Files
fips/testing/iface-binding/test.sh
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ArjenandJohnathan Corgan 95866b7c7c test(iface-binding): cover the presence machine end to end
Two daemons whose only transports are interface-bound, run against a veth
pair the harness creates, downs, deletes and recreates underneath them.

Asserts the boot race (a daemon whose only interface is missing starts,
reports the transport absent and the node Degraded, rather than exiting on
NoTransports or skipping the transport for the life of the process), the
late attach and discovery over it, the flap in both directions,
destroy-and-recreate, and that an optional interface which never appears
never moves node health.

Also the log policy, which is the half that is easy to regress silently:
absence is logged once on the edge and not once per retry; a required
interface still absent past the ten-second bring-up window errors exactly
once, while the optional one — absent just as long — stays silent; and that
error is not repeated on a schedule. The detach edge is checked not to
error, guarded by how long detection actually took, so a slow runner skips
the check rather than failing on the harness's own latency.

The containers run FIPS_TEST_MODE=default, not chaos. The chaos entrypoint
waits up to 30 s for every configured Ethernet interface before starting the
daemon, which is precisely the workaround under test — the daemon has to do
its own waiting here or the suite proves nothing.

Host-namespace ip(8) runs in a short-lived privileged container sharing the
host network and PID namespaces, for the reason chaos/sim/veth.py documents:
on macOS the containers live in the Docker VM, so ip(8) run on the macOS
host could never reach them.

Chaos ethernet transports are marked optional: true. In that harness a
neighbour's interface disappearing is the scenario, not a fault — node_churn
stops a container, which destroys its netns and with it both ends of every
veth it held, so a surviving node watches a required interface vanish for
the 30-90 s the neighbour is down, once per churn event. Reporting that at
error is right for a deployment and wrong for a harness that tears the
interface down on purpose; the mesh-wide zero-ERROR ceiling would have
failed on injected chaos rather than on a defect.

test(iface-binding): cover an interface present before the daemon starts

Every scenario in the suite created its interface after the daemons were
already running — that ordering is the boot race the suite was written for.
But it means both nodes could only ever reach Present through binder_loop,
so the inline bind in start_async, which is the ordinary case on a booted
router, had no end-to-end coverage at all. That is where the churn guard
went unseeded and the first detach stopped reaching node health, and no
existing case could reach it: they all detach from a binding the loop
created, which seeds the guard as a side effect.

Case (f) adds a third node whose single required interface exists before its
daemon does. The gate is what buys that ordering — the harness needs a
running container to have a netns to move a veth into, but the daemon must
not start until after the move, so node-c comes up parked on a file and the
harness releases it once the interface is in place. Then one detach, on a
binding the loop did not create, and the node must degrade.

Verified against the defect rather than only against the fix: with the guard
seed reverted, cases (a) through (e) all still pass and (f) is the only
failure. A regression test that has never been seen to fail is a claim, not
a test.

It also asserts the reverse edge, so Degraded stays a level rather than a
latch on this path too.

test(iface-binding): assert the fast path and the churn guard

Three gaps, two of them in tests that existed and asserted nothing.

**The netlink path was never asserted to be in use.** The 1 s poll is a
complete fallback and covers every wait in the suite, so the whole thing
passed with `open_link_socket()` hardcoded to Err — the fast path could have
been dead for a release and no test would have said so. The binder reports
which backing it got at startup, so case (g) asks it directly rather than
inferring from timing the poll would also satisfy, and the unit test that used
to write `let _ = w.is_event_driven();` now asserts it on Linux, where the
source is an unprivileged `AF_NETLINK` socket and falling back is a real loss
rather than a sandbox's prerogative.

**Churn damping had no end-to-end coverage**, which now matters twice over: it
bounds the recovery announcements, and since the detach edge withdraws peers
it is also the only thing bounding how often that withdrawal fires. Every flap
elsewhere in the suite is a single down/up with long settles either side —
exactly the shape the damper ignores. Case (h) drives four bindings that each
die inside `MIN_STABLE_BINDING`, asserts the guard engages, asserts it then
*suppresses* rather than merely counting, and asserts it is not a latch.

