## FLP Wire Format Revision Replace the 1-byte discriminator with a structured wire format: - 4-byte common prefix (ver+phase, flags, payload_len) and 16-byte established frame header with AEAD AAD binding - 5-byte encrypted inner header (4-byte session-relative timestamp + 1-byte message type) on all link messages - Phase-based packet dispatch replacing discriminator-based dispatch - SessionDatagram reassigned from type 0x40 to 0x00; add SenderReport (0x01) and ReceiverReport (0x02) message types for MMP - SessionDatagram: rename hop_limit to ttl, add path_mtu field (u16 LE) with min(datagram.path_mtu, transport.mtu()) at forwarding - Updated handshake packets (msg1: 87->90 bytes, msg2: 42->45 bytes) - FIPS_OVERHEAD updated from 135 to 144 bytes ## MMP Link-Layer Measurement Protocol Add the Metrics Measurement Protocol for link quality measurement between FIPS peers. Measures RTT, loss, jitter, throughput, OWD trend, and ETX from periodic sender/receiver reports exchanged over established links. Module layout: - mmp/algorithms.rs: JitterEstimator, SrttEstimator, DualEwma, OwdTrend, SpinBit, ETX computation - mmp/report.rs: SenderReport (48B) and ReceiverReport (68B) wire format - mmp/sender.rs: per-peer TX counters and interval tracking - mmp/receiver.rs: per-peer RX counters, jitter, loss, gap tracking - mmp/metrics.rs: derived metrics from report processing (SRTT, goodput_bps) - mmp/mod.rs: MmpMode (Full/Lightweight/Minimal), MmpConfig, MmpPeerState - node/handlers/mmp.rs: report dispatch, timer-driven generation, operator logging (periodic + teardown) Integration: per-frame TX/RX hooks in encrypted message handling, report dispatch from link message router, timer-driven generation from tick handler, and periodic operator logging with throughput formatting. Three operating modes: Full (sender + receiver reports, spin bit, CE echo), Lightweight (receiver reports only), Minimal (spin bit + CE echo only). ## Design Documentation Updated FLP sections across all design documents to match the implemented wire format, including revised overhead calculations and numeric values. 568 tests pass, clippy clean.
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FIPS Wire Formats
This document is the comprehensive wire format reference for all three protocol layers. It covers transport framing, link-layer message formats, and session-layer message formats, with an encapsulation walkthrough showing how application data is wrapped through each layer.
Encoding Rules
- All multi-byte integers are little-endian (LE)
- NodeAddr is 16 bytes — truncated SHA-256 hash of public key
- Signatures are 64 bytes — secp256k1 Schnorr
- Variable-length arrays use a 2-byte u16 LE count prefix followed by that many items
- Public keys are 33 bytes — compressed secp256k1 (02/03 prefix + 32 bytes)
Transport Framing
UDP
FIPS packets are carried directly in UDP datagrams. No additional framing is needed — each UDP datagram contains exactly one FIPS link-layer packet.
Stream Transports (future direction)
TCP, WebSocket, and Tor transports provide a byte stream, not datagrams. The
common prefix payload_len field provides integrated stream framing — the
receiver reads the 4-byte common prefix, then reads exactly the number of
bytes indicated by payload_len (plus any phase-specific header and AEAD
tag). No separate length prefix is needed.
Link-Layer Formats
All FLP packets begin with a 4-byte common prefix that identifies the protocol version, session lifecycle phase, per-packet flags, and payload length.
Common Prefix (4 bytes)
┌──────────────────────┬───────────┬───────────────┐
│ ver(4) + phase(4) │ flags │ payload_len │
│ 1 byte │ 1 byte │ 2 bytes LE │
└──────────────────────┴───────────┴───────────────┘
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| version | 4 bits (high) | Protocol version. Currently 0x0 |
| phase | 4 bits (low) | Session lifecycle phase (see table) |
| flags | 1 byte | Per-packet signal flags (zero during handshake) |
| payload_len | 2 bytes LE | Length of payload after phase-specific header, excluding AEAD tag |
Phase Table
| Phase | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0 | Established frame | Post-handshake encrypted traffic |
| 0x1 | Noise IK msg1 | Handshake initiation |
| 0x2 | Noise IK msg2 | Handshake response |
Flags (Established Phase Only)
| Bit | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | K (key epoch) | Selects active key during rekeying |
| 1 | CE | Congestion Experienced echo |
| 2 | SP (spin bit) | RTT measurement |
| 3-7 | — | Reserved (must be zero) |
Flags must be zero in handshake packets (phase 0x1 and 0x2).
