mirror of
https://github.com/jmcorgan/fips.git
synced 2026-08-11 09:07:44 +00:00
Move single-consumer modules into node/:
- rate_limit.rs, wire.rs, dns.rs — exclusively used by node subsystem
- Reduces top-level lib.rs from 16 to 13 modules
Split large files into focused subdirectories:
- noise.rs (1475 lines) → noise/{mod, handshake, session, replay, tests}.rs
- tree.rs (1479 lines) → tree/{mod, coordinate, declaration, state, tests}.rs
- bloom.rs (849 lines) → bloom/{mod, filter, state, tests}.rs
- All public APIs re-exported from mod.rs, no external import changes
Remove unused rate_limit defaults:
- HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_SECS, MAX_PENDING_INBOUND constants
- Default constructor eliminated in favor of with_params() taking config values
Fix all clippy warnings across codebase:
- Remove .clone() on Copy types, collapse nested ifs, replace match-return-None
with ?, remove/gate unused code, fix loop indexing, remove unnecessary casts
- Box large PeerSlot enum variants to reduce size disparity
- cargo clippy --all-targets now reports zero warnings
419 lines
13 KiB
Rust
419 lines
13 KiB
Rust
use super::*;
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use secp256k1::Parity;
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fn generate_keypair() -> secp256k1::Keypair {
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let secp = secp256k1::Secp256k1::new();
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let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
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let (secret_key, _) = secp.generate_keypair(&mut rng);
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secp256k1::Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &secret_key)
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_full_handshake() {
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let initiator_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let responder_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let responder_pub = responder_keypair.public_key();
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// Initiator knows responder's static key
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// Responder does NOT know initiator's static key (IK pattern)
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let mut initiator = HandshakeState::new_initiator(initiator_keypair, responder_pub);
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let mut responder = HandshakeState::new_responder(responder_keypair);
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assert_eq!(initiator.role(), HandshakeRole::Initiator);
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assert_eq!(responder.role(), HandshakeRole::Responder);
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// Initially, responder doesn't know initiator's identity
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assert!(responder.remote_static().is_none());
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// Message 1: Initiator -> Responder
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let msg1 = initiator.write_message_1().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(msg1.len(), HANDSHAKE_MSG1_SIZE);
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responder.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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// Now responder knows initiator's identity!
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assert!(responder.remote_static().is_some());
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assert_eq!(
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responder.remote_static().unwrap(),
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&initiator_keypair.public_key()
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);
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// Message 2: Responder -> Initiator
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let msg2 = responder.write_message_2().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(msg2.len(), HANDSHAKE_MSG2_SIZE);
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initiator.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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// Both should be complete
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assert!(initiator.is_complete());
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assert!(responder.is_complete());
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// Handshake hashes should match
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assert_eq!(initiator.handshake_hash(), responder.handshake_hash());
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// Convert to sessions
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let mut initiator_session = initiator.into_session().unwrap();
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let mut responder_session = responder.into_session().unwrap();
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// Test encryption/decryption
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let plaintext = b"Hello, secure world!";
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let ciphertext = initiator_session.encrypt(plaintext).unwrap();
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let decrypted = responder_session.decrypt(&ciphertext).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
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// Test reverse direction
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let plaintext2 = b"Hello back!";
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let ciphertext2 = responder_session.encrypt(plaintext2).unwrap();
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let decrypted2 = initiator_session.decrypt(&ciphertext2).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(decrypted2, plaintext2);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_multiple_messages() {
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let initiator_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let responder_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let mut initiator =
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HandshakeState::new_initiator(initiator_keypair, responder_keypair.public_key());
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let mut responder = HandshakeState::new_responder(responder_keypair);
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let msg1 = initiator.write_message_1().unwrap();
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responder.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = responder.write_message_2().unwrap();
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initiator.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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let mut initiator_session = initiator.into_session().unwrap();
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let mut responder_session = responder.into_session().unwrap();
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// Send many messages to test nonce increment
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for i in 0..100 {
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let msg = format!("Message {}", i);
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let ct = initiator_session.encrypt(msg.as_bytes()).unwrap();
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let pt = responder_session.decrypt(&ct).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(pt, msg.as_bytes());
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}
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assert_eq!(initiator_session.send_nonce(), 100);
