fips/src/node/stats.rs

//! Node-level statistics for the session, handshake, mmp, and transport
//! families. The forwarding, discovery, tree, bloom, congestion, and error
//! families have migrated to the atomic
//! [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry).
//!
//! Unlike `EthernetStats` (which uses `AtomicU64` + `Arc` for cross-task
//! sharing), these counters use plain `u64` because `Node` handlers run
//! on a single `&mut self` context. A `snapshot()` method produces a
//! copyable struct for control socket queries.

use serde::Serialize;

use crate::node::reject::{
    HandshakeReject, MmpReject, RejectReason, SessionReject, TransportReject,
};

/// FSP session statistics — receive-path silent-rejection counters.
///
/// Covers the unknown-session and state-machine-mismatch rejection
/// sites in `handlers/session.rs`. Each counter increments once per
/// dropped inbound message; the WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is
/// preserved alongside the counter bump for operator visibility.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SessionStats {
    /// Inbound session-layer message arrived for a peer address with no
    /// matching `SessionEntry`. Aggregates across encrypted data,
    /// SessionAck, SessionMsg3, SessionReceiverReport, and
    /// PathMtuNotification.
    pub unknown_session: u64,
    /// Inbound session-layer message arrived for a `SessionEntry` whose
    /// state is incompatible with the message type (encrypted data
    /// before Established; SessionAck outside Initiating; SessionMsg3
    /// outside AwaitingMsg3).
    pub bad_state: u64,
    /// Inbound XK msg3 whose initiator static key does not derive the
    /// source address the datagram claimed. The half-open session is
    /// dropped and no identity is registered.
    pub addr_mismatch: u64,
    /// Inbound rekey XK msg3 whose initiator static key differs from
    /// the key the session was established with. The rekey is
    /// abandoned and the existing session is left intact.
    pub rekey_key_mismatch: u64,
    /// A setup message naming an already-established peer armed a
    /// responder-side handshake alongside the running session and a
    /// SessionAck was sent. The message carries no authenticator, so this
    /// counts genuine peer restarts and forged setups alike; its rate is
    /// the signal that something is spraying setup messages, which the
    /// per-message DEBUG line cannot carry safely at line rate.
    pub rekey_armed: u64,
    /// A setup message named an established peer while our own rekey of
    /// that session was in flight and our address sorted smaller, so the
    /// tie-break dropped their msg1 and kept us as initiator.
    pub rekey_tiebreak: u64,
    /// A setup message named an established peer while our own rekey of
    /// that session was in flight and our address sorted larger, so we
    /// abandoned our own rekey and answered as responder. A sustained
    /// rate here means local key rotation is being suppressed.
    pub rekey_yielded: u64,
    /// A setup message named an established peer that already holds a
    /// completed rekey awaiting cut-over, so the message was dropped
    /// rather than arming a second handshake.
    pub rekey_pending: u64,
    /// A responder-side handshake armed by a peer's setup message passed
    /// the handshake timeout without a msg3 and was discarded. The
    /// established session is retained.
    pub rekey_expired: u64,
    /// A rekey this node initiated got no readable SessionAck within the
    /// handshake timeout, and its handshake was discarded so the trigger
    /// can retry. The established session is retained. A sustained rate
    /// means setups or acks to that peer are being lost, or the peer holds
    /// a stuck handshake of its own and wins the tie-break.
    pub rekey_unanswered: u64,
    /// A completed rekey session still waiting for the peer's cut-over was
    /// replaced by a newer one, completed from a msg3 carrying the same
    /// authenticated peer key. This drops key material the peer may
    /// already have adopted, so a sustained rate means one side keeps
    /// rekeying while the other never appears on the new epoch.
    pub pending_replaced: u64,
    /// An inbound SessionAck failed the XK msg2 read against a session we
    /// are initiating. The entry is kept and the handshake rolled back,
    /// since the message authenticates nothing; a sustained rate is either
    /// a broken path to the responder or forged acks holding establishment
    /// down.
    pub ack_handshake_failed: u64,
    /// A setup message was refused by the per-link-peer setup limiter,
    /// before any handshake state was created or any ack sent.
    pub setup_rate_limited: u64,
    /// A session would have been created but the table is at
    /// `node.limits.max_sessions`. A sustained rate means either the cap
    /// is sized below what this node legitimately carries, or something is
    /// holding the table full.
    pub table_full: u64,
    /// A session would have been created but unauthenticated half-open
    /// entries already hold their share of the table.
    pub half_open_full: u64,
}

