Three names didn't describe their behavior:
- removeFromCache → unlinkAndRemove: the method's main job is unlinking the
note from every referrer (parents, channels, the report/card/status/poll
indexes), not just evicting it from the map; the old name only captured
the last step.
- removeAllChildNotes → clearChildLinks: it clears only THIS note's forward
child collections and returns them — it does not touch the children's
replyTo and does not remove anything from the cache. The old name sounded
more aggressive than detachFromChildren(), which is actually the
both-directions op.
- Note.removeOnchainZap(source) → removeOnchainZapBySource(source): too easy
to confuse with removeOnchainZapForSource(txid, pubkey), which is the
verification-verdict removal with anti-spoof guards. The new name matches
its inner helper (innerRemoveOnchainZapBySource) and disambiguates the two.
Pure rename: no behavior change. Test names/comments updated to match.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqJPYzmjb1pR3NBeH2yY3s
deleteNote() (NIP-09) and removeFromCache() (prune) had drifted into two
near-duplicate "detach a note from the cache" routines. Removal really has
two halves — (1) unlink the note from everything that points AT it, and
(2) handle the note's OWN children — and only the second half differs
between the paths. removeFromCache() already implemented half (1)
completely, so deleteNote() now delegates to it and keeps only its two
delete-specific responsibilities: tearing down gift-wrap hosts and
severing (but keeping) its children via detachFromChildren().
This also fixes a real leak the duplication was hiding. computeReplyTo()
has no ReportEvent branch, so a report note's replyTo is empty and the
report→target link lives only in the explicit reported* index handling.
The old deleteNote() only undid reportedAuthor(), so deleting an
event-level report (reportedPost / reportedAddresses) left the reported
note's `.reports` map holding the removed report note — a partial deletion
that leaked the shell and risked a duplicate Note for the same id.
Delegating to removeFromCache() (author + post + addresses, all
idempotent) closes that gap.
Net behavior change is the report-leak fix only; the redundant
TorrentCommentEvent case is dropped because the torrent target is already
in replyTo (and removed via removeNote), and its @Suppress("DEPRECATION")
goes with it. Adds KDoc to both methods documenting the two-halves model.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqJPYzmjb1pR3NBeH2yY3s
Reframe from a forward-looking plan diff to the current architecture, and fix
the onAuthenticated signature to (event): Boolean (pubKey was dropped). All
structural elements already matched the merged code.
The auth set is already a per-RelaySession instance field (one session per
connect(), fresh policy per connection), so two connections never share auth
state. Add a regression test: authenticate different pubkeys on two connections
of the same server and assert each scope holds only its own — no union leak.
deleteNote() removed the target from its parents, gatherers, and the cache
map, but never cleared its own child collections nor dropped itself from
its children's replyTo. That left a partial deletion: every child kept the
removed shell alive through replyTo (a leak), and a reply resolved later
via computeReplyTo would getOrCreateNote a *second* Note for the same id —
breaking the one-Note-per-id invariant.
Adds Note.detachFromChildren(), which clears the note's forward child
collections (via removeAllChildNotes) and severs this note from each
child's replyTo (keeping any other parents). deleteNote() now calls it
before notes.remove(), so once the note leaves the map nothing points at
the dead shell. Orphaned replies become roots, which is correct once their
parent is hard-deleted from the cache.
Adds detachFromChildren coverage to NotePruningReferenceTest.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqJPYzmjb1pR3NBeH2yY3s
pubKey was always event.pubKey (the NIP-42 signer is the authenticated
identity), so the parameter was pure redundancy. onAuthenticated(event) and
authorize(event) now read event.pubKey directly; the engine still commits
cmd.event.pubKey. Removes the now-unused HexKey imports from IRelayPolicy and
PolicyStack.
Authentication state (who is logged in on a connection) is connection scope,
not a policy decision. It was stored on FullAuthPolicy, which forced the
AuthScopedPolicy marker, the PolicyStack union, and a downcast in
RequestContext just to route it back out as scope.
Now the engine owns it: RelaySession holds the authenticatedUsers set behind
the (now public) requestContext; the data plane and policies read it through
RequestContext. The policy stays pure decision —
- onConnect(scope, send): a per-connection policy captures the read-only scope
to gate on; shared singletons ignore it.