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assert_eq!(responder_session.recv_nonce(), 100);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_wrong_role_errors() {
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let keypair1 = generate_keypair();
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let keypair2 = generate_keypair();
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let mut initiator = HandshakeState::new_initiator(keypair1, keypair2.public_key());
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// Initiator can't read message 1
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assert!(initiator
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.read_message_1(&[0u8; HANDSHAKE_MSG1_SIZE])
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.is_err());
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// Initiator can't write message 2 before message 1
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assert!(initiator.write_message_2().is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_invalid_pubkey_in_msg1() {
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let keypair = generate_keypair();
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let mut responder = HandshakeState::new_responder(keypair);
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// Invalid pubkey bytes (first 33 bytes are zero)
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let invalid_msg = [0u8; HANDSHAKE_MSG1_SIZE];
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assert!(responder.read_message_1(&invalid_msg).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_decryption_failure_wrong_key() {
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let keypair1 = generate_keypair();
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let keypair2 = generate_keypair();
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let keypair3 = generate_keypair();
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// Session between 1 and 2
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let mut init1 = HandshakeState::new_initiator(keypair1, keypair2.public_key());
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let mut resp1 = HandshakeState::new_responder(keypair2);
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let msg1 = init1.write_message_1().unwrap();
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resp1.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = resp1.write_message_2().unwrap();
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init1.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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let mut session1 = init1.into_session().unwrap();
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// Session between 1 and 3
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let mut init2 = HandshakeState::new_initiator(keypair1, keypair3.public_key());
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let mut resp2 = HandshakeState::new_responder(keypair3);
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let msg1 = init2.write_message_1().unwrap();
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resp2.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = resp2.write_message_2().unwrap();
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init2.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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let mut session2 = resp2.into_session().unwrap();
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// Encrypt with session 1, try to decrypt with session 2
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let ciphertext = session1.encrypt(b"test").unwrap();
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assert!(session2.decrypt(&ciphertext).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_cipher_state_nonce_sequence() {
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let key = [0u8; 32];
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let mut cipher = CipherState::new(key);
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assert_eq!(cipher.nonce(), 0);
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let _ = cipher.encrypt(b"test").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(cipher.nonce(), 1);
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let _ = cipher.encrypt(b"test").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(cipher.nonce(), 2);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_session_remote_static() {
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let keypair1 = generate_keypair();
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let keypair2 = generate_keypair();
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let mut init = HandshakeState::new_initiator(keypair1, keypair2.public_key());
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let mut resp = HandshakeState::new_responder(keypair2);
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let msg1 = init.write_message_1().unwrap();
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resp.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = resp.write_message_2().unwrap();
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init.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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let session1 = init.into_session().unwrap();
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let session2 = resp.into_session().unwrap();
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// Each session should know the other's static key
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assert_eq!(session1.remote_static(), &keypair2.public_key());
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assert_eq!(session2.remote_static(), &keypair1.public_key());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_message_sizes() {
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// Verify our size constants are correct
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assert_eq!(HANDSHAKE_MSG1_SIZE, 33 + 33 + 16); // e + encrypted_s
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assert_eq!(HANDSHAKE_MSG2_SIZE, 33); // e only
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_responder_identity_discovery() {
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// This test verifies the key IK property: responder learns initiator's identity
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let initiator_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let responder_keypair = generate_keypair();
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let mut responder = HandshakeState::new_responder(responder_keypair);
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// Before message 1: responder has no idea who's connecting
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assert!(responder.remote_static().is_none());
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let mut initiator =
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HandshakeState::new_initiator(initiator_keypair, responder_keypair.public_key());
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let msg1 = initiator.write_message_1().unwrap();
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// After processing message 1: responder knows initiator's identity
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responder.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let discovered_initiator = responder.remote_static().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(discovered_initiator, &initiator_keypair.public_key());
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// The discovered key can be used to look up peer config, verify against allow-list, etc.
