fips/src/node/handlers/handshake.rs

//! Handshake handlers and connection promotion.

use crate::NodeAddr;
use crate::PeerIdentity;
use crate::node::acl::PeerAclContext;
use crate::node::dataplane::PeerActionCtx;
use crate::node::reject::{HandshakeReject, RejectReason};
use crate::node::{Node, NodeError};
use crate::peer::machine::{
    FailReason, HandshakePhase, PeerAction, PeerEvent, PeerMachine, PeerState,
};
use crate::peer::{ActivePeer, PeerConnection};
use crate::proto::fmp::wire::{Msg1Header, Msg2Header, build_msg2};
use crate::proto::fmp::{
    EstablishSnapshot, EstablishView, InboundDecision, InboundReject, OutboundDecision,
    OutboundSnapshot, PromotionResult, WireOutcome, cross_connection_winner,
};
use crate::transport::{Link, LinkDirection, LinkId, ReceivedPacket};
use std::time::Duration;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};

impl EstablishView for Node {
    fn establish_snapshot(&self, peer_addr: &NodeAddr) -> EstablishSnapshot {
        let existing = self.peers.get(peer_addr);
        let max_peers = self.max_peers();
        EstablishSnapshot {
            has_existing_peer: existing.is_some(),
            existing_peer_epoch: existing.and_then(|p| p.remote_epoch()),
            existing_session_age_secs: existing
                .map(|p| p.session_established_at().elapsed().as_secs())
                .unwrap_or(0),
            has_session: existing.map(|p| p.has_session()).unwrap_or(false),
            is_healthy: existing.map(|p| p.is_healthy()).unwrap_or(false),
            pending_new_session: existing
                .map(|p| p.pending_new_session().is_some())
                .unwrap_or(false),
            rekey_in_progress: existing.map(|p| p.rekey_in_progress()).unwrap_or(false),
            existing_msg2: existing.and_then(|p| p.handshake_msg2().map(|m| m.to_vec())),
            at_max_peers: max_peers > 0 && self.peers.len() >= max_peers,
            has_pending_outbound_to_peer: self.connections.values().any(|conn| {
                conn.expected_identity()
                    .map(|id| id.node_addr() == peer_addr)
                    .unwrap_or(false)
            }),
            rekey_enabled: self.config().node.rekey.enabled,
            our_node_addr: *self.identity().node_addr(),
        }
    }

    fn outbound_snapshot(&self, peer_addr: &NodeAddr) -> OutboundSnapshot {
        OutboundSnapshot {
            has_existing_peer: self.peers.contains_key(peer_addr),
            // Tie-break for THIS outbound connection (`is_outbound = true`),
            // pre-evaluated here so the core stays free of the peer helper.
            our_outbound_wins: cross_connection_winner(
                self.identity().node_addr(),
                peer_addr,
                true,
            ),
        }
    }
}

impl Node {
    /// Returns true if an inbound msg1 should be admitted past the
    /// `accept_connections` gate.
    ///
    /// Rekey/restart msg1 from an established peer is always admitted (the
    /// gate is meant to filter fresh handshakes from strangers, not
    /// maintenance traffic on established sessions). Two predicates cover
    /// "established peer at this transport+addr":
    ///
    /// 1. `addr_to_link` has an entry for `(transport_id, remote_addr)`.
    ///    This is the fast path and matches when the peer registered with
    ///    the same `TransportAddr` form we observe on inbound packets
    ///    (e.g., both numeric when peer config uses a numeric IP).
    ///
    /// 2. An active peer's `current_addr()` matches `(transport_id,
    ///    remote_addr)`. `current_addr` is updated from inbound encrypted-
    ///    frame source addrs (always numeric `SocketAddr`-form), so this
    ///    catches established peers whose `addr_to_link` key is hostname-
    ///    form (because `initiate_connection` populated it from a
    ///    hostname-bearing peer config) while inbound rekey msg1 arrives
    ///    in numeric form. Without this second predicate, the carve-out
    ///    misses any deployment that combines a hostname-based peer config
    ///    with `udp.accept_connections: false` or `udp.outbound_only: true`
    ///    (the production trigger for the 2026-04-30 bug).
    ///
    /// Otherwise the transport's `accept_connections` config decides;
    /// absence of a registered transport admits (no gate to apply).
    pub(in crate::node) fn should_admit_msg1(
        &self,
        transport_id: crate::transport::TransportId,
        remote_addr: &crate::transport::TransportAddr,
    ) -> bool {
        if self
            .addr_to_link
            .contains_key(&(transport_id, remote_addr.clone()))
        {
            return true;
        }
        if self.peers.values().any(|p| {
            p.transport_id() == Some(transport_id) && p.current_addr() == Some(remote_addr)
        }) {
            return true;
        }
        self.transports
            .get(&transport_id)
            .is_none_or(|t| t.accept_connections())
    }

    /// Handle handshake message 1 (phase 0x1).
    ///
    /// This creates a new inbound connection. Rate limiting is applied
    /// before any expensive crypto operations.
    pub(in crate::node) async fn handle_msg1(&mut self, packet: ReceivedPacket) {
        // === RATE LIMITING (before any processing) ===
        if !self.msg1_rate_limiter.start_handshake() {
            debug!(
                transport_id = %packet.transport_id,
                remote_addr = %packet.remote_addr,
                "Msg1 rate limited"
            );
            return;
        }

        // accept_connections gate. Rekey/restart msg1 on an existing link
        // is always admitted; the gate only filters truly-fresh connections
        // from strangers. Without this carve-out, the dual-init tie-breaker
        // deadlocks when the larger-NodeAddr side has accept_connections=false.
        if !self.should_admit_msg1(packet.transport_id, &packet.remote_addr) {
            self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
            self.stats_mut()
                .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
            return;
        }

        // Parse header
        let header = match Msg1Header::parse(&packet.data) {
            Some(h) => h,
            None => {
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                debug!("Invalid msg1 header");
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                return;
            }
        };