Established Frame (phase 0x0)
All post-handshake traffic between authenticated peers. Contains one encrypted link-layer message.
Outer header (16 bytes, used as AEAD AAD):
┌──────────────────────┬───────────┬───────────────┬──────────────┬──────────┐
│ ver(4) + phase(4) │ flags │ payload_len │ receiver_idx │ counter │
│ 1 byte │ 1 byte │ 2 bytes LE │ 4 bytes LE │ 8 bytes LE│
└──────────────────────┴───────────┴───────────────┴──────────────┴──────────┘
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=0, flags, payload_len |
| receiver_idx | 4 bytes LE | Session index for O(1) lookup |
| counter | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic nonce, used as AEAD nonce and for replay detection |
The entire 16-byte header is authenticated as Associated Data (AAD) in the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction.
Encrypted inner header (5 bytes, first bytes of plaintext):
┌───────────────┬──────────┐
│ timestamp │ msg_type │
│ 4 bytes LE │ 1 byte │
└───────────────┴──────────┘
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| timestamp | 4 bytes LE | Session-relative milliseconds (u32) |
| msg_type | 1 byte | Link-layer message type |
After decryption, the plaintext begins with the 4-byte timestamp followed by the 1-byte message type and message-specific fields.
Complete encrypted frame:
┌──────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┐
│ outer header (16 bytes, used as AAD) │ ciphertext + AEAD tag │
│ │ (inner_hdr + body) + 16 │
└──────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┘
Total overhead: 37 bytes (16 outer + 5 inner + 16 AEAD tag)
Minimum frame: 37 bytes (empty body)
Message Type Table
| Type | Message | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | SessionDatagram | Encapsulated session-layer payload for forwarding |
| 0x01 | SenderReport | MMP sender-side report (reserved) |
| 0x02 | ReceiverReport | MMP receiver-side report (reserved) |
| 0x10 | TreeAnnounce | Spanning tree state announcement |
| 0x20 | FilterAnnounce | Bloom filter reachability update |
| 0x30 | LookupRequest | Coordinate discovery request |
| 0x31 | LookupResponse | Coordinate discovery response |
| 0x50 | Disconnect | Orderly link teardown |
| 0x51 | Keepalive | Keepalive probe (reserved) |
Noise IK Message 1 (phase 0x1)
Handshake initiation from connecting party.
┌──────────────────────┬─────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ common prefix │ sender_idx │ Noise IK message 1 │
│ 4 bytes │ 4 bytes LE │ 82 bytes │
└──────────────────────┴─────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────┘
Total: 90 bytes
Common prefix: ver=0, phase=0x1, flags=0, payload_len=86 (4 + 82).
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=1, flags=0, payload_len |
| sender_idx | 4 bytes LE | Initiator's session index (becomes receiver's receiver_idx) |
| noise_msg1 | 82 bytes | Noise IK first message |
Noise msg1 breakdown (82 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | ephemeral_pubkey | 33 bytes | Initiator's ephemeral key (compressed secp256k1) |
| 33 | encrypted_static | 33 bytes | Initiator's static key (encrypted with es key) |
| 66 | tag | 16 bytes | AEAD tag for encrypted_static |
Noise pattern: -> e, es, s, ss
Noise IK Message 2 (phase 0x2)
Handshake response from responder.
┌──────────────────────┬─────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────────────────┐
│ common prefix │ sender_idx │ receiver_idx │ Noise IK message 2 │
│ 4 bytes │ 4 bytes LE │ 4 bytes LE │ 33 bytes │
└──────────────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────┴──────────────────────────┘
Total: 45 bytes
Common prefix: ver=0, phase=0x2, flags=0, payload_len=41 (4 + 4 + 33).
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=2, flags=0, payload_len |
| sender_idx | 4 bytes LE | Responder's session index |
| receiver_idx | 4 bytes LE | Echo of initiator's sender_idx from msg1 |
| noise_msg2 | 33 bytes | Noise IK second message |
Noise msg2 breakdown (33 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | ephemeral_pubkey | 33 bytes | Responder's ephemeral key (compressed secp256k1) |
Noise pattern: <- e, ee, se
After msg2, both parties derive identical symmetric session keys.
