Files
fips/testing/chaos/sim/assertions.py
T
Arjen dca938c104 feat(peer): switchover between a peer's transports, with no handshake
A peer reachable over more than one transport keeps one Noise session
and moves its traffic between transports on failure or degradation.
Implements docs/design/fips-multi-path-switchover.md §4-§10 and closes
the two-interface case in #143.

Three inner link messages next to Heartbeat: `0x52 PathProbe` and
`0x53 PathAck`, carrying a probe id, the sender's path id and a
`remote_active` bit, and `0x54 PathClose`, naming the receiver's path
id and a reason. A probe is an ordinary encrypted frame sent on a
candidate transport; the receiver, having decrypted it against the
session found by index, adds the path as `Probing`, marks it `rx_live`
and answers on that same path. The prober's receipt of the ack marks
the path `Live`, `tx_live`, and takes an RTT sample. No handshake, no
key material, no index allocation. Old nodes drop the unknown types at
debug, so a path to one stays `Probing` and never becomes eligible.

The discovery gate changes shape: a live peer beaconing on a transport
we hold no path to it over becomes a path candidate rather than being
skipped, and the heartbeat tick probes it. The active path's first
probe is small — the handshake proved it and seeded its MTU — while a
standby's discovery probes are padded to the link MTU, as is one a
minute on every path, so a medium that passes small frames and drops
large ones never proves itself. A standby the peer never answers on is
given up after eight probes; the active path never is.

Detection is per path and takes each medium's own failure signal: a
carrier edge, an unreachable-on-send (`ENETUNREACH`/`EHOSTUNREACH`), an
interface going away, or two unanswered heartbeats on a path the peer
is also silent on. Any of them marks the path `Suspect` and selection
leaves it at once, because the standby is warm: heartbeats run at
`node.path.active_heartbeat_ms` where either side sends and
`standby_heartbeat_ms` elsewhere, both stretched by the path's own
round trip so a Tor or Nym path is neither flooded nor declared dead
every round trip. A peer holding one live path is not heartbeated here
at all — selection has nothing to move to, and the link heartbeat keeps
its liveness. Soft signals (the peer's `remote_active` flipping away,
silence here while a standby hears the peer) trigger a probe, never
`Suspect`: reading them as a verdict forces both sides onto one path
and loops under a one-way failure.

A node that loses a path tells the peer with a `PathClose` on a
surviving one, so the peer moves at once rather than after its own
timeout. A transport that returns inside the five-minute grace revives
its dead paths as `Probing` with their RTT window and ETX intact.

Selection is measured, not configured: each path scores
`quality_index(etx, min_rtt)`, and traffic moves when the active path
is no longer eligible (mandatory) or when a standby beats it by
`switch_margin` for `switch_dwell_secs` (discretionary). Min RTT over a
window rather than SRTT, because SRTT inflates under load on the path
carrying traffic while an idle standby looks pristine — a ping-pong
generator. A `role: backup` transport carries a peer's traffic only
while no normal path is eligible, and yields outright when one becomes
eligible. `fipsctl path pin` overrides both while its path is eligible.

A switch re-seeds the path MTU from the new path, tightens the
session MTUs and refreshes the MSS ceiling, so the first frames after a
switch are not black-holed. The link record and `addr_to_link` follow
the active path. The link cost the tree sees is held at its pre-switch
value for the dwell, and until the two receiver reports that span the
switch have arrived — the first counts every frame in flight on the old
path as lost and spikes the per-report ETX for one interval, the second
replaces it — so neither a short flap nor that spike ripples mesh-wide
through parent selection or the next-hop order.

Operator surface: `role: backup` on any transport, `node.path.*`
(`switch_margin`, validated finite and at least 1.0, `switch_dwell_secs`,
`min_samples`, `active_heartbeat_ms`, `standby_heartbeat_ms`), and
`fipsctl path show|pin|unpin` over the `path_show`, `path_pin` and
`path_unpin` control commands.

Two chaos scenarios calibrate the defaults and are wired into both
runners: `dual-path-flap` (a raw-Ethernet veth as the cable, the Docker
bridge over UDP as the wifi) and `dual-udp-flap` (two interface-bound
UDP instances). Each flaps one path under iperf and carries detectors
that can fail on a switchover that did not carry traffic — a per-node
ceiling on "Peer promoted to active" (a second is a re-peering), a
one-second ceiling from link-down to the first switch, and a two-second
ceiling on any zero-byte iperf interval run — alongside the
`path_switches` band. Neither has been run to calibrate; the defaults
are chosen, not derived, and the design doc says so.

