Add TorTransport in src/transport/tor/ supporting three operating modes: Outbound (socks5 mode): - Non-blocking SOCKS5 connect via tokio-socks with per-destination circuit isolation (IsolateSOCKSAuth) - TorAddr enum for .onion and clearnet address types - Connection pool with per-connection receive tasks, reuses TCP stream FMP framing - connect_async()/connection_state_sync()/promote_connection() follow the same non-blocking polling pattern as TCP transport Inbound (directory mode — recommended for production): - Tor manages the onion service via HiddenServiceDir in torrc - FIPS reads .onion address from hostname file at startup - No control port needed — enables Tor Sandbox 1 (seccomp-bpf) - Accept loop mirrors TCP pattern with DirectoryServiceConfig Monitoring (control_port mode and optional in directory mode): - Async control port client supporting TCP and Unix socket connections via Box<dyn AsyncRead/Write> trait objects - AUTHENTICATE with cookie or password auth - 8 GETINFO queries: bootstrap, circuits, traffic, liveness, version, dormant state, SOCKS listeners - Background monitoring task polls every 10s, caches TorMonitoringInfo in Arc<RwLock> for synchronous query access - Bootstrap milestone logging (25/50/75/100%), stall warning (>60s), network liveness transitions, dormant mode entry - Directory mode optionally connects to control port when control_addr is configured (non-fatal on failure) Operator visibility: - show_transports query exposes tor_mode, onion_address, tor_monitoring (bootstrap, circuit_established, traffic, liveness, version, dormant) - fipstop transport detail view: Tor mode, onion address, SOCKS5/control errors, connection stats, Tor daemon status section - fipstop table view: tor(mode) label with truncated onion address hint Security hardening: - Per-destination circuit isolation via IsolateSOCKSAuth - Unix socket default for control port (/run/tor/control) - Reference torrc with HiddenServiceDir, VanguardsLiteEnabled, ConnectionPadding, DoS protections (PoW + intro rate limiting) Config: - TorConfig with socks5, control_port, and directory modes - DirectoryServiceConfig: hostname_file, bind_addr - control_addr, control_auth, cookie_path, connect_timeout, max_inbound_connections Testing: - 69 unit + integration tests with mock SOCKS5 and control servers - Docker tests: socks5-outbound (clearnet via Tor) and directory-mode (HiddenServiceDir onion service) Documentation: - Transport layer design doc: Tor architecture, directory mode - Configuration doc: Tor config tables and examples
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FIPS Wire Formats
This document is the comprehensive wire format reference for all three protocol layers. It covers transport framing, link-layer message formats, and session-layer message formats, with an encapsulation walkthrough showing how application data is wrapped through each layer.
Encoding Rules
- All multi-byte integers are little-endian (LE)
- NodeAddr is 16 bytes — truncated SHA-256 hash of public key
- Signatures are 64 bytes — secp256k1 Schnorr
- Variable-length arrays use a 2-byte u16 LE count prefix followed by that many items
- Public keys are 33 bytes — compressed secp256k1 (02/03 prefix + 32 bytes)
Transport Framing
Datagram-oriented transports (UDP, raw Ethernet, radio) preserve natural
packet boundaries and require no additional framing. Stream-oriented
transports (TCP, WebSocket, Tor) must delineate FIPS packets within the
byte stream; the common prefix payload_len field provides this
framing directly. TCP and Tor share a common stream reader
(tcp/stream.rs) that implements this framing.
Ethernet data frame header. The Ethernet transport prepends a 3-byte
header before the FMP payload on data frames: a 1-byte frame type
(0x00) followed by a 2-byte little-endian payload length. The length
field allows the receiver to trim Ethernet minimum-frame padding that
would otherwise corrupt AEAD verification. Beacon frames (0x01) have
no length field (fixed 34-byte payload). These bytes are consumed by the
transport layer and are not visible to FMP. The effective MTU for FMP is
the interface MTU minus three bytes (typically 1497).
Link-Layer Formats
All FMP packets begin with a 4-byte common prefix that identifies the protocol version, session lifecycle phase, per-packet flags, and payload length.
