
checked by hashing it against master's copy.

The BLE work landed after the content pass and gets one summary entry in
the changelog and one section in the release notes rather than nine
bullets: the ble_available gate replacing target_os = "linux",
packet-boundary recovery for stream-oriented backends, peer recognition by
node identity instead of a rotating link address, the L2CAP PSM moving
into the backend seam and onto the advertisement, the embedder-supplied
Android radio, bounded probe retry, and inbound handshakes moved off the
accept loop.

The two release-notes copies no longer share their link paths. Relative
links resolve from one directory only, so the seven written for
docs/releases/ all 404ed from the root copy. The root copy now uses paths
from the repository root and the versioned copy keeps the ../ form; both
sets were resolved against the tree. The same two links are broken the
same way in the v0.4.0 through v0.4.2 notes, left as shipped history.

The contributor tallies are re-derived against maint..HEAD rather than
adjusted: twenty commits from outside the project and 171 from me, with
Arjen at fifteen and fr34aky at two. An earlier count of twelve and 138
was carried from a measurement taken three days before this content was
written, and the BLE branch widened the gap after it. Arjen's NixOS flake
module, the UDP sin6_scope_id fix and most of the BLE rework were
uncredited, as was fr34aky's L2CAP PSM seam. They want one last re-derive
at tag time if anything lands before the tag.

A sweep of all 99 tracked markdown files against the tree corrected
fifty-three of them. Four told the reader to run a build.sh that does not
exist; the only harness builder is testing/scripts/build.sh. The BLE build
prerequisites were described as optional on the strength of a probe that
build.rs does not perform, and bluez was named a build prerequisite when
libdbus-sys asks only for libdbus-1-dev and pkg-config and bluez is the
runtime daemon. Link cost is the primary sort key in next-hop ranking, not
reserved for future use; Ethernet runs on macOS as well as Linux; the BLE
MTU is the L2CAP CoC MTU rather than a negotiated ATT_MTU; effective
Ethernet MTU is 1497; the LAN discovery subsystem is src/mdns and eight
citations still named a src/discovery that never existed here. The
connectivity states in three tutorials were invented, and their jq filters
matched nothing including healthy peers. One command filtered on a literal
fd97: address prefix, which only the first byte of fixes, so it returned
empty for all but one reader in 256 and every later step using the
variable failed silently. transports.tor.advertise_on_nostr was
undocumented despite being validated against node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled.

The transport design document gains the BLE section it never had, written
from the source: the backend cascade and its compile_error tripwire, the
platform gate, the PSM advertisement wire layout and the byte budget that
forces a 16-bit service-data key, and the probe and admission bounds.

Three source files carried the same class of staleness and are corrected
with the documentation: the OpenWrt ipk usage line and Makefile error text
both named a packaging/openwrt that does not exist, and chaos.sh parsed
--subnet without listing it.

Folded in with the content commit, having been prepared alongside it:

The three GitHub Action pins that had gone stale. Every third-party
action is pinned to a commit SHA, nothing reports that a pin has aged,
and re-resolving all ten against their tags found dorny/test-reporter@v2,
taiki-e/install-action@v2 and vmactions/freebsd-vm@v1 had moved. The
three install-action@nextest references stay unpinned, since that action
reads the tool to install from the ref name. check-action-pins.sh passes
at 75 references and all nine workflow files parse.

The lockfile refresh, which is the mutating half of the dependency sweep.
Thirty-six packages move to their latest semver-compatible versions and
every one is transitive; nothing declared in Cargo.toml changes version.
No advisory forces any of them. It was taken before the validation
battery, because a gate run against a lockfile that later moves proves
nothing about what ships.

The sha2 0.10 to 0.11, hkdf 0.12 to 0.13 and bech32 0.11 to 0.12 majors,
three of the four deferred at v0.4.0 for change surface rather than
security. All three land with no source change. sha2 and hkdf must move
together, since both depend on digest 0.11, and neither changes an
algorithm. That matters because the chaining-key KDF in the Noise
handshake is built on Hkdf::<Sha256>, where an output change would be a
wire break rather than a compile error; no known-answer vectors exist for
that path, so the wire-compatibility gate is what covers it. secp256k1
0.31 is deliberately absent, since nostr's own requirement would leave
two copies of the ECC library in the tree.

The README support matrix, rebuilt as one feature table broken out by
Linux variety. A single Linux column hid that Debian, Ubuntu, Arch and
NixOS are one glibc build differing in packaging, that OpenWrt is musl
and drops BLE, and that Android is not a daemon platform. Transport rows
sort by how many platforms carry them. A Native API row reads its
platform set from the cfg gates. The installer row becomes a package
format row naming the artifact, and only the .deb is exercised per
release.

