Johnathan Corgan
f4ac842d3a
Carries the security batch onto this line. Most of it merged as text; the forged-ack rollback had to be re-implemented, because this line runs XX where the other two run XK and the function the helper wraps does not exist here. The defect is the same shape under XX: the reader mixes the sender ephemeral into the symmetric state before the first authenticating operation, so a forged message poisons a handshake that is then kept. The saved field set is larger here, five rather than four, and the extra one matters: XX msg2 carries the responder static and stores it before the epoch decrypt that can still fail, so a failed read would otherwise leave an attacker key where the identity check reads it. The helper returns a rollback token rather than unit, because the two extra failure sites on this line need to roll back after a read that succeeded. Both of those sites now keep the entry. The negotiation-payload failure is plainly forgery-reachable, since the identity comparison has not run yet. The responder-identity mismatch is the sharper case and also keeps: it proves the sender of the datagram is not who we dialled, but the claimed source is an envelope field, so the forgery reading is available to anyone who can reach us, and dropping would hand out a one-datagram cancel of any initiation. It was a silent return and now has its own counter, kept separate from the read failure so a stale key mapping and somebody answering under their own identity cannot be summed together. This line carries six sites of the epoch-discard class, not the five the other lines have; the sixth is the negotiation payload split out of XX msg3. One fix was dropped by a clean auto-merge and restored: the change at the msg3 read failure slid onto an adjacent site that is unique to this line, leaving the original with the destructive call, no conflict and no warning. Its doc comment, counters and tests all arrived without it. Caught by sweeping the cleanly-merged files, and confirmed by reverting the line and watching the epoch-survival assertion fail. The profiler row-count guard is updated for the step this merge brings up. It has now caught a merged-in step twice. Green: fmt, build, clippy and test --lib, 1956 passed, plus the profiling recorder suite.
FIPS Documentation
FIPS (Free Internetworking Peering System) is a self-organizing encrypted mesh network built on Nostr identities, capable of operating over arbitrary transports — local networks, the public internet, Tor, Bluetooth, or point-to-point links — without central infrastructure.
With FIPS, your machine becomes a node in the mesh with a self-generated cryptographic identity. There are two ways to deploy it.
As an overlay on top of existing IP networks, FIPS lets your node reach any other FIPS node wherever it sits — behind a NAT, on a different ISP, on a phone over cellular, on a laptop with only Bluetooth in range, or behind a Tor onion. The mesh forwards IPv6 traffic transparently and end-to-end encrypted, with no central VPN concentrator or coordinating server.
From the ground up over raw Ethernet, WiFi, or Bluetooth, FIPS provides a complete permissionless network without any pre-existing IP infrastructure, ISP, or DNS. Any node that joins the link gets routable IPv6 addresses, peer discovery, and a path to every other node automatically.
Either way, existing networking software runs over it unchanged: SSH, HTTP servers, file transfer, anything IPv6-native works the same way it would on a local network.
New to FIPS? Start with the Getting Started guide.
Documentation Sections
Tutorials
If you are starting from scratch and want a guided path to a working mesh, go here.
How-To Guides
If you have a specific task in mind — enabling a feature, deploying a component, diagnosing a problem — go here.
Reference
If you need to look up wire formats, configuration keys, command flags, or counter inventories, go here.
Design
If you want to understand how the mesh self-organizes, why FIPS makes the choices it does, or how the pieces fit together, go here.