- onAuthenticated(): Boolean: the policy's vote on whether to record the
verified pubkey (default false, so blind-accept policies never record an
unverified identity). FullAuthPolicy runs authorize() then votes true.
- RelaySession.handleAuth performs the single, engine-side commit after the
whole chain approves and a verifying policy votes to record.
FullAuthPolicy keeps all auth logic (challenge, accept(AuthCmd), gating,
authorize) and gains a protected authenticatedUsers accessor over the scope for
subclasses (restricted content / filter rewrite). Deletes AuthScopedPolicy,
PolicyStack.authenticatedUsers, and the RequestContext downcast.
removeFromCache() relied solely on note.inGatherers to detach a pruned
note from its channels, while deleteNote() additionally resolved the
channel via getAnyChannel() and removed the note there too. inGatherers
is normally authoritative (Channel.addNote always calls addGatherer), so
this is defensive rather than a confirmed live leak — but it closes the
divergence so both removal paths detach channels identically. Guards
against any future consume path that adds a note to a getAnyChannel-
resolvable channel without the gatherer link: otherwise the note would
linger in the channel's notes map after leaving the cache, leaking it and
letting a relay echo mint a duplicate Note with the same id.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqJPYzmjb1pR3NBeH2yY3s
LocalCache must hold a single Note per event id/address and must never
remove a Note from the cache map while another Note still strongly
references it — a dangling reference both leaks the shell and lets a
relay echo mint a second Note with the same id.
Note.onchainZaps (NIP-BC) and Note.nutzaps (NIP-61) were added after the
removal/migration routines were written and were never wired into them,
so a pruned zap-source Note leaked through its target's maps:
- removeNote() only detached reply/boost/reaction/zap/zapPayment/report/
label, leaving the target's onchainZaps/nutzaps entry dangling when the
source note was pruned. Now also calls removeNutzap + a new
source-keyed removeOnchainZap (unconditional cache removal, distinct
from the verdict-respecting removeOnchainZapForSource).
- removeAllChildNotes() cleared onchainZaps but never returned the source
notes for removal from the cache map (asymmetric with nutzaps), so they
lingered orphaned. Now included.
- moveAllReferencesTo() dropped labels, zapPayments, and onchainZaps when
a replaceable's old version was superseded — silent data loss plus
orphaned onchain sources. Now migrated and cleared like the rest.
Adds NotePruningReferenceTest covering all three paths.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqJPYzmjb1pR3NBeH2yY3s
Keep the universal policy interface free of NIP-42: instead of a default
authenticatedUsers on IRelayPolicy, add an opt-in AuthScopedPolicy mixin that
only FullAuthPolicy (and PolicyStack, which unions its auth-tracking members)
implements. RequestContext.authenticatedUsers resolves it via an `as?
AuthScopedPolicy` downcast, defaulting to empty — so non-auth relays carry no
auth concept, and the accessor now earns its keep by encapsulating that cast
(ctx.policy is IRelayPolicy and no longer exposes the set directly).
Non-storage relays answer a REQ purely from filters: EventSource.events()
got no session/auth context, even though the connection's policy already
knows the authenticated pubkey(s). That walled the auth state off from the
code that produces events, forcing a shared mutable holder + hand-wired
RelaySession to build any caller-aware relay (NIP-50 search scored from the
viewer, DM-style restricted content, paid/allow-listed sets, per-connection
tenancy).
Introduce RequestContext (connectionId, authenticatedUsers, policy) and pass
it through the read path: RelaySession -> SessionBackend.query/count/
countResult -> EventSourceBackend -> EventSource. authenticatedUsers is now
exposed on IRelayPolicy (default empty, overridden by FullAuthPolicy and
unioned by PolicyStack) and read live, so a REQ after AUTH sees the freshly
authenticated pubkey(s). For richer per-connection state, downcast ctx.policy.
EventSourceServer.serve { } is now usable for auth-scoped relays without a
side channel. Adds a test proving ctx.authenticatedUsers reaches the source
after a NIP-42 handshake; updates RELAY.md.