impl SessionStats {
    pub fn snapshot(&self) -> SessionStatsSnapshot {
        SessionStatsSnapshot {
            unknown_session: self.unknown_session,
            bad_state: self.bad_state,
            addr_mismatch: self.addr_mismatch,
            rekey_key_mismatch: self.rekey_key_mismatch,
            rekey_armed: self.rekey_armed,
            rekey_tiebreak: self.rekey_tiebreak,
            rekey_yielded: self.rekey_yielded,
            rekey_pending: self.rekey_pending,
            rekey_expired: self.rekey_expired,
            rekey_unanswered: self.rekey_unanswered,
            pending_replaced: self.pending_replaced,
            ack_handshake_failed: self.ack_handshake_failed,
            setup_rate_limited: self.setup_rate_limited,
            table_full: self.table_full,
            half_open_full: self.half_open_full,
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: SessionReject) {
        match reason {
            SessionReject::UnknownSession => self.unknown_session += 1,
            SessionReject::BadState => self.bad_state += 1,
            SessionReject::AddrMismatch => self.addr_mismatch += 1,
            SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch => self.rekey_key_mismatch += 1,
            SessionReject::RekeyTiebreak => self.rekey_tiebreak += 1,
            SessionReject::RekeyYielded => self.rekey_yielded += 1,
            SessionReject::RekeyPending => self.rekey_pending += 1,
            SessionReject::AckHandshakeFailed => self.ack_handshake_failed += 1,
            SessionReject::SetupRateLimited => self.setup_rate_limited += 1,
            SessionReject::TableFull => self.table_full += 1,
            SessionReject::HalfOpenFull => self.half_open_full += 1,
        }
    }
}

/// Noise-handshake statistics — receive-path silent-rejection counters.
///
/// Covers the state-machine and lookup-miss rejection sites in
/// `handlers/handshake.rs` across msg1, msg2, and (on the XX side) msg3.
/// Each counter increments once per dropped inbound message; the
/// WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is preserved alongside the counter
/// bump for operator visibility.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct HandshakeStats {
    /// Handshake state-machine rejection: header parse failed, Noise
    /// crypto step failed, identity could not be learned, index allocator
    /// returned an error, msg2/msg3 send failed, promote_connection
    /// returned an error, ACL gate rejected the peer, or the admission
    /// gate fired (max_peers / accept_connections).
    pub bad_state: u64,
    /// Inbound handshake message arrived but no matching connection was
    /// found by the receiver_idx (or addr) lookup: msg2 for an unknown
    /// pending-outbound index, duplicate msg1 with no stored msg2 to
    /// resend, msg3 for an unknown pending-inbound index without a
    /// matching rekey-responder slot.
    pub unknown_connection: u64,
}

impl HandshakeStats {
    pub fn snapshot(&self) -> HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
        HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
            bad_state: self.bad_state,
            unknown_connection: self.unknown_connection,
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: HandshakeReject) {
        match reason {
            HandshakeReject::BadState => self.bad_state += 1,
            HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection => self.unknown_connection += 1,
        }
    }
}

/// MMP link-layer rejection statistics.
///
/// Covers the receive-path silent-rejection sites in
/// `src/node/handlers/mmp.rs::handle_sender_report` and
/// `handle_receiver_report`. Each counter increments once per
/// dropped inbound report; the WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is
/// preserved alongside the counter bump.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct MmpStats {
    /// `SenderReport::decode` or `ReceiverReport::decode` returned
    /// an error. Aggregated across the two report types.
    pub decode_error: u64,
    /// SenderReport or ReceiverReport arrived from a peer with no
    /// `ActivePeer` record on this node.
    pub unknown_peer: u64,
}

impl MmpStats {
    pub fn snapshot(&self) -> MmpStatsSnapshot {
        MmpStatsSnapshot {
            decode_error: self.decode_error,
            unknown_peer: self.unknown_peer,
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: MmpReject) {
        match reason {
            MmpReject::DecodeError => self.decode_error += 1,
            MmpReject::UnknownPeer => self.unknown_peer += 1,
        }
    }
}