        // Pre-crypto duplicate short-circuit. An *inbound* link from this
        // address that is not (yet) a promoted peer means our earlier msg2 was
        // lost: resend the stored msg2 without paying the crypto cost and
        // return. An inbound link that DOES belong to an active peer (a possible
        // restart/rekey) or an *outbound* link (a cross-connection) falls
        // through to the wire step and the structured classification below —
        // the pre-refactor `possible_restart` flag is no longer needed because
        // that classification now gates on `has_existing_peer` (identity), which
        // subsumes it.
        let addr_key = (packet.transport_id, packet.remote_addr.clone());
        if let Some(&existing_link_id) = self.addr_to_link.get(&addr_key)
            && let Some(link) = self.links.get(&existing_link_id)
        {
            if link.direction() == LinkDirection::Inbound {
                let is_active_peer = self.peers.values().any(|p| p.link_id() == existing_link_id);
                if !is_active_peer {
                    // Genuinely pending handshake — resend msg2.
                    let msg2_bytes = self.find_stored_msg2(existing_link_id);
                    if let Some(msg2) = msg2_bytes {
                        if let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&packet.transport_id) {
                            match transport.send(&packet.remote_addr, &msg2).await {
                                Ok(_) => debug!(
                                    remote_addr = %packet.remote_addr,
                                    "Resent msg2 for duplicate msg1"
                                ),
                                Err(e) => debug!(
                                    remote_addr = %packet.remote_addr,
                                    error = %e,
                                    "Failed to resend msg2"
                                ),
                            }
                        }
                    } else {
                        debug!(
                            remote_addr = %packet.remote_addr,
                            "Duplicate msg1 but no stored msg2 to resend"
                        );
                        self.stats_mut().record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(
                            HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection,
                        ));
                    }
                    self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                    return;
                }
            } else {
                // Outbound link to this address with no active peer yet: a
                // cross-connection. Just log; it is classified as a net-new
                // inbound below.
                let is_active_peer = self.peers.values().any(|p| p.link_id() == existing_link_id);
                if !is_active_peer {
                    debug!(
                        transport_id = %packet.transport_id,
                        remote_addr = %packet.remote_addr,
                        existing_link_id = %existing_link_id,
                        "Cross-connection detected: have outbound, received inbound msg1"
                    );
                }
            }
        }

        // === CRYPTO COST PAID HERE ===
        let link_id = self.allocate_link_id();
        let mut conn = PeerConnection::inbound_with_transport(
            link_id,
            packet.transport_id,
            packet.remote_addr.clone(),
            packet.timestamp_ms,
        );

        let our_keypair = self.identity().keypair();
        let noise_msg1 = &packet.data[header.noise_msg1_offset..];
        let msg2_response = match conn.receive_handshake_init(
            our_keypair,
            self.startup_epoch(),
            noise_msg1,
            packet.timestamp_ms,
        ) {
            Ok(m) => m,
            Err(e) => {
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                debug!(
                    error = %e,
                    "Failed to process msg1"
                );
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                return;
            }
        };

        // Learn peer identity from msg1
        let peer_identity = match conn.expected_identity() {
            Some(id) => *id,
            None => {
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                warn!("Identity not learned from msg1");
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                return;
            }
        };

        let peer_node_addr = *peer_identity.node_addr();

        // === PHASE B result ===
        // Bundle the Noise wire-step outputs (identity, remote epoch, sender
        // index, opaque msg2 payload). The wire step touched no `Node` registry
        // state; from here the decision reads only `wire` and the snapshot.
        let wire = WireOutcome {
            peer_identity,
            remote_epoch: conn.remote_epoch(),
            their_index: header.sender_idx,
            msg2_payload: msg2_response,
        };

        // === PHASE C input ===
        // Snapshot the registry state the inbound classification reads about
        // this peer identity (existing epoch/session/rekey state with the
        // session age resolved here, the max-peers cap, our own address for the
        // tie-break). Taken before this connection is inserted into the
        // registry, matching the pre-refactor read points.
        let est = self.establish_snapshot(&peer_node_addr);

        // === PHASE C: structured classification (pure core) ===
        // The decision reads only the snapshot + wire outcome; the shell below
        // drives the effects. `Promote`/`RestartThenPromote` fall through to the
        // shared authorize → allocate → send-msg2 → promote tail; the other
        // variants complete the rate-limiter and return here.
        match self.fmp.establish_inbound(&est, &wire) {
            InboundDecision::Reject {
                reason: InboundReject::AtMaxPeers,
            } => {
                // Net-new arm: drive the reject through the machine so a
                // net-new msg1 at the max-peers cap reaches `Failed{Rejected}`
                // with the index allocator untouched (no allocate before the
                // reject). The transient machine is discarded (never inserted
                // into `peer_machines`); `conn`/`link_id` were never inserted
                // into the registry either.
                debug!(
                    peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                    max = self.max_peers(),
                    "Silent-dropping Msg1 at max_peers cap (early gate; no Msg2 sent)"
                );
                let mut machine = PeerMachine::new_inbound(link_id, packet.timestamp_ms);
                let _ = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::InboundMsg1 {
                        link: link_id,
                        wire,
                        est,
                    },
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                debug_assert!(matches!(
                    machine.state(),
                    PeerState::Failed {
                        reason: FailReason::Rejected
                    }
                ));
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
            }
            InboundDecision::Reject {
                reason: reason @ (InboundReject::PendingSession | InboundReject::DualRekeyWon),
            } => {
                // Existing-peer rekey rejects — still inline. Byte-unchanged
                // from the pre-refactor shared reject tail.
                match reason {
                    InboundReject::PendingSession => debug!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                        "Rekey msg1 received but already have pending session, dropping"
                    ),
                    InboundReject::DualRekeyWon => debug!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                        "Dual rekey initiation: we win (smaller addr), dropping their msg1"
                    ),
                    InboundReject::AtMaxPeers => unreachable!(),
                }
                // `conn`/`link_id` were never inserted into the registry, so the
                // local drop suffices — no cleanup needed.
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
            }
            InboundDecision::ResendMsg2 { msg2 } => {
                if let Some(msg2) = msg2.as_deref()
                    && let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&packet.transport_id)
                {
                    match transport.send(&packet.remote_addr, msg2).await {
                        Ok(_) => debug!(
                            peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                            "Resent msg2 for duplicate msg1 (same epoch)"
                        ),
                        Err(e) => debug!(
                            peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                            error = %e,
                            "Failed to resend msg2"
                        ),
                    }
                }
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
            }
            InboundDecision::RekeyRespond {
                peer,
                abandon_first,
            } => {
                if abandon_first {
                    // Dual-initiation loser: abandon our own in-flight rekey and
                    // free its index before responding as the rekey responder.
                    debug!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer),
                        "Dual rekey initiation: we lose (larger addr), abandoning ours"
                    );
                    if let Some(existing) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer)
                        && let Some(idx) = existing.abandon_rekey()
                    {
                        if let Some(tid) = existing.transport_id() {
                            self.peers_by_index.remove(&(tid, idx.as_u32()));
                            self.pending_outbound.remove(&(tid, idx.as_u32()));
                        }
                        let _ = self.index_allocator.free(idx);
                    }
                }

