fips/src/node/handlers/forwarding.rs

//! SessionDatagram forwarding handler.
//!
//! Handles incoming SessionDatagram (0x00) link messages: decodes the
//! envelope, performs coordinate cache warming from plaintext session-layer
//! headers, delivers locally when the datagram is addressed to this node,
//! otherwise enforces the transit hop limit and routes to the next hop, and
//! generates error signals on routing failure.

use crate::NodeAddr;
use crate::node::reject::ForwardingReject;
use crate::node::session_wire::{
    FSP_COMMON_PREFIX_SIZE, FSP_HEADER_SIZE, FSP_PHASE_ESTABLISHED, FSP_PHASE_MSG1, FSP_PHASE_MSG2,
    FspCommonPrefix, FspEncryptedHeader, parse_encrypted_coords,
};
use crate::node::{Node, NodeError};
use crate::protocol::{
    CoordsRequired, MtuExceeded, PathBroken, SessionAck, SessionDatagram, SessionDatagramRef,
    SessionSetup,
};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tracing::{debug, warn};

impl Node {
    /// Handle an incoming SessionDatagram from a peer.
    ///
    /// Called by `dispatch_link_message` for msg_type 0x00. The payload
    /// has already had its msg_type byte stripped by dispatch.
    pub(in crate::node) async fn handle_session_datagram(
        &mut self,
        from: &NodeAddr,
        payload: &[u8],
        incoming_ce: bool,
    ) {
        self.metrics().forwarding.record_received(payload.len());

        let datagram_ref = match SessionDatagramRef::decode(payload) {
            Ok(dg) => dg,
            Err(e) => {
                self.metrics()
                    .forwarding
                    .record_reject_bytes(ForwardingReject::DecodeError, payload.len());
                debug!(error = %e, "Malformed SessionDatagram");
                return;
            }
        };

        // Coordinate cache warming from plaintext session-layer headers.
        // Runs ahead of both the delivery and the TTL decisions: the coords
        // a peer put on the wire are equally valid whichever way those go.
        self.try_warm_coord_cache_ref(&datagram_ref, payload.len());

        // Local delivery: dispatch to session layer handlers without
        // materializing an owned SessionDatagram payload Vec. Delivery to
        // the addressed node is *not* TTL-gated — under IP semantics the
        // TTL governs forwarding, not delivery to the addressed host — so
        // this test precedes the TTL gate below.
        if datagram_ref.dest_addr == *self.node_addr() {
            self.metrics().forwarding.record_delivered(payload.len());
            self.handle_session_payload(
                &datagram_ref.src_addr,
                from,
                datagram_ref.payload,
                datagram_ref.path_mtu,
                incoming_ce,
            )
            .await;
            return;
        }

        // TTL enforcement on the transit path: decrement first, then drop if
        // the datagram would leave with a TTL of zero. `saturating_sub` folds
        // the already-exhausted arrival (ttl=0) into the same test as the
        // last-hop arrival (ttl=1); neither is transmitted.
        let forwarded_ttl = datagram_ref.ttl.saturating_sub(1);
        if forwarded_ttl == 0 {
            self.metrics()
                .forwarding
                .record_reject_bytes(ForwardingReject::TtlExhausted, payload.len());
            debug!(
                src = %datagram_ref.src_addr,
                dest = %datagram_ref.dest_addr,
                ttl = datagram_ref.ttl,
                "SessionDatagram TTL exhausted, dropping"
            );
            return;
        }

        let mut datagram = datagram_ref.into_owned();
        datagram.ttl = forwarded_ttl;

        // Find next hop toward destination
        let next_hop_addr = match self.find_next_hop(&datagram.dest_addr) {
            Some(peer) => *peer.node_addr(),
            None => {
                self.metrics()
                    .forwarding
                    .record_reject_bytes(ForwardingReject::NoRoute, payload.len());
                debug!(
                    src = %self.peer_display_name(&datagram.src_addr),
                    dest = %self.peer_display_name(&datagram.dest_addr),
                    bytes = payload.len(),
                    "Dropping transit SessionDatagram: no route to destination"
                );
                self.send_routing_error(&datagram).await;
                return;
            }
        };