**`a_poisoned_binding_does_not_strand_the_transport` discarded its result.**
`let _ = eth.binding.tasks_alive();` left the entire point unasserted: reading
a poisoned lock as "alive" would have the binder believe a dead binding
healthy and never rebind, and treating it as an error would strand the
transport. `false` is what routes it back through detach and rebind, so say so.

`a_stop_racing_a_bind_leaves_nothing_behind` now asserts the error *kind*.
`bind_and_spawn` refuses at its presence probe long before the post-store
shutdown check, so `is_err()` alone passed on absence and would still pass
with that check deleted. The test keeps the coverage it genuinely has — stop
raises the flag before teardown, teardown leaves no socket and no loops — and
says plainly that the race it is named for needs a bind that succeeds, which
needs privilege no unit test has.

Both new cases were verified against the defect: with the netlink source
forced to Err, (g) fails; with `CHURN_THRESHOLD` raised out of reach, (h)
fails. Nothing else in the suite notices either.

One case was attempted and removed rather than shipped: `"interface
replaced"` cannot be produced deterministically, because the delete that
changes an ifindex fires a netlink event the binder acts on within
microseconds, so `gone` wins the race. It passed about one run in three.
reference/notes.md records the measurement and the two approaches that could
work.

Also fixes a real bug in the harness: `grep -q` under `set -o pipefail` exits
on its first match, `docker logs` takes SIGPIPE, and the pipeline reports
failure even though the line was found. That cost two false failures before it
was spotted; `log_count` reads the stream to the end.

test(chaos): cover an Ethernet rebind under active traffic

The one case dynamic interface binding had no coverage for anywhere: a
datagram crossing an Ethernet link while the interface underneath it goes away
and comes back.

No existing scenario could reach it, for two separate reasons.

`ethernet-only` and `ethernet-mesh` both run with `traffic.enabled: false`, so
no datagram crosses an Ethernet link in any test — `ethernet-only`'s own
comment says exactly that, and names framing, the length field that trims NIC
minimum-frame padding, and AEAD over Ethernet as unexercised because of it.

And `link_flaps` cannot produce a rebind whatever it is pointed at: it
simulates a down link with netem 100% loss, so the interface stays IFF_UP and
the presence machine never sees an edge. `ethernet-mesh` has had link flaps
enabled all along without once exercising a rebind.

`node_churn` is what actually moves an interface. Stopping a container
destroys its network namespace, deleting every veth in it — and deleting one
end of a veth deletes its peer — so a *surviving* node watches its Ethernet
interface disappear outright, and watches it return when the harness recreates
the pair on restart. That is a real detach and a real rebind, driven from
outside the daemon.

The new scenario is a 4-node Ethernet ring with traffic on and one node
churned at a time, with link flaps deliberately off so the only outage is a
genuine interface removal and a traffic shortfall cannot be ambiguous between
the two. Measured across four runs: 206-388 MB moved over Ethernet links while
interfaces were being taken away underneath.

It also needed an assertion that did not exist. Traffic results have always
been written to `iperf3-results.json` and never read, so a scenario carrying
`traffic.enabled: true` could have every session fail and still exit 0 on a
green control plane — and a rebind under load is precisely what a tree
snapshot cannot see. `min_traffic` counts sessions that finished with bytes
actually received, treating iperf3's top-level `error` and a missing `end`
block as zero, so a session only counts when it moved data.

The baseline is calibrated against four runs rather than assumed: `max_roots`
starts at the observed maximum plus one, and the site records the sample, its
size, and why four runs is thin. The first draft asserted a single root and
failed every run — the harness restores stopped nodes immediately before the
final snapshot, so a just-restarted node has not re-parented yet and is
briefly its own root. That is the scenario working.