                // Rekey: process as responder, store new session as pending.
                let noise_session = conn.take_session();
                let our_new_index = match self.index_allocator.allocate() {
                    Ok(idx) => idx,
                    Err(e) => {
                        warn!(error = %e, "Failed to allocate index for rekey");
                        self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                        self.stats_mut()
                            .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        return;
                    }
                };

                let noise_session = match noise_session {
                    Some(s) => s,
                    None => {
                        warn!("Rekey msg1: no session from handshake");
                        let _ = self.index_allocator.free(our_new_index);
                        self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                        self.stats_mut()
                            .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        return;
                    }
                };

                // Send msg2 response using the new handshake.
                let wire_msg2 = build_msg2(our_new_index, wire.their_index, &wire.msg2_payload);
                if let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&packet.transport_id) {
                    match transport.send(&packet.remote_addr, &wire_msg2).await {
                        Ok(_) => {
                            debug!(
                                peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer),
                                new_our_index = %our_new_index,
                                "Sent rekey msg2 response"
                            );
                        }
                        Err(e) => {
                            warn!(
                                peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer),
                                error = %e,
                                "Failed to send rekey msg2"
                            );
                            let _ = self.index_allocator.free(our_new_index);
                            self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                            self.stats_mut()
                                .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                            return;
                        }
                    }
                }

                // Store pending session on the existing peer.
                if let Some(existing) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer) {
                    existing.set_pending_session(noise_session, our_new_index, wire.their_index);
                    existing.record_peer_rekey();
                }

                // Register new index in peers_by_index.
                self.peers_by_index
                    .insert((packet.transport_id, our_new_index.as_u32()), peer);

                // Do NOT touch addr_to_link — the entry must keep pointing at the
                // original link so future msg1s from this address are recognized
                // as rekeys (not new connections). The temporary `conn`/`link_id`
                // were never inserted into the registry, so no cleanup is needed.
                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
            }
            InboundDecision::RestartThenPromote { peer } => {
                // === Restart inbound establish, driven by the machine. ===
                // Epoch mismatch — the peer restarted. The fresh leg is promoted
                // exactly like a net-new inbound (two-phase authorize); the OLD
                // peer's teardown is the machine's Phase-1
                // `[InvalidateSendState, ReportLost{peer}]`:
                //   InvalidateSendState → remove_active_peer(old): frees the four
                //     index slots + `peers_by_index` + decrypt unregister + FSP
                //     `sessions` + `pending_tun_packets`. The fresh leg's
                //     `our_index` is None, so the machine emits NO
                //     UnregisterDecryptSession.
                //   ReportLost{peer} → note_link_dead(old): reconnect backoff.
                // These execute BEFORE authorize/allocate, preserving the
                // pre-refactor order exactly (remove_active_peer → note_link_dead →
                // authorize → allocate → send msg2 → promote). `peer` here equals
                // `peer_identity.node_addr()` (see `establish_inbound`), so the
                // executor's `InvalidateSendState`
                // (`ambient.verified_identity.node_addr()`) targets the same addr
                // as the pre-refactor `remove_active_peer(&peer)`.
                debug!(
                    peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer),
                    "Peer restart detected (epoch mismatch), removing stale session"
                );

                // Keep the shell's own copies of the msg2 framing inputs before
                // the machine event consumes `wire` (WireOutcome is not Clone).
                let msg2_payload = wire.msg2_payload.clone();
                let their_index = wire.their_index;

                let mut machine = PeerMachine::new_inbound(link_id, packet.timestamp_ms);

                // Phase 1: classify + emit the old-peer teardown. For a restart the
                // fresh leg has `our_index == None`, so the emitted sequence is
                // exactly [InvalidateSendState, ReportLost{peer}]; the machine then
                // parks at Handshaking{ReceivedMsg1} (no allocation).
                let phase1 = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::InboundMsg1 {
                        link: link_id,
                        wire,
                        est,
                    },
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                debug_assert!(matches!(
                    machine.state(),
                    PeerState::Handshaking {
                        phase: HandshakePhase::ReceivedMsg1,
                        ..
                    }
                ));

                // Execute the Phase-1 teardown, in emitted order
                // (InvalidateSendState before ReportLost, both before
                // authorize/alloc). CLOCK NOTE — INTENTIONAL DIVERGENCE: the
                // pre-refactor arm timestamped `note_link_dead` with
                // `SystemTime::now()` wall-clock; routing `ReportLost` through the
                // executor uses `ambient.now_ms == packet.timestamp_ms`. This is an
                // accepted sub-millisecond reconnect-backoff timing shift — NOT
                // on-wire, NOT index/metrics. The machine is not yet in
                // `peer_machines`, but these two
                // actions do not touch the map, so executing them here is safe.
                let teardown_ctx = PeerActionCtx {
                    verified_identity: peer_identity,
                    transport_id: packet.transport_id,
                    remote_addr: packet.remote_addr.clone(),
                    our_index: None,
                    their_index: Some(their_index),
                    now_ms: packet.timestamp_ms,
                    is_outbound: false,
                };
                self.execute_peer_actions(link_id, &teardown_ctx, phase1)
                    .await;

                // Shell interposition: late-ACL authorize BEFORE any allocation.
                if self
                    .authorize_peer(
                        &peer_identity,
                        PeerAclContext::InboundHandshake,
                        packet.transport_id,
                        &packet.remote_addr,
                    )
                    .is_err()
                {
                    let _ = machine.step(
                        PeerEvent::Rejected,
                        packet.timestamp_ms,
                        &mut self.index_allocator,
                    );
                    self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                    self.stats_mut()
                        .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                    return;
                }

                // Phase 2: allocate our index + emit [SendHandshake, PromoteToActive].
                let promote_actions = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::Authorized,
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                let our_index = match machine.our_index() {
                    Some(idx) => idx,
                    None => {
                        // Allocation exhausted in Phase 2 (mirrors the pre-refactor
                        // allocate-failure path): no msg2, no promote. The old peer
                        // has already been torn down above — identical to the
                        // pre-refactor arm, which also removed the stale peer before
                        // hitting the shared allocate-failure return.
                        warn!("Failed to allocate session index for inbound");
                        self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                        self.stats_mut()
                            .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        return;
                    }
                };

