Restructures /docs/ by reader purpose (tutorials, how-to, reference, design), adds the new-user-progression and operator-recipe content the prior layout lacked, runs an accuracy pass against current source across the pre-existing design docs, and rewrites the gateway feature-set documentation end-to-end around its actual operational profile (a niche feature designed for systems already serving DHCP/DNS to a LAN, with two independent halves — outbound LAN→mesh, inbound mesh→LAN — sharing one nftables table, one binary, and one control socket). Top-level README and getting-started rewritten around two equally-weighted deployment modes (overlay on existing IP networks; ground-up over non-IP transports). ## Additions - 11 new tutorials in docs/tutorials/: an 8-step new-user progression from single-daemon test-mesh peering through to a ground-up two-device mesh, an IPv6-adapter side-trip walkthrough, an Advanced Tutorials index, and a hand-held OpenWrt walk-through for fips-gateway deployment that exercises both halves of the feature. - 12 new how-tos in docs/how-to/: firewall activation, Nostr discovery (resolve / advertise / open across five scenarios), Tor onion (directory + control_port modes), UDP buffer tuning, unprivileged-user setup, persistent identity, host aliases, Bluetooth LE peering, MTU diagnostics, manual Linux-host gateway deployment (covers both halves), gateway troubleshooting (organised by half), and a section index. - 9 new reference docs in docs/reference/: configuration, wire formats, control-socket protocol, four CLI references (fips, fipsctl, fipstop, fips-gateway), security posture matrix, and Nostr events catalog. Configuration and wire-formats are renamed-and-extended from prior design/ versions; the other seven are net-new. - 6 new design docs: fips-concepts, fips-architecture, and fips-prior-work split out of the deleted fips-intro.md; consolidated fips-mmp and fips-mtu aggregations; and a new generic port-advertisement-and-nat-traversal doc (Nostr-signaled port advertisement plus UDP NAT-traversal protocol, FIPS as an example implementation, suitable for eventual NIP submission). - Top-level docs/getting-started.md walking through the binary-installer-only Install story. - packaging/common/hosts pre-populated with the eight public test-mesh nodes so shortnames resolve out of the box on every fresh install. ## Changes - 23 wire-format diagrams relocated to reference/diagrams/ alongside the wire-formats move. - 4 design diagrams corrected against source code (fips-protocol-stack, fips-identity-derivation, fips-coordinate-discovery, fips-routing-decision). - 10 pre-existing design docs reconciled with current source. Numeric corrections: stale link-MMP report bounds (now [1s, 5s] with 200 ms cold-start floor); UDP default MTU (now 1280, IPv6 minimum); node_addr formula (SHA-256(pubkey)[..16]); Noise patterns (IK at link, XK at session); peer-ACL semantics (strict allowlist requires ALL in peers.deny); daemon DNS upstream ([::1]:5354); on-the-wire bloom-filter size (1,071 bytes); obsolete Cargo-feature references (PR #79 dropped them) removed. - Transport framing tightened across the docs: TCP is for UDP-filtered networks (not NAT traversal); Tor is a deployment mode (not failover); WebSocket dropped (not a shipped FIPS transport); WiFi promoted to Implemented via Ethernet in infrastructure mode; classic-Bluetooth row removed (BLE is the only Bluetooth-mode transport). - docs/design/fips-gateway.md rewritten end-to-end to lead with the niche-feature framing and the two-halves structure. Title moved from "FIPS Outbound LAN Gateway" to "FIPS Gateway"; architecture section describes the common machinery (the fips-gateway service, the nftables table, the control socket) before splitting into separate "Outbound Half" and "Inbound Half" sections of equal weight; security considerations split per-half; no Future Work section (speculative directions live in the project tracker, not in protocol design docs). Inbound port forwarding is a first-class half rather than a buried "Implemented Extensions" subsection. - Gateway terminology unified across all gateway docs as a separate Linux service running alongside the fips daemon (its own systemd unit / OpenWrt init script). Container- pattern terms (sidecar) are reserved for the Docker/Kubernetes sidecar deployment examples — the testing/sidecar/ tree, examples/k8s-sidecar/, examples/sidecar-nostr-relay/, examples/wireguard-sidecar-macos/, and the related CHANGELOG / top-level