Index Semantics
Each party in a link session maintains two indices:
| Index | Chosen By | Used By | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| our_index | Us | Them | They include this as receiver_idx in packets to us |
| their_index | Them | Us | We include this as receiver_idx in packets to them |
Handshake Flow
Initiator Responder
--------- ---------
generates sender_idx
generates ephemeral keypair
[0x01|flags=0|len] | sender_idx | noise_msg1
------------------------------------------------>
validates msg1
learns initiator's static key
generates sender_idx
generates ephemeral keypair
[0x02|flags=0|len] | sender_idx | receiver_idx | noise_msg2
<------------------------------------------------
validates msg2
derives session keys
=============== HANDSHAKE COMPLETE ===============
First encrypted frame:
[0x00|flags|len] | receiver_idx | counter=0 | ciphertext+tag
------------------------------------------------>
Link-Layer Message Types
These messages are carried as plaintext inside encrypted frames (phase 0x0). After decryption of the AEAD ciphertext, the plaintext begins with a 4-byte session-relative timestamp followed by the 1-byte message type and message-specific fields.
TreeAnnounce (0x10)
Spanning tree state announcement, exchanged between direct peers only.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x10 |
| 1 | version | 1 byte | 0x01 (v1) |
| 2 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic counter, increments on parent change |
| 10 | timestamp | 8 bytes LE | Unix seconds |
| 18 | parent | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of selected parent (self = root) |
| 34 | ancestry_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of AncestryEntry records |
| 36 | ancestry | 32 x n bytes | AncestryEntry array (self -> root) |
| 36 + 32n | signature | 64 bytes | Schnorr signature over entire message |
AncestryEntry (32 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | node_addr | 16 bytes | Node's routing identifier |
| 16 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Node's sequence number |
| 24 | timestamp | 8 bytes LE | Node's Unix timestamp |
Size: 100 + (n x 32) bytes, where n = ancestry_count (depth + 1,
includes self)
| Tree Depth | Payload | With Link Overhead |
|---|---|---|
| 0 (root) | 132 bytes | 169 bytes |
| 3 | 228 bytes | 265 bytes |
| 5 | 292 bytes | 329 bytes |
| 10 | 452 bytes | 489 bytes |
FilterAnnounce (0x20)
Bloom filter reachability update, exchanged between direct peers only.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x20 |
| 1 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic counter for freshness |
| 9 | hash_count | 1 byte | Number of hash functions (5 in v1) |
| 10 | size_class | 1 byte | Filter size: 512 << size_class bytes |
| 11 | filter_bits | variable | Bloom filter bit array |
Size class table:
| size_class | Bytes | Bits | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 512 | 4,096 | Reserved |
| 1 | 1,024 | 8,192 | v1 (MUST use) |
| 2 | 2,048 | 16,384 | Reserved |
| 3 | 4,096 | 32,768 | Reserved |
v1 payload: 1,035 bytes (11 header + 1,024 filter). With link overhead: 1,072 bytes.
LookupRequest (0x30)
Coordinate discovery request, flooded through the mesh.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x30 |
| 1 | request_id | 8 bytes LE | Unique random identifier |
| 9 | target | 16 bytes | NodeAddr being sought |
| 25 | origin | 16 bytes | Requester's NodeAddr |
| 41 | ttl | 1 byte | Remaining hops (default 64) |
| 42 | origin_coords_cnt | 2 bytes LE | Number of coordinate entries |
| 44 | origin_coords | 16 x n bytes | Requester's ancestry (NodeAddr only) |
| 44 + 16n | visited_hash_cnt | 1 byte | Hash count for visited filter |
| 45 + 16n | visited_bits | 256 bytes | Compact bloom of visited nodes |
Size: 301 + (n x 16) bytes, where n = origin depth + 1
| Origin Depth | Payload |
|---|---|
| 3 | 349 bytes |
| 5 | 381 bytes |
| 10 | 461 bytes |
LookupResponse (0x31)
Coordinate discovery response, greedy-routed back to requester.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x31 |
| 1 | request_id | 8 bytes LE | Echoes the request's ID |
| 9 | target | 16 bytes | NodeAddr that was found |
| 25 | target_coords_cnt | 2 bytes LE | Number of coordinate entries |
| 27 | target_coords | 16 x n bytes | Target's ancestry (NodeAddr only) |
| 27 + 16n | proof | 64 bytes | Schnorr signature over (request_id || target) |
Size: 91 + (n x 16) bytes
| Target Depth | Payload |
|---|---|
| 3 | 139 bytes |
| 5 | 171 bytes |
| 10 | 251 bytes |
Proof coverage: Signs (request_id || target) only — coordinates are
excluded so the proof survives tree reconvergence during the lookup
round-trip.
