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fips/.github
Johnathan Corgan d399f8e07d Pin every GitHub Action to a commit SHA, and verify the nak download
Not one action reference in this repository was pinned. Every uses: line named
a mutable tag, and one named a branch. That includes the jobs holding the AUR
deploy key, the jobs with release write scope, and the packaging jobs that run
with a signing key in the environment, so whoever controls one of those action
repositories could repoint a tag into a job holding our credentials.

Sixty-two of the sixty-six references are now full commit SHAs with the
original tag kept as a trailing comment, so a reader can still tell which
release a pin is. Each SHA was resolved from the upstream peeled tag. Four
references are left unpinned and justified in one place rather than silently:
two actions select the tool they install from the ref name itself, so a bare
SHA hands them a hex string where a toolchain name belongs and the step fails.
Pinning those means moving the selection into with:, which changes what
resolves, and that is a separate decision from pinning.

A guard enforces the form on every sweep, wired into the parity job and the
local runner beside the existing checkers. It accepts only owner/repo@40-hex
with a mandatory trailing comment, treats an unreadable tree as exit 2 rather
than as a pass, and its header names what it does not cover: the actions that
pinned actions themselves invoke, the pip and cargo installs that are version
pinned at best, and anything fetched at run time.

The sharper hole was not the tags. The OpenWrt packaging workflow fetched a
helper binary straight from a release URL with no verification, in two jobs
that hold a signing key, which is code execution from a third-party host into a
credentialed job and needs nobody to retag anything. That download now goes
through a shared script with per-architecture pinned SHA-256 constants,
modelled on the zig block already in that workflow. Upstream publishes no
checksum document, so the provenance comment records the asset URL and the date
the hashes were taken by downloading rather than pretending they were verified
against a published sum.
2026-08-11 15:44:07 +00:00
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