Refs #143
2026-09-23 11:48:33 -03:00

744 lines
26 KiB
Python

"""Post-run scenario assertions evaluated via control-socket data.
Assertions are declared in the scenario YAML under ``assertions:`` and
are evaluated near the end of the simulation, before teardown begins.
Each failing assertion is recorded with a clear pass/fail message; the
runner exits non-zero when any assertion fails.
Currently supported assertions:
- ``bloom_send_rate``: per-node trailing-window ceiling on
``stats.bloom.sent`` delta. Calibrated for the bloom-storm
regression scenario but generally usable.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from dataclasses import dataclass
from .control import snapshot_all_bloom
from .scenario import (
MinTrafficAssertion,
BaselineAssertion,
BloomSendRateAssertion,
CongestionSignalsAssertion,
MaxErrorsAssertion,
MaxParentSwitchesAssertion,
MaxPromotionsAssertion,
MaxStallAssertion,
MinParentSwitchesAssertion,
SwitchLatencyAssertion,
TreeParentsAssertion,
)
from .topology import SimTopology
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@dataclass
class AssertionOutcome:
name: str
passed: bool
detail: str
def _bloom_sent_total(node_data: dict) -> int | None:
"""Extract stats.bloom.sent from a show_bloom response."""
stats = node_data.get("stats") or {}
sent = stats.get("sent")
if sent is None:
return None
try:
return int(sent)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
class BloomSendRateMonitor:
"""Samples per-node ``stats.bloom.sent`` to evaluate a trailing-window
ceiling assertion at end-of-run.
Usage:
m = BloomSendRateMonitor(topology, cfg)
m.sample_window_start() # called window_secs before scenario end
...
m.sample_end() # called at scenario end
outcome = m.evaluate()
"""
def __init__(self, topology: SimTopology, cfg: BloomSendRateAssertion):
self.topology = topology
self.cfg = cfg
self.window_start: dict[str, int] = {}
self.window_end: dict[str, int] = {}
def sample_window_start(self) -> None:
snap = snapshot_all_bloom(self.topology)
for nid, data in snap.items():
v = _bloom_sent_total(data)
if v is not None:
self.window_start[nid] = v
def sample_end(self) -> None:
snap = snapshot_all_bloom(self.topology)
for nid, data in snap.items():
v = _bloom_sent_total(data)
if v is not None:
self.window_end[nid] = v
def evaluate(self) -> AssertionOutcome:
max_per_node = self.cfg.max_per_node
window_secs = self.cfg.window_secs
if not self.window_start or not self.window_end:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="bloom_send_rate",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL bloom_send_rate: failed to sample window endpoints "
f"(start={len(self.window_start)} nodes, "
f"end={len(self.window_end)} nodes)"
),
)
per_node_deltas: dict[str, int] = {}
for nid, end_v in self.window_end.items():
start_v = self.window_start.get(nid)
if start_v is None:
continue
per_node_deltas[nid] = end_v - start_v
offenders = {
nid: d for nid, d in per_node_deltas.items() if d > max_per_node
}
max_obs = max(per_node_deltas.values()) if per_node_deltas else 0
if offenders:
sorted_off = sorted(offenders.items(), key=lambda kv: -kv[1])
details = ", ".join(f"{nid}={d}" for nid, d in sorted_off)
detail = (
f"FAIL bloom_send_rate: {len(offenders)} node(s) exceeded "
f"ceiling of {max_per_node} bloom_sent over trailing "
f"{window_secs}s — offenders: {details} "
f"(all per-node deltas: "
f"{', '.join(f'{n}={v}' for n, v in sorted(per_node_deltas.items()))})"
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="bloom_send_rate",
passed=False,
detail=detail,
)
detail = (
f"PASS bloom_send_rate: max per-node delta {max_obs} <= "
f"ceiling {max_per_node} over trailing {window_secs}s "
f"(per-node: "
f"{', '.join(f'{n}={v}' for n, v in sorted(per_node_deltas.items()))})"
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="bloom_send_rate",
passed=True,
detail=detail,
)
def evaluate_max_parent_switches(
cfg: MaxParentSwitchesAssertion,
parent_switch_count: int,
scope: str,
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Stability ceiling on parent switches over the run.
``scope`` describes what was counted and appears in the message, so a
reader can tell a per-node result from a mesh-wide one. Resolving a
per-node scope to a real node is the caller's job, and so is failing
loudly when it cannot: an unresolvable node would count zero switches
and sail under any ceiling without having observed anything.
"""
if parent_switch_count <= cfg.max_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_parent_switches",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS max_parent_switches: {parent_switch_count} switches "