Wired into both runners, since a chaos scenario on one side only makes "local
green" and "GitHub green" stop meaning the same thing; check-ci-parity was
confirmed to fail on a one-sided addition before this was committed.

The iface-binding suite's entry in the GitHub workflow's integration matrix
moves here from the commit that introduced the presence machine. That commit
declared the suite on GitHub before testing/iface-binding/ existed and before
testing/ci-local.sh knew about it, so testing/check-ci-parity.sh failed there
and the three workflow steps named files that were not yet in the tree.
Registering both runners in the commit that adds the suite settles both.
2026-09-10 19:18:09 +00:00

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#!/bin/bash
# Integration test for dynamic interface binding.
#
# Asserts the five behaviors the presence machine exists to provide, against
# real daemons and a real veth pair:
#
# (a) boot race — a daemon whose interface does not exist yet starts,
# reports the transport ABSENT, and reports Degraded
# (b) late attach — the interface appears; the daemon binds it with no
# restart, clears Degraded, and peers over it
# (c) flap — the interface goes down and comes back; presence and
# health follow it in BOTH directions
# (d) destroy/recreate — the interface is deleted outright and recreated; the
# daemon rebinds (the case the old ENXIO beacon hack
# half-covered)
# (e) optional — an interface that never appears logs at info and
# never moves node health
#
# plus the log-hygiene property the design is explicit about: absence is logged
# once on the edge, never once per retry.
#
# The daemons run under FIPS_TEST_MODE=default, NOT chaos: the chaos entrypoint
# waits for Ethernet interfaces before starting the daemon, which is exactly
# the workaround being retired. The daemon must wait for itself here.
#
# Usage: ./test.sh [--skip-build] [--keep-up]
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
TESTING_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
COMPOSE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
NODE_A="fips-ifb-node-a${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
NODE_B="fips-ifb-node-b${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
NODE_C="fips-ifb-node-c${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
# The interface each node binds. Same name on both sides: they are in separate
# network namespaces, and using one name keeps the fixtures identical.
LAB_IFACE="ve-lab0"
# The interface that never exists. `optional: true` in both configs.
DOCK_IFACE="fips-dock0"
# node-c's interface, present before its daemon starts. See case (f).
BOOT_IFACE="ve-boot0"
# Host-side veth names, scoped per run: these live in the host (or Docker VM)
# namespace for the moment between creation and the move into the containers,
# where two concurrent runs would otherwise collide on one name.
HOST_VETH_A="vhifb${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-0}a"
HOST_VETH_B="vhifb${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-0}b"
HOST_VETH_C="vhifb${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-0}c"
HOST_VETH_D="vhifb${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-0}d"
SKIP_BUILD=false
KEEP_UP=false
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--skip-build) SKIP_BUILD=true; shift ;;
--keep-up) KEEP_UP=true; shift ;;
*) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
done
log() { echo "=== $*"; }
pass() { echo "PASS: $*"; }
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; dump_diagnostics; exit 1; }
dump_diagnostics() {
echo "--- node-a transports ---" >&2
docker exec "$NODE_A" fipsctl show transports >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-a status ---" >&2
docker exec "$NODE_A" fipsctl show status >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-a log (tail) ---" >&2
docker logs --tail 80 "$NODE_A" >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-b log (tail) ---" >&2
docker logs --tail 80 "$NODE_B" >&2 2>&1 || true
return 0
}
cleanup() {
# Remove the veth pair wherever it survived: inside a container if the move
# succeeded, on the host if the run died between creation and the move.
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link del "$LAB_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
ip_host "ip link del $HOST_VETH_A" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link del "$BOOT_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
ip_host "ip link del $HOST_VETH_C" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ "$KEEP_UP" = false ]; then
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" down --volumes --remove-orphans >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
return 0
}
