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Johnathan Corgan 98560594cf Prove ACL rejection per peer by matching a single log line 
The four rejection checks were independent greps over the whole log:
two npubs, a context and a decision. Together they proved only that
node-a mentioned each npub somewhere, rejected somebody on an inbound
handshake, and rejected somebody by denylist. Nothing tied a rejection
to a named peer, and node-a lists both denied peers as auto_connect
peers, so it logs their npubs on the outbound connect path whether or
not any rejection ever happened. The actual message was never matched.

Replace them with a helper that requires every given string on ONE
line, and assert per denied peer: the real message, that peer's npub,
and the denylist decision together. Strings match in any order by
chaining fixed-string greps over the surviving lines, so the assertion
does not depend on how the log formatter orders a message and its
fields. A grep over empty input yields the empty string rather than
anything a caller could mistake for a match, so an unreadable container
times out and fails instead of passing.

Two limits are written at the call sites rather than left implied. The
decision conjunct discriminates nothing, since the two allowing
variants return early and denylist is the only value that can reach
that warning. And node-a authorizes before dialing, so it emits a
fully formed rejection line for each denied peer on the outbound path;
these assertions are satisfiable without the inbound check running at
all, and it is the peer-count assertions that would catch that.

Verified against the running harness: all three find a real matching
line. The defect shape they replace was exercised offline first, with
the three strings spread across three lines, where the old checks
passed and the new ones fail.
2026-07-23 04:16:16 +00:00
..
.gitignore
Add peer ACL enforcement with reloadable allow/deny files (#50)
2026-04-16 05:13:07 +00:00
docker-compose.yml
Stop concurrent local CI runs from clobbering each other's containers
2026-07-19 06:41:25 +00:00
generate-configs.sh
Test infrastructure overhaul: gateway robustness + full CI coverage
2026-04-30 10:24:32 +00:00
README.md
Add peer ACL enforcement with reloadable allow/deny files (#50)
2026-04-16 05:13:07 +00:00
test.sh
Prove ACL rejection per peer by matching a single log line
2026-07-23 04:16:16 +00:00

README.md

ACL Allowlist Test

Six Docker nodes use per-node ACL files mounted at the hardcoded runtime paths:

  • node-a and node-b carry the insider allowlist (node-a, node-b, node-e, node-f)
  • node-c and node-d each carry a broad allowlist containing every node alias
  • node-e and node-f do not mount any ACL files locally
  • every node gets a generated /etc/fips/hosts with aliases for node-a through node-f

This lets us test three different node behaviors at once:

  • insiders (a, b) explicitly allow a, b, e, and f
  • outsiders (c, d) allow everyone locally, but still cannot join because insiders reject them
  • allowed remotes (e, f) rely on the insider ACLs and do not need local ACL files

Test Identities

Allowed:

  • node-a
    • npub1sjlh2c3x9w7kjsqg2ay080n2lff2uvt325vpan33ke34rn8l5jcqawh57m
    • 0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f20
  • node-b
    • npub1tdwa4vjrjl33pcjdpf2t4p027nl86xrx24g4d3avg4vwvayr3g8qhd84le
    • b102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1fb0

Denied:

  • node-c
    • npub1cld9yay0u24davpu6c35l4vldrhzvaq66pcqtg9a0j2cnjrn9rtsxx2pe6
    • c102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1fc0
  • node-d
    • npub1n9lpnv0592cc2ps6nm0ca3qls642vx7yjsv35rkxqzj2vgds52sqgpverl
    • d102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1fd0

Additional allowed:

  • node-e
    • npub1x5z9rwzzm26q9verutx4aajhf2zw2pyp34c6whhde2zduxqav40qgq36l6
    • nsec1egyrmekfw3u4l88v8zhrak9uht503s2kvn9v49tqgp6c5l2yuxgsv386l0
  • node-f
    • npub1ytrut7gjncn2zfnhn56c0zgftf0w6p99gf6fu8j73hzw5603zglqc9av6c
    • nsec1afh3nysthqh47awpdewcw59wvvp499f8dvlyclmnv4gvpxdk56dsa6eqsn

The generated fips.key fixtures use a mix of bare hex and nsec1... values. FIPS accepts either format in key files.

Run

Build the Linux binaries and test image:

./testing/scripts/build.sh --no-docker

Start the ACL test mesh:

./testing/acl-allowlist/generate-configs.sh
docker compose -f testing/acl-allowlist/docker-compose.yml up -d --build

Or run the full integration check:

./testing/acl-allowlist/test.sh

test.sh regenerates the ACL fixtures automatically before starting Docker. The generated ACL files use alias names, and the generated hosts file makes those aliases resolvable at runtime.

The ACL harness pins the expected test entrypoint explicitly so it does not accidentally reuse an older fips-test:latest image with a different startup script.

Docker service/container/hostname identifiers in this harness intentionally use service-*, fips-acl-container-*, and host-* names so they do not collide with the logical FIPS aliases node-a through node-f. For data-plane checks and operator examples, use the explicit FIPS names such as node-a.fips and node-d.fips.

ACL paths are fixed in this branch:

  • /etc/fips/peers.allow
  • /etc/fips/peers.deny

Mounted ACL files in this harness:

  • node-a and node-b: insider allowlist plus ALL deny fallback
  • node-c and node-d: broad local allowlist used by outsider nodes trying to blend in
  • node-e and node-f: no ACL files mounted
  • all nodes: /etc/fips/hosts aliases for node-a through node-f

Generated fixture location:

  • testing/acl-allowlist/generated-configs/

Inspect peer state:

docker exec fips-acl-container-a fipsctl show peers
docker exec fips-acl-container-b fipsctl show peers
docker exec fips-acl-container-c fipsctl show peers
docker exec fips-acl-container-d fipsctl show peers
docker exec fips-acl-container-e fipsctl show peers
docker exec fips-acl-container-f fipsctl show peers

Inspect the loaded ACL state directly:

docker exec fips-acl-container-a fipsctl acl show

Use explicit .fips names when checking reachability through the FIPS overlay:

docker exec fips-acl-container-a ping node-d.fips
docker exec fips-acl-container-a ping npub1n9lpnv0592cc2ps6nm0ca3qls642vx7yjsv35rkxqzj2vgds52sqgpverl.fips

The output shows both the original ACL file entries and the resolved effective npub entries.

Expected:

  • node-a sees node-b, node-e, and node-f
  • node-b sees node-a
  • node-c sees no peers
  • node-d sees no peers
  • node-e sees node-a
  • node-f sees node-a

Visible rejection logs:

docker compose -f testing/acl-allowlist/docker-compose.yml logs -f service-a service-b service-c service-d service-e service-f

On startup, node-c and node-d immediately try their configured outbound static connection to node-a. Their own ACLs permit that attempt, but the insider ACL on node-a still rejects both peers. Because node-a also has static peer stanzas for node-c and node-d, you may see both outbound_connect and inbound_handshake rejection messages during startup. The outsider-initiated path emits messages like:

Rejected peer by ACL ... context=inbound_handshake decision=denylist match

Those messages are now emitted at debug level. This harness enables RUST_LOG=info,fips::node=debug so the ACL rejection details stay visible in test logs, and operators can temporarily raise log level the same way when diagnosing ACL issues locally.

A later ping6 from node-c.fips does not emit a new inbound_handshake message. The ping uses the data-plane session path, and since no peer session to node-a.fips was established, it just times out.

Stop and clean up:

docker compose -f testing/acl-allowlist/docker-compose.yml down
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