Files
fips/src/node/stats.rs
T
Johnathan Corgan 0155345984 Bind the FSP session address to the authenticated peer key, on both the initial and rekey paths
The responder recorded a session under the source address carried in the
datagram without ever checking that address against the static key the
Noise handshake had just authenticated. A peer could therefore complete a
genuine handshake while claiming another node's address, and the identity
cache, the session map and the address the IPv6 shim reconstructs on
delivery would all attribute its traffic to the node it named.

Derive the address from the authenticated key at the point the key first
becomes available in msg3, and reject the handshake when it does not match
the claimed source. The entry has already been removed by that point, so
returning drops the half-open session and neither the identity nor the
session is recorded.

The rekey responder path needed its own check rather than inheriting that
one. It returns before the initial path's code is reached, and it never
read the peer's static key at all, so a rekey could complete under an
established session with a different key than the one that opened it. It
now requires the key to be unchanged, which is the stronger comparison
available there, and abandons the rekey while keeping the existing session
intact on mismatch. Tearing the session down instead would have handed an
attacker a way to kill established sessions.

Both comparisons are on x-only keys. A stored peer key may carry a
synthesized even parity because npubs encode no parity, while the
handshake learns the true point, so comparing full keys would reject
roughly half of legitimate peers on every rekey.

Both rejections are counted separately in the session reject statistics.
The tests drive real Noise handshakes through the datagram entry point and
construct the mismatch rather than asserting the comparison exists.
2026-08-09 06:48:01 +00:00

485 lines
17 KiB
Rust

//! Node-level statistics for the session, handshake, mmp, and transport
//! families. The forwarding, discovery, tree, bloom, congestion, and error
//! families have migrated to the atomic
//! [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry).
//!
//! Unlike `EthernetStats` (which uses `AtomicU64` + `Arc` for cross-task
//! sharing), these counters use plain `u64` because `Node` handlers run
//! on a single `&mut self` context. A `snapshot()` method produces a
//! copyable struct for control socket queries.
use serde::Serialize;
use crate::node::reject::{
HandshakeReject, MmpReject, RejectReason, SessionReject, TransportReject,
};
/// FSP session statistics — receive-path silent-rejection counters.
///
/// Covers the unknown-session and state-machine-mismatch rejection
/// sites in `handlers/session.rs`. Each counter increments once per
/// dropped inbound message; the WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is
/// preserved alongside the counter bump for operator visibility.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SessionStats {
/// Inbound session-layer message arrived for a peer address with no
/// matching `SessionEntry`. Aggregates across encrypted data,
/// SessionAck, SessionMsg3, SessionReceiverReport, and
/// PathMtuNotification.
pub unknown_session: u64,
/// Inbound session-layer message arrived for a `SessionEntry` whose
/// state is incompatible with the message type (encrypted data
/// before Established; SessionAck outside Initiating; SessionMsg3
/// outside AwaitingMsg3).
pub bad_state: u64,
/// Inbound XK msg3 whose initiator static key does not derive the
/// source address the datagram claimed. The half-open session is
/// dropped and no identity is registered.
pub addr_mismatch: u64,
/// Inbound rekey XK msg3 whose initiator static key differs from
/// the key the session was established with. The rekey is
/// abandoned and the existing session is left intact.
pub rekey_key_mismatch: u64,
}
impl SessionStats {
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> SessionStatsSnapshot {
SessionStatsSnapshot {
unknown_session: self.unknown_session,
bad_state: self.bad_state,
addr_mismatch: self.addr_mismatch,
rekey_key_mismatch: self.rekey_key_mismatch,
}
}
pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: SessionReject) {
match reason {
SessionReject::UnknownSession => self.unknown_session += 1,
SessionReject::BadState => self.bad_state += 1,
SessionReject::AddrMismatch => self.addr_mismatch += 1,
SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch => self.rekey_key_mismatch += 1,
}
}
}
/// Noise-handshake statistics — receive-path silent-rejection counters.