README entries — where the term carries its standard container meaning. - Net-new design body content: rekey section in fips-mesh-layer (Noise IK msg1/msg2 over the established link, K-bit cutover, drain window, smaller-NodeAddr-wins tie-breaker on dual-init); Mesh Size Estimation and Antipoison FPR Cap sections in fips-bloom-filters; Mesh-Interface Query Filter subsection in fips-ipv6-adapter; failure-suppression knobs and clock- skew tolerance in fips-nostr-discovery; loop-rejection and mid-chain ancestor swap added to spanning-tree propagation / stability rules; Priority Chain in fips-mesh-operation renumbered to match the routing-decision diagram. - Top-level README: dropped the stale nostr-discovery cargo-feature parenthetical. docs/README.md and the four section READMEs (tutorials, how-to, reference, design) refreshed for the new structure; index rows reflect both halves of the gateway feature and the new fips-gateway CLI reference. - Cargo.toml [package.metadata.deb] assets path updated for the fips-security.md move; .gitignore /reference/ rule anchored to repo root so docs/reference/ is trackable. - packaging/openwrt-ipk/files/etc/fips/fips.yaml configuration-doc URL updated to the new docs/reference/configuration.md location. ## Deletions - docs/design/fips-intro.md (split into the three new intro design docs). - docs/design/document-relationships.svg (orphan, no longer referenced). - docs/proposals/ tree removed; the only proposal it contained (the Nostr UDP hole-punch protocol) was rewritten as the new generic design/port-advertisement-and-nat-traversal.md.
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Host a Service of Your Own
In reach-mesh-services you used ordinary IPv6 tools to reach services on other mesh nodes. This tutorial flips the direction. You will bring up a small HTTP server on your machine, make a deliberate choice about which interface it binds to, and turn on the mesh firewall to keep the exposure to what you intended. By the end you will have hosted your first peer-reachable service and made an informed decision about who can reach it.
The whole exercise should take about twenty minutes. You should have already worked through persistent-identity so that the npub your service is reachable at does not change between restarts.
What you'll build
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ your fips node │
│ │
│ python3 -m http.server │
│ --bind <fips0-addr> 8080 │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ fips0 fd97:….:Y ◀─── port 8080 open │
└────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
│
│ reachable as
│ http://<your-npub>.fips:8080/
▼
any mesh peer that can route to <your-npub>.fips
You will have:
- A single-page HTTP server bound to
fips0only — not the public internet, not your LAN, just the mesh. - The mesh firewall baseline active, default-deny on
fips0inbound, with one explicit drop-in that allows TCP/8080. - A clear understanding of which interface choice corresponds to which audience.
Why bind interface matters
The single most important decision when hosting a service is which interface (and therefore which audience) the service is exposed to. This is true for every IPv6 service, not just FIPS — but FIPS makes it stark because your machine often has several interfaces with very different exposure profiles.
Bind interface = exposure surface. A typical FIPS host has at least two distinct audiences:
fips0(fd97:…, reachable as<your-npub>.fips) — reachable only from FIPS peers that have a working link to your node. Bound by Noise authentication and (optionally) the peer ACL.eth0/wlan0(your LAN address) — reachable from anyone on your local network segment, with no FIPS auth in the way.When you run a server, the
--bindargument decides which of these audiences sees the service. Binding to a specific address opts in to one audience. Binding to[::]or0.0.0.0opts in to all of them at once — including any you forgot you had.Audit what's already listening. Bringing up
fips0adds a new audience to every service on this host that was already bound to0.0.0.0or[::]. SSH, your web server, a database — if any of them was listening on all interfaces before you joined the mesh, they are now reachable from mesh peers too. A quickss -tulnpwill show you everything currently listening and on which addresses. The mesh firewall (Step 5 below) is one way to bring those exposures back under explicit control; rebinding the affected services to a specific non-mesh address is another.