# ── Host-namespace ip(8) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Every `ip link` operation that touches the host network stack runs inside a
# short-lived privileged container sharing the host network and PID namespaces,
# for the reason testing/chaos/sim/veth.py documents at length: on macOS the
# containers live in the Docker VM, so running ip(8) on the macOS host could
# never reach them, while on Linux the shared namespaces make it identical to
# running ip(8) directly.
ip_host() {
docker run --rm --privileged --network host --pid host \
--entrypoint /bin/sh "$IMAGE" -c "$1"
}
# Docker's own view of a container, so the gate case can wait for a netns
# without implying the daemon inside it has started.
container_state() {
docker inspect -f '{{.State.Status}}' "$1" 2>/dev/null || true
}
container_pid() {
docker inspect -f '{{.State.Pid}}' "$1"
}
# Create the veth pair and move one end into each container.
create_veth() {
local pid_a pid_b
pid_a="$(container_pid "$NODE_A")"
pid_b="$(container_pid "$NODE_B")"
# One invocation, not three. The host-side names exist only between the
# `add` and the two `netns` moves, and ci-cleanup.sh's host-veth sweep is
# deliberately shaped to the chaos simulation's names and does not cover
# these — so the window in which a hard kill could strand them is kept to
# a single command, with the EXIT trap covering the rest.
ip_host "set -e
ip link add $HOST_VETH_A type veth peer name $HOST_VETH_B
ip link set $HOST_VETH_A netns $pid_a name $LAB_IFACE
ip link set $HOST_VETH_B netns $pid_b name $LAB_IFACE" >/dev/null
# A moved link arrives down. Presence is IFF_UP, so the daemon correctly
# does not bind until this runs — which is also why (c) can flap it with
# nothing but `ip link set down`.
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
docker exec "$NODE_B" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
return 0
}
# ── Daemon introspection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Field of a named transport's `interface` block, or "" if the transport, the
# block, or the daemon is not there.
iface_field() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show transports 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
except Exception:
print(""); raise SystemExit
for t in data.get("transports", []):
if t.get("name") == sys.argv[1]:
print(t.get("interface", {}).get(sys.argv[2], ""))
break
else:
print("")
' "$2" "$3"
}
node_state() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show status 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("state", ""))
except Exception:
print("")
'
}
peer_count() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show peers 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
except Exception:
print(0); raise SystemExit
print(len(data.get("peers", [])))
'
}
# Count of a literal in a container log. Used for the log-hygiene assertion.
log_count() {
docker logs "$1" 2>&1 | grep -c -- "$2" || true
}
# Poll `expr` until it prints `want`, up to `timeout` seconds.
# Usage: wait_for <timeout> <want> <command...>
wait_for() {
local timeout="$1" want="$2"; shift 2
local i got
for i in $(seq 1 "$timeout"); do
got="$("$@" || true)"
if [ "$got" = "$want" ]; then
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo " (last value: '${got:-}', wanted '$want')" >&2
return 1
}
# Poll until the command prints a value that is at least `want`.
wait_for_at_least() {
local timeout="$1" want="$2"; shift 2
local i got
for i in $(seq 1 "$timeout"); do
got="$("$@" || true)"
if [ -n "$got" ] && [ "$got" -ge "$want" ] 2>/dev/null; then
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo " (last value: '${got:-}', wanted >= '$want')" >&2
return 1
}
# ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
IMAGE="${FIPS_TEST_IMAGE:-fips-test:latest}"
trap cleanup EXIT
if [ "$SKIP_BUILD" = false ]; then
log "Building test image"
bash "$TESTING_DIR/scripts/build.sh"
fi
log "Generating fixtures"
LAB_IFACE="$LAB_IFACE" DOCK_IFACE="$DOCK_IFACE" BOOT_IFACE="$BOOT_IFACE" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/generate-configs.sh"
log "Starting nodes with $LAB_IFACE absent"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d
# The daemon must reach a serving state without the interface. Waiting on the
# control socket answering at all is the first half of assertion (a): a daemon
# that exited on `NoTransports` never answers.
if ! wait_for 40 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(a) node-a did not come up Degraded with $LAB_IFACE absent"
fi
pass "(a) daemon started and serves with its only interface absent"
# ── (a) presence and policy are visible to an operator ───────────────────
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport is not reported ABSENT"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab policy)" = "required" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport is not reported required"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab name)" = "$LAB_IFACE" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport does not name $LAB_IFACE"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock transport is not reported ABSENT"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock policy)" = "optional" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock transport is not reported optional"