        // Apply path_mtu min() from the outgoing link's transport MTU
        if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get(&next_hop_addr)
            && let Some(tid) = peer.transport_id()
            && let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&tid)
        {
            if let Some(addr) = peer.current_addr() {
                datagram.path_mtu = datagram.path_mtu.min(transport.link_mtu(addr));
            } else {
                datagram.path_mtu = datagram.path_mtu.min(transport.mtu());
            }
        }

        // ECN CE relay: propagate incoming CE and detect local congestion
        let local_congestion = self.detect_congestion(&next_hop_addr);
        let outgoing_ce = incoming_ce || local_congestion;
        if local_congestion {
            self.metrics().congestion.congestion_detected.inc();
            let now = Instant::now();
            let should_log = self
                .last_congestion_log
                .map(|t| now.duration_since(t) >= Duration::from_secs(5))
                .unwrap_or(true);
            if should_log {
                self.last_congestion_log = Some(now);
                debug!(next_hop = %next_hop_addr, "Congestion detected, CE flag set on forwarded packet");
            }
        }

        // Forward: re-encode (includes 0x00 type byte) and send
        let encoded = datagram.encode();
        if let Err(e) = self
            .send_encrypted_link_message_with_ce(&next_hop_addr, &encoded, outgoing_ce)
            .await
        {
            match e {
                NodeError::MtuExceeded { mtu, .. } => {
                    self.metrics()
                        .forwarding
                        .record_reject_bytes(ForwardingReject::MtuExceeded, payload.len());
                    self.send_mtu_exceeded_error(&datagram, mtu).await;
                }
                _ => {
                    self.metrics()
                        .forwarding
                        .record_reject_bytes(ForwardingReject::SendError, payload.len());
                    debug!(
                        next_hop = %next_hop_addr,
                        dest = %datagram.dest_addr,
                        error = %e,
                        "Failed to forward SessionDatagram"
                    );
                }
            }
        } else {
            self.metrics().forwarding.record_forwarded(encoded.len());
            // Classify this transit forward by route class (partition of
            // forwarded_packets). Done here, at the data-plane chokepoint, so
            // the error-signal routing callers of find_next_hop are excluded.
            let class = self.classify_forward(&datagram.dest_addr, &next_hop_addr);
            self.metrics().forwarding.record_route_class(class);
            if outgoing_ce {
                self.metrics().congestion.ce_forwarded.inc();
            }
        }
    }

    /// Attempt to warm the coordinate cache from session-layer payload headers.
    ///
    /// Transit routers parse the 4-byte FSP common prefix to identify message
    /// type, then extract plaintext coordinate fields from:
    /// - SessionSetup (phase 0x1): src_coords + dest_coords
    /// - SessionAck (phase 0x2): src_coords
    /// - Encrypted with CP flag (phase 0x0): cleartext coords between header and ciphertext
    ///
    /// Decode failures are logged and silently ignored — they don't block
    /// forwarding.
    ///
    /// `outer_len` is the length of the msg_type-stripped `SessionDatagram`
    /// buffer this view was decoded from. It is carried in rather than
    /// reconstructed from the header size so the malformed-frame byte counter
    /// measures the same population as its siblings — which are charged the
    /// outer slice — instead of the inner FSP payload.
    fn try_warm_coord_cache_ref(&mut self, datagram: &SessionDatagramRef<'_>, outer_len: usize) {
        let prefix = match FspCommonPrefix::parse(datagram.payload) {
            Some(p) => p,
            None => return,
        };

        let inner = &datagram.payload[FSP_COMMON_PREFIX_SIZE..];

        let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
            .unwrap_or(0);