                // Shell registry surgery, in the pre-refactor order:
                // set indices on the shell connection, insert link / reverse map /
                // connection, then build + store the framed msg2. The old index was
                // already freed by `remove_active_peer` above, BEFORE this fresh
                // allocation — matching the pre-refactor allocation sequence.
                conn.set_our_index(our_index);
                conn.set_their_index(their_index);
                let link = Link::connectionless(
                    link_id,
                    packet.transport_id,
                    packet.remote_addr.clone(),
                    LinkDirection::Inbound,
                    Duration::from_millis(self.config().node.base_rtt_ms),
                );
                self.links.insert(link_id, link);
                self.addr_to_link.insert(addr_key, link_id);
                self.connections.insert(link_id, conn);
                let wire_msg2 = build_msg2(our_index, their_index, &msg2_payload);
                if let Some(conn) = self.connections.get_mut(&link_id) {
                    conn.set_handshake_msg2(wire_msg2.clone());
                }

                // Register the machine (Promote/Restart tail only).
                self.peer_machines.insert(link_id, machine);

                // Execute [SendHandshake, PromoteToActive]. Because the old peer was
                // removed in Phase 1, `promote_connection`'s cross-connection branch
                // (`peers.get(addr)`) cannot fire, so it always returns `Promoted`;
                // the defensive `PromotionResolved{CrossConnectionWon/Lost}`
                // follow-ups are unreachable here (see the post-tail note).
                let ambient = PeerActionCtx {
                    verified_identity: peer_identity,
                    transport_id: packet.transport_id,
                    remote_addr: packet.remote_addr.clone(),
                    our_index: Some(our_index),
                    their_index: Some(their_index),
                    now_ms: packet.timestamp_ms,
                    is_outbound: false,
                };
                self.execute_peer_actions(link_id, &ambient, promote_actions)
                    .await;

                // Post-`Promoted` shell tail (byte-identical to the pre-refactor
                // Promoted arm), reached only when promotion succeeded (machine now
                // Established); a send/promote failure removed the machine and
                // already cleaned up.
                //
                // DEFENSIVE CROSS-CONNECTION: the machine's
                // `PromotionResolved{CrossConnectionWon/Lost}` follow-ups run the
                // index-level cleanup generically in the executor, but the loser-
                // link surgery (close_connection → remove_link → addr_to_link) is
                // NOT reproduced here — it is UNREACHABLE on the driven restart
                // path: Phase-1 `remove_active_peer` removed `peers[addr]`, so
                // `promote_connection` returns `Promoted`. The full cross-connection
                // link surgery is wired later; the
                // debug_assert below catches any regression that reaches a non-
                // Established, non-absent state.
                debug_assert!(matches!(
                    self.peer_machines.get(&link_id).map(|m| m.state()),
                    Some(PeerState::Established { .. }) | None
                ));
                if matches!(
                    self.peer_machines.get(&link_id).map(|m| m.state()),
                    Some(PeerState::Established { .. })
                ) {
                    // Store msg2 on peer for resend on duplicate msg1
                    if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer_node_addr) {
                        peer.set_handshake_msg2(wire_msg2.clone());
                    }
                    // Send initial tree announce to new peer
                    if let Err(e) = self.send_tree_announce_to_peer(&peer_node_addr).await {
                        debug!(peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr), error = %e, "Failed to send initial TreeAnnounce");
                    }
                    // Schedule filter announce (sent on next tick via debounce)
                    self.bloom_state.mark_update_needed(peer_node_addr);
                    self.reset_lookup_backoff();
                }

                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
            }
            InboundDecision::Promote => {
                // === Net-new inbound establish, driven by the machine. ===
                // Two-phase authorize: Phase 1 classifies with no allocation; the
                // shell interposes the late-ACL gate here; Phase 2 allocates the
                // single index and emits [SendHandshake, PromoteToActive]. A
                // rejected/unauthorized msg1 therefore allocates NO index —
                // matching the pre-refactor authorize-before-allocate ordering
                // exactly.

                // Keep the shell's own copies of the msg2 framing inputs before
                // the machine event consumes `wire` (WireOutcome is not Clone).
                let msg2_payload = wire.msg2_payload.clone();
                let their_index = wire.their_index;

                let mut machine = PeerMachine::new_inbound(link_id, packet.timestamp_ms);

                // Phase 1: classify (no allocation, no actions for a net-new leg).
                let phase1 = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::InboundMsg1 {
                        link: link_id,
                        wire,
                        est,
                    },
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                debug_assert!(phase1.is_empty());
                debug_assert!(matches!(
                    machine.state(),
                    PeerState::Handshaking {
                        phase: HandshakePhase::ReceivedMsg1,
                        ..
                    }
                ));

                // Shell interposition: late-ACL authorize BEFORE any allocation.
                if self
                    .authorize_peer(
                        &peer_identity,
                        PeerAclContext::InboundHandshake,
                        packet.transport_id,
                        &packet.remote_addr,
                    )
                    .is_err()
                {
                    let _ = machine.step(
                        PeerEvent::Rejected,
                        packet.timestamp_ms,
                        &mut self.index_allocator,
                    );
                    self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                    self.stats_mut()
                        .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                    return;
                }

                // Phase 2: allocate our index + emit [SendHandshake, PromoteToActive].
                let promote_actions = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::Authorized,
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                let our_index = match machine.our_index() {
                    Some(idx) => idx,
                    None => {
                        // Allocation exhausted in Phase 2 (mirrors the pre-refactor
                        // allocate-failure path): no msg2, no promote. The concrete
                        // allocator error is consumed inside `on_authorized`, so the
                        // restored warn! carries the pre-refactor message text only.
                        warn!("Failed to allocate session index for inbound");
                        self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
                        self.stats_mut()
                            .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        return;
                    }
                };

                // Shell registry surgery, in the pre-refactor order:
                // set indices on the shell connection, insert link / reverse map /
                // connection, then build + store the framed msg2.
                conn.set_our_index(our_index);
                conn.set_their_index(their_index);
                let link = Link::connectionless(
                    link_id,
                    packet.transport_id,
                    packet.remote_addr.clone(),
                    LinkDirection::Inbound,
                    Duration::from_millis(self.config().node.base_rtt_ms),
                );
                self.links.insert(link_id, link);
                self.addr_to_link.insert(addr_key, link_id);
                self.connections.insert(link_id, conn);
                let wire_msg2 = build_msg2(our_index, their_index, &msg2_payload);
                if let Some(conn) = self.connections.get_mut(&link_id) {
                    conn.set_handshake_msg2(wire_msg2.clone());
                }

                // Register the machine (Promote tail only — discarded on every
                // reject/resend/rekey arm per the insertion discipline).
                self.peer_machines.insert(link_id, machine);