///
/// Covers the state-machine and lookup-miss rejection sites in
/// `handlers/handshake.rs` across msg1, msg2, and (on the XX side) msg3.
/// Each counter increments once per dropped inbound message; the
/// WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is preserved alongside the counter
/// bump for operator visibility.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct HandshakeStats {
/// Handshake state-machine rejection: header parse failed, Noise
/// crypto step failed, identity could not be learned, index allocator
/// returned an error, msg2/msg3 send failed, promote_connection
/// returned an error, ACL gate rejected the peer, or the admission
/// gate fired (max_peers / accept_connections).
pub bad_state: u64,
/// Inbound handshake message arrived but no matching connection was
/// found by the receiver_idx (or addr) lookup: msg2 for an unknown
/// pending-outbound index, duplicate msg1 with no stored msg2 to
/// resend, msg3 for an unknown pending-inbound index without a
/// matching rekey-responder slot.
pub unknown_connection: u64,
}
impl HandshakeStats {
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
bad_state: self.bad_state,
unknown_connection: self.unknown_connection,
}
}
pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: HandshakeReject) {
match reason {
HandshakeReject::BadState => self.bad_state += 1,
HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection => self.unknown_connection += 1,
}
}
}
/// MMP link-layer rejection statistics.
///
/// Covers the receive-path silent-rejection sites in
/// `src/node/handlers/mmp.rs::handle_sender_report` and
/// `handle_receiver_report`. Each counter increments once per
/// dropped inbound report; the WARN/DEBUG log line at the site is
/// preserved alongside the counter bump.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct MmpStats {
/// `SenderReport::decode` or `ReceiverReport::decode` returned
/// an error. Aggregated across the two report types.
pub decode_error: u64,
/// SenderReport or ReceiverReport arrived from a peer with no
/// `ActivePeer` record on this node.
pub unknown_peer: u64,
}
impl MmpStats {
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> MmpStatsSnapshot {
MmpStatsSnapshot {
decode_error: self.decode_error,
unknown_peer: self.unknown_peer,
}
}
pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: MmpReject) {
match reason {
MmpReject::DecodeError => self.decode_error += 1,
MmpReject::UnknownPeer => self.unknown_peer += 1,
}
}
}
/// Transport-layer rejection statistics aggregated at the node level.
///
/// Per-transport modules (`transport/tcp/stats.rs`, `transport/tor/stats.rs`)
/// keep their own `connections_accepted` / `connections_rejected` /
/// `pool_inbound` / `pool_outbound` counters at the transport layer.
/// `TransportStats` here collects node-level visibility for any future
/// admission-rejection paths that the node code itself decides to
/// register via `record_reject(RejectReason::Transport(...))`.
///
/// The `inbound_cap_exceeded` counter is the typed-dispatch parity
/// counterpart of the per-transport `connections_rejected` counter,
/// which lives in the accept-loop task with no `NodeStats` access.
/// Currently this node-side counter stays at zero; it exists so the
/// typed-rejection enum stays the canonical entry point and so a
/// future transport-to-node bridge (event or sampling) has a
/// well-known destination.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct TransportStats {
/// Reserved for node-side inbound-cap-exceeded admission rejection
/// dispatch. Per-transport accept-loop cap rejections are tracked
/// on the transport-level stats (`TcpStats::connections_rejected`,
/// `TorStats::connections_rejected`) directly.
pub inbound_cap_exceeded: u64,
}
impl TransportStats {
pub fn snapshot(&self) -> TransportStatsSnapshot {
TransportStatsSnapshot {
inbound_cap_exceeded: self.inbound_cap_exceeded,
}
}
pub(super) fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: TransportReject) {
match reason {
TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded => self.inbound_cap_exceeded += 1,
}
}
}
/// Aggregate node statistics.
///
/// Holds only the families that have not migrated to the atomic
/// [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry): session,
/// handshake, mmp, and transport. The forwarding, discovery, tree,
/// bloom, congestion, and error families are served exclusively from
/// the registry.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct NodeStats {
pub session: SessionStats,
pub handshake: HandshakeStats,
pub mmp: MmpStats,
pub transport: TransportStats,
}
impl NodeStats {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Record a typed rejection from a silent-rejection site.