f"({scope}) <= ceiling {cfg.max_total}"
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_parent_switches",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL max_parent_switches: {parent_switch_count} switches "
f"({scope}) > ceiling {cfg.max_total} — the tree is reparenting "
f"more than the hysteresis band should allow. Check whether a "
f"cost change smaller than the hysteresis margin is still "
f"triggering a switch."
),
)
def evaluate_baseline(
cfg: BaselineAssertion,
snapshot: dict | None,
sessions: int,
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Floor on the mesh having formed: nodes answered, agreed a root, took parents."""
if not snapshot:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="baseline",
passed=False,
detail=(
"FAIL baseline: no final tree snapshot was taken, so nothing "
"about the mesh was observed. This is a harness failure."
),
)
reporting = len(snapshot)
roots = {v.get("root") for v in snapshot.values() if v.get("root")}
parented = sum(
1 for v in snapshot.values()
if v.get("parent") and v.get("parent") != v.get("my_node_addr")
)
parts, failures = [], []
def note(ok, text):
parts.append(text)
if not ok:
failures.append(text)
if cfg.min_nodes_reporting is not None:
note(reporting >= cfg.min_nodes_reporting,
f"{reporting} node(s) answered (need {cfg.min_nodes_reporting})")
if cfg.max_roots is not None:
note(len(roots) <= cfg.max_roots and len(roots) >= 1,
f"{len(roots)} distinct root(s) (allowed {cfg.max_roots})")
if cfg.min_nodes_parented is not None:
note(parented >= cfg.min_nodes_parented,
f"{parented} node(s) have a parent (need {cfg.min_nodes_parented})")
if cfg.min_sessions is not None:
note(sessions >= cfg.min_sessions,
f"{sessions} session(s) established (need {cfg.min_sessions})")
summary = "; ".join(parts)
if failures:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="baseline",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL baseline: {'; '.join(failures)}. Full: {summary}"
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="baseline", passed=True, detail=f"PASS baseline: {summary}"
)
def evaluate_tree_parents(
cfg: TreeParentsAssertion,
snapshot: dict | None,
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Check each node's parent in the final tree snapshot.
Parents are compared by node address, resolved from the snapshot's own
``my_node_addr`` fields, so the check does not depend on the display
name a node happened to publish.
Every way of not knowing the answer is a failure: no snapshot, the
node absent from it, the expected parent absent from it, or the node
still claiming to be its own root. Each of those produces the same
"no match" that a genuinely wrong parent does, and only saying so
separately keeps a harness problem from reading as a routing verdict.
"""
if not snapshot:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="tree_parents",
passed=False,
detail=(
"FAIL tree_parents: no final tree snapshot was taken, so no "
"node's parent was observed. This is a harness failure, not "
"a statement about the tree."
),
)
addr_of = {
nid: data.get("my_node_addr")
for nid, data in snapshot.items()
if data.get("my_node_addr")
}
id_of = {addr: nid for nid, addr in addr_of.items()}
good, bad = [], []
for child, want_parent in sorted(cfg.expected.items()):
entry = snapshot.get(child)
if entry is None:
bad.append(
f"{child} is absent from the snapshot ({len(snapshot)} node(s) "
f"present: {', '.join(sorted(snapshot))})"
)
continue
want_addr = addr_of.get(want_parent)
if want_addr is None:
bad.append(
f"{child}: expected parent {want_parent} is absent from the "
f"snapshot, so its address cannot be resolved"
)
continue
got_addr = entry.get("parent")
if got_addr == entry.get("my_node_addr"):
bad.append(
f"{child} is its own parent — it still believes it is root, "
f"so the tree never converged around it (wanted {want_parent})"
)
continue
if got_addr == want_addr:
good.append(f"{child}->{want_parent}")
continue
got_id = id_of.get(got_addr) or entry.get("parent_display_name") or got_addr
bad.append(f"{child} chose {got_id}, wanted {want_parent}")
if bad:
detail = f"FAIL tree_parents: {'; '.join(bad)}"
if good:
detail += f". Correct: {', '.join(good)}"
return AssertionOutcome(name="tree_parents", passed=False, detail=detail)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="tree_parents",
passed=True,
detail=f"PASS tree_parents: {', '.join(good)}",
)
_CONGESTION_FLOORS = (
("min_nodes_detected", "congestion_detected"),
("min_nodes_ce_forwarded", "ce_forwarded"),
("min_nodes_ce_received", "ce_received"),
)