/// Transport-layer rejection statistics aggregated at the node level.
///
/// Per-transport modules (`transport/tcp/stats.rs`, `transport/tor/stats.rs`)
/// keep their own `connections_accepted` / `connections_rejected` /
/// `pool_inbound` / `pool_outbound` counters at the transport layer.
/// `TransportStats` here collects node-level visibility for any future
/// admission-rejection paths that the node code itself decides to
/// register via `record_reject(RejectReason::Transport(...))`.
///
/// The `inbound_cap_exceeded` counter is the typed-dispatch parity
/// counterpart of the per-transport `connections_rejected` counter,
/// which lives in the accept-loop task with no `NodeStats` access.
/// Currently this node-side counter stays at zero; it exists so the
/// typed-rejection enum stays the canonical entry point and so a
/// future transport-to-node bridge (event or sampling) has a
/// well-known destination.
///
/// `payload_len_mismatch` is different in kind: it counts a framing
/// drop the node itself performs at the receive dispatch point, so it
/// has a live writer and can be non-zero on a running node.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct TransportStats {
    /// Reserved for node-side inbound-cap-exceeded admission rejection
    /// dispatch. Per-transport accept-loop cap rejections are tracked
    /// on the transport-level stats (`TcpStats::connections_rejected`,
    /// `TorStats::connections_rejected`) directly.
    pub inbound_cap_exceeded: u64,
    /// Inbound FMP frames dropped because the payload length declared
    /// in the common prefix did not match the frame the transport
    /// delivered.
    pub payload_len_mismatch: u64,
}

impl TransportStats {
    pub fn snapshot(&self) -> TransportStatsSnapshot {
        TransportStatsSnapshot {
            inbound_cap_exceeded: self.inbound_cap_exceeded,
            payload_len_mismatch: self.payload_len_mismatch,
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: TransportReject) {
        match reason {
            TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded => self.inbound_cap_exceeded += 1,
            TransportReject::PayloadLenMismatch => self.payload_len_mismatch += 1,
        }
    }
}

/// Aggregate node statistics.
///
/// Holds only the families that have not migrated to the atomic
/// [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry): session,
/// handshake, mmp, and transport. The forwarding, discovery, tree,
/// bloom, congestion, and error families are served exclusively from
/// the registry.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct NodeStats {
    pub session: SessionStats,
    pub handshake: HandshakeStats,
    pub mmp: MmpStats,
    pub transport: TransportStats,
}

impl NodeStats {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self::default()
    }

    /// Record a typed rejection from a silent-rejection site.
    ///
    /// Dispatches to the appropriate sub-stats `record_reject` based on
    /// the [`RejectReason`] top-level variant. Only the families still
    /// stored on `NodeStats` (session, handshake, mmp, transport) are
    /// routed here; the migrated families are recorded directly on the
    /// [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry).
    pub fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: RejectReason) {
        match reason {
            RejectReason::Session(r) => self.session.record_reject(r),
            RejectReason::Handshake(r) => self.handshake.record_reject(r),
            RejectReason::Transport(r) => self.transport.record_reject(r),
            RejectReason::Mmp(r) => self.mmp.record_reject(r),
            // The forwarding, discovery, tree, and bloom families are
            // recorded directly on the MetricsRegistry and never reach
            // this NodeStats dispatch.
            RejectReason::Forwarding(_)
            | RejectReason::Discovery(_)
            | RejectReason::Tree(_)
            | RejectReason::Bloom(_) => {
                debug_assert!(false, "migrated reject family must use MetricsRegistry");
            }
        }
    }
}