pass "(a) presence and policy are visible in show_transports"
# ── log hygiene, measured across the absence ─────────────────────────────
#
# The required interface's absence must be logged once, on the edge — not once
# per retry. Measured over an interval long enough for many retries (the binder
# polls every second). The 12 s also carries the next assertion past the 10 s
# bring-up window, so both the edge rule and the deadline are covered by one
# wait.
# Matched on the edge line specifically. The deadline error below is a
# different line by design, and counting both here would read the deadline
# firing during the sleep as a repeated edge.
EDGE_LINE="Ethernet interface absent; waiting"
absent_before="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "$EDGE_LINE")"
sleep 12
absent_after="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "$EDGE_LINE")"
if [ "$absent_after" -ne "$absent_before" ]; then
fail "absence was logged $((absent_after - absent_before)) more times over 12s of retries; \
the edge must be logged once, not per attempt"
fi
# Two edges total: one for the required lab interface, one for the optional
# dock interface. More would mean the edge is not an edge.
[ "$absent_before" -eq 2 ] \
|| fail "expected exactly 2 absence edges at start, saw $absent_before"
pass "absence is logged once on the edge, not per retry"
# ── a sustained absence errors exactly once ──────────────────────────────
#
# The edge is not an error: an interface missing for a moment at boot and bound
# a moment later is the ordinary case this mechanism exists to absorb. Past the
# 10 s bring-up window it is no longer a race, and a *required* interface says
# so — once. The 12 s above put us on the far side of that window.
#
# Exactly one line, from lab. The optional dock interface has been absent just
# as long and must be silent, which is what `optional` means; two here would
# mean the policy is not being consulted.
startup_errors="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
if [ "$startup_errors" -ne 1 ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -- " ERROR " >&2 || true
fail "expected exactly 1 ERROR line for the required interface past the \
bring-up window, saw $startup_errors (an optional interface must contribute none)"
fi
[ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" "still missing past the bring-up window")" -eq 1 ] \
|| fail "the ERROR line is not the sustained-absence report"
pass "a required interface absent past the window errors, an optional one does not"
# ...and does not keep saying it. Duration is state, published as
# interface.since_secs and as Degraded; re-announcing it on a timer is what
# the old 1 m / 10 m / 1 h ladder did.
sleep 12
[ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")" -eq 1 ] \
|| fail "the sustained-absence error repeated; it must be said once per episode"
pass "the sustained-absence error is said once, not on a schedule"
# ── (b) late attach ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
log "Creating the veth pair"
create_veth
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(b) node-a did not bind $LAB_IFACE after it appeared"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(b) node-b did not bind $LAB_IFACE after it appeared"
fi
pass "(b) both daemons bound the interface with no restart"
# Health must clear. This is `Degraded` behaving as a level rather than a
# latch — the property that made the old monotonic failed-set wrong.
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(b) node-a stayed Degraded after its interface returned"
fi
pass "(b) Degraded cleared when the interface came back"
# The optional interface is still absent and must still not matter.
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock unexpectedly bound"
pass "(e) an absent optional interface does not degrade the node"
# Discovery and peering over the late-bound interface: the point of binding at
# all. Without this the suite would prove the daemon can open a socket, not
# that traffic flows over it.
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 1 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(b) node-a found no peer over the late-bound interface"
fi
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 1 peer_count "$NODE_B"; then
fail "(b) node-b found no peer over the late-bound interface"
fi
pass "(b) nodes discovered and peered over the late-bound interface"
# ── (c) flap ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
errors_before_detach="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
log "Taking $LAB_IFACE down on node-a"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" down
detach_start=$SECONDS
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(c) node-a did not notice the interface going down"