Four changelog and release-note gaps the BLE re-walk found: a Bluetooth
LE bullet stranded inside the released 0.4.2 section, a missing Fixed
entry for the scan and probe loop counting a pool-refused connection as
an established link, the unnamed embedder call that installs an
application-owned radio, and the fact that stopping the transport now
stops scanning as well as advertising.

Three release-document gaps found walking the unsurveyed commits: the UDP
reuse-flag fix stated in the direction opposite to the one it was made,
with the silent second-daemon bind it prevents left unsaid; the corrected
native-API socket paragraph carried into both release-note copies, which
still named SOCK_SEQPACKET on FreeBSD and two kernels where three are
handled; and the coordinate-cache hardening, which shipped with no text
anywhere despite adding four operator-visible status fields. That last
entry states plainly that the checks are mitigations and not a closure,
since the coordinate is still not authenticated.

Also folded in, the documentation pass that followed the content commit:

A stage-pipeline diagram for the probe, embedded in the fipsctl
reference under the five-stage list. It draws the five stages left to
right with each stage's failure reasons below it, and the bypass that
skips both lookup stages when the coordinates are cached or the target
is a direct peer. Its branches come from the probe state machine rather
than from the report, so the path stage is drawn as the one failure that
does not stop the probe.

A rewrite of the README's "What FIPS does" section. It now opens with
what a machine running FIPS gets, rather than with the two deployment
modes, and gives the self-organizing and permissionless property its own
paragraph since it holds for both modes.

A regrouping of the README's feature list into the mesh, getting traffic
onto it, and running a node, with a bullet added for the native datagram
API, which had none despite sitting in the support matrix. The Quick
start now leads with the released packages rather than a source build.
It also fixes a real defect: the package enables fips.service and
fips-dns.service and starts neither on a fresh install, so .fips name
resolution was silently dead until the next reboot and neither page said
to start the service.

A rewrite of the release notes. They opened with seven subsections of
upgrade caveats and reached the first feature two hundred lines in; they
now open with a summary of the release and elaborate below it in the
same order. Android is stated as supported through an embedded crate
rather than as a standalone daemon, consistently across all three
documents. The OpenWrt pair is corrected: it is 802.11s between routers
with FIPS supplying encryption, authentication and routing, plus a
convention of an open !FIPS SSID a client joins over WiFi, not meshing
over a router's own radios. The probe's path output is described as the
least-common-ancestor walk, which is the worst-case fallback route
rather than the route a packet takes. Detail that did not change what a
reader does was cut from the notes and kept in the changelog.
2026-08-30 10:42:59 +00:00