// --- Snapshot types (copyable, serializable) ---

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct ForwardingStatsSnapshot {
    pub received_packets: u64,
    pub received_bytes: u64,
    pub decode_error_packets: u64,
    pub decode_error_bytes: u64,
    pub warm_malformed_packets: u64,
    pub warm_malformed_bytes: u64,
    pub coord_warm_foreign_root: u64,
    pub coord_warm_key_mismatch: u64,
    pub coord_hint_changed: u64,
    pub coord_hint_rejected: u64,
    pub ttl_exhausted_packets: u64,
    pub ttl_exhausted_bytes: u64,
    pub delivered_packets: u64,
    pub delivered_bytes: u64,
    pub forwarded_packets: u64,
    pub forwarded_bytes: u64,
    pub drop_no_route_packets: u64,
    pub drop_no_route_bytes: u64,
    pub drop_mtu_exceeded_packets: u64,
    pub drop_mtu_exceeded_bytes: u64,
    pub drop_send_error_packets: u64,
    pub drop_send_error_bytes: u64,
    pub originated_packets: u64,
    pub originated_bytes: u64,
    pub route_tree_up: u64,
    pub route_tree_down: u64,
    pub route_tree_down_cross: u64,
    pub route_crosslink_descend: u64,
    pub route_crosslink_ascend: u64,
    pub route_direct_peer: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct LookupStatsSnapshot {
    pub req_received: u64,
    pub req_decode_error: u64,
    pub req_duplicate: u64,
    pub req_own_loopback: u64,
    pub req_dedup_cache_full: u64,
    pub req_dedup_evicted: u64,
    pub req_sign_rate_limited: u64,
    pub req_target_is_us: u64,
    pub req_forwarded: u64,
    pub req_ttl_exhausted: u64,
    pub req_initiated: u64,
    pub req_deduplicated: u64,
    pub req_backoff_suppressed: u64,
    pub req_forward_rate_limited: u64,
    pub req_bloom_miss: u64,
    pub req_no_tree_peer: u64,
    pub req_fallback_forwarded: u64,
    pub resp_received: u64,
    pub resp_decode_error: u64,
    pub resp_forwarded: u64,
    pub resp_identity_miss: u64,
    pub resp_proof_failed: u64,
    pub resp_unsolicited: u64,
    pub resp_no_route: u64,
    pub resp_accepted: u64,
    pub resp_timed_out: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct TreeStatsSnapshot {
    pub received: u64,
    pub decode_error: u64,
    pub unknown_peer: u64,
    pub addr_mismatch: u64,
    pub sig_failed: u64,
    pub stale: u64,
    pub ancestry_invalid: u64,
    pub accepted: u64,
    pub loop_detected: u64,
    pub ancestry_changed: u64,
    pub sent: u64,
    pub rate_limited: u64,
    pub send_failed: u64,
    pub outbound_sign_failed: u64,
    pub parent_switches: u64,
    pub parent_losses: u64,
    pub flap_dampened: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct BloomStatsSnapshot {
    pub received: u64,
    pub decode_error: u64,
    pub invalid: u64,
    pub non_v1: u64,
    pub unknown_peer: u64,
    pub stale: u64,
    pub fill_exceeded: u64,
    pub accepted: u64,
    pub sent: u64,
    pub debounce_suppressed: u64,
    pub send_failed: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct SessionStatsSnapshot {
    pub unknown_session: u64,
    pub bad_state: u64,
    pub addr_mismatch: u64,
    pub rekey_key_mismatch: u64,
    pub rekey_armed: u64,
    pub rekey_tiebreak: u64,
    pub rekey_yielded: u64,
    pub rekey_pending: u64,
    pub rekey_expired: u64,
    pub rekey_unanswered: u64,
    pub pending_replaced: u64,
    pub ack_handshake_failed: u64,
    pub setup_rate_limited: u64,
    pub table_full: u64,
    pub half_open_full: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
    pub bad_state: u64,
    pub unknown_connection: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct MmpStatsSnapshot {
    pub decode_error: u64,
    pub unknown_peer: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct TransportStatsSnapshot {
    pub inbound_cap_exceeded: u64,
    pub payload_len_mismatch: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct ErrorSignalStatsSnapshot {
    pub coords_required: u64,
    pub path_broken: u64,
    pub mtu_exceeded: u64,
    pub path_mtu_notif_below_floor: u64,
    pub mtu_exceeded_below_floor: u64,
    pub lookup_resp_mtu_below_floor: u64,
    pub unbound_coords: u64,
    pub unbound_broken: u64,
    pub unbound_mtu: u64,
    pub unbound_forged: u64,
    pub emit_over_peer_budget: u64,
    pub emit_over_dest_interval: u64,
    pub emit_limiter_at_capacity: u64,
    pub mtu_exceeded_uncorroborated: u64,
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct CongestionStatsSnapshot {
    pub ce_forwarded: u64,
    pub ce_received: u64,
    pub congestion_detected: u64,
    pub kernel_drop_events: u64,
}