def evaluate_congestion_signals(
cfg: CongestionSignalsAssertion,
snapshot: dict | None,
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Floors on how many nodes observed each congestion counter.
``snapshot`` is the final congestion snapshot keyed by node id. None
means the snapshot never ran, which fails: a missing snapshot and a
mesh that observed no congestion produce the same zero counts, and
treating them alike is how an assertion comes to pass on an absence
of evidence.
"""
if not snapshot:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="congestion_signals",
passed=False,
detail=(
"FAIL congestion_signals: no final congestion snapshot was "
"taken, so no node was observed at all. This is a harness "
"failure, not a statement about congestion."
),
)
parts, failures = [], []
for attr, counter in _CONGESTION_FLOORS:
floor = getattr(cfg, attr)
if floor is None:
continue
hits = sorted(
nid for nid, data in snapshot.items()
if (data.get("congestion") or {}).get(counter, 0) > 0
)
parts.append(f"{counter}: {len(hits)} node(s) >0 (floor {floor})")
if len(hits) < floor:
failures.append(
f"{counter} non-zero on {len(hits)} node(s), need {floor}"
)
else:
parts[-1] += f" [{', '.join(hits)}]"
summary = "; ".join(parts)
if failures:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="congestion_signals",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL congestion_signals: {'; '.join(failures)} — across "
f"{len(snapshot)} node(s) sampled. Full counts: {summary}"
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="congestion_signals",
passed=True,
detail=f"PASS congestion_signals: {summary}",
)
def evaluate_max_errors(
cfg: MaxErrorsAssertion,
errors: list[tuple[str, str]],
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Ceiling on ERROR-level log lines across the whole mesh.
``errors`` is the ``AnalysisResult.errors`` list of ``(source, line)``
pairs rather than a bare count, so a failure can name the nodes and
quote the lines. A ceiling breach that only reports a number sends the
reader back to the logs it was supposed to save them reading.
"""
count = len(errors)
if count <= cfg.max_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_errors",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS max_errors: {count} ERROR line(s) mesh-wide <= "
f"ceiling {cfg.max_total}"
),
)
per_node: dict[str, int] = {}
for source, _line in errors:
per_node[source] = per_node.get(source, 0) + 1
worst = sorted(per_node.items(), key=lambda kv: -kv[1])
breakdown = ", ".join(f"{src}={n}" for src, n in worst)
samples = "\n".join(
f" [{src}] {line.strip()}" for src, line in errors[:5]
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_errors",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL max_errors: {count} ERROR line(s) mesh-wide > ceiling "
f"{cfg.max_total} — per node: {breakdown}. First "
f"{min(5, count)}:\n{samples}"
),
)
def evaluate_min_parent_switches(
cfg: MinParentSwitchesAssertion,
parent_switch_count: int,
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Sanity guard: fail the scenario if the harness-induced flap did
not produce at least ``cfg.min_total`` parent switches across the
run. Detects misconfiguration (e.g., wrong root election) where
the bloom-rate assertion would otherwise trivially pass on any
binary including the regressed one.
"""
if parent_switch_count >= cfg.min_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="min_parent_switches",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS min_parent_switches: {parent_switch_count} switches "
f"(mesh-wide) >= floor {cfg.min_total}"
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="min_parent_switches",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL min_parent_switches: {parent_switch_count} switches "
f"(mesh-wide) < floor {cfg.min_total} — harness did not induce "
f"sufficient "
f"parent flapping; bloom-rate assertion would be trivially "
f"true. Check tree-snapshot-warmup.json: did the expected "
f"node win the root election?"
),
)
def _session_bytes(result: dict) -> int:
"""Bytes actually received in one iperf3 session, or 0 if it failed.
iperf3 reports a failed run as a top-level ``error`` string with no
``end`` block, and a killed-but-partial run still carries whatever it
managed. Both are handled by reading the received total and treating
anything missing as zero, so a session only counts when it moved bytes.
"""
if not isinstance(result, dict) or result.get("error"):
return 0
end = result.get("end")
if not isinstance(end, dict):
return 0
summary = end.get("sum_received") or end.get("sum_sent")
if not isinstance(summary, dict):
