Files
fips/testing/iface-binding/test.sh
T
Johnathan Corgan d5e4533c1e fix(testing): make the chaos veth restore and the iface-binding suite hold on a loaded CI host
ethernet-churn failed on master and next alike, as a tree that did not
converge. The daemon was not the cause: the harness left ring links down
and reported them restored, and under host load those dead links lined up
until every link was down at once. Finding that turned up several more
harness defects, fixed together here.

The iface-binding suite built its host veth names from
FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX, and an interface name gets fifteen characters. On a
runner that sets the suffix to a timestamp and a pid, ip(8) refused the
name before the first pair existed. GitHub's job does not set the suffix,
so it passed there. The names now use the four-hex-character token from
sim.naming, as the chaos simulation and the NAT topology script already
do, and the reaper in ci-cleanup.sh matches the new shape under both the
scoped and the unscoped sweep.

A churned node's restart recreates each veth pair it shared with its
neighbours. A stopped container's network namespace can outlive the stop
by about two minutes, and while it does, renaming the survivor's new end
fails with "File exists". The harness ignored that, read the old
interface's MAC, logged success, and left the new end down. The restore
now deletes any interface holding the final or temporary name first,
checks every add, move and rename, and waits for both ends to report
operstate up. A restore that still fails raises as a harness fault. A
container PID docker cannot report now raises instead of reading as "not
running", and a pair is deferred only for a neighbour churn itself
stopped. The survivor's end of a recreated link also gets its netem
parameters back; before, that direction ran unshaped.

The runner hands one down-node set to every manager, and node churn and
traffic stored it as `down_nodes or set()`. The set is empty when they are
built, so each kept a private copy: traffic started iperf3 on stopped
containers, and netem and link flaps tried to shape them.

Every manager and event schedule drew from one random stream in
wall-clock order, so host load changed which node churn stopped next. Each
consumer now has its own stream derived from the seed. The topology and
ephemeral node choice stay on the seed's own stream, so generated
topologies do not change, but every other runtime draw does. The final
tree snapshot now waits for three consecutive agreeing reads, five
seconds apart and bounded at ninety seconds, instead of being taken the
moment the stopped nodes were restored.

A red chaos scenario lost its results directory with the worktree the CI
worker deletes. Each scenario's results are now scoped to the run, and a
red prints its status, assertions, final tree and each node's log tail
into the run log.

ethernet-churn's baseline had been calibrated on the broken restore. On
the fixed harness, sixteen runs across master-line and next-line code,
twelve of them under contention and across three seeds, all ended with 4
nodes answering, 1 root and 3 parented, and the scenario now asserts
exactly that. The scenario loader also checked the parented floor against
one root only; it now checks it against max_roots, since a mesh with R
roots can parent at most n - R nodes.
2026-09-10 19:18:42 +00:00

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#!/bin/bash
# Integration test for dynamic interface binding.
#
# Asserts the five behaviors the presence machine exists to provide, against
# real daemons and a real veth pair:
#
# (a) boot race — a daemon whose interface does not exist yet starts,
# reports the transport ABSENT, and reports Degraded
# (b) late attach — the interface appears; the daemon binds it with no
# restart, clears Degraded, and peers over it
# (c) flap — the interface goes down and comes back; presence and
# health follow it in BOTH directions
# (d) destroy/recreate — the interface is deleted outright and recreated; the
# daemon rebinds (the case the old ENXIO beacon hack
# half-covered)
# (e) optional — an interface that never appears logs at info and
# never moves node health
#
# plus the log-hygiene property the design is explicit about: absence is logged
# once on the edge, never once per retry.
#
# The daemons run under FIPS_TEST_MODE=default, NOT chaos: the chaos entrypoint
# waits for Ethernet interfaces before starting the daemon, which is exactly
# the workaround being retired. The daemon must wait for itself here.
#
# Usage: ./test.sh [--skip-build] [--keep-up]
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
TESTING_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
COMPOSE_FILE="$SCRIPT_DIR/docker-compose.yml"