The SPI name leaned on "Req" (the NIP-01 command), which isn't self-explanatory.
Rename to read as what it is — a source of events for a query:
- ReqResponder -> EventSource (method respond() -> events())
- ReqResponderBackend -> EventSourceBackend (param responder -> source)
- ReqResponderServer -> EventSourceServer
- *Test + RELAY.md + KDoc references updated to match.
Also drop the JwtAuthPolicy snippet from RELAY.md (it was only an illustrative
doc example, never a real class); the surrounding prose still documents the
`authorize` bridge hook.
Pure rename + doc edit, no behavior change; full suite green.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Cleanup pass (4 review angles), behaviour-preserving, full suite green:
- Extract RelayServerBase: NostrServer and ReqResponderServer duplicated
connect/serve/buildPolicy/activeConnections and the connection scope verbatim
(ConnectionRegistry only unified the bookkeeping). They now share one engine
base and contribute only their backend + teardown; ReqResponderServer is ~10
lines, NostrServer just its ingest/store wiring.
- HyperLogLog.leadingZeroBits: replace the hand-rolled per-byte bit loop with
stdlib Int.countLeadingZeroBits() (- 24 for the 0..255 byte).
- LimitsPolicy.clampLimits: drop the `var changed` + throwaway-list map for a
`none{} -> map{}` that's simpler and allocates nothing when no filter is
clamped (the common case once maxLimit is set).
- PolicyStack: collapse the two first-non-null hook loops to firstNotNullOfOrNull.
- RelaySession.handleAuth: use OkMessage.rejected(MachineReadablePrefix.ERROR, …)
instead of hand-writing the "error:" prefix, matching the COUNT path.
Skipped: rewriting FullAuthPolicy's pre-existing auth-required:/invalid: reason
strings to MachineReadablePrefix — unchanged context lines, out of this diff's
scope.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
The pendingNewlyAdded field was a rollback token faked through instance state:
FullAuthPolicy.accept(AuthCmd) committed the pubkey eagerly, so a later
rejection (composed policy or a throwing hook) had to be undone, and the field
existed only to avoid dropping a pubkey that was already authenticated.
Fix the root cause — the eager commit. accept(AuthCmd) now only validates; the
pubkey is recorded in FullAuthPolicy.onAuthenticated (made final), which the
engine calls only after accept AND the whole policy chain approve the AUTH.
External-auth bridges override a new open `authorize` hook that runs before the
commit; throwing rejects the login with nothing committed to undo.
This deletes pendingNewlyAdded, IRelayPolicy.onAuthenticationFailed, its
PolicyStack override, and both rollback call-sites in RelaySession.handleAuth —
and makes the prior compose-after-reject / failed-re-AUTH cases correct by
construction (no rollback to get wrong). Tests updated to override `authorize`;
the two regression tests pass unchanged.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Behaviour-preserving readability improvements (full suite green):
- LimitsPolicy: drop the <T : Command> generic reject helpers (which forced
rejectSubId<ReqCmd>(...) call-site type args). Each check is now a
"rejection reason or null" function (eventRejection / subscriptionRejection)
and the accept overloads just wrap a non-null reason — the three overloads
read almost identically.
- Extract ConnectionRegistry: NostrServer and ReqResponderServer duplicated
the connection bookkeeping (stable-id keying, active gauge, once-only
teardown accounting). That subtle logic now lives in one named class both
servers delegate to; their connect()/close() shrink to the parts that
actually differ (the backend and what else teardown closes).
- HyperLogLog.addPubKey: rename `ri` -> `registerIndex`.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Final-review findings on the relay tooling:
- Auth bypass (security): FullAuthPolicy.accept(AuthCmd) commits the pubkey,
but handleAuth only rolled back on the hook-throw path — a policy composed
AFTER FullAuthPolicy that rejects the AuthCmd left the connection
authenticated behind an OK false. handleAuth now also rolls back on the
reject path, preserving OK-true-iff-authenticated for any composition order.
- Failed re-AUTH no longer drops a prior valid auth: onAuthenticationFailed
removes only the pubkey THIS AUTH newly added (tracked via Set.add's return),
not one already authenticated earlier on the connection.