fi
detach_elapsed=$(( SECONDS - detach_start ))
if ! wait_for 20 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a did not report Degraded while its interface was down"
fi
pass "(c) a link going down is observed as absence and degrades health"
# A detach is reported, at warn. The edge is not an error — a link coming and
# going is the weather in a mesh daemon, and the error is the 10 s deadline's
# to give, not the edge's.
if ! wait_for_at_least 10 1 log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface detached"; then
fail "(c) a runtime detach was not reported"
fi
# Only meaningful while we are still inside the bring-up window. Detection is
# sub-second over netlink, so this is the ordinary path; if the runner was slow
# enough that the deadline could have fired, the check has nothing to say and
# says so rather than failing on the harness's own latency.
if [ "$detach_elapsed" -lt 8 ]; then
detach_errors="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
if [ "$detach_errors" -ne "$errors_before_detach" ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -- " ERROR " >&2 || true
fail "(c) the detach edge logged an ERROR after ${detach_elapsed}s; the \
edge is a warn and only outlasting the window earns an error"
fi
pass "(c) a detach is reported without crying error"
else
echo " (skipped the edge-not-an-error check: detach took ${detach_elapsed}s,"
echo " which is inside the deadline's reach)"
fi
log "Bringing $LAB_IFACE back up on node-a"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(c) node-a did not rebind after the interface came back"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a stayed Degraded after the interface came back"
fi
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 2 iface_field "$NODE_A" lab binds; then
fail "(c) the rebind was not counted"
fi
pass "(c) the interface flapped and the daemon followed it both ways"
# ── (d) destroy and recreate ─────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Deleting the netdev outright is the case the old ENXIO beacon-socket reopen
# half-covered: the veth is gone, the socket underneath is stale, and the name
# comes back a moment later. One presence machine now covers it.
log "Deleting and recreating the veth pair"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link del "$LAB_IFACE"
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-a did not notice the interface being deleted"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-b did not notice its end of the pair disappearing"
fi
create_veth
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-a did not rebind the recreated interface"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-b did not rebind the recreated interface"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(d) node-a stayed Degraded after the interface was recreated"
fi
pass "(d) a destroyed and recreated interface is rebound"
# Peering must re-establish over the new hardware. A recreated veth has a new
# MAC, so this also exercises the "same name, different hardware" path that
# drops cached neighbors instead of resuming onto them.
if ! wait_for_at_least 60 1 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(d) node-a did not re-peer after the interface was recreated"
fi
pass "(d) peering re-established over the recreated interface"
# ── (f) an interface present before the daemon starts ────────────────────
#
# Everything above binds through the binder loop, because the interface does
# not exist until the harness makes it. The ordinary case on a booted router is
# the opposite one: the interface is already there and `start_async` binds it
# inline, before the loop is running.
#
# That path published its presence edge outside the churn guard, so the guard
# believed it had announced nothing and the *first* detach asked for no
# retraction. The node kept reporting Running with its only required interface
# gone, and stayed that way until a second detach happened to repair the guard.
# Nothing in cases (a)-(e) can reach it.
log "(f) starting node-c with its interface already present"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d node-c
# The container parks on the gate, so this is the netns and not yet the daemon.
if ! wait_for 30 "running" container_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c container did not start"
fi
pid_c="$(container_pid "$NODE_C")"
ip_host "set -e
ip link add $HOST_VETH_C type veth peer name $HOST_VETH_D
ip link set $HOST_VETH_C netns $pid_c name $BOOT_IFACE
ip link set $HOST_VETH_D netns $pid_c name ${BOOT_IFACE}p" >/dev/null
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" up
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "${BOOT_IFACE}p" up
# Release the gate. The daemon now starts with the interface already up.
docker exec "$NODE_C" touch /tmp/fips-go
if ! wait_for 40 "running" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c did not come up Running with its interface present at start"