                // Execute [SendHandshake, PromoteToActive]. The executor frames +
                // sends msg2 (bytes identical to `wire_msg2`), promotes via
                // `promote_connection`, feeds PromotionResolved back, and runs the
                // inert RegisterDecryptSession (register stays in
                // `promote_connection`). Its send-failure / promote-failure arms
                // run the pre-refactor cleanup and remove the machine, leaving it
                // absent (not Established).
                let ambient = PeerActionCtx {
                    verified_identity: peer_identity,
                    transport_id: packet.transport_id,
                    remote_addr: packet.remote_addr.clone(),
                    our_index: Some(our_index),
                    their_index: Some(their_index),
                    now_ms: packet.timestamp_ms,
                    is_outbound: false,
                };
                self.execute_peer_actions(link_id, &ambient, promote_actions)
                    .await;

                // Post-`Promoted` shell tail (byte-identical to the pre-refactor
                // Promoted arm), reached only when promotion succeeded (the machine
                // is now Established); a send/promote failure removed the machine
                // and already cleaned up.
                if matches!(
                    self.peer_machines.get(&link_id).map(|m| m.state()),
                    Some(PeerState::Established { .. })
                ) {
                    // Store msg2 on peer for resend on duplicate msg1
                    if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer_node_addr) {
                        peer.set_handshake_msg2(wire_msg2.clone());
                    }
                    // Send initial tree announce to new peer
                    if let Err(e) = self.send_tree_announce_to_peer(&peer_node_addr).await {
                        debug!(peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr), error = %e, "Failed to send initial TreeAnnounce");
                    }
                    // Schedule filter announce (sent on next tick via debounce)
                    self.bloom_state.mark_update_needed(peer_node_addr);
                    self.reset_lookup_backoff();
                }

                self.msg1_rate_limiter.complete_handshake();
            }
        }
    }

    /// Find stored msg2 bytes for a given link (pre- or post-promotion).
    ///
    /// Checks the PeerConnection (if still pending) and then the ActivePeer
    /// (if already promoted).
    fn find_stored_msg2(&self, link_id: LinkId) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
        // Check pending connection first
        if let Some(conn) = self.connections.get(&link_id)
            && let Some(msg2) = conn.handshake_msg2()
        {
            return Some(msg2.to_vec());
        }
        // Check promoted peer
        for peer in self.peers.values() {
            if peer.link_id() == link_id
                && let Some(msg2) = peer.handshake_msg2()
            {
                return Some(msg2.to_vec());
            }
        }
        None
    }

    /// Handle handshake message 2 (phase 0x2).
    ///
    /// This completes an outbound handshake we initiated.
    pub(in crate::node) async fn handle_msg2(&mut self, packet: ReceivedPacket) {
        // Parse header
        let header = match Msg2Header::parse(&packet.data) {
            Some(h) => h,
            None => {
                debug!("Invalid msg2 header");
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                return;
            }
        };

        // Look up our pending handshake by our sender_idx (receiver_idx in msg2)
        let key = (packet.transport_id, header.receiver_idx.as_u32());
        let link_id = match self.pending_outbound.get(&key) {
            Some(id) => *id,
            None => {
                debug!(
                    receiver_idx = %header.receiver_idx,
                    "No pending outbound handshake for index"
                );
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection));
                return;
            }
        };

        // Check if this is a rekey msg2: the handshake state is on the
        // ActivePeer (not a PeerConnection), so self.connections won't have it.
        // Look for a peer with matching rekey_our_index.
        if !self.connections.contains_key(&link_id) {
            let noise_msg2 = &packet.data[header.noise_msg2_offset..];

            // Find peer with rekey in progress for this index
            let peer_addr = self.peers.iter().find_map(|(addr, peer)| {
                if peer.rekey_in_progress() && peer.rekey_our_index() == Some(header.receiver_idx) {
                    Some(*addr)
                } else {
                    None
                }
            });

            if let Some(peer_node_addr) = peer_addr {
                let display_name = self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr);

                // Complete the rekey handshake on the ActivePeer
                if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer_node_addr) {
                    match peer.complete_rekey_msg2(noise_msg2) {
                        Ok((session, remote_epoch)) => {
                            let our_index = peer.rekey_our_index().unwrap_or(header.receiver_idx);
                            let remote_epoch_changed = matches!(
                                (peer.remote_epoch(), remote_epoch),
                                (Some(old), Some(new)) if old != new
                            );
                            if remote_epoch.is_some() {
                                peer.set_remote_epoch(remote_epoch);
                            }
                            peer.set_pending_session(session, our_index, header.sender_idx);

                            if let Some(transport_id) = peer.transport_id() {
                                self.peers_by_index
                                    .insert((transport_id, our_index.as_u32()), peer_node_addr);
                            }

                            if remote_epoch_changed {
                                if self.sessions.remove(&peer_node_addr).is_some() {
                                    debug!(
                                        peer = %display_name,
                                        "Cleared stale FSP session after peer restart during FMP rekey"
                                    );
                                }
                                info!(
                                    peer = %display_name,
                                    "Peer restart detected during FMP rekey, replacing stale endpoint session"
                                );
                            }

                            debug!(
                                peer = %display_name,
                                new_our_index = %our_index,
                                new_their_index = %header.sender_idx,
                                "Rekey completed (initiator), pending K-bit cutover"
                            );
                        }
                        Err(e) => {
                            warn!(
                                peer = %display_name,
                                error = %e,
                                "Rekey msg2 processing failed"
                            );
                            if let Some(idx) = peer.abandon_rekey() {
                                if let Some(tid) = peer.transport_id() {
                                    self.peers_by_index.remove(&(tid, idx.as_u32()));
                                }
                                let _ = self.index_allocator.free(idx);
                            }
                            self.stats_mut()
                                .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        }
                    }
                }

                self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
                return;
            }

            // Not a rekey — stale pending_outbound entry pointing at a
            // removed connection and no rekey-in-progress peer claims the
            // receiver_idx. State-machine inconsistency, not a fresh
            // lookup miss.
            self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
            self.stats_mut()
                .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
            return;
        }

        let (peer_identity, our_index) = {
            let conn = self.connections.get_mut(&link_id).unwrap();

            let noise_msg2 = &packet.data[header.noise_msg2_offset..];
            if let Err(e) = conn.complete_handshake(noise_msg2, packet.timestamp_ms) {
                warn!(
                    link_id = %link_id,
                    error = %e,
                    "Handshake completion failed"
                );
                conn.mark_failed();
                self.stats_mut()
                    .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                return;
            }

            conn.set_their_index(header.sender_idx);
            conn.set_source_addr(packet.remote_addr.clone());

            let peer_identity = match conn.expected_identity() {
                Some(id) => *id,
                None => {
                    warn!(link_id = %link_id, "No identity after handshake");
                    self.stats_mut()
                        .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                    return;
                }
            };

