Files
fips/docs/tutorials/host-a-service.md
Johnathan Corgan 6a564e26ac Prepare the v0.5.0 release content
Everything the release needs except the version number, which stays at
0.5.0-dev until the tag.

The changelog entry covers only the work that is new on this line. The
point release's forty-six entries arrived under their own heading with the
forward merge and are left alone; the twenty that remained are regrouped by
topic and eight more added for changes no entry covered. Three of those
eight matter to someone upgrading. Five root modules and four re-exports
left the public library surface and Node::connections narrowed, none of it
recorded anywhere; the entry names what to use instead and distinguishes
the removed connection-phase enum from the Noise type of the same name,
which is a different type that still exists. Tracing targets moved, so an
existing RUST_LOG filter stops matching rather than erroring. And the
handshake resend interval key no longer governs the first resend, which is
now a constant, though it still governs later ones.

Seven more entries cover the work that landed after the first content pass
was written: the experimental native datagram API, the fipsctl probe
diagnostic, per-instance transport addressing, the app-owned UDP socket
seam, and the connect, disconnect and path-MTU fixes. The four bug fixes
among them all reach the deployed line, so the release notes no longer
claim this release carries exactly one fix for a shipped bug; it carries
four.

There is no security section, because after the split every security entry
belongs to the point release. The release notes say so plainly rather than
leaving a reader upgrading across both releases to conclude this one
carries no security work.

The notes are organized by audience, since the release spans OpenWrt
routers, embedders, FreeBSD, and the existing platforms, and a single list
serves none of them. The native datagram API is given a section of its own
rather than folded into the embedding seam: it is a client-facing API
rather than a way to host a node, and its one rule with no Berkeley-socket
counterpart, that the v1 wire carries no half-close, needs to be somewhere
a client author will read it. FreeBSD is advertised as supported on x86_64
only, stated wherever the platform appears. Android is advertised as an
embedding seam and not as a supported platform: a compile-gated library
surface with no artifact and no host application guide.

The configuration table rename is carried through every shipped file that
taught the old spelling: nine documentation files, the OpenWrt sample
config and a test generator, twenty-two sites in all. Guides written this
same cycle were among them, which is how the omission was found. The
documentation that arrived with the native API was checked for the same
omission and was already clean. The compatibility tests keep the old
spelling deliberately, since they exist to test the fold.

The changelog section is the fold of master's [Unreleased], not a snapshot
of it. An earlier version of this commit took a copy that then drifted, so
each section ended up holding a bullet the other did not and re-folding
them would have picked a winner silently. Both causes were fixed on master
instead — the NixOS module had never been recorded there, and the
pre-release batch of fixes was new — so [Unreleased] is a strict superset
and this is a copy rather than a merge. [0.5.0] carries all forty-six
bullets byte for byte, [Unreleased] is empty, and [0.4.2] is untouched,
checked by hashing it against master's copy.

The BLE work landed after the content pass and gets one summary entry in
the changelog and one section in the release notes rather than nine
bullets: the ble_available gate replacing target_os = "linux",
packet-boundary recovery for stream-oriented backends, peer recognition by
node identity instead of a rotating link address, the L2CAP PSM moving
into the backend seam and onto the advertisement, the embedder-supplied
Android radio, bounded probe retry, and inbound handshakes moved off the
accept loop.

The two release-notes copies no longer share their link paths. Relative
links resolve from one directory only, so the seven written for
docs/releases/ all 404ed from the root copy. The root copy now uses paths
from the repository root and the versioned copy keeps the ../ form; both
sets were resolved against the tree. The same two links are broken the
same way in the v0.4.0 through v0.4.2 notes, left as shipped history.

The contributor tallies are re-derived against maint..HEAD rather than
adjusted: twenty commits from outside the project and 171 from me, with
Arjen at fifteen and fr34aky at two. An earlier count of twelve and 138
was carried from a measurement taken three days before this content was
written, and the BLE branch widened the gap after it. Arjen's NixOS flake
module, the UDP sin6_scope_id fix and most of the BLE rework were
uncredited, as was fr34aky's L2CAP PSM seam. They want one last re-derive
at tag time if anything lands before the tag.