Common Prefix (4 bytes)
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| version | 4 bits (high) | Protocol version. Currently 0x0 |
| phase | 4 bits (low) | Session lifecycle phase (see table) |
| flags | 1 byte | Per-packet signal flags (zero during handshake) |
| payload_len | 2 bytes LE | Length of payload after phase-specific header, excluding AEAD tag |
Phase Table
| Phase | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0 | Established frame | Post-handshake encrypted traffic |
| 0x1 | Noise IK msg1 | Handshake initiation |
| 0x2 | Noise IK msg2 | Handshake response |
Flags (Established Phase Only)
| Bit | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | K (key epoch) | Selects active key during rekeying |
| 1 | CE | Congestion Experienced echo |
| 2 | SP (spin bit) | RTT measurement |
| 3-7 | — | Reserved (must be zero) |
Flags must be zero in handshake packets (phase 0x1 and 0x2).
Established Frame (phase 0x0)
All post-handshake traffic between authenticated peers. Contains one encrypted link-layer message.
Outer header (16 bytes, used as AEAD AAD):
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=0, flags, payload_len |
| receiver_idx | 4 bytes LE | Session index for O(1) lookup |
| counter | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic nonce, used as AEAD nonce and for replay detection |
The entire 16-byte header is authenticated as Associated Data (AAD) in the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction.
Encrypted inner header (5 bytes, first bytes of plaintext):
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| timestamp | 4 bytes LE | Session-relative milliseconds (u32) |
| msg_type | 1 byte | Link-layer message type |
After decryption, the plaintext begins with the 4-byte timestamp followed by the 1-byte message type and message-specific fields.
Complete encrypted frame:
Message Type Table
| Type | Message | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | SessionDatagram | Encapsulated session-layer payload for forwarding |
| 0x01 | SenderReport | MMP sender-side metrics report (48 bytes) |
| 0x02 | ReceiverReport | MMP receiver-side metrics report (68 bytes) |
| 0x10 | TreeAnnounce | Spanning tree state announcement |
| 0x20 | FilterAnnounce | Bloom filter reachability update |
| 0x30 | LookupRequest | Coordinate discovery request |
| 0x31 | LookupResponse | Coordinate discovery response |
| 0x50 | Disconnect | Orderly link teardown |
| 0x51 | Heartbeat | Link liveness probe |
Noise IK Message 1 (phase 0x1)
Handshake initiation from connecting party.
Common prefix: ver=0, phase=0x1, flags=0, payload_len=110 (4 + 106).
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=1, flags=0, payload_len |
| sender_idx | 4 bytes LE | Initiator's session index (becomes receiver's receiver_idx) |
| noise_msg1 | 106 bytes | Noise IK first message |
Noise msg1 breakdown (106 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | ephemeral_pubkey | 33 bytes | Initiator's ephemeral key (compressed secp256k1) |
| 33 | encrypted_static | 49 bytes | Initiator's static key (33) + AEAD tag (16) |
| 82 | encrypted_epoch | 24 bytes | Startup epoch (8) + AEAD tag (16) |
Noise pattern: -> e, es, s, ss with epoch payload
Noise IK Message 2 (phase 0x2)
Handshake response from responder.
Common prefix: ver=0, phase=0x2, flags=0, payload_len=65 (4 + 4 + 57).
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=2, flags=0, payload_len |
| sender_idx | 4 bytes LE | Responder's session index |
| receiver_idx | 4 bytes LE | Echo of initiator's sender_idx from msg1 |
| noise_msg2 | 57 bytes | Noise IK second message |
Noise msg2 breakdown (57 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | ephemeral_pubkey | 33 bytes | Responder's ephemeral key (compressed secp256k1) |
| 33 | encrypted_epoch | 24 bytes | Startup epoch (8) + AEAD tag (16) |
Noise pattern: <- e, ee, se with epoch payload
After msg2, both parties derive identical symmetric session keys. The encrypted epoch in msg1 and msg2 enables peer restart detection — if a peer's epoch changes, the other side knows it restarted and must re-establish the link.
Index Semantics
Each party in a link session maintains two indices:
| Index | Chosen By | Used By | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| our_index | Us | Them | They include this as receiver_idx in packets to us |
| their_index | Them | Us | We include this as receiver_idx in packets to them |
Handshake Flow
Link-Layer Message Types
These messages are carried as plaintext inside encrypted frames (phase 0x0). After decryption of the AEAD ciphertext, the plaintext begins with a 4-byte session-relative timestamp followed by the 1-byte message type and message-specific fields.