fi
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_C" boot presence)" = "present" ] \
|| fail "(f) node-c did not bind $BOOT_IFACE inline at start"
pass "(f) an interface present at start is bound inline and reports Running"
# The assertion. One detach, on a binding this loop did not create.
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" down
if ! wait_for 30 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_C" boot presence; then
fail "(f) node-c did not notice $BOOT_IFACE going down"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c stayed Running after its only required interface went \
away — the start-time bind never reached node health"
fi
pass "(f) the first detach after a clean start degrades the node"
# And it is still a level, not a latch, on this path too.
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" up
if ! wait_for 30 "running" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c stayed Degraded after its interface returned"
fi
pass "(f) health clears again when the interface returns"
# ── (g) the link-event fast path is actually the one in use ──────────────
#
# The whole suite would pass with `open_link_socket()` hardcoded to Err: the
# 1 s poll is a complete fallback and covers every `wait_for` window here, so
# nothing else asserts that the netlink path exists, let alone that it is what
# detected anything. The binder says which backing it got at startup, so ask
# it directly rather than inferring from timing that the poll would also
# satisfy.
# `log_count`, not `grep -q`: under `set -o pipefail` a `grep -q` that exits on
# its first match closes the pipe, `docker logs` takes SIGPIPE, and the
# pipeline reports failure even though the line was found. `grep -c` reads the
# stream to the end.
if [ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" "event_driven=true")" -eq 0 ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -i "binder started" >&2 || true
fail "(g) the binder fell back to polling; the netlink link-event source \
did not open, and every timing assertion in this suite would still pass"
fi
pass "(g) detection is driven by netlink events, not by the poll fallback"
# ── (h) churn damping engages on a genuinely flapping interface ──────────
#
# This is load-bearing twice over. It is what stops a flapping interface
# logging a recovery per cycle, and — since the detach edge now withdraws the
# peers that interface carried — it is also the only thing bounding how often
# that withdrawal can fire. Nothing exercised it: every flap elsewhere in this
# suite is a single down/up with long settles either side, which is precisely
# the shape the damper ignores.
#
# Four bindings that each die well inside MIN_STABLE_BINDING (10 s). The
# streak crosses CHURN_THRESHOLD (3) on the third, which is the edge that
# announces itself.
log "(h) flapping $LAB_IFACE to drive the churn guard"
for _ in 1 2 3 4; do
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" down
sleep 1
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
sleep 2
done
if ! wait_for_at_least 30 1 log_count "$NODE_A" "keeps dying immediately after binding"; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -i "ethernet" | tail -20 >&2
fail "(h) four short-lived bindings did not engage the churn guard"
fi
pass "(h) a flapping interface engages churn damping"
# Having engaged, the guard must hold health rather than announcing each bind.
# The failure this catches is a damper that counts but does not damp.
recoveries_during_churn="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface recovered")"
if [ "$recoveries_during_churn" -gt 6 ]; then
fail "(h) node-a announced $recoveries_during_churn recoveries; the guard \
counted the churn but kept announcing through it"
fi
pass "(h) churn suppressed the per-cycle recovery announcements"
# And it is not a latch: once a binding lasts, the interface is announced
# again and the node returns to Running on its own.
log "(h) letting $LAB_IFACE settle"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if ! wait_for 60 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(h) node-a did not rebind after the flapping stopped"
fi
if ! wait_for 60 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(h) node-a stayed Degraded after the flapping stopped"
fi
pass "(h) a settled interface is announced again after churn"
# ── final log hygiene ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Four outages happened above (start, down, delete, and node-b's end of the
# delete). A generous ceiling still catches the failure mode that matters: a
# retry loop logging per attempt would be in the hundreds by now.
edges="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface")"
[ "$edges" -lt 40 ] \
|| fail "node-a logged $edges interface lines; the edges are not edges"
pass "log volume stayed proportional to edges, not to retries"
echo
echo "ALL PASSED"