        match prefix.phase {
            FSP_PHASE_MSG1 => match SessionSetup::decode(inner) {
                Ok(setup) => {
                    self.coord_cache_mut()
                        .insert(datagram.src_addr, setup.src_coords, now_ms);
                    self.coord_cache_mut()
                        .insert(datagram.dest_addr, setup.dest_coords, now_ms);
                    debug!(
                        src = %datagram.src_addr,
                        dest = %datagram.dest_addr,
                        "Cached coords from SessionSetup"
                    );
                }
                Err(e) => {
                    debug!(error = %e, "Failed to decode SessionSetup for cache warming");
                }
            },
            FSP_PHASE_MSG2 => match SessionAck::decode(inner) {
                Ok(ack) => {
                    self.coord_cache_mut()
                        .insert(datagram.src_addr, ack.src_coords, now_ms);
                    self.coord_cache_mut()
                        .insert(datagram.dest_addr, ack.dest_coords, now_ms);
                    debug!(
                        src = %datagram.src_addr,
                        dest = %datagram.dest_addr,
                        "Cached coords from SessionAck"
                    );
                }
                Err(e) => {
                    debug!(error = %e, "Failed to decode SessionAck for cache warming");
                }
            },
            FSP_PHASE_ESTABLISHED if prefix.has_coords() => {
                // CP flag set: coords in cleartext between header and ciphertext.
                // Parse coords from the cleartext section after the 12-byte header.
                // Re-parse with the encrypted-header parser — the same guard the
                // local-delivery path uses — so the slice below is bounded by
                // FSP_ENCRYPTED_MIN_SIZE and not by the 4-byte prefix check.
                if FspEncryptedHeader::parse(datagram.payload).is_none() {
                    // Counter is the always-on surface; the debug fields are the
                    // drill-down that separates a short frame from a bad version
                    // or a U-flagged one. The level stays at debug: any peer past
                    // the handshake can drive this at line rate.
                    self.metrics().forwarding.record_warm_malformed(outer_len);
                    debug!(
                        len = datagram.payload.len(),
                        outer_len,
                        version = prefix.version,
                        flags = prefix.flags,
                        "Not a well-formed encrypted FSP message; not warming coords"
                    );
                    return;
                }
                let coord_data = &datagram.payload[FSP_HEADER_SIZE..];
                match parse_encrypted_coords(coord_data) {
                    Ok((src_coords, dest_coords, _bytes_consumed)) => {
                        if let Some(coords) = src_coords {
                            self.coord_cache_mut()
                                .insert(datagram.src_addr, coords, now_ms);
                        }
                        if let Some(coords) = dest_coords {
                            self.coord_cache_mut()
                                .insert(datagram.dest_addr, coords, now_ms);
                        }
                        debug!(
                            src = %datagram.src_addr,
                            dest = %datagram.dest_addr,
                            "Cached coords from encrypted message"
                        );
                    }
                    Err(e) => {
                        debug!(error = %e, "Failed to parse coords for cache warming");
                    }
                }
            }
            _ => {
                // Phase 0x0 without CP, error signals, unknown: no coords to cache
            }
        }
    }

    /// Generate and send a routing error signal back to the datagram's source.
    ///
    /// If we have cached coords for the destination, send PathBroken (we know
    /// where it is but can't reach it). Otherwise send CoordsRequired (we
    /// don't know where it is).
    ///
    /// If we can't route the error back to the source either, drop silently.
    /// No cascading errors.
    async fn send_routing_error(&mut self, original: &SessionDatagram) {
        // Rate limit: one error signal per destination per 100ms
        if !self
            .routing_error_rate_limiter
            .should_send(&original.dest_addr)
        {
            return;
        }

        let my_addr = *self.node_addr();

        let now_ms = std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
            .unwrap_or(0);

        let error_payload =
            if let Some(coords) = self.coord_cache().get(&original.dest_addr, now_ms) {
                let coords = coords.clone();
                PathBroken::new(original.dest_addr, my_addr)
                    .with_last_coords(coords)
                    .encode()
            } else {
                CoordsRequired::new(original.dest_addr, my_addr).encode()
            };

        let error_dg = SessionDatagram::new(my_addr, original.src_addr, error_payload)
            .with_ttl(self.config().node.session.default_ttl);

        let next_hop_addr = match self.find_next_hop(&original.src_addr) {
            Some(peer) => *peer.node_addr(),
            None => {
                debug!(
                    src = %original.src_addr,
                    dest = %original.dest_addr,
                    "Cannot route error signal back to source, dropping"
                );
                return;
            }
        };

        let encoded = error_dg.encode();
        if let Err(e) = self
            .send_encrypted_link_message(&next_hop_addr, &encoded)
            .await
        {
            debug!(
                next_hop = %next_hop_addr,
                error = %e,
                "Failed to send routing error signal"
            );
        } else {
            debug!(
                original_dest = %original.dest_addr,
                error_dest = %original.src_addr,
                "Sent routing error signal"
            );
        }
    }