There is nothing FIPS-specific about this rule; it applies to SSH, web servers, databases, anything. FIPS just gives you the option of "mesh peers only" as a distinct audience, which most hosts otherwise don't have.
Step 1: Find your node's mesh address
You need the fd97:... address assigned to your fips0
adapter. Two equivalent ways to get it:
ip -6 addr show fips0
Look for the inet6 fd97:... line. The address up to the /
is what you want.
Or via the daemon:
sudo fipsctl show identities
The first JSON entry has local: true and a ula field — that
is your address.
For the rest of this tutorial we will write the address as
<your-fips0-addr>. Substitute the actual fd97:... value
when you run the commands. Save it to a shell variable for
convenience:
FIPS0_ADDR=$(ip -6 addr show fips0 | awk '/inet6 fd97:/ {print $2}' | cut -d/ -f1)
echo "$FIPS0_ADDR"
You should also know your npub from persistent-identity:
NPUB=$(sudo cat /etc/fips/fips.pub)
echo "$NPUB"
<your-npub>.fips and <your-fips0-addr> are two names for
the same destination.
Step 2: Bring up an HTTP server bound to fips0
Make a small directory with one file in it so the server has something to serve:
mkdir -p /tmp/mesh-demo
echo '<h1>Hello from the mesh</h1>' > /tmp/mesh-demo/index.html
cd /tmp/mesh-demo
Start a Python HTTP server bound to your fips0 address:
python3 -m http.server --bind "$FIPS0_ADDR" 8080
Leave the server running. The terminal will show:
Serving HTTP on fd97:... port 8080 (http://[fd97:...]:8080/) ...
Two things to notice:
- The "Serving HTTP on …" line names your
fd97:...address explicitly. Python is binding only to that one address. - The default would have been
0.0.0.0— which is not what you want here. Without--bind, the server would be reachable from your LAN and any public IP this host has, not just from the mesh.
Step 3: Verify the service locally
Open a second terminal. From the same host, fetch the page:
curl -6 "http://[$FIPS0_ADDR]:8080/"
Expect:
<h1>Hello from the mesh</h1>
Now fetch it by name. Both forms should work:
curl -6 "http://${NPUB}.fips:8080/"
The daemon's local DNS responder turned the npub-form name into
the fd97:... address, and the request landed at your HTTP
server.
What just happened. The kernel routed your local request via the loopback path because the destination address is assigned to one of your own interfaces. You exercised the client side (DNS, IPv6 socket open, HTTP request) and the server side (HTTP listener, response). What you have not yet verified is reachability from another mesh node. That is the next concern.
Step 4: Reachability from a mesh node
Any mesh node — a direct peer, or a node several hops away —
reaches your service the same way you reached test-us01 in
reach-mesh-services: it looks up
<your-npub>.fips, gets back your fd97:... address, opens
a TCP connection to it, and the FIPS data plane carries the
packets across the mesh to you. From the remote host the curl
looks identical to yours:
curl -6 "http://${NPUB}.fips:8080/"
If you have a second machine on the mesh — or you can ask
another operator to try it — this is the moment to confirm.
A node that can already ping6 ${NPUB}.fips should also be
able to fetch your page. If it can ping but the curl times
out, jump to Troubleshooting — but most
likely the firewall step in this tutorial has not happened
yet, so a remote attempt right now will succeed straight
through to your HTTP server.
That is the problem. With no firewall in place, any mesh node that can route to you — your direct peers, and every node beyond them in the mesh — can reach port 8080. You have not yet made a deliberate decision about whether you want that. The rest of this tutorial replaces the implicit "every port with a listener is reachable" with an explicit "only the ports I have opened are reachable, optionally only from specific mesh nodes." That is the firewall's job, and it is the only mechanism in play in the rest of this tutorial.