NODE_A="fips-ifb-node-a${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
NODE_B="fips-ifb-node-b${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
NODE_C="fips-ifb-node-c${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
# The interface each node binds. Same name on both sides: they are in separate
# network namespaces, and using one name keeps the fixtures identical.
LAB_IFACE="ve-lab0"
# The interface that never exists. `optional: true` in both configs.
DOCK_IFACE="fips-dock0"
# node-c's interface, present before its daemon starts. See case (f).
BOOT_IFACE="ve-boot0"
# Host-side veth names, scoped per run: these live in the host (or Docker VM)
# namespace for the moment between creation and the move into the containers,
# where two concurrent runs would otherwise collide on one name.
#
# The scope comes from a four-hex hash of the run suffix, not from the suffix
# itself. An interface name gets 15 characters and the suffix alone can spend
# 24 of them (`-20260910t025205-2802512`), so interpolating it produced
# `vhifb-20260910t025205-2802512b` and ip(8) refused the name outright. The
# chaos simulation had already met this and answers it in `sim.naming`, which
# the NAT topology script also calls; this uses the same token so the reaper
# in `ci-cleanup.sh` can match these interfaces by the same rule.
#
# Empty for an empty suffix, so a bare run keeps short unscoped names.
veth_token() {
local suffix="${FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX:-}"
if [ -z "$suffix" ]; then
echo ""
return 0
fi
PYTHONPATH="$TESTING_DIR/chaos" python3 -m sim.naming "$suffix"
}
VETH_TOKEN="$(veth_token)"
HOST_VETH_A="vhifb${VETH_TOKEN}a"
HOST_VETH_B="vhifb${VETH_TOKEN}b"
HOST_VETH_C="vhifb${VETH_TOKEN}c"
HOST_VETH_D="vhifb${VETH_TOKEN}d"
SKIP_BUILD=false
KEEP_UP=false
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--skip-build) SKIP_BUILD=true; shift ;;
--keep-up) KEEP_UP=true; shift ;;
*) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
done
log() { echo "=== $*"; }
pass() { echo "PASS: $*"; }
fail() { echo "FAIL: $*" >&2; dump_diagnostics; exit 1; }
dump_diagnostics() {
echo "--- node-a transports ---" >&2
docker exec "$NODE_A" fipsctl show transports >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-a status ---" >&2
docker exec "$NODE_A" fipsctl show status >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-a log (tail) ---" >&2
docker logs --tail 80 "$NODE_A" >&2 2>&1 || true
echo "--- node-b log (tail) ---" >&2
docker logs --tail 80 "$NODE_B" >&2 2>&1 || true
return 0
}
cleanup() {
# Remove the veth pair wherever it survived: inside a container if the move
# succeeded, on the host if the run died between creation and the move.
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link del "$LAB_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
ip_host "ip link del $HOST_VETH_A" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link del "$BOOT_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
ip_host "ip link del $HOST_VETH_C" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if [ "$KEEP_UP" = false ]; then
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" down --volumes --remove-orphans >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
return 0
}
# ── Host-namespace ip(8) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Every `ip link` operation that touches the host network stack runs inside a
# short-lived privileged container sharing the host network and PID namespaces,
# for the reason testing/chaos/sim/veth.py documents at length: on macOS the
# containers live in the Docker VM, so running ip(8) on the macOS host could
# never reach them, while on Linux the shared namespaces make it identical to
# running ip(8) directly.
ip_host() {
docker run --rm --privileged --network host --pid host \
--entrypoint /bin/sh "$IMAGE" -c "$1"
}
# Docker's own view of a container, so the gate case can wait for a netns
# without implying the daemon inside it has started.
container_state() {
docker inspect -f '{{.State.Status}}' "$1" 2>/dev/null || true
}
container_pid() {
docker inspect -f '{{.State.Pid}}' "$1"
}
# Create the veth pair and move one end into each container.
create_veth() {
local pid_a pid_b
pid_a="$(container_pid "$NODE_A")"
pid_b="$(container_pid "$NODE_B")"
