fix: persist desktop AUTH approvals for long relay URLs

The desktop AUTH banner ("<relay> requires authentication to deliver
this message") kept re-appearing on every challenge even after the user
clicked Always or Never.

Root cause: PreferencesAuthApprovalStore used the raw relay URL as the
java.util.prefs.Preferences key. Preferences caps keys at
MAX_KEY_LENGTH (80 chars) and throws IllegalArgumentException from put()
for anything longer. Outbox-proxy relay URLs that embed an npub and a
query string routinely exceed that (e.g.
wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1...?broadcast=true is 102 chars), so
setScope threw. RelayAuthenticator swallows the exception, so the
ALWAYS/BLOCKED grant was silently never persisted and the relay
re-prompted on the next AUTH challenge.

Fold any relay URL over MAX_KEY_LENGTH into a bounded sha256:-prefixed
64-char hex key. Short URLs are still stored verbatim so existing grants
keep working.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015aJPf1AsPTdzdMYR6pZ4e2
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-07-16 01:25:34 +00:00
parent f586656223
commit b3fce19ff7
2 changed files with 124 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ package com.vitorpamplona.amethyst.desktop.auth
import com.vitorpamplona.amethyst.commons.relayClient.auth.AuthApprovalScope
import com.vitorpamplona.amethyst.commons.relayClient.auth.AuthApprovalStore
import com.vitorpamplona.quartz.nip01Core.core.toHexKey
import com.vitorpamplona.quartz.nip01Core.relay.normalizer.NormalizedRelayUrl
import com.vitorpamplona.quartz.utils.sha256.sha256
import java.util.prefs.Preferences
/**
@@ -46,6 +48,16 @@ import java.util.prefs.Preferences
* `ONCE` scope is never persisted — that's the in-memory contract enforced
* by the [AuthApprovalStore] interface. This implementation only writes
* `ALWAYS` and `BLOCKED`.
*
* **Key length:** `java.util.prefs.Preferences` caps keys at
* [Preferences.MAX_KEY_LENGTH] (80 chars) and throws `IllegalArgumentException`
* from [Preferences.put] for anything longer. Relay URLs routinely exceed that
* — e.g. an outbox-proxy URL that embeds an npub and a query string
* (`wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1…?broadcast=true`, 100+ chars). Storing such a
* URL raw made [setScope] throw; the caller (`RelayAuthenticator`) swallows the
* exception, so the `ALWAYS` / `BLOCKED` grant was silently never persisted and
* the AUTH banner re-appeared on every challenge. [keyFor] folds any over-long
* URL into a bounded 64-char SHA-256 hex key to stay under the cap.
*/
class PreferencesAuthApprovalStore(
private val accountPubKeyHex: String,
@@ -55,8 +67,27 @@ class PreferencesAuthApprovalStore(
"/com/vitorpamplona/amethyst/desktop/auth/$accountPubKeyHex",
)
/**
* The Preferences key for a relay URL, guaranteed to fit within
* [Preferences.MAX_KEY_LENGTH].
*
* Short URLs are stored verbatim (readable, and backward-compatible with
* grants written before this fix). URLs at or over the limit are hashed to
* a `sha256:`-prefixed 64-char hex digest (71 chars total, under the 80
* cap). The prefix keeps the hashed keyspace disjoint from raw relay URLs,
* which always start with `ws://` / `wss://`, so the two can never collide.
*/
private fun keyFor(relayUrl: NormalizedRelayUrl): String {
val url = relayUrl.url
return if (url.length <= Preferences.MAX_KEY_LENGTH) {
url
} else {
"sha256:" + sha256(url.encodeToByteArray()).toHexKey()
}
}
override suspend fun getScope(relayUrl: NormalizedRelayUrl): AuthApprovalScope? {
val raw = node.get(relayUrl.url, null) ?: return null
val raw = node.get(keyFor(relayUrl), null) ?: return null
return runCatching { AuthApprovalScope.valueOf(raw) }.getOrNull()
}
@@ -70,7 +101,7 @@ class PreferencesAuthApprovalStore(
// upgrade to "until next clear()".
return
}
node.put(relayUrl.url, scope.name)
node.put(keyFor(relayUrl), scope.name)
node.flush()
}
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2025 Vitor Pamplona
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
* copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the
* Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
* subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR
* COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
* WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
package com.vitorpamplona.amethyst.desktop.auth
import com.vitorpamplona.amethyst.commons.relayClient.auth.AuthApprovalScope
import com.vitorpamplona.quartz.nip01Core.relay.normalizer.NormalizedRelayUrl
import kotlinx.coroutines.test.runTest
import kotlin.test.AfterTest
import kotlin.test.Test
import kotlin.test.assertEquals
import kotlin.test.assertNull
class PreferencesAuthApprovalStoreTest {
// A distinct per-run account so the test never collides with a real user's
// stored grants under Preferences.userRoot().
private val accountPubKeyHex = "test${System.nanoTime()}".padEnd(64, '0').take(64)
private val store = PreferencesAuthApprovalStore(accountPubKeyHex)
@AfterTest
fun cleanup() =
runTest {
store.clear()
}
@Test
fun shortRelayUrlRoundTrips() =
runTest {
val relay = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://relay.example/")
store.setScope(relay, AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS)
assertEquals(AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS, store.getScope(relay))
}
@Test
fun overLongRelayUrlPersistsInsteadOfThrowing() =
runTest {
// 102 chars — over java.util.prefs.Preferences.MAX_KEY_LENGTH (80).
// Storing this raw threw "Key too long", the exception was swallowed
// upstream, and the grant silently never persisted -> the AUTH banner
// re-appeared on every challenge. Regression guard for that bug.
val relay = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1max2lm5977tkj4zc28djq25g2muzmjgh2jqf83mq7vy539hfs7eqgec4et?broadcast=true")
assertEquals(102, relay.url.length)
store.setScope(relay, AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS)
assertEquals(AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS, store.getScope(relay))
}
@Test
fun overLongRelayUrlBlockedPersists() =
runTest {
val relay = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1max2lm5977tkj4zc28djq25g2muzmjgh2jqf83mq7vy539hfs7eqgec4et?broadcast=true")
store.setScope(relay, AuthApprovalScope.BLOCKED)
assertEquals(AuthApprovalScope.BLOCKED, store.getScope(relay))
}
@Test
fun distinctOverLongRelayUrlsDoNotCollide() =
runTest {
val a = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1max2lm5977tkj4zc28djq25g2muzmjgh2jqf83mq7vy539hfs7eqgec4et?broadcast=true")
val b = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://filter.nostr.wine/npub1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq?broadcast=true")
store.setScope(a, AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS)
store.setScope(b, AuthApprovalScope.BLOCKED)
assertEquals(AuthApprovalScope.ALWAYS, store.getScope(a))
assertEquals(AuthApprovalScope.BLOCKED, store.getScope(b))
}
@Test
fun onceIsNeverPersisted() =
runTest {
val relay = NormalizedRelayUrl("wss://relay.example/")
store.setScope(relay, AuthApprovalScope.ONCE)
assertNull(store.getScope(relay))
}
}