TreeAnnounce (0x10)
Spanning tree state announcement, exchanged between direct peers only.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x10 |
| 1 | version | 1 byte | 0x01 (v1) |
| 2 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic counter, increments on parent change |
| 10 | timestamp | 8 bytes LE | Unix seconds |
| 18 | parent | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of selected parent (self = root) |
| 34 | ancestry_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of AncestryEntry records |
| 36 | ancestry | 32 x n bytes | AncestryEntry array (self -> root) |
| 36 + 32n | signature | 64 bytes | Schnorr signature over entire message |
AncestryEntry (32 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | node_addr | 16 bytes | Node's routing identifier |
| 16 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Node's sequence number |
| 24 | timestamp | 8 bytes LE | Node's Unix timestamp |
Size: 100 + (n x 32) bytes, where n = ancestry_count (depth + 1,
includes self)
| Tree Depth | Payload | With Link Overhead |
|---|---|---|
| 0 (root) | 132 bytes | 169 bytes |
| 3 | 228 bytes | 265 bytes |
| 5 | 292 bytes | 329 bytes |
| 10 | 452 bytes | 489 bytes |
FilterAnnounce (0x20)
Bloom filter reachability update, exchanged between direct peers only.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x20 |
| 1 | sequence | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic counter for freshness |
| 9 | hash_count | 1 byte | Number of hash functions (5 in v1) |
| 10 | size_class | 1 byte | Filter size: 512 << size_class bytes |
| 11 | filter_bits | variable | Bloom filter bit array |
Size class table:
| size_class | Bytes | Bits | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 512 | 4,096 | Reserved |
| 1 | 1,024 | 8,192 | v1 (MUST use) |
| 2 | 2,048 | 16,384 | Reserved |
| 3 | 4,096 | 32,768 | Reserved |
v1 payload: 1,035 bytes (11 header + 1,024 filter). With link overhead: 1,072 bytes.
LookupRequest (0x30)
Coordinate discovery request, flooded through the mesh.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x30 |
| 1 | request_id | 8 bytes LE | Unique random identifier |
| 9 | target | 16 bytes | NodeAddr being sought |
| 25 | origin | 16 bytes | Requester's NodeAddr |
| 41 | ttl | 1 byte | Remaining hops (default 64) |
| 42 | min_mtu | 2 bytes LE | Minimum transport MTU the origin requires (0 = no requirement) |
| 44 | origin_coords_cnt | 2 bytes LE | Number of coordinate entries |
| 46 | origin_coords | 16 x n bytes | Requester's ancestry (NodeAddr only) |
| 46 + 16n | visited_hash_cnt | 1 byte | Hash count for visited filter |
| 47 + 16n | visited_bits | 256 bytes | Compact bloom of visited nodes |
Size: 303 + (n x 16) bytes, where n = origin depth + 1
| Origin Depth | Payload |
|---|---|
| 3 | 351 bytes |
| 5 | 383 bytes |
| 10 | 463 bytes |
LookupResponse (0x31)
Coordinate discovery response, greedy-routed back to requester.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x31 |
| 1 | request_id | 8 bytes LE | Echoes the request's ID |
| 9 | target | 16 bytes | NodeAddr that was found |
| 25 | path_mtu | 2 bytes LE | Minimum MTU along response path (transit-annotated) |
| 27 | target_coords_cnt | 2 bytes LE | Number of coordinate entries |
| 29 | target_coords | 16 x n bytes | Target's ancestry (NodeAddr only) |
| 29 + 16n | proof | 64 bytes | Schnorr signature over (request_id || target || target_coords) |
Size: 93 + (n x 16) bytes
| Target Depth | Payload |
|---|---|
| 3 | 141 bytes |
| 5 | 173 bytes |
| 10 | 253 bytes |
The path_mtu field is initialized to u16::MAX by the target and each
transit hop applies min(path_mtu, outgoing_link_mtu), giving the
originator an MTU estimate for the discovered path.
Proof coverage: Signs (request_id || target || target_coords) —
path_mtu is excluded from the proof because it is a transit annotation
modified at each hop. Coordinates are included because proof verification
at the source confirms the target actually holds the claimed tree position.
The source verifies the proof upon receipt.