A sweep of all 99 tracked markdown files against the tree corrected
fifty-three of them. Four told the reader to run a build.sh that does not
exist; the only harness builder is testing/scripts/build.sh. The BLE build
prerequisites were described as optional on the strength of a probe that
build.rs does not perform, and bluez was named a build prerequisite when
libdbus-sys asks only for libdbus-1-dev and pkg-config and bluez is the
runtime daemon. Link cost is the primary sort key in next-hop ranking, not
reserved for future use; Ethernet runs on macOS as well as Linux; the BLE
MTU is the L2CAP CoC MTU rather than a negotiated ATT_MTU; effective
Ethernet MTU is 1497; the LAN discovery subsystem is src/mdns and eight
citations still named a src/discovery that never existed here. The
connectivity states in three tutorials were invented, and their jq filters
matched nothing including healthy peers. One command filtered on a literal
fd97: address prefix, which only the first byte of fixes, so it returned
empty for all but one reader in 256 and every later step using the
variable failed silently. transports.tor.advertise_on_nostr was
undocumented despite being validated against node.rendezvous.nostr.enabled.

The transport design document gains the BLE section it never had, written
from the source: the backend cascade and its compile_error tripwire, the
platform gate, the PSM advertisement wire layout and the byte budget that
forces a 16-bit service-data key, and the probe and admission bounds.

Three source files carried the same class of staleness and are corrected
with the documentation: the OpenWrt ipk usage line and Makefile error text
both named a packaging/openwrt that does not exist, and chaos.sh parsed
--subnet without listing it.

Folded in with the content commit, having been prepared alongside it:

The three GitHub Action pins that had gone stale. Every third-party
action is pinned to a commit SHA, nothing reports that a pin has aged,
and re-resolving all ten against their tags found dorny/test-reporter@v2,
taiki-e/install-action@v2 and vmactions/freebsd-vm@v1 had moved. The
three install-action@nextest references stay unpinned, since that action
reads the tool to install from the ref name. check-action-pins.sh passes
at 75 references and all nine workflow files parse.

The lockfile refresh, which is the mutating half of the dependency sweep.
Thirty-six packages move to their latest semver-compatible versions and
every one is transitive; nothing declared in Cargo.toml changes version.
No advisory forces any of them. It was taken before the validation
battery, because a gate run against a lockfile that later moves proves
nothing about what ships.

The sha2 0.10 to 0.11, hkdf 0.12 to 0.13 and bech32 0.11 to 0.12 majors,
three of the four deferred at v0.4.0 for change surface rather than
security. All three land with no source change. sha2 and hkdf must move
together, since both depend on digest 0.11, and neither changes an
algorithm. That matters because the chaining-key KDF in the Noise
handshake is built on Hkdf::<Sha256>, where an output change would be a
wire break rather than a compile error; no known-answer vectors exist for
that path, so the wire-compatibility gate is what covers it. secp256k1
0.31 is deliberately absent, since nostr's own requirement would leave
two copies of the ECC library in the tree.

The README support matrix, rebuilt as one feature table broken out by
Linux variety. A single Linux column hid that Debian, Ubuntu, Arch and
NixOS are one glibc build differing in packaging, that OpenWrt is musl
and drops BLE, and that Android is not a daemon platform. Transport rows
sort by how many platforms carry them. A Native API row reads its
platform set from the cfg gates. The installer row becomes a package
format row naming the artifact, and only the .deb is exercised per
release.

Four changelog and release-note gaps the BLE re-walk found: a Bluetooth
LE bullet stranded inside the released 0.4.2 section, a missing Fixed
entry for the scan and probe loop counting a pool-refused connection as
an established link, the unnamed embedder call that installs an
application-owned radio, and the fact that stopping the transport now
stops scanning as well as advertising.

Three release-document gaps found walking the unsurveyed commits: the UDP
reuse-flag fix stated in the direction opposite to the one it was made,
with the silent second-daemon bind it prevents left unsaid; the corrected
native-API socket paragraph carried into both release-note copies, which
still named SOCK_SEQPACKET on FreeBSD and two kernels where three are
handled; and the coordinate-cache hardening, which shipped with no text
anywhere despite adding four operator-visible status fields. That last
entry states plainly that the checks are mitigations and not a closure,
since the coordinate is still not authenticated.

