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https://github.com/jmcorgan/fips.git
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Reject rekey settings that fire the trigger immediately and forever
Config validation said nothing about the rekey block, so two settings that disable rekey in appearance and hammer it in practice were accepted silently. after_messages of zero makes the message-count arm true on every poll, since the trigger tests the counter against it with a greater-or-equal. It reads like a way to switch the arm off and does the opposite. after_secs at or below the per-session jitter is the same trap on the timer arm. Each session offsets the interval by a random value drawn from plus or minus the jitter bound, so a smaller interval saturates to zero on a negative draw and rekeys on sight, for roughly half of sessions and not the other half. The rule is expressed against the jitter constant rather than its current value, so it tracks if the bound ever moves. Both are checked whether or not rekey is enabled, so turning it on later cannot surface a configuration error at a surprising moment. Neither has an upper bound: a very large value is the established way to disable one arm of the trigger and stays legal.
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ mod node;
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mod peer;
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mod transport;
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use crate::node::REKEY_JITTER_SECS;
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use crate::upper::config::{DnsConfig, TunConfig};
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use crate::{Identity, IdentityError};
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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@@ -686,6 +687,32 @@ impl Config {
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}
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}
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// Reject rekey triggers that fire immediately and forever. Both
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// arms are checked regardless of `node.rekey.enabled` so that
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// turning rekey on later cannot surface a config error at a
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// surprising moment. There is deliberately no upper bound:
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// u64::MAX is the idiom for disabling one arm of the trigger.
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let rekey = &self.node.rekey;
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if rekey.after_messages == 0 {
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return Err(ConfigError::Validation(
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"`node.rekey.after_messages` must be at least 1; 0 fires the message-count trigger on every poll instead of disabling it. \
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Use a very large value to effectively disable the message-count trigger."
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.to_string(),
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));
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}
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let jitter_secs = REKEY_JITTER_SECS.unsigned_abs();
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if rekey.after_secs <= jitter_secs {
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return Err(ConfigError::Validation(format!(
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"`node.rekey.after_secs` is {}, but must be greater than the per-session rekey jitter of {jitter_secs}s; \
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each session offsets the interval by a random value in [-{jitter_secs}, +{jitter_secs}] seconds, so a smaller interval saturates to zero \
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and rekeys on sight for roughly half of sessions. \
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Use a very large value to effectively disable the timer trigger.",
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rekey.after_secs
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)));
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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@@ -1459,6 +1486,86 @@ peers:
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.expect("outbound_only should be exempt from the loopback check");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_default_rekey_settings_ok() {
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Config::default()
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.validate()
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.expect("shipped default rekey settings must validate");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_after_messages_zero_rejected() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.after_messages = 0;
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let err = config.validate().expect_err("validation should fail");
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let msg = err.to_string();
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assert!(msg.contains("after_messages"), "got: {msg}");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_after_messages_one_accepted() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.after_messages = 1;
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config
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.validate()
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.expect("after_messages = 1 rekeys every message, which is wasteful but well defined");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_after_secs_at_or_below_jitter_rejected() {
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let jitter = REKEY_JITTER_SECS.unsigned_abs();
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for after_secs in [0, 1, jitter - 1, jitter] {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.after_secs = after_secs;
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match config.validate() {
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Err(e) => assert!(e.to_string().contains("after_secs"), "got: {e}"),
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Ok(()) => panic!("after_secs = {after_secs} should be rejected"),
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}
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_after_secs_just_above_jitter_accepted() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.after_secs = REKEY_JITTER_SECS.unsigned_abs() + 1;
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config
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.validate()
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.expect("one second above the jitter bound leaves a non-zero effective interval");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_unbounded_values_accepted() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.after_secs = u64::MAX;
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config.node.rekey.after_messages = u64::MAX;
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config
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.validate()
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.expect("u64::MAX disables an arm of the trigger and must stay legal");
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_validate_rekey_checked_even_when_disabled() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.enabled = false;
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config.node.rekey.after_messages = 0;
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let err = config.validate().expect_err("validation should fail");
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assert!(err.to_string().contains("after_messages"));
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.node.rekey.enabled = false;
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config.node.rekey.after_secs = REKEY_JITTER_SECS.unsigned_abs();
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let err = config.validate().expect_err("validation should fail");
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assert!(err.to_string().contains("after_secs"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_outbound_only_forces_ephemeral_bind() {
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let cfg = UdpConfig {
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