Files
fips/src/node/tests/bloom_poison.rs
T
Johnathan Corgan e1ae261eb2 node: wire the next-side XX handshake and rekey rejection sites
Adapt the typed RejectReason coverage to the Noise XX handshake: wire the
msg1/msg2/msg3 state-machine rejection sites in handlers/handshake.rs and
the rekey-initiator outbound sites in handlers/rekey.rs, and add the
XX-specific HandshakeStats counters. The shared RejectReason scaffold and
the branch-agnostic clusters come from the merged refactor-hotpath work;
this commit carries only the next-side delta.
2026-05-28 21:21:45 +00:00

173 lines
6.0 KiB
Rust

//! Direct tests for the M1 antipoison FPR cap in handle_filter_announce.
//!
//! These tests construct a minimal Node with a single synthetic peer,
//! then call handle_filter_announce directly with crafted FilterAnnounce
//! payloads. Focused on the ingress check semantics; broader
//! filter-exchange behavior is covered by the multi-node tests in
//! bloom.rs.
use super::*;
use crate::bloom::{BloomFilter, DEFAULT_FILTER_SIZE_BITS, DEFAULT_HASH_COUNT};
use crate::peer::ActivePeer;
use crate::protocol::FilterAnnounce;
/// Inject a synthetic active peer into the node with a known NodeAddr.
/// Returns the peer's NodeAddr.
fn inject_peer(node: &mut Node) -> NodeAddr {
let peer_identity = make_peer_identity();
let peer_addr = *peer_identity.node_addr();
let peer = ActivePeer::new(peer_identity, LinkId::new(1), 0);
node.peers.insert(peer_addr, peer);
peer_addr
}
/// Encode a FilterAnnounce to the payload format handle_filter_announce
/// expects (msg_type byte stripped).
fn encode_payload(announce: &FilterAnnounce) -> Vec<u8> {
let (mut full, _stats) = announce.encode().unwrap();
full.remove(0); // strip msg_type byte
full
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_m1_rejects_all_ones_filter_announce() {
let mut node = make_node();
let peer_addr = inject_peer(&mut node);
// Craft an all-ones FilterAnnounce (the observed-in-the-wild attack).
let all_ones = BloomFilter::from_bytes(
vec![0xFFu8; DEFAULT_FILTER_SIZE_BITS / 8],
DEFAULT_HASH_COUNT,
)
.unwrap();
let announce = FilterAnnounce::full(all_ones, 1, 1);
let payload = encode_payload(&announce);
let before_fill_exceeded = node.stats().bloom.fill_exceeded;
let before_accepted = node.stats().bloom.accepted;
node.handle_filter_announce(&peer_addr, &payload).await;
let after = &node.stats().bloom;
// While the typed-rejection rollout is in progress the call site bumps
// counter directly AND dispatches through record_reject, which
// hits the same counter. A later change will collapse this to a
// single increment by removing the legacy direct bump; for now
// the rejection-path event yields a +2 delta.
assert_eq!(
after.fill_exceeded,
before_fill_exceeded + 2,
"fill_exceeded counter must increment on all-ones rejection"
);
assert_eq!(
after.accepted, before_accepted,
"accepted counter must NOT increment on rejection"
);
// Peer state unchanged: no filter stored, sequence not advanced.
let peer = node.get_peer(&peer_addr).expect("peer still present");
assert!(
peer.inbound_filter().is_none(),
"peer must NOT have a stored filter after rejection"
);
assert_eq!(
peer.filter_sequence(),
0,
"peer filter_sequence must NOT advance on rejection"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_m1_accepts_sub_cap_filter() {
let mut node = make_node();
let peer_addr = inject_peer(&mut node);
// A legitimate filter with 50 entries — fill ~0.03, FPR ~2e-8,
// far below the 0.05 cap. Represents normal mesh traffic.
let mut filter = BloomFilter::new();
for i in 0..50u8 {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
bytes[0] = i;
filter.insert(&NodeAddr::from_bytes(bytes));
}
let announce = FilterAnnounce::full(filter, 1, 1);
let payload = encode_payload(&announce);
let before_fill_exceeded = node.stats().bloom.fill_exceeded;
let before_accepted = node.stats().bloom.accepted;
node.handle_filter_announce(&peer_addr, &payload).await;
let after = &node.stats().bloom;
assert_eq!(
after.fill_exceeded, before_fill_exceeded,
"fill_exceeded must NOT increment on legitimate sub-cap filter"
);
assert_eq!(
after.accepted,
before_accepted + 1,
"accepted must increment on legitimate filter"
);
// Peer state updated: filter stored, sequence advanced.
let peer = node.get_peer(&peer_addr).expect("peer still present");
assert!(
peer.inbound_filter().is_some(),
"peer must have a stored filter after acceptance"
);
assert_eq!(
peer.filter_sequence(),
1,
"peer filter_sequence must advance to announce's sequence"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_m1_sequence_not_advanced_allows_recovery() {
// Confirms the "keep prior filter, don't advance seq" rejection
// semantics: a compliant announce after a rejected one still
// succeeds at seq=1, because the rejected announce (also seq=1)
// did not advance the peer's recorded sequence.
let mut node = make_node();
let peer_addr = inject_peer(&mut node);
// First announce: all-ones, rejected.
let bad = BloomFilter::from_bytes(
vec![0xFFu8; DEFAULT_FILTER_SIZE_BITS / 8],
DEFAULT_HASH_COUNT,
)
.unwrap();
let bad_announce = FilterAnnounce::full(bad, 1, 1);
node.handle_filter_announce(&peer_addr, &encode_payload(&bad_announce))
.await;
assert_eq!(
node.get_peer(&peer_addr).unwrap().filter_sequence(),
0,
"rejected announce must not advance sequence"
);
// Second announce: legitimate, seq=1 (would be stale if rejection
// had advanced the recorded sequence). Must be accepted.
let mut good = BloomFilter::new();
for i in 0..10u8 {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
bytes[0] = i;
good.insert(&NodeAddr::from_bytes(bytes));
}
let good_announce = FilterAnnounce::full(good, 1, 1);
node.handle_filter_announce(&peer_addr, &encode_payload(&good_announce))
.await;
let peer = node.get_peer(&peer_addr).unwrap();
assert!(
peer.inbound_filter().is_some(),
"compliant announce at same seq must be accepted after rejection"
);
assert_eq!(peer.filter_sequence(), 1);
// Direct bump + record_reject dispatch both increment the same
// counter while the typed-rejection rollout is in progress. A later
// change collapses these back to a single increment.
assert_eq!(node.stats().bloom.fill_exceeded, 2);
assert_eq!(node.stats().bloom.accepted, 1);
}