# One invocation, not three. The host-side names exist only between the
# `add` and the two `netns` moves, and ci-cleanup.sh's host-veth sweep is
# deliberately shaped to the chaos simulation's names and does not cover
# these — so the window in which a hard kill could strand them is kept to
# a single command, with the EXIT trap covering the rest.
ip_host "set -e
ip link add $HOST_VETH_A type veth peer name $HOST_VETH_B
ip link set $HOST_VETH_A netns $pid_a name $LAB_IFACE
ip link set $HOST_VETH_B netns $pid_b name $LAB_IFACE" >/dev/null
# A moved link arrives down. Presence is IFF_UP, so the daemon correctly
# does not bind until this runs — which is also why (c) can flap it with
# nothing but `ip link set down`.
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
docker exec "$NODE_B" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
return 0
}
# ── Daemon introspection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Field of a named transport's `interface` block, or "" if the transport, the
# block, or the daemon is not there.
iface_field() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show transports 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
except Exception:
print(""); raise SystemExit
for t in data.get("transports", []):
if t.get("name") == sys.argv[1]:
print(t.get("interface", {}).get(sys.argv[2], ""))
break
else:
print("")
' "$2" "$3"
}
node_state() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show status 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("state", ""))
except Exception:
print("")
'
}
peer_count() {
docker exec "$1" fipsctl show peers 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
except Exception:
print(0); raise SystemExit
print(len(data.get("peers", [])))
'
}
# Count of a literal in a container log. Used for the log-hygiene assertion.
log_count() {
docker logs "$1" 2>&1 | grep -c -- "$2" || true
}
# Poll `expr` until it prints `want`, up to `timeout` seconds.
# Usage: wait_for <timeout> <want> <command...>
wait_for() {
local timeout="$1" want="$2"; shift 2
local i got
for i in $(seq 1 "$timeout"); do
got="$("$@" || true)"
if [ "$got" = "$want" ]; then
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo " (last value: '${got:-}', wanted '$want')" >&2
return 1
}
# Poll until the command prints a value no greater than `want`.
wait_for_at_most() {
local timeout="$1" want="$2"; shift 2
local i got
for i in $(seq 1 "$timeout"); do
got="$("$@" || true)"
if [ -n "$got" ] && [ "$got" -le "$want" ] 2>/dev/null; then
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo " (last value: '${got:-}', wanted <= '$want')" >&2
return 1
}
# Poll until the command prints a value that is at least `want`.
wait_for_at_least() {
local timeout="$1" want="$2"; shift 2
local i got
for i in $(seq 1 "$timeout"); do
got="$("$@" || true)"
if [ -n "$got" ] && [ "$got" -ge "$want" ] 2>/dev/null; then
return 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo " (last value: '${got:-}', wanted >= '$want')" >&2
return 1
}
# ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
IMAGE="${FIPS_TEST_IMAGE:-fips-test:latest}"
trap cleanup EXIT
if [ "$SKIP_BUILD" = false ]; then
log "Building test image"
bash "$TESTING_DIR/scripts/build.sh"
fi
log "Generating fixtures"
LAB_IFACE="$LAB_IFACE" DOCK_IFACE="$DOCK_IFACE" BOOT_IFACE="$BOOT_IFACE" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/generate-configs.sh"
log "Starting nodes with $LAB_IFACE absent"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d
# The daemon must reach a serving state without the interface. Waiting on the
# control socket answering at all is the first half of assertion (a): a daemon
# that exited on `NoTransports` never answers.
if ! wait_for 40 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(a) node-a did not come up Degraded with $LAB_IFACE absent"
fi
pass "(a) daemon started and serves with its only interface absent"
# ── (a) presence and policy are visible to an operator ───────────────────
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport is not reported ABSENT"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab policy)" = "required" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport is not reported required"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" lab name)" = "$LAB_IFACE" ] \
|| fail "(a) lab transport does not name $LAB_IFACE"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock transport is not reported ABSENT"
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock policy)" = "optional" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock transport is not reported optional"
pass "(a) presence and policy are visible in show_transports"