            (peer_identity, conn.our_index())
        };

        if self
            .authorize_peer(
                &peer_identity,
                PeerAclContext::OutboundHandshake,
                packet.transport_id,
                &packet.remote_addr,
            )
            .is_err()
        {
            self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
            if let Some(link) = self.links.get(&link_id) {
                let tid = link.transport_id();
                let addr = link.remote_addr().clone();
                if let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&tid) {
                    transport.close_connection(&addr).await;
                }
            }
            self.connections.remove(&link_id);
            // Drop the machine persisted at dial — this leg never promotes.
            self.peer_machines.remove(&link_id);
            self.remove_link(&link_id);
            if let Some(idx) = our_index {
                let _ = self.index_allocator.free(idx);
            }
            self.stats_mut()
                .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
            return;
        }

        let peer_node_addr = *peer_identity.node_addr();

        debug!(
            peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
            link_id = %link_id,
            their_index = %header.sender_idx,
            "Outbound handshake completed"
        );

        // Cross-connection resolution: if the peer was already promoted via
        // our inbound handshake (we processed their msg1), both nodes initially
        // use mismatched sessions. The tie-breaker determines which handshake
        // wins: smaller node_addr's outbound.
        //
        // - Winner (smaller node): swap to outbound session + outbound indices
        // - Loser (larger node): keep inbound session + original their_index
        //
        // This ensures both nodes use the same Noise handshake (the winner's
        // outbound = the loser's inbound).
        // Structured classification (pure core): cross-connection swap/keep, or
        // a net-new promote. The tie-break is pre-evaluated in the snapshot; the
        // effect bodies below are unchanged.
        let out_snap = self.outbound_snapshot(&peer_node_addr);
        let out_decision = self.fmp.establish_outbound(&out_snap);
        if out_decision != OutboundDecision::Promote {
            // The dial-persisted outbound machine is not consumed by the inline
            // Swap/Keep resolution below (which mutates the existing promoted peer
            // directly, with no machine). Drop it on entry so none of this block's
            // exits leave a dangling machine — matching the pre-persistence path,
            // which created no machine for a cross-connection.
            self.peer_machines.remove(&link_id);
            // Extract the outbound connection
            let mut conn = match self.connections.remove(&link_id) {
                Some(c) => c,
                None => {
                    self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
                    self.stats_mut()
                        .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection));
                    return;
                }
            };

            if out_decision == OutboundDecision::CrossConnectionSwap {
                // We're the smaller node. Swap to outbound session + indices.
                // The peer will keep their inbound session (complement of ours).
                let outbound_our_index = conn.our_index();
                let outbound_session = conn.take_session();

                let (outbound_session, outbound_our_index) = match (
                    outbound_session,
                    outbound_our_index,
                ) {
                    (Some(s), Some(idx)) => (s, idx),
                    _ => {
                        warn!(peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr), "Incomplete outbound connection");
                        self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
                        self.stats_mut()
                            .record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
                        return;
                    }
                };

                if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&peer_node_addr) {
                    let suppressed = peer.replay_suppressed_count();
                    let old_our_index = peer.replace_session(
                        outbound_session,
                        outbound_our_index,
                        header.sender_idx,
                    );

                    // Update peers_by_index: remove old inbound index, add outbound
                    let transport_id = peer.transport_id().unwrap();
                    if let Some(old_idx) = old_our_index {
                        self.peers_by_index
                            .remove(&(transport_id, old_idx.as_u32()));
                        let _ = self.index_allocator.free(old_idx);
                    }
                    self.peers_by_index
                        .insert((transport_id, outbound_our_index.as_u32()), peer_node_addr);

                    if suppressed > 0 {
                        debug!(
                            peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                            count = suppressed,
                            "Suppressed replay detections during link transition"
                        );
                    }

                    debug!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                        new_our_index = %outbound_our_index,
                        new_their_index = %header.sender_idx,
                        "Cross-connection: swapped to outbound session (our outbound wins)"
                    );
                }
            } else {
                // We're the larger node. Keep our inbound session (it pairs
                // with the peer's outbound, which is the winning handshake).
                //
                // Do NOT update their_index here. Our their_index was set during
                // promote_connection() from the peer's msg1 sender_idx, which is
                // the peer's outbound our_index. After the peer (winner) swaps to
                // their outbound session, that index is exactly what they'll use.
                // The msg2 sender_idx we see here is the peer's INBOUND our_index,
                // which becomes stale after the peer swaps.
                let outbound_our_index = conn.our_index();

                if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get(&peer_node_addr) {
                    debug!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                        kept_their_index = ?peer.their_index(),
                        "Cross-connection: keeping inbound session and original their_index (peer outbound wins)"
                    );
                }

                // Free the outbound's session index since we're not using it
                if let Some(idx) = outbound_our_index {
                    let _ = self.index_allocator.free(idx);
                }
            }

            // Clean up outbound connection state
            self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
            // Close the losing TCP connection (no-op for connectionless)
            if let Some(link) = self.links.get(&link_id) {
                let tid = link.transport_id();
                let addr = link.remote_addr().clone();
                if let Some(transport) = self.transports.get(&tid) {
                    transport.close_connection(&addr).await;
                }
            }
            self.remove_link(&link_id);

            // Send TreeAnnounce now that sessions are aligned
            if let Err(e) = self.send_tree_announce_to_peer(&peer_node_addr).await {
                debug!(peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr), error = %e, "Failed to send TreeAnnounce after cross-connection resolution");
            }
            // Schedule filter announce (sent on next tick via debounce)
            self.bloom_state.mark_update_needed(peer_node_addr);
            self.reset_lookup_backoff();
            return;
        }