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# Security Reference
Consolidated security reference covering the nftables baseline, peer
ACL file format, cryptographic primitives, rekey defaults, replay
window, filesystem permissions, threat-resistance matrix, and default
network exposures per transport. For the threat-model design and
rationale, see [../design/fips-security.md](../design/fips-security.md).
For the operator activation steps and drop-in recipes, see
[../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md](../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md).
## nftables Baseline
The shipped baseline is `/etc/fips/fips.nft`. It defines a single
nftables table `inet fips` with one chain hooked at `input`, structured
as follows:
| Step | Rule | Effect |
| ---- | ---- | ------ |
| 1 | `iifname != "fips0" return` | Match only traffic arriving on `fips0`; everything else short-circuits. |
| 2 | `ct state established,related accept` | Allow conntrack replies and related ICMPv6 errors. |
| 3 | `icmpv6 type echo-request accept` | Allow IPv6 echo (ping6 reachability). |
| 4 | `include "/etc/fips/fips.d/*.nft"` | Splice in operator drop-ins (empty matches nothing). |
| 5 | `counter drop` | Default-deny everything else; counter increments on every drop. |
Outbound from `fips0` is unrestricted. The baseline is a documented
dpkg conffile — operator edits to `/etc/fips/fips.nft` are preserved
across upgrades.
The systemd unit is `fips-firewall.service` (oneshot). It is **not**
enabled by default; activation is an explicit operator gesture
documented in
[../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md](../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md).
## Drop-In File Format
Operator extensions live under `/etc/fips/fips.d/` with the `.nft`
suffix. Each file is included inline into the `inbound` chain at the
marked point and may contain any nftables rule lines valid in that
context.
Naming convention: `<purpose>-from-<source>.nft` keeps drop-ins easy
to scan. Examples shipped in the design discussion:
- `ssh-from-bastion.nft` — accept TCP/22 from a single mesh-node address
- `http-from-cluster.nft` — accept TCP/80 from a `/64` mesh-address prefix
- `dns-public.nft` — accept UDP/53 and TCP/53 from any mesh node
- `git-from-trusted.nft` — accept TCP/9418 from a set of mesh-node addresses
After editing, reload via
`sudo systemctl reload-or-restart fips-firewall.service` (or
equivalently `sudo nft -f /etc/fips/fips.nft` since the file is
idempotent).
## Cryptographic Primitives
| Component | Choice | Where Used |
| --------- | ------ | ---------- |
| Curve | secp256k1 | FMP IK, FSP XK, Schnorr signatures |
| Diffie-Hellman | ECDH on secp256k1 (x-only normalized) | Noise IK, Noise XK |
| AEAD | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | FMP link encryption, FSP session encryption |
| Hash | SHA-256 | NodeAddr derivation, Noise key schedule |
| Key derivation | HKDF-SHA256 | Noise key schedule |
| Signatures | secp256k1 Schnorr | TreeAnnounce, LookupResponse proof, Nostr adverts |
| Noise pattern (link) | `Noise_IK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256`, with the deviation below | FMP link layer (IK with epoch payload) |
| Noise pattern (session) | `Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256`, with the deviation below | FSP session layer (XK with epoch payload) |
These choices align with the Nostr cryptographic stack
(secp256k1 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + SHA-256) and the NIP-44 encrypted
messaging standard.
### Deviation: Empty Associated Data in the Handshake AEAD
Both Noise patterns above deviate from the standard construction in one
respect. The handshake AEAD uses an empty associated-data field where
standard Noise `EncryptAndHash` uses the handshake hash `h`.
The choice was deliberate. Using secp256k1 rather than 25519 already put the
construction outside standard Noise, so no standard-Noise peer could be
confused with it, and the transcript hash bought no distinguishing value.
That argument is about domain separation, and on those grounds it holds. It
does not cover transcript binding, which is the property actually absent.
Domain separation and DH binding survive through the chaining key `ck`, which
`mix_key` chains from `ck = h`, seeded from the protocol name in
`SymmetricState::initialize` (`src/noise/handshake.rs`). The handshake hash
`h` is maintained at every step and is never fed to the AEAD, so it binds
nothing.
## Rekey Defaults
Both link-layer and session-layer Noise sessions rekey under one of
two triggers, configurable under `node.rekey.*`:
| Parameter | Default | Description |
| --------- | ------- | ----------- |
| `enabled` | `true` | Master switch. |
| `after_secs` | `120` | Time-based rekey threshold. |
| `after_messages` | `65536` | Message-count rekey threshold. |
In addition to the configurable triggers, the daemon retains the old
session keys for a fixed **10-second drain window** after each
cutover (compile-time constant `DRAIN_WINDOW_SECS` in
`src/node/handlers/rekey.rs`). Rekey rotates the Noise key schedule
and the session indices; old session keys are kept in
`previous_session` for the drain window so in-flight packets
encrypted under the old keys still decrypt.
## Replay Window
Both layers use explicit per-packet counters with a sliding bitmap
window for replay protection. The bitmap is **2048 entries** at both
layers — large enough to accommodate UDP reordering and packet loss
without false-positive replay rejection. Counters older than the