# ── log hygiene, measured across the absence ─────────────────────────────
#
# The required interface's absence must be logged once, on the edge — not once
# per retry. Measured over an interval long enough for many retries (the binder
# polls every second). The 12 s also carries the next assertion past the 10 s
# bring-up window, so both the edge rule and the deadline are covered by one
# wait.
# Matched on the edge line specifically. The deadline error below is a
# different line by design, and counting both here would read the deadline
# firing during the sleep as a repeated edge.
EDGE_LINE="Ethernet interface absent; waiting"
absent_before="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "$EDGE_LINE")"
sleep 12
absent_after="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "$EDGE_LINE")"
if [ "$absent_after" -ne "$absent_before" ]; then
fail "absence was logged $((absent_after - absent_before)) more times over 12s of retries; \
the edge must be logged once, not per attempt"
fi
# Two edges total: one for the required lab interface, one for the optional
# dock interface. More would mean the edge is not an edge.
[ "$absent_before" -eq 2 ] \
|| fail "expected exactly 2 absence edges at start, saw $absent_before"
pass "absence is logged once on the edge, not per retry"
# ── a sustained absence errors exactly once ──────────────────────────────
#
# The edge is not an error: an interface missing for a moment at boot and bound
# a moment later is the ordinary case this mechanism exists to absorb. Past the
# 10 s bring-up window it is no longer a race, and a *required* interface says
# so — once. The 12 s above put us on the far side of that window.
#
# Exactly one line, from lab. The optional dock interface has been absent just
# as long and must be silent, which is what `optional` means; two here would
# mean the policy is not being consulted.
startup_errors="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
if [ "$startup_errors" -ne 1 ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -- " ERROR " >&2 || true
fail "expected exactly 1 ERROR line for the required interface past the \
bring-up window, saw $startup_errors (an optional interface must contribute none)"
fi
[ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" "still missing past the bring-up window")" -eq 1 ] \
|| fail "the ERROR line is not the sustained-absence report"
pass "a required interface absent past the window errors, an optional one does not"
# ...and does not keep saying it. Duration is state, published as
# interface.since_secs and as Degraded; re-announcing it on a timer is what
# the old 1 m / 10 m / 1 h ladder did.
sleep 12
[ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")" -eq 1 ] \
|| fail "the sustained-absence error repeated; it must be said once per episode"
pass "the sustained-absence error is said once, not on a schedule"
# ── (b) late attach ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
log "Creating the veth pair"
create_veth
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(b) node-a did not bind $LAB_IFACE after it appeared"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(b) node-b did not bind $LAB_IFACE after it appeared"
fi
pass "(b) both daemons bound the interface with no restart"
# Health must clear. This is `Degraded` behaving as a level rather than a
# latch — the property that made the old monotonic failed-set wrong.
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(b) node-a stayed Degraded after its interface returned"
fi
pass "(b) Degraded cleared when the interface came back"
# The optional interface is still absent and must still not matter.
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_A" dock presence)" = "absent" ] \
|| fail "(e) dock unexpectedly bound"
pass "(e) an absent optional interface does not degrade the node"
# Discovery and peering over the late-bound interface: the point of binding at
# all. Without this the suite would prove the daemon can open a socket, not
# that traffic flows over it.
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 1 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(b) node-a found no peer over the late-bound interface"
fi
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 1 peer_count "$NODE_B"; then
fail "(b) node-b found no peer over the late-bound interface"
fi
pass "(b) nodes discovered and peered over the late-bound interface"
# ── (c) flap ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
errors_before_detach="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
log "Taking $LAB_IFACE down on node-a"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" down
detach_start=$SECONDS
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(c) node-a did not notice the interface going down"
fi
detach_elapsed=$(( SECONDS - detach_start ))
if ! wait_for 20 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a did not report Degraded while its interface was down"
fi
pass "(c) a link going down is observed as absence and degrades health"
# A detach is reported, at warn. The edge is not an error — a link coming and
# going is the weather in a mesh daemon, and the error is the 10 s deadline's
# to give, not the edge's.
if ! wait_for_at_least 10 1 log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface detached"; then
fail "(c) a runtime detach was not reported"
fi
# Only meaningful while we are still inside the bring-up window. Detection is
# sub-second over netlink, so this is the ordinary path; if the runner was slow
# enough that the deadline could have fired, the check has nothing to say and
# says so rather than failing on the harness's own latency.
if [ "$detach_elapsed" -lt 8 ]; then
detach_errors="$(log_count "$NODE_A" " ERROR ")"
if [ "$detach_errors" -ne "$errors_before_detach" ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -- " ERROR " >&2 || true
fail "(c) the detach edge logged an ERROR after ${detach_elapsed}s; the \
edge is a warn and only outlasting the window earns an error"
fi
pass "(c) a detach is reported without crying error"
else
echo " (skipped the edge-not-an-error check: detach took ${detach_elapsed}s,"
echo " which is inside the deadline's reach)"
