Files
Amber/CLAUDE.md
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Claudeandgreenart7c3 83a48c67db Encrypt the per-account database at rest when a passphrase is set
The passphrase lock protected the account keys but left the per-account
database — connected applications, permission grants, request history and
relay logs — as plaintext JSON, leaking metadata about which apps you sign
for. Those files are now encrypted with the master key (AES-256-GCM, an
"AMBERENC1:" header) whenever a passphrase lock is enabled.

- writeSecure/readSecure transparently encrypt/decrypt the apps, history and
  logs files; plaintext files from before the passphrase migrate on read.
- Enabling a passphrase re-encrypts every account's database immediately
  (rewriteAllStores); removing it rewrites plaintext. settings.json and
  accounts.json stay plaintext, but the private keys in accounts.json are
  already master-key-encrypted.
- DesktopKeyStore exposes synchronous encryptString/decryptString for the
  storage layer and refuses DB writes while locked rather than clobbering
  ciphertext with an empty document.

Adds a unit test covering the full round trip: plaintext → enable →
ciphertext (no plaintext leak) → reload decrypts → lock evicts the key →
unlock → disable → plaintext.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YQTVwy8RBj7spdEK3aEc3i
2026-09-28 10:12:11 -03:00

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Markdown

# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Build & development commands
```bash
./gradlew assembleDebug # debug build
./gradlew assembleRelease # release build (requires signing keystore)
./gradlew ktlintCheck # Kotlin style check (also runs on every git commit via pre-commit hook)
./gradlew ktlintFormat # auto-fix Kotlin style issues
./gradlew lint # Android Lint, warnings fail the build (runs on commit and push via hooks)
./gradlew test --no-daemon # unit tests (also runs on every git push via pre-push hook)
./build.sh # builds both offline and free release variants to ~/release/
```
Git hooks are auto-installed via the root `build.gradle.kts` preBuild task — no manual setup needed.
## Build flavors
| Flavor | Purpose |
|--------|---------|
| `free` (default) | Online variant with full networking (OkHttp, Coil, relay connectivity) |
| `offline` | No network stack; use `BuildFlavorChecker.isOfflineFlavor()` to guard network code |
## Modules
- `:app` — the Android app (everything below in Architecture refers to it)
- `:desktop` — Compose for Desktop (JVM) NIP-46 signer for Windows/macOS/Linux; standalone port that mirrors the Android permission model against `quartz-jvm` (no NIP-55). `./gradlew :desktop:run` to launch, `:desktop:packageDistributionForCurrentOs` to package. Its core mirrors `NotificationSubscription`/`EventNotificationConsumer`/`BunkerRequestUtils` in `desktop/.../core/BunkerEngine.kt` — behavior changes to the Android bunker flow should be ported there too. Keys are AES-encrypted via a PKCS12 Java KeyStore (`DesktopKeyStore`) whose password lives in the OS credential store (Keychain / Credential Manager / Secret Service via `java-keyring`, file fallback — see `KeystorePassword.resolve`); an opt-in `PassphraseLock` instead wraps the master key with Argon2id and adds a startup/auto-lock gate that evicts key material and gates the bunker engine — and, while set, encrypts the per-account database (apps/permissions/history/logs) at rest via `writeSecure`/`readSecure`. State is JSON files per account (no Room). See `desktop/README.md`.
## Architecture
### Request ingestion — three paths
External apps and relays reach the signer through three distinct paths:
1. **`nostrsigner://` Intent** → `SignerActivity` → parsed by `IntentUtils` → shown as bottom sheet
2. **ContentProvider IPC** → `SignerProvider` → synchronous signing via `runBlocking`
3. **NIP-46 relay events** (kind 24133) → `NotificationSubscription` → `EventNotificationConsumer` → `BunkerRequestUtils`