window are rejected. The same `ReplayWindow` and
`decrypt_with_replay_check()` implementation is used at both the FMP
and FSP layers.
## Peer ACL
Mesh-level ACL files at `/etc/fips/peers.allow` and
`/etc/fips/peers.deny` give the operator allowlist/blocklist control
over which npubs may complete the FMP Noise IK link handshake.
File format:
- One entry per line. An entry is either a bech32 `npub1...`,
an alias defined in `/etc/fips/hosts`, or the literal `ALL`
wildcard (case-insensitive).
- Lines beginning with `#` are comments.
- Blank lines are ignored.
Evaluation order (first match wins, default-allow on no match):
1. `peers.allow` — if the peer matches an entry here (or `ALL` is
in `peers.allow`), the handshake is admitted, regardless of any
`peers.deny` entry.
2. `peers.deny` — if the peer matches an entry here (or `ALL` is
in `peers.deny`), the handshake is refused.
3. Otherwise the peer is admitted.
`peers.allow` is **not** an exclusive gate on its own: an unlisted
peer falls through to step 3 and is admitted unless it appears in
`peers.deny`. To turn `peers.allow` into a strict allowlist, place
`ALL` in `peers.deny` so every unlisted peer is rejected at step 2.
The `ALL` wildcard makes the operator's posture explicit:
- `ALL` in `peers.allow` admits every peer (same effect as the
default-allow behavior, but documented in the file).
- `ALL` in `peers.deny` blocks every peer except those listed in
`peers.allow` — the "allowlist-strict" posture.
In practice this collapses to a few common postures:
- **Default-allow with denylist**: leave `peers.allow` empty;
populate `peers.deny`. All npubs may peer except those listed.
- **Allowlist-strict**: populate `peers.allow` and put `ALL`
in `peers.deny`. Only the listed npubs may peer; everyone else
is rejected at step 2.
A populated `peers.allow` with an empty `peers.deny` is not a
strict allowlist — it is equivalent to default-allow plus an
explicit "always-admit" set. The strict variant requires `ALL`
in `peers.deny`.
Aliases are resolved through `/etc/fips/hosts` at file-load
time. If `peers.allow` lists `core-vm` and `/etc/fips/hosts`
maps `core-vm` to a specific npub, that npub is admitted. If
`core-vm` is later remapped to a different npub, the ACL
re-resolves on the next mtime change. Operators should be aware
that ACL semantics follow the `hosts`-file aliasing, not just
the literal npubs visible in the file.
Both files are reloaded automatically when their mtime changes
— no daemon restart or signal is needed. ACL evaluation runs
after msg1 decryption but before any further peer-state
mutation; rate-limited msg1s never reach the ACL.
## Filesystem Permissions
| Path | Owner | Mode | Purpose |
| ---- | ----- | ---- | ------- |
| `/etc/fips/fips.key` | root:root | `0600` | Persistent identity private key (sensitive). |
| `/etc/fips/fips.pub` | root:root | `0644` | Public key (npub). |
| `/etc/fips/fips.yaml` | root:root | `0644` | Daemon configuration (dpkg conffile). |
| `/etc/fips/fips.nft` | root:root | `0644` | nftables baseline (dpkg conffile). |
| `/etc/fips/fips.d/` | root:root | `0755` | Operator drop-in directory. |
| `/etc/fips/hosts` | root:root | `0644` | Optional hostname → npub map (dpkg conffile). |
| `/etc/fips/peers.allow` | root:root | `0644` | Optional peer allowlist. |
| `/etc/fips/peers.deny` | root:root | `0644` | Optional peer denylist. |
| `/run/fips/control.sock` | root:fips | `0770` | Control socket (members of `fips` group can use `fipsctl`). |
| `/run/fips/api.sock` | root:fips | `0770` | Native datagram API socket, when `node.native_api.enabled` is set (experimental; absent otherwise). |
| `/run/fips/` | root:fips | `0750` | Socket parent directory. |
Adding a user to the `fips` group grants `fipsctl` access without
requiring root. The daemon `chown`s the control socket and its parent
directory at bind time, and does the same for the native API socket when
that is enabled.
## Native Datagram API
**Experimental. Disabled by default** (`node.native_api.enabled`, default
`false`), and built on Linux, FreeBSD and macOS only. It is not a stable API
surface, not a reliability layer, and not the v2 external process API. No
compatibility promise is made about it.
**Any user in the `fips` group can impersonate the node on the mesh.** The
API socket is created at mode `0770` owned by group `fips`, and that is the
entire authorization model. A process that can open it can:
- send datagrams under this node's identity to any peer it names, which
peers authenticate as coming from this node;
- hold any port from 1024 upward and receive mesh traffic addressed to this
node on it, including traffic another local program expected;
- do both without authenticating, without a capability check, and without
any record beyond the daemon's own logs.
Group membership is therefore equivalent to possession of the node's
identity for the purpose of sending on the mesh. **On a node with the native
API enabled, treat membership of the `fips` group exactly as you would treat
`/etc/fips/fips.key`.** Grant it to the accounts that are trusted to speak as
the node and to no others, and review it before enabling the API on a shared
machine.
**The file descriptor carries the grant, not the connection.** A setup call
hands the client a socket descriptor and the connection it was made on is then
closed; the flow or the held port lives until that descriptor is closed. A
descriptor is an ordinary kernel object, so it survives `fork`, survives
`exec` unless the client asked for it close-on-exec when it received it, and