SessionDatagram (0x00)
Encapsulated session-layer payload for multi-hop forwarding.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x00 |
| 1 | ttl | 1 byte | Remaining hops, decremented each hop |
| 2 | path_mtu | 2 bytes LE | Path MTU, min'd at each forwarding hop |
| 4 | src_addr | 16 bytes | Source NodeAddr |
| 20 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | Destination NodeAddr |
| 36 | payload | variable | Session-layer message |
Fixed header: 36 bytes (SESSION_DATAGRAM_HEADER_SIZE)
The path_mtu field is initialized to u16::MAX by the sender and each
forwarding hop applies min(path_mtu, outgoing_link_mtu), giving the
receiver an estimate of the minimum MTU along the path.
The payload is opaque to transit nodes — session-layer encrypted independently of link encryption.
Disconnect (0x50)
Orderly link teardown with reason code.
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x50 |
| 1 | reason | 1 byte | Disconnect reason code |
Reason codes:
| Code | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x00 | Shutdown | Normal operator-requested stop |
| 0x01 | Restart | Restarting, may reconnect soon |
| 0x02 | ProtocolError | Protocol error encountered |
| 0x03 | TransportFailure | Transport failure |
| 0x04 | ResourceExhaustion | Memory or connection limit |
| 0x05 | SecurityViolation | Authentication or policy violation |
| 0x06 | ConfigurationChange | Peer removed from configuration |
| 0x07 | Timeout | Heartbeat liveness timeout |
| 0xFF | Other | Unspecified reason |
SenderReport (0x01)
Sent by the frame sender to provide interval-based transmission statistics.
| Offset | Field | Size | Encoding |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 | 0x01 |
| 1 | reserved | 3 | Zero |
| 4 | interval_start_counter | 8 | u64 LE — first counter in this interval |
| 12 | interval_end_counter | 8 | u64 LE — last counter in this interval |
| 20 | interval_start_timestamp | 4 | u32 LE — timestamp at interval start |
| 24 | interval_end_timestamp | 4 | u32 LE — timestamp at interval end |
| 28 | interval_bytes_sent | 4 | u32 LE — payload bytes sent in interval |
| 32 | cumulative_packets_sent | 8 | u64 LE — total packets sent on this link |
| 40 | cumulative_bytes_sent | 8 | u64 LE — total bytes sent on this link |
Total: 48 bytes.
ReceiverReport (0x02)
Sent by the frame receiver to provide loss, jitter, and timing feedback.
| Offset | Field | Size | Encoding |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 | 0x02 |
| 1 | reserved | 3 | Zero |
| 4 | highest_counter | 8 | u64 LE — highest counter value received |
| 12 | cumulative_packets_recv | 8 | u64 LE — total packets received |
| 20 | cumulative_bytes_recv | 8 | u64 LE — total bytes received |
| 28 | timestamp_echo | 4 | u32 LE — echoed sender timestamp for RTT |
| 32 | dwell_time | 2 | u16 LE — time between receive and echo (ms) |
| 34 | max_burst_loss | 2 | u16 LE — largest loss burst in interval |
| 36 | mean_burst_loss | 2 | u16 LE — mean burst length (u8.8 fixed-point) |
| 38 | reserved | 2 | Zero |
| 40 | jitter | 4 | u32 LE — interarrival jitter (microseconds) |
| 44 | ecn_ce_count | 4 | u32 LE — cumulative ECN-CE marked packets |
| 48 | owd_trend | 4 | i32 LE — one-way delay trend (µs/s, signed) |
| 52 | burst_loss_count | 4 | u32 LE — number of loss bursts in interval |
| 56 | cumulative_reorder_count | 4 | u32 LE — total reordered packets |
| 60 | interval_packets_recv | 4 | u32 LE — packets received in interval |
| 64 | interval_bytes_recv | 4 | u32 LE — bytes received in interval |
Total: 68 bytes.
Session-Layer Message Formats
Session-layer messages are carried as the payload of a SessionDatagram (0x00). All FSP messages begin with a 4-byte common prefix that identifies the protocol version, session lifecycle phase, per-packet flags, and payload length.
FSP Common Prefix (4 bytes)
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| version | 4 bits (high) | Protocol version. Currently 0x0 |
| phase | 4 bits (low) | Session lifecycle phase (see table) |
| flags | 1 byte | Per-packet signal flags (zero during handshake) |
| payload_len | 2 bytes LE | Length of payload after phase-specific header |
FSP Phase Table
| Phase | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x0 | Established | Post-handshake encrypted traffic or plaintext error signals |
| 0x1 | Handshake msg1 | SessionSetup (Noise XK msg1) |
| 0x2 | Handshake msg2 | SessionAck (Noise XK msg2) |
| 0x3 | Handshake msg3 | SessionMsg3 (Noise XK msg3) |
FSP Flags (Established Phase Only)
| Bit | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | CP (coords present) | Source and destination coordinates follow the header in cleartext |
| 1 | K (key epoch) | Selects active key during rekeying |
| 2 | U (unencrypted) | Payload is plaintext (error signals) |
| 3-7 | — | Reserved (must be zero) |
Flags must be zero in handshake packets (phase 0x1, 0x2, and 0x3).