(There is a separate, unrelated control called the peer ACL that decides which npubs may establish a peer connection with your node at the transport layer. It is not part of the firewall and does not affect what is described below; Step 7 is a brief signpost to it.)
Step 5: Activate the mesh firewall baseline
FIPS ships a default-deny nftables baseline at
/etc/fips/fips.nft that restricts inbound traffic on fips0
to ICMPv6 echo and conntrack replies. The baseline is not
enabled by default — activation is an explicit step the
operator has to take.
Activate it:
sudo systemctl enable --now fips-firewall.service
This loads the table immediately and arranges for it to load on every subsequent boot. Confirm:
sudo nft list table inet fips
You will see one chain named inbound hooked at input,
roughly:
table inet fips {
chain inbound {
type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;
iifname != "fips0" return
ct state established,related accept
icmpv6 type echo-request accept
counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
}
}
The chain admits ICMPv6 echo (so ping6 from any mesh node
still works) and conntrack replies (so your outbound
connections still get their replies back). Everything else
inbound on fips0 hits the final counter ... drop.
What this changed. Your HTTP server is still running and still reachable from this same host (same-host traffic to
fd97:...goes via the loopback path, which hasiifname != "fips0"and short-circuits at the first rule). But any mesh node trying to reachfd97:...:8080now has its TCP SYN dropped before it can reach your server. From the remote end the connection times out.
So the firewall is in the right shape but in the wrong state for our purpose: we want mesh nodes to reach port 8080. The next step opens that one port.
Step 6: Open port 8080 via a drop-in
Drop-ins live under /etc/fips/fips.d/ with the .nft
suffix. Each file is included into the inbound chain at the
marked point and may contain any nftables rule lines valid in
that context.
Create one for your HTTP service:
sudo tee /etc/fips/fips.d/http-mesh-demo.nft >/dev/null <<'EOF'
tcp dport 8080 accept
EOF
Reload the firewall:
sudo systemctl reload-or-restart fips-firewall.service
Confirm the rule is live:
sudo nft list table inet fips
The inbound chain now contains your tcp dport 8080 accept
rule between the conntrack rule and the final counter drop.
A curl from any mesh node will now reach the HTTP server. The
path is: remote node's mesh data plane → forwarded across the
mesh → your direct peer's link to you → fips0 ingress →
inbound chain → matches tcp dport 8080 accept → delivered
to the HTTP server.
If you only want to expose the service to a specific node
or set of nodes, source-filter the rule. The address filter
applies to the mesh-source address as it arrives on fips0,
which is the originating node's address — not necessarily a
direct peer. Replace the drop-in contents with something like:
ip6 saddr fd97:1234:5678:9abc:def0:1234:5678:9abc tcp dport 8080 accept
The source address is the node's mesh address, which it
publishes in its fips.pub (and which you can resolve from
its npub). For multiple nodes, use a set:
ip6 saddr {
fd97:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:6666:7777,
fd97:8888:9999:aaaa:bbbb:cccc:dddd:eeee
} tcp dport 8080 accept
For the worked example, leave the drop-in unfiltered — any mesh node that can route to you can fetch your page.
Step 7: A note on the peer ACL
The firewall you just configured is the only control in scope for this tutorial. There is a separate, optional control called the peer ACL that you may run across in other docs; it is unrelated to the firewall and worth a sentence here only so you do not confuse the two.
The peer ACL decides which npubs may establish a peer
connection with your node at the transport layer. It does not
look at ports, drop-ins, or fips0 traffic. You do not need
it for this tutorial.
For when you do:
- ../how-to/enable-nostr-discovery.md — operator recipe.
- ../reference/security.md § Peer ACL — file format, evaluation order, alias handling.