fi
# The peers that interface carried must go with it, and go *now*.
#
# `link_dead_timeout_secs` is at its 30 s default here, so a withdrawal inside
# 15 s can only have come from the detach edge and not from the liveness
# reaper. That gap is the whole point: until the edge drove the teardown, this
# node kept the peer, kept selecting routes through it, and kept advertising
# reachability it no longer had — dropping transit traffic in silence for the
# whole timeout, with alternative paths sitting unused.
if ! wait_for_at_most 15 0 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a kept a peer that was only reachable over the downed \
interface; the detach edge did not withdraw it"
fi
pass "(c) the peers the interface carried were withdrawn on the detach edge"
log "Bringing $LAB_IFACE back up on node-a"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(c) node-a did not rebind after the interface came back"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a stayed Degraded after the interface came back"
fi
if ! wait_for_at_least 45 2 iface_field "$NODE_A" lab binds; then
fail "(c) the rebind was not counted"
fi
pass "(c) the interface flapped and the daemon followed it both ways"
# And the withdrawal is not a one-way door: the peer comes back over the
# rebound interface on its own, by beacon, with no operator action.
if ! wait_for_at_least 60 1 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(c) node-a did not re-peer after its interface came back"
fi
pass "(c) peering re-established over the rebound interface"
# ── (d) destroy and recreate ─────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Deleting the netdev outright is the case the old ENXIO beacon-socket reopen
# half-covered: the veth is gone, the socket underneath is stale, and the name
# comes back a moment later. One presence machine now covers it.
log "Deleting and recreating the veth pair"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link del "$LAB_IFACE"
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-a did not notice the interface being deleted"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-b did not notice its end of the pair disappearing"
fi
create_veth
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-a did not rebind the recreated interface"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "present" iface_field "$NODE_B" lab presence; then
fail "(d) node-b did not rebind the recreated interface"
fi
if ! wait_for 20 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(d) node-a stayed Degraded after the interface was recreated"
fi
pass "(d) a destroyed and recreated interface is rebound"
# Peering must re-establish over the new hardware. A recreated veth has a new
# MAC, so this also exercises the "same name, different hardware" path that
# drops cached neighbors instead of resuming onto them.
if ! wait_for_at_least 60 1 peer_count "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(d) node-a did not re-peer after the interface was recreated"
fi
pass "(d) peering re-established over the recreated interface"
# ── (f) an interface present before the daemon starts ────────────────────
#
# Everything above binds through the binder loop, because the interface does
# not exist until the harness makes it. The ordinary case on a booted router is
# the opposite one: the interface is already there and `start_async` binds it
# inline, before the loop is running.
#
# That path published its presence edge outside the churn guard, so the guard
# believed it had announced nothing and the *first* detach asked for no
# retraction. The node kept reporting Running with its only required interface
# gone, and stayed that way until a second detach happened to repair the guard.
# Nothing in cases (a)-(e) can reach it.
log "(f) starting node-c with its interface already present"
docker compose -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" up -d node-c
# The container parks on the gate, so this is the netns and not yet the daemon.
if ! wait_for 30 "running" container_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c container did not start"
fi
pid_c="$(container_pid "$NODE_C")"
ip_host "set -e
ip link add $HOST_VETH_C type veth peer name $HOST_VETH_D
ip link set $HOST_VETH_C netns $pid_c name $BOOT_IFACE
ip link set $HOST_VETH_D netns $pid_c name ${BOOT_IFACE}p" >/dev/null
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" up
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "${BOOT_IFACE}p" up
# Release the gate. The daemon now starts with the interface already up.
docker exec "$NODE_C" touch /tmp/fips-go
if ! wait_for 40 "running" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c did not come up Running with its interface present at start"
fi
[ "$(iface_field "$NODE_C" boot presence)" = "present" ] \
|| fail "(f) node-c did not bind $BOOT_IFACE inline at start"
pass "(f) an interface present at start is bound inline and reports Running"