FSP Encrypted Message (phase 0x0, U flag clear)
Post-handshake encrypted data. The 12-byte cleartext header is used as AEAD AAD. Coordinates may appear in cleartext between the header and ciphertext when the CP flag is set.
Cleartext header (12 bytes, used as AEAD AAD):
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| common prefix | 4 bytes | ver=0, phase=0, flags, payload_len |
| counter | 8 bytes LE | Monotonic nonce, used as AEAD nonce and for replay detection |
Optional cleartext coordinates (when CP flag is set):
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of source coordinate entries |
| src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Source's ancestry (NodeAddr, self -> root) |
| dest_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of dest coordinate entries |
| dest_coords | 16 x m bytes | Destination's ancestry |
Transit nodes parse the CP flag and extract coordinates without decryption.
Encrypted inner header (6 bytes, first bytes of AEAD plaintext):
| Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|
| timestamp | 4 bytes LE | Session-relative milliseconds (u32) |
| msg_type | 1 byte | Session-layer message type |
| inner_flags | 1 byte | Bit 0: SP (spin bit for RTT measurement) |
After the inner header, the remaining plaintext is the message-type-specific body.
Complete encrypted message:
FSP Session Message Types
| Type | Message | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 0x10 | Data | Port-multiplexed service payload (see DataPacket below) |
| 0x11 | SenderReport | MMP sender-side metrics report |
| 0x12 | ReceiverReport | MMP receiver-side metrics report |
| 0x13 | PathMtuNotification | End-to-end path MTU echo |
| 0x14 | CoordsWarmup | Standalone coordinate cache warming |
| 0x20 | CoordsRequired | Error: transit node lacks destination coordinates |
| 0x21 | PathBroken | Error: greedy routing reached dead end |
| 0x22 | MtuExceeded | Error: forwarded packet exceeds next-hop MTU |
Message types 0x10-0x14 are carried inside the AEAD ciphertext (dispatched
by the msg_type field in the encrypted inner header). Types 0x20-0x22 are
plaintext error signals (U flag set, no encryption).
Session-layer SenderReport (0x11) and ReceiverReport (0x12) use the same body format as their link-layer counterparts (0x01 and 0x02). The msg_type byte in the body matches the link-layer value; dispatch to the correct layer happens at the session level based on the FSP message type.
SessionSetup (phase 0x1)
Establishes a session and warms transit coordinate caches. Contains the first message of the Noise XK handshake (ephemeral key only — the initiator's static identity is not revealed until msg3).
SessionSetup, SessionAck, and SessionMsg3 are identified by the phase
field in the FSP common prefix (0x1, 0x2, 0x3), not by a message type
byte. The msg_type field in the encrypted inner header applies only to
established-phase (0x0) messages.
Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x1, flags=0, payload_len.
Body (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | flags | 1 byte | Bit 0: REQUEST_ACK, Bit 1: BIDIRECTIONAL |
| 1 | src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of source coordinate entries |
| 3 | src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Source's ancestry (NodeAddr, self -> root) |
| ... | dest_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of dest coordinate entries |
| ... | dest_coords | 16 x m bytes | Destination's ancestry |
| ... | handshake_len | 2 bytes LE | Noise payload length |
| ... | handshake_payload | variable | Noise XK msg1 (33 bytes — ephemeral key only) |
SessionAck (phase 0x2)
Second message of the Noise XK handshake. The responder sends its ephemeral key and encrypted epoch. Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x2, flags=0, payload_len.
Body (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 1 | src_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of acknowledger coordinate entries |
| 3 | src_coords | 16 x n bytes | Acknowledger's ancestry (for cache warming) |
| ... | dest_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of initiator coordinate entries |
| ... | dest_coords | 16 x m bytes | Initiator's ancestry (for return-path cache warming) |
| ... | handshake_len | 2 bytes LE | Noise payload length |
| ... | handshake_payload | variable | Noise XK msg2 (57 bytes — ephemeral key + encrypted epoch) |
SessionMsg3 (phase 0x3)
Third and final message of the Noise XK handshake. The initiator reveals its encrypted static identity and epoch. After msg3, both parties derive identical symmetric session keys and the session is established. Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x3, flags=0, payload_len.