/// Native datagram API counters.
///
/// Eight of the `drop_*` fields are one per
/// [`DropReason`](crate::native::link::DropReason) variant, so a variant added
/// later has nowhere to hide. `drop_oversize` is the ninth and has no reason
/// because it is refused on the send side, before the registry sees the
/// datagram.
///
/// Present on every platform even though the API builds only on Linux and
/// FreeBSD, so `show_metrics` carries one schema everywhere and a consumer does
/// not branch on the host.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct NativeStatsSnapshot {
    pub flows_opened: u64,
    pub flows_accepted: u64,
    pub flows_closed: u64,
    pub flows_expired: u64,
    pub sent_datagrams: u64,
    pub sent_bytes: u64,
    pub received_datagrams: u64,
    pub received_bytes: u64,
    pub drop_no_port: u64,
    pub drop_backlog_full: u64,
    pub drop_too_many_flows: u64,
    pub drop_pending_queue_full: u64,
    pub drop_flow_queue_full: u64,
    pub drop_arrival_queue_full: u64,
    pub drop_listener_not_reading: u64,
    pub drop_listener_gone: u64,
    pub drop_oversize: u64,
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_record_reject_unknown_session() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::UnknownSession);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::UnknownSession);
        assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_record_reject_bad_state() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::BadState);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::BadState);
        assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_record_reject_addr_mismatch() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
        assert_eq!(stats.addr_mismatch, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_key_mismatch, 0);
        assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_record_reject_rekey_key_mismatch() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_key_mismatch, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.addr_mismatch, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_record_reject_separates_the_three_rekey_arming_refusals() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyTiebreak);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyYielded);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyYielded);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyPending);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_tiebreak, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_yielded, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_pending, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.rekey_armed, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_snapshot_carries_the_rekey_arming_counters() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyTiebreak);
        stats.rekey_armed = 7;
        stats.rekey_expired = 3;
        stats.pending_replaced = 2;
        let snap = stats.snapshot();
        assert_eq!(snap.rekey_tiebreak, 1);
        assert_eq!(snap.rekey_armed, 7);
        assert_eq!(snap.rekey_expired, 3);
        assert_eq!(snap.pending_replaced, 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn session_stats_snapshot_carries_identity_binding_counters() {
        let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
        stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
        let snap = stats.snapshot();
        assert_eq!(snap.addr_mismatch, 1);
        assert_eq!(snap.rekey_key_mismatch, 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_session() {
        let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Session(SessionReject::UnknownSession));
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Session(SessionReject::BadState));
        assert_eq!(stats.session.unknown_session, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.session.bad_state, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn handshake_stats_record_reject_bad_state() {
        let mut stats = HandshakeStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
        stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
        stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
        assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 3);
        assert_eq!(stats.unknown_connection, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn handshake_stats_record_reject_unknown_connection() {
        let mut stats = HandshakeStats::default();
        stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection);
        stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection);
        assert_eq!(stats.unknown_connection, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_handshake() {
        let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection));
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
        assert_eq!(stats.handshake.bad_state, 2);
        assert_eq!(stats.handshake.unknown_connection, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.session.unknown_session, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn mmp_stats_record_reject_decode_error() {
        let mut s = MmpStats::default();
        s.record_reject(MmpReject::DecodeError);
        s.record_reject(MmpReject::DecodeError);
        assert_eq!(s.decode_error, 2);
        assert_eq!(s.unknown_peer, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn mmp_stats_record_reject_unknown_peer() {
        let mut s = MmpStats::default();
        s.record_reject(MmpReject::UnknownPeer);
        assert_eq!(s.unknown_peer, 1);
        assert_eq!(s.decode_error, 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_mmp() {
        let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Mmp(MmpReject::DecodeError));
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Mmp(MmpReject::UnknownPeer));
        assert_eq!(stats.mmp.decode_error, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.mmp.unknown_peer, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn transport_stats_record_reject_inbound_cap_exceeded() {
        let mut s = TransportStats::default();
        s.record_reject(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded);
        s.record_reject(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded);
        assert_eq!(s.inbound_cap_exceeded, 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_transport() {
        let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Transport(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded));
        assert_eq!(stats.transport.inbound_cap_exceeded, 1);
    }

    /// Records both transport reasons so a swapped or shared arm shows up
    /// as a mis-attributed counter rather than as a plausible total.
    #[test]
    fn transport_stats_record_reject_keeps_the_two_reasons_on_separate_counters() {
        let mut s = TransportStats::default();
        s.record_reject(TransportReject::PayloadLenMismatch);
        s.record_reject(TransportReject::PayloadLenMismatch);
        s.record_reject(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded);
        assert_eq!(s.payload_len_mismatch, 2);
        assert_eq!(s.inbound_cap_exceeded, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_payload_len_mismatch_to_transport() {
        let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
        stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Transport(TransportReject::PayloadLenMismatch));
        assert_eq!(stats.transport.payload_len_mismatch, 1);
        assert_eq!(stats.transport.inbound_cap_exceeded, 0);
        assert_eq!(stats.handshake.bad_state, 0);
    }
}