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}
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// ===== ReplayWindow Tests =====
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#[test]
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fn test_replay_window_basic() {
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let mut window = ReplayWindow::new();
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// First packet is always acceptable
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assert!(window.check(0));
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window.accept(0);
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assert_eq!(window.highest(), 0);
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// Replay of 0 should fail
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assert!(!window.check(0));
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// New higher counter is acceptable
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assert!(window.check(1));
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window.accept(1);
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assert_eq!(window.highest(), 1);
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// Out-of-order within window is acceptable
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// (after accepting 10, 2 is still in window)
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window.accept(10);
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assert!(window.check(5));
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window.accept(5);
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// Replay of 5 should now fail
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assert!(!window.check(5));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_replay_window_large_jump() {
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let mut window = ReplayWindow::new();
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// Accept counter 0
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window.accept(0);
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// Jump to a large counter
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window.accept(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE as u64 + 100);
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// Old counter should be outside window
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assert!(!window.check(0));
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assert!(!window.check(50));
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// Counters within window should work
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assert!(window.check(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE as u64 + 99));
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assert!(window.check(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE as u64 + 50));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_replay_window_boundary() {
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let mut window = ReplayWindow::new();
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// Accept at boundary
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window.accept(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE as u64 - 1);
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// Counter 0 should be exactly at the edge of the window
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assert!(window.check(0));
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window.accept(0);
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// Move window forward by 1
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window.accept(REPLAY_WINDOW_SIZE as u64);
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// Counter 0 is now outside the window
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assert!(!window.check(0));
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// Counter 1 is still in the window
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assert!(window.check(1));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_replay_window_sequential() {
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let mut window = ReplayWindow::new();
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// Accept counters 0-999 in order
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for i in 0..1000 {
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assert!(window.check(i), "Counter {} should be acceptable", i);
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window.accept(i);
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}
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// All should be marked as seen
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for i in 0..1000 {
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assert!(!window.check(i), "Counter {} should be rejected as replay", i);
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}
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assert_eq!(window.highest(), 999);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_replay_window_reset() {
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let mut window = ReplayWindow::new();
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window.accept(100);
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assert_eq!(window.highest(), 100);
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assert!(!window.check(100));
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window.reset();
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assert_eq!(window.highest(), 0);
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assert!(window.check(100));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_session_replay_protection() {
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let keypair1 = generate_keypair();
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let keypair2 = generate_keypair();
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let mut init = HandshakeState::new_initiator(keypair1, keypair2.public_key());
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let mut resp = HandshakeState::new_responder(keypair2);
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let msg1 = init.write_message_1().unwrap();
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resp.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = resp.write_message_2().unwrap();
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init.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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let mut sender = init.into_session().unwrap();
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let mut receiver = resp.into_session().unwrap();
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// Encrypt a message
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let counter = sender.current_send_counter();
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let ciphertext = sender.encrypt(b"test message").unwrap();
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// First decryption should succeed
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let plaintext = receiver
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.decrypt_with_replay_check(&ciphertext, counter)
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.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(plaintext, b"test message");
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// Replay should fail
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let result = receiver.decrypt_with_replay_check(&ciphertext, counter);
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assert!(matches!(result, Err(NoiseError::ReplayDetected(_))));
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// Check method alone also detects replay
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assert!(receiver.check_replay(counter).is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_handshake_with_odd_parity_responder() {
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// Node B's secret key produces an odd-parity public key (0x03 prefix).
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// When the initiator only has the npub (x-only), PeerIdentity::pubkey_full()
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// returns even parity (0x02). The pre-message mix_hash must normalize
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// parity so both sides produce matching hash chains.
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let secp = secp256k1::Secp256k1::new();
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// Node B (responder) - odd parity key
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let sk_b = secp256k1::SecretKey::from_slice(
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&hex::decode("b102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1fb0")
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.unwrap(),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let kp_b = secp256k1::Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk_b);
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let (xonly_b, parity_b) = kp_b.public_key().x_only_public_key();
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assert_eq!(parity_b, Parity::Odd, "Test requires odd-parity responder key");
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// Node A (initiator) - even parity key
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let sk_a = secp256k1::SecretKey::from_slice(
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&hex::decode("0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20")
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.unwrap(),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let kp_a = secp256k1::Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &sk_a);
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// Simulate the production path: initiator gets responder's key via npub
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// (x-only -> assumed even parity)
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let assumed_even_b = xonly_b.public_key(Parity::Even);
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assert_ne!(
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assumed_even_b, kp_b.public_key(),
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"Even assumption should differ from actual odd key"
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);
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// Handshake using assumed-even key (as production code does)
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let mut initiator = HandshakeState::new_initiator(kp_a, assumed_even_b);
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let mut responder = HandshakeState::new_responder(kp_b);
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let msg1 = initiator.write_message_1().unwrap();
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responder.read_message_1(&msg1).unwrap();
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let msg2 = responder.write_message_2().unwrap();
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initiator.read_message_2(&msg2).unwrap();
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assert!(initiator.is_complete());
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assert!(responder.is_complete());
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// Verify sessions can communicate
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let mut sender = initiator.into_session().unwrap();
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let mut receiver = responder.into_session().unwrap();
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let counter = sender.current_send_counter();
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let ciphertext = sender.encrypt(b"parity test").unwrap();
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let plaintext = receiver
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.decrypt_with_replay_check(&ciphertext, counter)
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.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(plaintext, b"parity test");
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}
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