Body (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 1 | handshake_len | 2 bytes LE | Noise payload length |
| 3 | handshake_payload | variable | Noise XK msg3 (73 bytes — encrypted static + encrypted epoch) |
Noise XK msg3 breakdown (73 bytes):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | encrypted_static | 49 bytes | Initiator's static key (33) + AEAD tag (16) |
| 49 | encrypted_epoch | 24 bytes | Startup epoch (8) + AEAD tag (16) |
SessionMsg3 does not carry coordinates — both endpoints already have each other's coordinates from SessionSetup (msg1) and SessionAck (msg2).
Data (0x10) — DataPacket Port Multiplexing
DataPacket is the primary application data carrier. The body after the 6-byte encrypted inner header contains a 4-byte port header followed by the service payload:
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | src_port | 2 bytes LE | Source service port |
| 2 | dst_port | 2 bytes LE | Destination service port |
| 4 | payload | variable | Service-specific payload |
The receiver dispatches by dst_port to the registered service handler.
Port registry (three tiers):
| Range | Purpose |
|---|---|
| 0–255 (0x00–0xFF) | Reserved, protocol use |
| 256–1023 (0x100–0x3FF) | Reserved, FIPS standard services |
| 1024–65535 (0x400–0xFFFF) | Application use |
Initial assignment: Port 256 (0x100) = IPv6 shim.
IPv6 Shim Payload Format (Port 256)
The IPv6 shim defines its own payload format with a leading format byte:
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | format | 1 byte | Compression format (0x00 = mesh-internal compressed) |
| 1 | fields | variable | Format-specific residual fields |
Format 0x00 — mesh-internal compressed (default):
Strips source and destination IPv6 addresses (32 bytes) and payload length (2 bytes) from each packet. Carries residual fields that cannot be derived from session context:
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | format | 1 byte | 0x00 |
| 1 | traffic_class | 1 byte | IPv6 Traffic Class (DSCP + ECN) |
| 2 | flow_label | 3 bytes | IPv6 Flow Label (20 bits, big-endian, zero-padded) |
| 5 | next_header | 1 byte | IPv6 Next Header (protocol identifier) |
| 6 | hop_limit | 1 byte | IPv6 Hop Limit |
| 7 | upper_payload | variable | Upper-layer payload (TCP, UDP, ICMPv6, etc.) |
The receiver reconstructs the full 40-byte IPv6 header from session context (source and destination addresses derived from session npubs, version = 6, payload length from outer packet length) plus the 6 bytes of residual fields, then delivers the complete IPv6 packet to the TUN interface.
Format 0x01+: Reserved for future use (e.g., full-header gateway traffic).
Compression savings: 29 bytes per packet (34 bytes stripped, 7 bytes
format + residual added). Net overhead for IPv6 traffic: 77 bytes
(FIPS_IPV6_OVERHEAD), down from 110 bytes base DataPacket overhead.
PathMtuNotification (0x13)
Sent by the destination to report the observed forward-path MTU.
| Offset | Field | Size | Encoding |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | path_mtu | 2 | u16 LE — minimum MTU observed along the forward path |
Total body: 2 bytes (plus FSP common prefix + encrypted header + AEAD tag).
CoordsWarmup (0x14)
Standalone coordinate cache warming message. Sent when piggybacking coordinates via the CP flag on a data packet would exceed the transport MTU, or as an immediate response to CoordsRequired/PathBroken signals (rate-limited).
CoordsWarmup is an encrypted FSP message with the CP flag set and an empty body. Transit nodes extract coordinates via the existing CP-flag parsing path — no transit-side changes required.
Wire format:
FSP header (12 bytes, AAD): ver=0, phase=0, flags=CP, counter, payload_len
Cleartext coords: src_coords + dst_coords (same encoding as CP flag)
AEAD ciphertext: inner_header(6) + Poly1305 tag(16) = 22 bytes
Total FSP payload: 12 + coords + 22
The cleartext coords section uses the same variable-length encoding as any
CP-flagged message: src_coords_count(2) + src_coords(16×n) + dest_coords_count(2) + dest_coords(16×m).