Step 8: Stop the server and tidy up
When you are done, stop the HTTP server in the first terminal
with Ctrl-C. The drop-in stays in place; remove it if you
do not want port 8080 reachable after the demo:
sudo rm /etc/fips/fips.d/http-mesh-demo.nft
sudo systemctl reload-or-restart fips-firewall.service
The fips-firewall.service itself can stay enabled —
default-deny on fips0 is a sensible posture even with no
extra services running. To turn it back off:
sudo systemctl disable --now fips-firewall.service
What you've learned
- Bind interface = audience. Binding to a specific address
opts in to one audience; binding to wildcard
(
0.0.0.0/[::]) opts in to all of them, including ones you forgot you had. For mesh-only exposure, bind to yourfd97:...address. - Same-host loopback is misleading. A local curl to your
own
fd97:...address goes via the loopback path, not throughfips0ingress. To actually verify mesh-side reachability you need a second machine, or to read what the firewall is doing innft list table inet fips. - The mesh firewall is opt-in.
fips-firewall.serviceis not enabled by default. Once it is enabled,fips0is default-deny except for ICMPv6 echo and conntrack replies. - Ports open via drop-ins. Each file under
/etc/fips/fips.d/*.nftadds rules into theinboundchain. Source-filter withip6 saddrto scope a port to specific mesh nodes. - Two independent controls at two different layers. The
firewall is a layer-3 filter on
fips0: it controls which TCP/UDP ports are reachable and (optionally) which mesh source addresses may reach them. The peer ACL is a transport-layer admission filter on Noise handshakes: it controls which npubs may become direct peers of your node. They are unrelated — the ACL does not touch fips0 traffic, and the firewall does not look at npubs.
You now have the mental model for hosting any IPv6 service
behind a deliberate exposure policy. The mechanics generalize:
SSH on port 22, a database on port 5432, a custom protocol on
its own port — same --bind rule, same drop-in shape.
Troubleshooting
- A remote mesh node cannot reach the service after the
firewall reload. Check the drop-in syntax with
sudo nft -c -f /etc/fips/fips.nftbefore reloading; a syntax error in any drop-in causes the whole table to fail to load and the previous rules persist. Thensudo nft list table inet fipsto confirm yourtcp dport 8080 acceptrule is present in theinboundchain. - Local curl works, remote curl times out. The packet is
reaching
fips0ingress and being dropped by the baseline. Either your drop-in did not load (see above) or it has a source filter that excludes the remote node's address. - Local curl fails after binding to fips0. Double-check
that your
FIPS0_ADDRmatches the address shown inip -6 addr show fips0. The Python server message also echoes the bound address — confirm it starts withfd97:, not127.0.0.1or::. Address already in usefrom Python. Another process holds port 8080. Pick a different port (8081,9000, …) for both thepython3 -m http.serverinvocation and the drop-in.- Watch the firewall counter to confirm drops. The
counter ... dropline at the bottom of the chain increments on every dropped inbound packet. After a remote mesh node attempts to reach a port you have not opened,sudo nft list table inet fipswill show the counter packet count rising.
What's next
- ground-up-mesh.md — Bring up two devices on a shared physical link — Ethernet, WiFi, or Bluetooth — with no pre-existing IP infrastructure between them. The second deployment mode of FIPS, where the mesh is the network rather than an overlay on top of one. Coexists with overlay peers; the same daemon carries both.
For more depth on the firewall and ACL surface:
- ../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md
— operator recipes for the baseline, drop-in patterns,
and how to fold the baseline into an existing
nftables.conf. - ../reference/security.md — consolidated security reference: nftables baseline rules, drop-in format, peer ACL semantics, default exposures by transport, threat-resistance matrix.
- ../design/fips-security.md — threat model, why the baseline is opt-in, the metadata- privacy posture.
If you want to host a service that is not on a FIPS node — say,
an existing HTTP server on a regular LAN box — and expose it to
mesh peers through a fips-gateway, that's the inbound
port-forward mode: the gateway runs a mesh-side listener on fips0
and forwards to a LAN target. The operator recipe is at
../how-to/deploy-gateway.md#inbound-port-forwarding;
a hand-held walk-through on an OpenWrt AP is at
deploy-fips-gateway.md under "Advanced"
in README.md.