///
/// Dispatches to the appropriate sub-stats `record_reject` based on
/// the [`RejectReason`] top-level variant. Only the families still
/// stored on `NodeStats` (session, handshake, mmp, transport) are
/// routed here; the migrated families are recorded directly on the
/// [`MetricsRegistry`](crate::node::metrics::MetricsRegistry).
pub fn record_reject(&mut self, reason: RejectReason) {
match reason {
RejectReason::Session(r) => self.session.record_reject(r),
RejectReason::Handshake(r) => self.handshake.record_reject(r),
RejectReason::Transport(r) => self.transport.record_reject(r),
RejectReason::Mmp(r) => self.mmp.record_reject(r),
// The forwarding, discovery, tree, and bloom families are
// recorded directly on the MetricsRegistry and never reach
// this NodeStats dispatch.
RejectReason::Forwarding(_)
| RejectReason::Discovery(_)
| RejectReason::Tree(_)
| RejectReason::Bloom(_) => {
debug_assert!(false, "migrated reject family must use MetricsRegistry");
}
}
}
}
// --- Snapshot types (copyable, serializable) ---
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct ForwardingStatsSnapshot {
pub received_packets: u64,
pub received_bytes: u64,
pub decode_error_packets: u64,
pub decode_error_bytes: u64,
pub ttl_exhausted_packets: u64,
pub ttl_exhausted_bytes: u64,
pub delivered_packets: u64,
pub delivered_bytes: u64,
pub forwarded_packets: u64,
pub forwarded_bytes: u64,
pub drop_no_route_packets: u64,
pub drop_no_route_bytes: u64,
pub drop_mtu_exceeded_packets: u64,
pub drop_mtu_exceeded_bytes: u64,
pub drop_send_error_packets: u64,
pub drop_send_error_bytes: u64,
pub originated_packets: u64,
pub originated_bytes: u64,
pub route_tree_up: u64,
pub route_tree_down: u64,
pub route_tree_down_cross: u64,
pub route_crosslink_descend: u64,
pub route_crosslink_ascend: u64,
pub route_direct_peer: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct DiscoveryStatsSnapshot {
pub req_received: u64,
pub req_decode_error: u64,
pub req_duplicate: u64,
pub req_dedup_cache_full: u64,
pub req_target_is_us: u64,
pub req_forwarded: u64,
pub req_ttl_exhausted: u64,
pub req_initiated: u64,
pub req_deduplicated: u64,
pub req_backoff_suppressed: u64,
pub req_forward_rate_limited: u64,
pub req_bloom_miss: u64,
pub req_no_tree_peer: u64,
pub req_fallback_forwarded: u64,
pub resp_received: u64,
pub resp_decode_error: u64,
pub resp_forwarded: u64,
pub resp_identity_miss: u64,
pub resp_proof_failed: u64,
pub resp_no_route: u64,
pub resp_accepted: u64,
pub resp_timed_out: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct TreeStatsSnapshot {
pub received: u64,
pub decode_error: u64,
pub unknown_peer: u64,
pub addr_mismatch: u64,
pub sig_failed: u64,
pub stale: u64,
pub ancestry_invalid: u64,
pub accepted: u64,
pub loop_detected: u64,
pub ancestry_changed: u64,
pub sent: u64,
pub rate_limited: u64,
pub send_failed: u64,
pub outbound_sign_failed: u64,
pub parent_switches: u64,
pub parent_losses: u64,
pub flap_dampened: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct BloomStatsSnapshot {
pub received: u64,
pub decode_error: u64,
pub invalid: u64,
pub non_v1: u64,
pub unknown_peer: u64,
pub stale: u64,
pub fill_exceeded: u64,
pub accepted: u64,
pub sent: u64,
pub debounce_suppressed: u64,
pub send_failed: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct SessionStatsSnapshot {
pub unknown_session: u64,
pub bad_state: u64,
pub addr_mismatch: u64,
pub rekey_key_mismatch: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct HandshakeStatsSnapshot {
pub bad_state: u64,
pub unknown_connection: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct MmpStatsSnapshot {
pub decode_error: u64,
pub unknown_peer: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct TransportStatsSnapshot {
pub inbound_cap_exceeded: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct ErrorSignalStatsSnapshot {
pub coords_required: u64,
pub path_broken: u64,
pub mtu_exceeded: u64,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct CongestionStatsSnapshot {
pub ce_forwarded: u64,
pub ce_received: u64,
pub congestion_detected: u64,
pub kernel_drop_events: u64,