Typical size (depth-3 tree): 12 + (2+64+2+64) + 22 = 166 bytes FSP payload. With SessionDatagram + link overhead: 166 + 36 + 37 = 239 bytes on the wire.
CoordsRequired (0x20)
Plaintext error signal — transit node lacks coordinates for destination. Identified by the FSP phase field, not a separate message type byte (same as SessionSetup/SessionAck/SessionMsg3). Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x0, U flag set, payload_len=34.
Payload (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x20 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | NodeAddr we couldn't route to |
| 18 | reporter | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of reporting router |
Payload size: 34 bytes. Total on wire: 38 bytes (4 prefix + 34 payload).
PathBroken (0x21)
Plaintext error signal — greedy routing reached a dead end. Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x0, U flag set, payload_len.
Payload (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x21 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | Unreachable NodeAddr |
| 18 | reporter | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of reporting router |
| 34 | last_coords_count | 2 bytes LE | Number of stale coordinate entries |
| 36 | last_known_coords | 16 x n bytes | Stale coordinates that failed |
MtuExceeded (0x22)
Plaintext error signal — forwarded packet exceeds the next-hop link MTU. Sent by a transit router back to the source when a SessionDatagram cannot be forwarded because its size exceeds the outgoing link's MTU. Encoded with FSP prefix: ver=0, phase=0x0, U flag set, payload_len=36.
Payload (after 4-byte FSP prefix):
| Offset | Field | Size | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | msg_type | 1 byte | 0x22 |
| 1 | flags | 1 byte | Reserved |
| 2 | dest_addr | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of the destination being forwarded to |
| 18 | reporter | 16 bytes | NodeAddr of the router that detected the MTU violation |
| 34 | mtu | 2 bytes LE | Bottleneck MTU at the reporting router |
Payload size: 36 bytes. Total on wire: 40 bytes (4 prefix + 36 payload).
The source uses the reported MTU to adjust its session-layer path MTU
estimate. MtuExceeded is the reactive complement to the proactive
path_mtu field in SessionDatagram and LookupResponse.
Encapsulation Walkthrough
A complete picture of how application data is wrapped through each layer.
Application Data -> Wire
Starting with an IPv6 application sending a 1024-byte TCP payload to a destination (the original IPv6 packet at the TUN is 1064 bytes: 40-byte header + 1024-byte payload):
Layer 5: Application data
1024 bytes (TCP payload inside 1064-byte IPv6 packet)
Layer 4: IPv6 shim compression (port 256)
Strip IPv6 addresses (32) + payload length (2), keep residual fields
format (1) + residual (6) + upper payload (1024) = 1031 bytes
Layer 3: Session encryption (FSP)
FSP header (12) + AEAD(inner_hdr (6) + port_hdr (4) + shim (1031)) + tag (16)
= 12 + 1041 + 16 = 1069 bytes
Layer 2: SessionDatagram envelope (FMP routing)
msg_type (1) + ttl (1) + path_mtu (2) + src_addr (16) + dest_addr (16) + payload (1069)
= 1105 bytes
Layer 1: Link encryption (FMP per-hop)
outer header (16) + encrypted(inner_hdr (5) + datagram (1105)) + AEAD tag (16)
= 1142 bytes
Layer 0: Transport
UDP datagram containing 1142 bytes
Total overhead for IPv6 traffic: 1142 − 1064 = 78 bytes per packet. The
difference from the FIPS_IPV6_OVERHEAD constant (77 bytes) is the 1-byte
FMP msg_type counted in the link inner header rather than the
SessionDatagram body.