# The assertion. One detach, on a binding this loop did not create.
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" down
if ! wait_for 30 "absent" iface_field "$NODE_C" boot presence; then
fail "(f) node-c did not notice $BOOT_IFACE going down"
fi
if ! wait_for 30 "degraded" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c stayed Running after its only required interface went \
away — the start-time bind never reached node health"
fi
pass "(f) the first detach after a clean start degrades the node"
# And it is still a level, not a latch, on this path too.
docker exec "$NODE_C" ip link set "$BOOT_IFACE" up
if ! wait_for 30 "running" node_state "$NODE_C"; then
fail "(f) node-c stayed Degraded after its interface returned"
fi
pass "(f) health clears again when the interface returns"
# ── (g) the link-event fast path is actually the one in use ──────────────
#
# The whole suite would pass with `open_link_socket()` hardcoded to Err: the
# 1 s poll is a complete fallback and covers every `wait_for` window here, so
# nothing else asserts that the netlink path exists, let alone that it is what
# detected anything. The binder says which backing it got at startup, so ask
# it directly rather than inferring from timing that the poll would also
# satisfy.
# `log_count`, not `grep -q`: under `set -o pipefail` a `grep -q` that exits on
# its first match closes the pipe, `docker logs` takes SIGPIPE, and the
# pipeline reports failure even though the line was found. `grep -c` reads the
# stream to the end.
if [ "$(log_count "$NODE_A" "event_driven=true")" -eq 0 ]; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -i "binder started" >&2 || true
fail "(g) the binder fell back to polling; the netlink link-event source \
did not open, and every timing assertion in this suite would still pass"
fi
pass "(g) detection is driven by netlink events, not by the poll fallback"
# ── (h) churn damping engages on a genuinely flapping interface ──────────
#
# This is load-bearing twice over. It is what stops a flapping interface
# logging a recovery per cycle, and — since the detach edge now withdraws the
# peers that interface carried — it is also the only thing bounding how often
# that withdrawal can fire. Nothing exercised it: every flap elsewhere in this
# suite is a single down/up with long settles either side, which is precisely
# the shape the damper ignores.
#
# Four bindings that each die well inside MIN_STABLE_BINDING (10 s). The
# streak crosses CHURN_THRESHOLD (3) on the third, which is the edge that
# announces itself.
log "(h) flapping $LAB_IFACE to drive the churn guard"
for _ in 1 2 3 4; do
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" down
sleep 1
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up
sleep 2
done
if ! wait_for_at_least 30 1 log_count "$NODE_A" "keeps dying immediately after binding"; then
docker logs "$NODE_A" 2>&1 | grep -i "ethernet" | tail -20 >&2
fail "(h) four short-lived bindings did not engage the churn guard"
fi
pass "(h) a flapping interface engages churn damping"
# Having engaged, the guard must hold health rather than announcing each bind.
# The failure this catches is a damper that counts but does not damp.
recoveries_during_churn="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface recovered")"
if [ "$recoveries_during_churn" -gt 6 ]; then
fail "(h) node-a announced $recoveries_during_churn recoveries; the guard \
counted the churn but kept announcing through it"
fi
pass "(h) churn suppressed the per-cycle recovery announcements"
# And it is not a latch: once a binding lasts, the interface is announced
# again and the node returns to Running on its own.
log "(h) letting $LAB_IFACE settle"
docker exec "$NODE_A" ip link set "$LAB_IFACE" up >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if ! wait_for 60 "present" iface_field "$NODE_A" lab presence; then
fail "(h) node-a did not rebind after the flapping stopped"
fi
if ! wait_for 60 "running" node_state "$NODE_A"; then
fail "(h) node-a stayed Degraded after the flapping stopped"
fi
pass "(h) a settled interface is announced again after churn"
# ── final log hygiene ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Four outages happened above (start, down, delete, and node-b's end of the
# delete). A generous ceiling still catches the failure mode that matters: a
# retry loop logging per attempt would be in the hundreds by now.
edges="$(log_count "$NODE_A" "Ethernet interface")"
[ "$edges" -lt 40 ] \
|| fail "node-a logged $edges interface lines; the edges are not edges"
pass "log volume stayed proportional to edges, not to retries"
echo
echo "ALL PASSED"