can be handed to another process over `SCM_RIGHTS`. A process holding one can
send as this node on that flow, or receive on that port, without ever opening
the API socket and without being in the `fips` group.
Nothing revokes a descriptor already handed out. Restarting the daemon closes
its own halves and ends every flow and listener at once, and that is the only
revocation there is.
Two consequences follow for `fipsctl` access. First, the `fips` group is
already the control-socket group, so enabling the native API silently
upgrades every existing `fipsctl` user from "can read node state and manage
peers" to "can send as the node". Second, an operator who wants the two
audiences separated must not enable the API on a node whose `fips` group has
been handed out for monitoring.
`node.native_api.debug_commands` (default `false`) is a second, independent
gate. It admits three commands (`inject`, `stats`, `arrive`) that exist for
the test harness: `arrive` makes the daemon dispatch a datagram as though a
peer had sent it, reaching any listener on this node under any peer identity
the caller names. Leave it off outside a test harness; a packaged node does
not enable it.
The socket is local only. It is not reachable over the network, and nothing
about it changes the mesh's own authentication: a peer still verifies the
node's signature, which is precisely why a local caller that can send through
this socket is indistinguishable from the node itself.
See [configuration.md](configuration.md#native-datagram-api-nodenative_api)
for the key list and
[../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md](../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md)
for the client.
## Threat-Resistance Matrix
The link layer's threat-resistance matrix is consolidated here from
the FMP design document:
| Threat | Mitigation |
| ------ | ---------- |
| Connection exhaustion | Token-bucket rate limit + connection count limit |
| CPU exhaustion (msg1 flood) | Rate limit before crypto operations |
| Replay attacks | Counter-based nonces with sliding window (2048 entries) |
| State confusion | Strict handshake state machine validation |
| Spoofed encrypted packets | Index lookup + AEAD verification |
| Spoofed msg2 | Index lookup + Noise ephemeral key binding |
| Address spoofing | Cryptographic authority, not address-based |
| Session correlation | Index rotation on rekey |
| Inbound exposure on `fips0` | Default-deny nftables baseline (operator opt-in) |
| Sybil identities | Discretionary peering + handshake rate limiting + optional peer ACL |
| Eclipse attack | Diverse peering across independent operators and transports |
| Unauthorized peer admission | Optional `peers.allow` allowlist consulted before handshake |
| Local impersonation via the native datagram API | API disabled by default; when enabled, `fips` group membership is the only gate and must be treated as key access |
See [../design/fips-mesh-layer.md](../design/fips-mesh-layer.md) for
the unauthenticated-attack-surface analysis (only handshake msg1 is
reachable by unauthenticated parties), and
[../design/fips-mesh-operation.md](../design/fips-mesh-operation.md#privacy-considerations)
for the metadata-privacy model and the rejection of onion routing.
## Default Network Exposures by Transport
| Transport | Default Inbound | Default Bind | Opt-in |
| --------- | --------------- | ------------ | ------ |
| UDP | None until `bind_addr` set | `0.0.0.0:2121` typical | Operator sets `transports.udp.bind_addr` |
| TCP | None until `bind_addr` set | None — outbound-only without bind | Operator sets `transports.tcp.bind_addr` |
| Ethernet | Listens on configured interface (raw `AF_PACKET`) | EtherType 0x2121 on selected interface | Per-flag `listen`, `announce`, `auto_connect`, `accept_connections` |
| Tor | None until `directory_service` configured | `127.0.0.1:8443` (loopback only) | Operator sets `transports.tor.directory_service` and configures `HiddenServiceDir` in `torrc` |
| BLE | Off by default | n/a | Operator enables `transports.ble.*` |
| Nostr discovery | Off by default | n/a (relay client, not a listener) | Operator sets `node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled: true` |
The mesh-layer `fips0` interface is reachable from any mesh node that
can route to you, not only direct peers — your direct peers forward
traffic from any reachable mesh node onto your `fips0`. The
default-deny nftables baseline (operator opt-in) is the recommended
way to restrict inbound traffic on `fips0`. See
[../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md](../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md).
## See also
- [../design/fips-security.md](../design/fips-security.md) — threat
model and design rationale for the `fips0` baseline
- [../design/fips-mesh-layer.md](../design/fips-mesh-layer.md) — FMP
link encryption, replay protection, rate limiting
- [../design/fips-session-layer.md](../design/fips-session-layer.md)
— FSP end-to-end encryption, Noise XK, replay window
- [../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md](../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md)
— operator activation and drop-in recipes
- [configuration.md](configuration.md) — full `node.rekey.*`,
`node.rate_limit.*` parameter tables
- [../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md](../how-to/use-the-native-datagram-api.md)
— enabling the experimental native datagram API, and what group
membership grants once it is on
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