Overhead Budget
| Layer | Overhead | Component |
|---|---|---|
| Link encryption | 37 bytes | 16 outer header (AAD) + 5 inner header (timestamp + msg_type) + 16 AEAD tag |
| SessionDatagram body | 35 bytes | 1 ttl + 2 path_mtu + 16 src + 16 dest (msg_type counted in inner header) |
| FSP header | 12 bytes | 4 prefix + 8 counter |
| FSP inner header | 6 bytes | 4 timestamp + 1 msg_type + 1 inner_flags (inside AEAD) |
| Session AEAD tag | 16 bytes | Poly1305 tag on session-encrypted payload |
| Protocol envelope | 106 bytes | FIPS_OVERHEAD constant |
| Port header | 4 bytes | src_port + dst_port (DataPacket only) |
| DataPacket total | 110 bytes | Base overhead for any port-multiplexed service |
| IPv6 compression | −33 bytes | 40-byte IPv6 header → 7-byte format + residual |
| IPv6 data path total | 77 bytes | FIPS_IPV6_OVERHEAD constant |
At Each Transit Node
1. Receive UDP datagram
2. Parse common prefix -> version, phase, flags, payload_len
3. Phase 0x0 -> established frame
4. Look up (transport_id, receiver_idx) -> session
5. Check replay window (counter)
6. Decrypt with link keys (16-byte header as AAD) -> plaintext
7. Strip inner header -> timestamp, msg_type
8. msg_type 0x00 -> SessionDatagram
9. Read dest_addr -> routing decision
10. Decrement ttl, min path_mtu
11. Re-encrypt with next-hop link keys
12. Send via next-hop transport
Transit nodes see the SessionDatagram envelope (src_addr, dest_addr, ttl, path_mtu) but cannot read the session-layer payload (encrypted with endpoint session keys).
Size Summary
FMP Handshake Messages (Noise IK)
| Message | Raw Noise | Wire Frame |
|---|---|---|
| IK msg1 (ephemeral + encrypted static + encrypted epoch) | 106 bytes | 114 bytes |
| IK msg2 (ephemeral + encrypted epoch) | 57 bytes | 69 bytes |
FSP Handshake Messages (Noise XK)
| Message | Raw Noise | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| XK msg1 (ephemeral only) | 33 bytes | Carried in SessionSetup |
| XK msg2 (ephemeral + encrypted epoch) | 57 bytes | Carried in SessionAck |
| XK msg3 (encrypted static + encrypted epoch) | 73 bytes | Carried in SessionMsg3 |
Link-Layer Messages (inside encrypted frame)
| Message | Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| TreeAnnounce | 100 + 32n bytes | n = depth + 1 |
| FilterAnnounce | 1,035 bytes | v1 (1KB filter) |
| LookupRequest | 303 + 16n bytes | n = origin depth + 1 |
| LookupResponse | 93 + 16n bytes | n = target depth + 1 |
| SessionDatagram | 36 + payload bytes | Fixed 36-byte header |
| Disconnect | 2 bytes |
Session-Layer Messages (inside SessionDatagram)
| Message | Typical Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SessionSetup | ~170 bytes | Depth-dependent (XK msg1 = 33 bytes) |
| SessionAck | ~190 bytes | Depth-dependent, carries both endpoints' coords (XK msg2 = 57 bytes) |
| SessionMsg3 | ~80 bytes | Fixed (XK msg3 = 73 bytes, no coords) |
| Data (minimal) | 12 + 6 + 4 + payload + 16 bytes | Steady state (port header included) |
| Data (with coords) | 12 + ~130 + 6 + 4 + payload + 16 bytes | Warmup/recovery (port header included) |
| SenderReport | 12 + 6 + 46 + 16 bytes | MMP metrics |
| ReceiverReport | 12 + 6 + 66 + 16 bytes | MMP metrics |
| PathMtuNotification | 12 + 6 + 2 + 16 bytes | MTU signal |
| CoordsWarmup | 12 + coords + 6 + 16 bytes | Standalone warmup (empty body) |
| CoordsRequired | 38 bytes | Fixed (prefix + msg_type + body) |
| PathBroken | 35 + 16n bytes | Includes stale coords |
| MtuExceeded | 40 bytes | Fixed (prefix + msg_type + body) |
Complete Packet Sizes (link + session)
| Scenario | Wire Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Encrypted frame minimum | 37 bytes | Empty body |
| SessionDatagram + Data (minimal) | 37 + 35 + 12 + 6 + 4 + payload + 16 | 110 + payload (any service) |
| SessionDatagram + IPv6 Data (minimal) | 110 + 7 + upper_payload − 34 | 77 + IPv6 payload (compressed) |
| SessionDatagram + Data (with coords) | 110 + coords + payload | Coords vary with tree depth |
| SessionDatagram + SessionSetup | ~275 bytes | Depth-3, both dirs |
| SessionDatagram + CoordsRequired | 37 + 36 + 38 = 111 bytes | Including link overhead |
References
- fips-mesh-layer.md — FMP behavioral specification
- fips-session-layer.md — FSP behavioral specification
- fips-transport-layer.md — Transport framing
- fips-mesh-operation.md — How messages work together
- fips-ipv6-adapter.md — MTU enforcement