return 0
value = summary.get("bytes", 0)
return value if isinstance(value, int) and value > 0 else 0
def evaluate_min_traffic(
cfg: MinTrafficAssertion,
results: list[dict],
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Floor on iperf3 sessions that actually carried data.
Without this the traffic generator is decoration: the results were
written to disk and never read, so a scenario whose every session
failed still passed on a healthy control plane. A rebind under load is
exactly the case a tree snapshot cannot see.
"""
per_session = [_session_bytes(r) for r in results]
ok = [b for b in per_session if b > 0]
total = sum(ok)
if len(ok) >= cfg.min_sessions_ok and total >= cfg.min_bytes_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="min_traffic",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS min_traffic: {len(ok)}/{len(results)} session(s) moved "
f"data (need {cfg.min_sessions_ok}); {total} byte(s) total "
f"(need {cfg.min_bytes_total})"
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="min_traffic",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL min_traffic: {len(ok)}/{len(results)} session(s) moved data "
f"(need {cfg.min_sessions_ok}); {total} byte(s) total (need "
f"{cfg.min_bytes_total}). A green control plane with no traffic "
f"means the data path did not survive what the scenario did to it."
),
)
def evaluate_path_switches(cfg, count: int) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Band on path switches (traffic moving between transports under one
session) over the run.
``min_total`` catches a harness that flapped a link nothing was
switching over: a dual-path scenario in which no switch happened
tested nothing. ``max_total`` is the stability ceiling: a healthy
dual-path pair should switch only when a link goes and comes back,
never on its own.
"""
if cfg.min_total is not None and count < cfg.min_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="path_switches",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL path_switches: {count} switches < floor {cfg.min_total} "
f"— the flaps did not move traffic between paths. Check that "
f"both paths came up (fipsctl path show) before the first flap."
),
)
if cfg.max_total is not None and count > cfg.max_total:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="path_switches",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL path_switches: {count} switches > ceiling {cfg.max_total} "
f"— traffic is moving between paths more than the flaps "
f"account for. Look for discretionary switches on a healthy "
f"pair: the margin or the dwell is too small."
),
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="path_switches",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS path_switches: {count} switches within "
f"[{cfg.min_total if cfg.min_total is not None else 0}, "
f"{cfg.max_total if cfg.max_total is not None else 'inf'}]"
),
)
def evaluate_max_promotions(
cfg: MaxPromotionsAssertion,
promotions: list[tuple[str, str]],
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Per-node ceiling on "Peer promoted to active" lines.
``promotions`` is ``AnalysisResult.peers_promoted``: ``(source, line)``
pairs, one per handshake that completed on that node. The first per
peer is the pair meeting; any beyond the ceiling is a re-peering — the
session was torn down and rebuilt — which a switchover scenario exists
to prove does not happen. Liveness is no backstop here: standby probes
keep a peer alive while its data path is blackholed, so this counts
the one event a blackhole that lasts to the reaper cannot avoid.
"""
per_node: dict[str, int] = {}
for source, _line in promotions:
per_node[source] = per_node.get(source, 0) + 1
over = {src: n for src, n in per_node.items() if n > cfg.per_node}
if not over:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_promotions",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS max_promotions: every node promoted at most "
f"{cfg.per_node} time(s) ({len(promotions)} total)"
),
)
breakdown = ", ".join(f"{src}={n}" for src, n in sorted(over.items()))
samples = "\n".join(
f" [{src}] {line.strip()}"
for src, line in promotions
if src in over
)
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_promotions",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL max_promotions: {breakdown} exceed(s) the per-node ceiling "
f"of {cfg.per_node}. A second promotion is a re-peering: the "
f"session was lost and rebuilt, so a switchover did not carry.\n"
f"{samples}"
),
)
def _line_epoch(line: str) -> float | None:
"""Epoch seconds of a node log line's leading RFC 3339 timestamp, if any.