SessionDatagram (0x00)
Encapsulated session-layer payload for multi-hop forwarding.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x00 |
| 1 | ttl | 1 byte | Remaining hops, decremented each hop |
| 2 | path_mtu | 2 bytes LE | Path MTU, min'd at each forwarding hop |
| 4 | src_addr | 16 bytes | Source NodeAddr |
| 20 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | Destination NodeAddr |
| 36 | payload | variable | Session-layer message |
Fixed header: 36 bytes (SESSION_DATAGRAM_HEADER_SIZE)
The path_mtu field is initialized to u16::MAX by the sender and each
forwarding hop applies min(path_mtu, outgoing_link_mtu), giving the
receiver an estimate of the minimum MTU along the path.
The payload is opaque to transit nodes — session-layer encrypted independently of link encryption.
Disconnect (0x50)
Orderly link teardown with reason code.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x50 |
| 1 | reason | 1 byte | Disconnect reason code |
Reason codes:
| Code | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | Shutdown | Normal operator-requested stop |
| 0x01 | Restart | Restarting, may reconnect soon |
| 0x02 | ProtocolError | Protocol error encountered |
| 0x03 | TransportFailure | Transport failure |
| 0x04 | ResourceExhaustion | Memory or connection limit |
| 0x05 | SecurityViolation | Authentication or policy violation |
| 0x06 | ConfigurationChange | Peer removed from configuration |
| 0x07 | Timeout | Keepalive or stale detection timeout |
| 0xFF | Other | Unspecified reason |
Session-Layer Message Types
These messages are carried as the payload of a SessionDatagram (0x00).
SessionSetup (0x00)
Establishes a session and warms transit coordinate caches.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x00 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Bit 0: REQUEST_ACK, Bit 1: BIDIRECTIONAL |
| 2 | src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of source coordinate entries |
| 4 | src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Source's ancestry (NodeAddr, self -> root) |
| ... | dest_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of dest coordinate entries |
| ... | dest_coords | 16 x m bytes | Destination's ancestry |
| ... | handshake_len | 2 bytes LE | Noise payload length |
| ... | handshake_payload | variable | Noise IK msg1 (82 bytes typical) |
Example (depth-3 source, depth-4 destination):
SessionDatagram header: 36 bytes
SessionSetup payload: 1 + 1 + 2 + 48 + 2 + 64 + 2 + 82 = 202 bytes
Total: 238 bytes
SessionAck (0x01)
Confirms session establishment, completes the Noise handshake.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x01 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of coordinate entries |
| 4 | src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Acknowledger's ancestry (for cache warming) |
| ... | handshake_len | 2 bytes LE | Noise payload length |
| ... | handshake_payload | variable | Noise IK msg2 (33 bytes typical) |
DataPacket (0x10)
Encrypted application data with explicit replay protection counter.
Minimal header (COORDS_PRESENT = 0):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x10 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Bit 0: COORDS_PRESENT |
| 2 | counter | 8 bytes LE | Session encryption counter / replay nonce |
| 10 | payload_length | 2 bytes LE | Length of encrypted payload |
| 12 | payload | variable | Encrypted application data + 16-byte AEAD tag |
Header size: 12 bytes (DATA_HEADER_SIZE)
With coordinates (COORDS_PRESENT = 1):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x10 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | 0x01 (COORDS_PRESENT) |
| 2 | counter | 8 bytes LE | Session encryption counter |
| 10 | payload_length | 2 bytes LE | Length of encrypted payload |
| 12 | src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Source coordinate entries |
| 14 | src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Source's ancestry |
| ... | dest_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Dest coordinate entries |
| ... | dest_coords | 16 x m bytes | Destination's ancestry |
| ... | payload | variable | Encrypted application data |
CoordsRequired (0x20)
Link-layer error signal — transit node lacks coordinates for destination. Plaintext (not end-to-end encrypted), generated by transit nodes.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x20 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | NodeAddr we couldn't route to |
| 18 | reporter | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of reporting router |
Payload: 34 bytes. Wrapped in SessionDatagram: 70 bytes total.