All three paths converge on `Account.sign()` / encrypt/decrypt methods backed by `NostrSignerInternal`.
### Global state — `Amber.kt`
`Amber` is the Application class and acts as the DI container. Key singletons it owns:
- `applicationIOScope` — `CoroutineScope(Dispatchers.IO + SupervisorJob() + exceptionHandler)`, used for all background work
- `client: NostrClient` — the Quartz Nostr relay client
- `notificationSubscription` — keeps the NIP-46 filter alive in the background
- `profileSubscription` — per-account, throttled one-shot metadata fetch; first fetches the user's NIP-65 relay list (kind 10002) and saves it locally, then fetches the metadata (kind 0) from the default profile relays plus the saved user relays; started/stopped by the composables that display each account via `ProfileSubscriptionEffect` (not app-wide)
- `isStartingAppState: MutableStateFlow<Boolean>` — set to `true` during `runMigrations()`; code that must wait for startup calls `isStartingAppState.first { !it }`
- `settings.killSwitch` — when true, all relays are disconnected; checked before every relay operation
### Per-account isolation
Every `npub` gets its own:
- `SharedPreferences` file (`prefs_${npub}`)
- `AppDatabase` (`amber_db_${npub}`) — apps + permissions
- `LogDatabase` — operation logs
- `HistoryDatabase` — request history
All databases are lazy-loaded and cached in `ConcurrentHashMap`s in `Amber`. Account data (including decrypted keys) is loaded via `LocalPreferences.loadFromEncryptedStorage()` and cached in `LargeCache`.
### Permission system
Permissions are stored in `ApplicationEntity` + `ApplicationPermissionsEntity` (Room). Each permission entry has:
- `rememberType` — auto-accept, auto-reject, or always-ask
- `acceptUntil` / `rejectUntil` — time-bound grants
- `kind` — event-kind-specific rules
Before showing the approval UI, all three ingestion paths query the database; if a matching auto-accept rule exists, signing proceeds silently.
### Biometric / PIN lock is UI-only
The biometric/PIN prompt (`useAuth` / `usePin` in `AmberSettings`, configured in `SecurityScreen`) is **only an app-launch UI gate**, not a signing gate. It is rendered by `BiometricAuthScreen`, which is invoked exclusively from the two UI entry points — `MainActivity` and `SignerActivity` — to unlock the app's screens before any approval bottom sheet is shown.
It does **not** protect the signing operations themselves:
- **ContentProvider IPC** (`SignerProvider`) and **NIP-46 relay events** (`EventNotificationConsumer` → `BunkerRequestUtils`) never touch `BiometricAuthScreen`, `Biometrics`, `useAuth`, or `usePin`. They sign in the background based purely on the permission database.
- When an auto-accept rule matches, all three paths sign silently **without** triggering the biometric/PIN prompt — including `nostrsigner://` intents, which auto-finish before the UI is interacted with.
In other words, the lock controls who can open and navigate the app UI; it does not stand between a request and `Account.sign()`. Authorization for automatic signing is governed solely by the permission system (`rememberType` / `acceptUntil` / `kind`).
### Key files
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `Amber.kt` | Application singleton, Nostr client, relay connectivity |
| `LocalPreferences.kt` | Account/settings persistence, encrypted key storage |
| `IntentUtils.kt` | Parses `nostrsigner://` URIs, creates `IntentData` objects |
| `SignerProvider.kt` | ContentProvider IPC signing |
| `BunkerRequestUtils.kt` | NIP-46 protocol handling, relay responses |
| `AccountStateViewModel.kt` | Auth state, account switching, toast notifications |
| `ConnectivityService.kt` | Foreground service, network monitoring, relay reconnection |
| `BiometricAuthScreen.kt` | UI-only app-launch lock (biometric/PIN); not a signing gate |
| `Biometrics.kt` | Wraps `BiometricPrompt` / keyguard credential prompt |
| `SecurityScreen.kt` | Toggles `useAuth` / `usePin` and the re-prompt interval |
- For repository collaboration, use ngit and follow `.claude/skills/ngit/SKILL.md`.