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn session_stats_record_reject_unknown_session() {
let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::UnknownSession);
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::UnknownSession);
assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 2);
assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 0);
}
#[test]
fn session_stats_record_reject_bad_state() {
let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::BadState);
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::BadState);
assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 2);
assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 0);
}
#[test]
fn session_stats_record_reject_addr_mismatch() {
let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
assert_eq!(stats.addr_mismatch, 2);
assert_eq!(stats.rekey_key_mismatch, 0);
assert_eq!(stats.unknown_session, 0);
}
#[test]
fn session_stats_record_reject_rekey_key_mismatch() {
let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
assert_eq!(stats.rekey_key_mismatch, 1);
assert_eq!(stats.addr_mismatch, 0);
}
#[test]
fn session_stats_snapshot_carries_identity_binding_counters() {
let mut stats = SessionStats::default();
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::AddrMismatch);
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
stats.record_reject(SessionReject::RekeyKeyMismatch);
let snap = stats.snapshot();
assert_eq!(snap.addr_mismatch, 1);
assert_eq!(snap.rekey_key_mismatch, 2);
}
#[test]
fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_session() {
let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Session(SessionReject::UnknownSession));
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Session(SessionReject::BadState));
assert_eq!(stats.session.unknown_session, 1);
assert_eq!(stats.session.bad_state, 1);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_stats_record_reject_bad_state() {
let mut stats = HandshakeStats::default();
stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::BadState);
assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 3);
assert_eq!(stats.unknown_connection, 0);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_stats_record_reject_unknown_connection() {
let mut stats = HandshakeStats::default();
stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection);
stats.record_reject(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection);
assert_eq!(stats.unknown_connection, 2);
assert_eq!(stats.bad_state, 0);
}
#[test]
fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_handshake() {
let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::UnknownConnection));
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Handshake(HandshakeReject::BadState));
assert_eq!(stats.handshake.bad_state, 2);
assert_eq!(stats.handshake.unknown_connection, 1);
assert_eq!(stats.session.unknown_session, 0);
}
#[test]
fn mmp_stats_record_reject_decode_error() {
let mut s = MmpStats::default();
s.record_reject(MmpReject::DecodeError);
s.record_reject(MmpReject::DecodeError);
assert_eq!(s.decode_error, 2);
assert_eq!(s.unknown_peer, 0);
}
#[test]
fn mmp_stats_record_reject_unknown_peer() {
let mut s = MmpStats::default();
s.record_reject(MmpReject::UnknownPeer);
assert_eq!(s.unknown_peer, 1);
assert_eq!(s.decode_error, 0);
}
#[test]
fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_mmp() {
let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Mmp(MmpReject::DecodeError));
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Mmp(MmpReject::UnknownPeer));
assert_eq!(stats.mmp.decode_error, 1);
assert_eq!(stats.mmp.unknown_peer, 1);
}
#[test]
fn transport_stats_record_reject_inbound_cap_exceeded() {
let mut s = TransportStats::default();
s.record_reject(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded);
s.record_reject(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded);
assert_eq!(s.inbound_cap_exceeded, 2);
}
#[test]
fn node_stats_record_reject_dispatches_to_transport() {
let mut stats = NodeStats::new();
stats.record_reject(RejectReason::Transport(TransportReject::InboundCapExceeded));
assert_eq!(stats.transport.inbound_cap_exceeded, 1);
}
}