``tracing`` writes ``2026-09-13T13:39:01.123456Z`` first on every line.
Anything else (a bare stderr line, a runner line) is not timed.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
head = line.strip().split(" ", 1)[0]
if not head.endswith("Z"):
return None
try:
return datetime.fromisoformat(head.replace("Z", "+00:00")).timestamp()
except ValueError:
return None
def evaluate_switch_latency(
cfg: SwitchLatencyAssertion,
flap_events: list[tuple[float, str, str, str]],
switches: list[tuple[str, str]],
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Ceiling on the time from each link-down to the first switch on
either endpoint.
``flap_events`` is the link manager's record: ``(epoch, "down" | "up",
a, b)``. ``switches`` is ``AnalysisResult.path_switches``: ``(source,
line)``, where ``source`` is the node id and the line carries its own
timestamp. For each down edge, the latency is the earliest switch line
on ``a`` or ``b`` stamped at or after the down; a down with no switch
inside ``max_ms`` fails. The worst flap is what is reported.
"""
downs = [(t, a, b) for t, kind, a, b in flap_events if kind == "down"]
if not downs:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="switch_latency",
passed=False,
detail="FAIL switch_latency: no link was taken down, nothing measured",
)
timed: list[tuple[str, float]] = []
for source, line in switches:
t = _line_epoch(line)
if t is not None:
timed.append((source, t))
limit = cfg.max_ms / 1000.0
worst: tuple[float, str, str] | None = None
missing: list[str] = []
for down_at, a, b in downs:
after = [
t - down_at
for src, t in timed
if src in (a, b) and t >= down_at and t - down_at <= limit
]
if not after:
from datetime import datetime, timezone
when = datetime.fromtimestamp(down_at, timezone.utc).strftime("%H:%M:%S")
missing.append(f"{a}--{b} down at {when}Z")
continue
latency = min(after)
if worst is None or latency > worst[0]:
worst = (latency, a, b)
if missing:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="switch_latency",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL switch_latency: {len(missing)} of {len(downs)} link-down(s) "
f"had no path switch on either endpoint within {cfg.max_ms} ms: "
+ "; ".join(missing)
),
)
assert worst is not None
return AssertionOutcome(
name="switch_latency",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS switch_latency: worst {worst[0] * 1000:.0f} ms "
f"({worst[1]}--{worst[2]}) over {len(downs)} link-down(s), "
f"ceiling {cfg.max_ms} ms"
),
)
def _longest_stall_secs(result: dict) -> float:
"""Longest run of consecutive zero-byte intervals in one iperf3 result,
in seconds. 0 for a result with no intervals."""
intervals = result.get("intervals") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
if not isinstance(intervals, list):
return 0.0
longest = 0.0
run = 0.0
for iv in intervals:
summary = iv.get("sum") if isinstance(iv, dict) else None
if not isinstance(summary, dict):
continue
seconds = summary.get("seconds", 1.0)
if not isinstance(seconds, (int, float)) or seconds <= 0:
seconds = 1.0
if summary.get("bytes", 0) == 0:
run += seconds
longest = max(longest, run)
else:
run = 0.0
return longest
def evaluate_max_stall(
cfg: MaxStallAssertion,
results: list[dict],
) -> AssertionOutcome:
"""Ceiling on the longest zero-byte run inside any iperf3 session.
``min_traffic`` cannot see a hole: a session that stalls for ten
seconds mid-run still moves bytes before and after. This reads the
per-interval totals iperf3 records and fails on the longest run of
zeros across every session, which is the stall a switchover leaves
when it does not carry.
"""
if not results:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_stall",
passed=False,
detail="FAIL max_stall: no iperf3 session ran, nothing measured",
)
stalls = [(_longest_stall_secs(r), r) for r in results]
worst_secs, worst = max(stalls, key=lambda pair: pair[0])
if worst_secs <= cfg.max_secs:
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_stall",
passed=True,
detail=(
f"PASS max_stall: longest zero-byte run {worst_secs:.0f} s "
f"across {len(results)} session(s), ceiling {cfg.max_secs:g} s"
),
)
start = worst.get("start", {}) if isinstance(worst, dict) else {}
when = start.get("timestamp", {}).get("time", "?") if isinstance(start, dict) else "?"
return AssertionOutcome(
name="max_stall",
passed=False,
detail=(
f"FAIL max_stall: a session starting {when} moved nothing for "
f"{worst_secs:.0f} s, over the ceiling of {cfg.max_secs:g} s. Bytes "
f"either side of the hole satisfied min_traffic; the hole is a "
f"switchover that did not carry."
),
)