PathBroken (0x21)
Link-layer error signal — greedy routing reached a dead end. Plaintext, generated by transit nodes.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x21 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | Unreachable NodeAddr |
| 18 | reporter | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of reporting router |
| 34 | last_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of stale coordinate entries |
| 36 | last_known_coords | 16 x n bytes | Stale coordinates that failed |
Encapsulation Walkthrough
A complete picture of how application data is wrapped through each layer.
Application Data -> Wire
Starting with an application sending a 1024-byte payload to a destination:
Layer 4: Application data
1024 bytes
Layer 3: Session encryption (FSP)
DataPacket header (12 bytes) + encrypted payload (1024) + AEAD tag (16)
= 1052 bytes
Layer 2: SessionDatagram envelope (FLP routing)
msg_type (1) + ttl (1) + path_mtu (2) + src_addr (16) + dest_addr (16) + payload (1052)
= 1088 bytes
Layer 1: Link encryption (FLP per-hop)
outer header (16) + encrypted(inner_hdr (5) + datagram (1088)) + AEAD tag (16)
= 1125 bytes
Layer 0: Transport
UDP datagram containing 1125 bytes
Overhead Budget
| Layer | Overhead | Component |
|---|---|---|
| Link encryption | 37 bytes | 16 outer header (AAD) + 5 inner header + 16 AEAD tag |
| SessionDatagram | 36 bytes | 1 type + 1 ttl + 2 path_mtu + 16 src + 16 dest |
| DataPacket header | 12 bytes | 1 type + 1 flags + 8 counter + 2 length |
| Session AEAD tag | 16 bytes | Poly1305 tag on session-encrypted payload |
| Minimal total | 101 bytes | |
| Coordinates (if present) | ~43 bytes | Varies with tree depth |
| Worst case | 144 bytes | FIPS_OVERHEAD constant |
At Each Transit Node
1. Receive UDP datagram
2. Parse common prefix -> version, phase, flags, payload_len
3. Phase 0x0 -> established frame
4. Look up (transport_id, receiver_idx) -> session
5. Check replay window (counter)
6. Decrypt with link keys (16-byte header as AAD) -> plaintext
7. Strip inner header -> timestamp, msg_type
8. msg_type 0x00 -> SessionDatagram
9. Read dest_addr -> routing decision
10. Decrement ttl, min path_mtu
11. Re-encrypt with next-hop link keys
12. Send via next-hop transport
Transit nodes see the SessionDatagram envelope (src_addr, dest_addr, ttl, path_mtu) but cannot read the session-layer payload (encrypted with endpoint session keys).
Size Summary
Handshake Messages
| Message | Size |
|---|---|
| Noise IK msg1 | 90 bytes |
| Noise IK msg2 | 45 bytes |
Link-Layer Messages (inside encrypted frame)
| Message | Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TreeAnnounce | 100 + 32n bytes | n = depth + 1 |
| FilterAnnounce | 1,035 bytes | v1 (1KB filter) |
| LookupRequest | 301 + 16n bytes | n = origin depth + 1 |
| LookupResponse | 91 + 16n bytes | n = target depth + 1 |
| SessionDatagram | 36 + payload bytes | Fixed 36-byte header |
| Disconnect | 2 bytes |
Session-Layer Messages (inside SessionDatagram)
| Message | Typical Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SessionSetup | ~200 bytes | Depth-dependent |
| SessionAck | ~80 bytes | Depth-dependent |
| DataPacket (minimal) | 12 + payload bytes | Steady state |
| DataPacket (with coords) | 12 + ~130 + payload bytes | Warmup/recovery |
| CoordsRequired | 34 bytes | Fixed |
| PathBroken | 36 + 16n bytes | Includes stale coords |
Complete Packet Sizes (link + session)
| Scenario | Wire Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Encrypted frame minimum | 37 bytes | Empty body |
| SessionDatagram + DataPacket (minimal) | 37 + 36 + 12 + payload + 16 | 101 + payload |
| SessionDatagram + DataPacket (with coords) | ~144 + payload | Worst case |
| SessionDatagram + SessionSetup | ~275 bytes | Depth-3, both dirs |
| SessionDatagram + CoordsRequired | 37 + 36 + 34 = 107 bytes | Including link overhead |
References
- fips-link-layer.md — FLP behavioral specification
- fips-session-layer.md — FSP behavioral specification
- fips-transport-layer.md — Transport framing
- fips-mesh-operation.md — How messages work together
- fips-ipv6-adapter.md — MTU enforcement