- Rename the server-side RelayConnectionListener -> RelayServerListener to
avoid colliding with the existing client-side
relay.client.listeners.RelayConnectionListener (published-API clarity).
- RelayLimits.toNip11Limitation clamps created_at bounds to Int range so a
post-2038 epoch second can't wrap negative in the NIP-11 document.
- Add regression tests for both auth cases (reject-after-FullAuth; failed
re-AUTH keeps prior auth).
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Nip11RelayInformation modeled `icon` but not `banner` (NIP-11's wide
promotional image, distinct from the square icon), so relays advertising a
banner couldn't round-trip it. Add the field + a round-trip test.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Previously max_message_length and max_subscriptions were hard-coded in
RelaySession behind a parallel `limits` param, while the per-command limits
went through LimitsPolicy — two mechanisms, and a custom policy couldn't
influence the session-level ones.
Unify them: add two default-noop hooks to IRelayPolicy —
acceptMessage(raw) (pre-parse) and acceptSubscription(subId, openCount) —
chained through PolicyStack so they compose across multiple policies.
LimitsPolicy now implements all limit checks; RelaySession just invokes the
hooks and no longer takes a `limits` param. Servers compose LimitsPolicy
whenever `limits` is set and keep `limits` only to advertise via NIP-11.
Behaviour is unchanged (oversized -> NOTICE invalid:, sub cap -> CLOSED
rate-limited:); the enforcement now lives in the policy layer. Adds direct
hook unit tests; existing end-to-end limit tests still pass.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
A relay author no longer hand-rolls limit policies or wires NIP-11 twice.
- RelayLimits: one config that is both enforced and advertised. Pass it to
NostrServer/ReqResponderServer and every limit is applied; toNip11Limitation()
renders the same numbers into the NIP-11 limitation block so they can't drift.
- LimitsPolicy: per-command enforcement (max_content_length, max_event_tags,
created_at bounds reject EVENT; max_filters / max_subid_length reject
REQ/COUNT; max_limit clamps, default_limit fills) with invalid: prefixes.
Servers prepend it automatically when limits declares command caps.
- RelaySession: session-level caps that a policy can't see — max_message_length
(NOTICE before parse) and max_subscriptions (rate-limited: CLOSED on new sub).
- NIP-11 serving: Nip11RelayInformation.toJson() + CONTENT_TYPE
(application/nostr+json); the existing model was parse-only.
- Tests for the policy, the session-level caps end-to-end, and the
limits->NIP-11 round trip; RELAY.md Limits + Serving NIP-11 sections.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
The HLL aggregation side (estimate/merge/encode) existed but the construction
side did not, and the Jackson wire (de)serializer silently dropped the `hll`
field — so a JVM/Android relay could not actually answer COUNT with HLL.
- HyperLogLog.addPubKey(): the NIP-45 construction (register index = pubkey
byte at the filter offset; value = leading-zero-bits from offset+1, +1),
KMP-safe. Plus HyperLogLog.builderFor(filter) and an HllBuilder that streams
event pubkeys into registers and yields an approximate CountResult.
- Plumb CountResult through the count path: SessionBackend.countResult /
ReqResponder.countResult (default = exact count(); override for approximate/
hll); RelaySession sends the returned CountResult.
- Fix CountResultSerializer/Deserializer (jvmAndroid) to write/read the `hll`
hex field, matching the kotlinx serializer the native targets already use.
- Tests for construction (index/value/merge-idempotence) and the wire path;
RELAY.md Approximate COUNT section.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Gives relay operators metrics/logging hooks without patching the engine, and
removes the hashCode()-keyed connection registry the audit flagged.
- RelaySession gains a stable, process-unique `id` (monotonic counter).
- RelayConnectionListener (onConnect/onDisconnect, no-op default) is accepted
by NostrServer and ReqResponderServer; both now key their connection
registry by `id` instead of hashCode() (no more identity-collision hole).
- Both servers expose a live `activeConnections` gauge. Teardown accounting is
idempotent (double close counted once) and onDisconnect fires for any
connections still open at server close.