        // === Net-new outbound establish, driven by the machine. ===
        // ONLY the `establish_outbound == Promote` arm is cut over here. The
        // Swap/Keep cross-connection arms and the rekey-msg2 completion branch
        // above STAY INLINE: they mutate an existing already-promoted peer
        // via `replace_session` with no PeerAction, so the machine's Swap/Keep
        // arms cannot be neutral until `PeerSendState` expresses `replace_session`.
        //
        // This arm is `has_existing_peer == false` only, so `promote_connection`
        // always hits its else branch and returns `Promoted`; the defensive
        // `CrossConnectionWon/Lost` follow-ups are UNREACHABLE here (their
        // loser-link surgery is wired later). Direct analog of the inbound
        // net-new arm — no ordering constraint, lowest risk.
        //
        // Look up the outbound machine persisted at DIAL, and step `Msg2 →
        // [PromoteToActive]` in place. Both dial paths reach msg2 in
        // `Handshaking{SentMsg1}` — each drives the machine to send msg1 before
        // msg2 — and `on_msg2` is state-independent regardless: it decides from
        // the outbound snapshot, not the
        // machine's state, and reads the machine's unset `conn.our_index`
        // as `None`, so stepping the persisted (vs the former transient) machine
        // is byte-identical: same `Promote` decision (`has_existing_peer == false`),
        // same `our_index == None`. The machine is already in `peer_machines`
        // (inserted at dial), so the executor's `PromoteToActive` arm can feed
        // `PromotionResolved` back via the same lookup. A defensive transient
        // reproduces the pre-persistence path if the machine is somehow absent — a
        // state-machine inconsistency, since every dialed leg persists one. The
        // outbound `our_index` was allocated at DIAL (unchanged), the promote
        // sends nothing on the wire, and `promote_connection` frees nothing new,
        // so index sequence, `peers`/`peers_by_index`/`addr_to_link` state, and
        // metrics are byte-identical. `pending_outbound` lifecycle stays shell-side
        // (removed on the Established tail); the machine never touches it.
        let promote_actions = match self.peer_machines.get_mut(&link_id) {
            Some(machine) => machine.step(
                PeerEvent::Msg2 {
                    their_index: header.sender_idx,
                    out: out_snap,
                },
                packet.timestamp_ms,
                &mut self.index_allocator,
            ),
            None => {
                // No machine persisted at dial (e.g. a test that seeds
                // `connections`/`pending_outbound` directly, or any path that
                // reaches msg2 without `start_handshake`): reproduce the
                // pre-persistence transient exactly.
                let mut machine =
                    PeerMachine::new_outbound(link_id, peer_identity, packet.timestamp_ms);
                let actions = machine.step(
                    PeerEvent::Msg2 {
                        their_index: header.sender_idx,
                        out: out_snap,
                    },
                    packet.timestamp_ms,
                    &mut self.index_allocator,
                );
                self.peer_machines.insert(link_id, machine);
                actions
            }
        };
        debug_assert_eq!(
            promote_actions,
            vec![PeerAction::PromoteToActive { link: link_id }]
        );

        // Execute `[PromoteToActive]`. The executor calls `promote_connection`,
        // feeds `PromotionResolved{Promoted}` back, registers the decrypt-worker
        // session (the register was relocated into the executor's
        // `PromoteToActive` Ok arm, gated on the result), and runs the now-inert
        // `RegisterDecryptSession` follow-up. A promote failure (e.g.
        // `MaxPeersExceeded` if peers filled between dial and msg2) runs the
        // executor's Err cleanup and removes the machine, leaving it absent (not
        // Established).
        let ambient = PeerActionCtx {
            verified_identity: peer_identity,
            transport_id: packet.transport_id,
            remote_addr: packet.remote_addr.clone(),
            our_index,
            their_index: Some(header.sender_idx),
            now_ms: packet.timestamp_ms,
            is_outbound: true,
        };
        self.execute_peer_actions(link_id, &ambient, promote_actions)
            .await;

        // Post-`Promoted` shell tail (byte-identical to the pre-refactor Promoted
        // arm), reached only when promotion succeeded (machine now Established).
        // `pending_outbound.remove` runs here — exactly where the pre-refactor Ok
        // arm removed it, before the TreeAnnounce/bloom/backoff tail. A promote
        // failure removed the machine and skips the whole tail (the pre-refactor
        // Err arm likewise left `pending_outbound` in place and only recorded the
        // reject, which the executor's Err arm already did).
        debug_assert!(matches!(
            self.peer_machines.get(&link_id).map(|m| m.state()),
            Some(PeerState::Established { .. }) | None
        ));
        if matches!(
            self.peer_machines.get(&link_id).map(|m| m.state()),
            Some(PeerState::Established { .. })
        ) {
            self.pending_outbound.remove(&key);
            info!(
                peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                "Peer promoted to active"
            );
            // Send initial tree announce to new peer
            if let Err(e) = self.send_tree_announce_to_peer(&peer_node_addr).await {
                debug!(peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr), error = %e, "Failed to send initial TreeAnnounce");
            }
            // Schedule filter announce (sent on next tick via debounce)
            self.bloom_state.mark_update_needed(peer_node_addr);
            self.reset_lookup_backoff();
        }
    }

    /// Promote a connection to active peer after successful authentication.
    ///
    /// Handles cross-connection detection and resolution using tie-breaker rules.
    pub(in crate::node) fn promote_connection(
        &mut self,
        link_id: LinkId,
        verified_identity: PeerIdentity,
        current_time_ms: u64,
    ) -> Result<PromotionResult, NodeError> {
        // Remove the connection from pending
        let mut connection = self
            .connections
            .remove(&link_id)
            .ok_or(NodeError::ConnectionNotFound(link_id))?;

        // Verify handshake is complete and extract session
        if !connection.has_session() {
            return Err(NodeError::HandshakeIncomplete(link_id));
        }

        let noise_session = connection
            .take_session()
            .ok_or(NodeError::NoSession(link_id))?;

        let our_index = connection
            .our_index()
            .ok_or_else(|| NodeError::PromotionFailed {
                link_id,
                reason: "missing our_index".into(),
            })?;
        let their_index = connection
            .their_index()
            .ok_or_else(|| NodeError::PromotionFailed {
                link_id,
                reason: "missing their_index".into(),
            })?;
        let transport_id = connection
            .transport_id()
            .ok_or_else(|| NodeError::PromotionFailed {
                link_id,
                reason: "missing transport_id".into(),
            })?;
        let current_addr = connection
            .source_addr()
            .ok_or_else(|| NodeError::PromotionFailed {
                link_id,
                reason: "missing source_addr".into(),
            })?
            .clone();
        let link_stats = connection.link_stats().clone();
        let remote_epoch = connection.remote_epoch();

        let peer_node_addr = *verified_identity.node_addr();
        let is_outbound = connection.is_outbound();

        // Check for cross-connection
        if let Some(existing_peer) = self.peers.get(&peer_node_addr) {
            let existing_link_id = existing_peer.link_id();

            let remote_epoch_changed = matches!((existing_peer.remote_epoch(), remote_epoch), (Some(old), Some(new)) if old != new);

            // Determine which connection wins. A peer restart (different
            // startup epoch) is not a normal cross-connection: the old link
            // and FSP sessions are cryptographically stale, so the freshly
            // authenticated connection must replace them regardless of the
            // tie-breaker direction.
            let this_wins = remote_epoch_changed
                || cross_connection_winner(
                    self.identity().node_addr(),
                    &peer_node_addr,
                    is_outbound,
                );

            if this_wins {
                // This connection wins, replace the existing peer
                let old_peer = self.peers.remove(&peer_node_addr).unwrap();
                let loser_link_id = old_peer.link_id();