    /// Generate and send an MtuExceeded error signal back to the datagram's source.
    ///
    /// Called when `send_encrypted_link_message()` fails with
    /// `NodeError::MtuExceeded` during forwarding. The signal tells the
    /// source the bottleneck MTU so it can immediately reduce its path MTU.
    async fn send_mtu_exceeded_error(&mut self, original: &SessionDatagram, bottleneck_mtu: u16) {
        // Rate limit: reuse routing_error_rate_limiter keyed on dest_addr
        if !self
            .routing_error_rate_limiter
            .should_send(&original.dest_addr)
        {
            return;
        }

        let my_addr = *self.node_addr();

        let error_payload = MtuExceeded::new(original.dest_addr, my_addr, bottleneck_mtu).encode();

        let error_dg = SessionDatagram::new(my_addr, original.src_addr, error_payload)
            .with_ttl(self.config().node.session.default_ttl);

        let next_hop_addr = match self.find_next_hop(&original.src_addr) {
            Some(peer) => *peer.node_addr(),
            None => {
                debug!(
                    src = %original.src_addr,
                    dest = %original.dest_addr,
                    "Cannot route MtuExceeded signal back to source, dropping"
                );
                return;
            }
        };

        let encoded = error_dg.encode();
        if let Err(e) = self
            .send_encrypted_link_message(&next_hop_addr, &encoded)
            .await
        {
            debug!(
                next_hop = %next_hop_addr,
                error = %e,
                "Failed to send MtuExceeded error signal"
            );
        } else {
            debug!(
                original_dest = %original.dest_addr,
                error_dest = %original.src_addr,
                bottleneck_mtu,
                "Sent MtuExceeded error signal"
            );
        }
    }

    /// Detect congestion for CE marking on forwarded datagrams.
    ///
    /// Checks two signal sources:
    /// 1. Outgoing link MMP metrics (loss rate, ETX) against configured thresholds
    /// 2. Local transport congestion (kernel drops on any transport)
    ///
    /// Returns `true` if any signal indicates congestion.
    pub(in crate::node) fn detect_congestion(&self, next_hop: &NodeAddr) -> bool {
        if !self.config().node.ecn.enabled {
            return false;
        }
        // Outgoing link MMP metrics
        if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get(next_hop)
            && let Some(mmp) = peer.mmp()
        {
            let metrics = &mmp.metrics;
            if metrics.loss_rate() >= self.config().node.ecn.loss_threshold
                || metrics.etx >= self.config().node.ecn.etx_threshold
            {
                return true;
            }
        }
        // Local transport congestion (kernel drops)
        self.transport_drops.values().any(|s| s.dropping)
    }

    /// Sample transport congestion indicators.
    ///
    /// Called from the tick handler (1s interval). For each transport,
    /// queries the cumulative kernel drop counter and sets the `dropping`
    /// flag if new drops occurred since the previous sample.
    pub(in crate::node) fn sample_transport_congestion(&mut self) {
        let mut new_drop_events = Vec::new();
        for (&tid, transport) in &self.transports {
            let congestion = transport.congestion();
            let state = self.transport_drops.entry(tid).or_default();
            if let Some(current) = congestion.recv_drops
                && state.observe_drops(current)
            {
                new_drop_events.push(tid);
            }
        }
        for tid in new_drop_events {
            self.metrics().congestion.kernel_drop_events.inc();
            warn!(
                transport_id = tid.as_u32(),
                "Kernel recv drops first observed on transport"
            );
        }
    }
}