- Tests + RELAY.md Observability section.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Add cs-rCZ, de-rDE, sv-rSE and pt-rBR translations for the new settings
search field (placeholder + no-results) and the share-to-DM flow strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit finding: FullAuthPolicy.accept(AuthCmd) added the pubkey to the
authenticated set before onAuthenticated ran, so a bridge that threw from
onAuthenticated (its whole point — reject when e.g. a JWT exchange fails)
produced an OK false while the connection stayed authenticated server-side.
Subsequent REQ/EVENT/COUNT were then allowed despite the failed login — an
auth bypass.
- Add IRelayPolicy.onAuthenticationFailed(pubKey) (default no-op), forwarded
by PolicyStack and overridden by FullAuthPolicy to drop the pubkey.
- RelaySession.handleAuth calls it when onAuthenticated throws, restoring the
invariant that a client treated as authenticated is exactly one that got
OK true. The rollback is itself guarded so a misbehaving policy can't also
swallow the failing OK.
- Tests: failed-hook now asserts the connection is NOT authenticated and that
a follow-up REQ is rejected with auth-required.
- RELAY.md: note that throwing from onAuthenticated rolls auth back.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Lets non-storage relays (search, redirector, computed/projected data) answer
REQs without implementing the heavy IEventStore or hand-writing the
readFrame -> parse -> policy -> EVENT/EOSE loop.
- ReqResponder: the public Flow<Event> SPI — respond(filters): Flow<Event>
(+ a count() default). EOSE is sent when the flow completes.
- SessionBackend: the seam RelaySession now depends on (query/count/submit/
negentropy-snapshot). submit + snapshot default to reject / empty so a
responder only implements the read path. LiveEventStore implements it
(storage path unchanged); ReqResponderBackend adapts a ReqResponder.
- ReqResponderServer: storage-free dispatch engine mirroring NostrServer's
connect/serve/close, reusing RelaySession for the full wire protocol.
- RelaySession now frames backend failures as CLOSED error: <msg> (REQ) and
count failures likewise, instead of dropping the coroutine — useful for
responders doing network I/O.
- RELAY.md: Non-Storage Relays section + engine/source-map updates.
Storage path (NostrServer + IEventStore, live tail, negentropy) is unchanged;
existing server/auth/negentropy tests pass alongside the new responder tests.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Addresses the self-contained, low-risk items from the relay-ergonomics
request:
- NIP-50: add SearchQuery to parse Filter.search into free-text terms and
the typed key:value extensions (domain/language/sentiment/nsfw/include),
preserving unknown extensions and offering a canonical toSearchString().
- NIP-42: add a suspend IRelayPolicy.onAuthenticated(pubKey, event) hook
(chained through PolicyStack) so external-auth bridges (e.g. JWT exchange)
can live inside FullAuthPolicy instead of leaking into transport code.
RelaySession invokes it after the AUTH passes; a throw becomes OK false.
- Ergonomics: Command.fromJson/toJson and Message.fromJson/toJson mirroring
Event, plus MachineReadablePrefix + OkMessage/ClosedMessage factories for
standardized OK/CLOSED reason prefixes.
- Docs: RELAY.md sections for the external-auth bridge, NIP-50 search, and
the wire helpers.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016YBS2pWCBSDgAMthHzfCTr
Kind 34551 (CommunityRulesEvent) was missing from EventFactory.create, so
signing a community-rules template produced a generic Event. Returning it
as CommunityRulesEvent in Account.sendCommunityRules threw a
ClassCastException when publishing community rules.
Register the kind in the factory and add a regression test.
- Mark all *_search_keywords translatable="false" (English concept/protocol
index; stops Crowdin translating protocol terms and breaking locale search) [#1]
- Collapse ~23 symbol+nav rows via a local symEntry() helper [#3]
- Reword keywordsRes KDoc to match the actual word-prefix tokenization [#6]
- Add search keywords to the Legal rows (privacy_policy, child_safety) [#7]
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add keyword blobs so settings resolve by concept/protocol name, not just
title — e.g. "blossom" -> Media Servers, "audio rooms" -> Nests Servers,
"negentropy" -> Event Sync, "nsec" -> Backup Keys. NIP numbers omitted by
preference.