                // Clean up old peer's index from peers_by_index
                if let (Some(old_tid), Some(old_idx)) =
                    (old_peer.transport_id(), old_peer.our_index())
                {
                    self.peers_by_index.remove(&(old_tid, old_idx.as_u32()));
                    // Unregister the OLD cache_key from the decrypt
                    // worker pool BEFORE freeing the index for reuse.
                    // Otherwise the worker's per-shard HashMap retains a
                    // stale entry pointing at the removed peer's session;
                    // if the index allocator later recycles old_idx to a
                    // different peer, the new register call overwrites
                    // the stale entry — but until that point, decrypt
                    // jobs that land at the recycled cache_key resolve
                    // to the wrong session and AEAD silently fails.
                    #[cfg(unix)]
                    self.unregister_decrypt_worker_session((old_tid, old_idx.as_u32()));
                    let _ = self.index_allocator.free(old_idx);
                }

                if remote_epoch_changed {
                    if self.sessions.remove(&peer_node_addr).is_some() {
                        debug!(
                            peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                            "Cleared stale FSP session after peer restart during promotion"
                        );
                    }
                    info!(
                        peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                        winner_link = %link_id,
                        loser_link = %loser_link_id,
                        "Peer restart detected during promotion, replacing stale active peer"
                    );
                }

                self.seed_path_mtu_for_link_peer(&peer_node_addr, transport_id, &current_addr);

                let mut new_peer = ActivePeer::with_session(
                    verified_identity,
                    link_id,
                    current_time_ms,
                    noise_session,
                    our_index,
                    their_index,
                    transport_id,
                    current_addr,
                    link_stats,
                    is_outbound,
                    &self.config().node.mmp,
                    remote_epoch,
                );
                new_peer.set_tree_announce_min_interval_ms(
                    self.config().node.tree.announce_min_interval_ms,
                );

                self.peers.insert(peer_node_addr, new_peer);
                self.peers_by_index
                    .insert((transport_id, our_index.as_u32()), peer_node_addr);
                self.peering
                    .reconciler
                    .retry_pending
                    .remove(&peer_node_addr);
                self.register_identity(peer_node_addr, verified_identity.pubkey_full());

                debug!(
                    peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                    winner_link = %link_id,
                    loser_link = %loser_link_id,
                    "Cross-connection resolved: this connection won"
                );

                // The decrypt-worker registration is no longer done
                // here — it relocated OUT of `promote_connection` into the single
                // executor `PromoteToActive` Ok arm (`peer_actions.rs`), gated on
                // the returned `PromotionResult` (`Promoted | CrossConnectionWon`).
                // The executor runs it synchronously right after this call returns,
                // before any await, so the live establish behaviour is unchanged.

                Ok(PromotionResult::CrossConnectionWon {
                    loser_link_id,
                    node_addr: peer_node_addr,
                })
            } else {
                // This connection loses, keep existing
                // Free the index we allocated
                let _ = self.index_allocator.free(our_index);

                debug!(
                    peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                    winner_link = %existing_link_id,
                    loser_link = %link_id,
                    "Cross-connection resolved: this connection lost"
                );

                Ok(PromotionResult::CrossConnectionLost {
                    winner_link_id: existing_link_id,
                })
            }
        } else {
            // No existing promoted peer. There may be a pending outbound
            // connection to the same peer (cross-connection in progress).
            // Do NOT clean it up yet — we need the outbound to stay alive
            // so that when the peer's msg2 arrives, we can learn the peer's
            // inbound session index and update their_index on the promoted
            // peer. The outbound will be cleaned up in handle_msg2 or by
            // the 30s handshake timeout.
            let pending_to_same_peer: Vec<LinkId> = self
                .connections
                .iter()
                .filter(|(_, conn)| {
                    conn.expected_identity()
                        .map(|id| *id.node_addr() == peer_node_addr)
                        .unwrap_or(false)
                })
                .map(|(lid, _)| *lid)
                .collect();

            for pending_link_id in &pending_to_same_peer {
                debug!(
                    peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                    pending_link_id = %pending_link_id,
                    promoted_link_id = %link_id,
                    "Deferring cleanup of pending outbound (awaiting msg2 for index update)"
                );
            }

            // Normal promotion
            if self.max_peers() > 0 && self.peers.len() >= self.max_peers() {
                let _ = self.index_allocator.free(our_index);
                return Err(NodeError::MaxPeersExceeded {
                    max: self.max_peers(),
                });
            }

            // Preserve tree announce rate-limit state from old peer (if reconnecting).
            // Without this, reconnection resets the rate limit window to zero,
            // allowing an immediate announce that can feed an announce loop.
            let old_announce_ts = self
                .peers
                .get(&peer_node_addr)
                .map(|p| p.last_tree_announce_sent_ms());

            self.seed_path_mtu_for_link_peer(&peer_node_addr, transport_id, &current_addr);

            let mut new_peer = ActivePeer::with_session(
                verified_identity,
                link_id,
                current_time_ms,
                noise_session,
                our_index,
                their_index,
                transport_id,
                current_addr,
                link_stats,
                is_outbound,
                &self.config().node.mmp,
                remote_epoch,
            );
            new_peer.set_tree_announce_min_interval_ms(
                self.config().node.tree.announce_min_interval_ms,
            );
            if let Some(ts) = old_announce_ts {
                new_peer.set_last_tree_announce_sent_ms(ts);
            }

            self.peers.insert(peer_node_addr, new_peer);
            self.peers_by_index
                .insert((transport_id, our_index.as_u32()), peer_node_addr);
            self.peering
                .reconciler
                .retry_pending
                .remove(&peer_node_addr);
            self.register_identity(peer_node_addr, verified_identity.pubkey_full());

            debug!(
                peer = %self.peer_display_name(&peer_node_addr),
                link_id = %link_id,
                our_index = %our_index,
                their_index = %their_index,
                "Connection promoted to active peer"
            );

            // The decrypt-worker registration relocated OUT of
            // `promote_connection` into the single executor `PromoteToActive` Ok
            // arm (`peer_actions.rs`), gated on the returned `PromotionResult`
            // (`Promoted | CrossConnectionWon`, never `CrossConnectionLost`). The
            // executor runs it synchronously right after this call returns, before
            // any await — same point, same effect as the pre-refactor in-place call
            // (no-op when the worker pool isn't spawned; unit-test path or
            // `FIPS_DECRYPT_WORKERS=0`).

            Ok(PromotionResult::Promoted(peer_node_addr))
        }
    }
}