Also folded in, the documentation pass that followed the content commit:

A stage-pipeline diagram for the probe, embedded in the fipsctl
reference under the five-stage list. It draws the five stages left to
right with each stage's failure reasons below it, and the bypass that
skips both lookup stages when the coordinates are cached or the target
is a direct peer. Its branches come from the probe state machine rather
than from the report, so the path stage is drawn as the one failure that
does not stop the probe.

A rewrite of the README's "What FIPS does" section. It now opens with
what a machine running FIPS gets, rather than with the two deployment
modes, and gives the self-organizing and permissionless property its own
paragraph since it holds for both modes.

A regrouping of the README's feature list into the mesh, getting traffic
onto it, and running a node, with a bullet added for the native datagram
API, which had none despite sitting in the support matrix. The Quick
start now leads with the released packages rather than a source build.
It also fixes a real defect: the package enables fips.service and
fips-dns.service and starts neither on a fresh install, so .fips name
resolution was silently dead until the next reboot and neither page said
to start the service.

A rewrite of the release notes. They opened with seven subsections of
upgrade caveats and reached the first feature two hundred lines in; they
now open with a summary of the release and elaborate below it in the
same order. Android is stated as supported through an embedded crate
rather than as a standalone daemon, consistently across all three
documents. The OpenWrt pair is corrected: it is 802.11s between routers
with FIPS supplying encryption, authentication and routing, plus a
convention of an open !FIPS SSID a client joins over WiFi, not meshing
over a router's own radios. The probe's path output is described as the
least-common-ancestor walk, which is the worst-case fallback route
rather than the route a packet takes. Detail that did not change what a
reader does was cut from the notes and kept in the changelog.
2026-08-30 10:42:59 +00:00

19 KiB

Host a Service of Your Own

In reach-mesh-services you used ordinary IPv6 tools to reach services on other mesh nodes. This tutorial flips the direction. You will bring up a small HTTP server on your machine, make a deliberate choice about which interface it binds to, and turn on the mesh firewall to keep the exposure to what you intended. By the end you will have hosted your first peer-reachable service and made an informed decision about who can reach it.

The whole exercise should take about twenty minutes. You should have already worked through persistent-identity so that the npub your service is reachable at does not change between restarts.

What you'll build

   ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
   │  your fips node                          │
   │                                          │
   │   python3 -m http.server                 │
   │      --bind <fips0-addr> 8080            │
   │                       │                  │
   │                       ▼                  │
   │   fips0  fd97:….:Y  ◀─── port 8080 open  │
   └────────────┬─────────────────────────────┘
                │
                │  reachable as
                │     http://<your-npub>.fips:8080/
                ▼
   any mesh peer that can route to <your-npub>.fips

You will have:

  • A single-page HTTP server bound to fips0 only — not the public internet, not your LAN, just the mesh.
  • The mesh firewall baseline active, default-deny on fips0 inbound, with one explicit drop-in that allows TCP/8080.
  • A clear understanding of which interface choice corresponds to which audience.

Why bind interface matters

The single most important decision when hosting a service is which interface (and therefore which audience) the service is exposed to. This is true for every IPv6 service, not just FIPS — but FIPS makes it stark because your machine often has several interfaces with very different exposure profiles.

Bind interface = exposure surface. A typical FIPS host has at least two distinct audiences:

  • fips0 (fd97:…, reachable as <your-npub>.fips) — reachable only from FIPS peers that have a working link to your node. Bound by Noise authentication and (optionally) the peer ACL.
  • eth0 / wlan0 (your LAN address) — reachable from anyone on your local network segment, with no FIPS auth in the way.

When you run a server, the --bind argument decides which of these audiences sees the service. Binding to a specific address opts in to one audience. Binding to [::] or 0.0.0.0 opts in to all of them at once — including any you forgot you had.

Audit what's already listening. Bringing up fips0 adds a new audience to every service on this host that was already bound to 0.0.0.0 or [::]. SSH, your web server, a database — if any of them was listening on all interfaces before you joined the mesh, they are now reachable from mesh peers too. A quick ss -tulnp will show you everything currently listening and on which addresses. The mesh firewall (Step 5 below) is one way to bring those exposures back under explicit control; rebinding the affected services to a specific non-mesh address is another.

There is nothing FIPS-specific about this rule; it applies to SSH, web servers, databases, anything. FIPS just gives you the option of "mesh peers only" as a distinct audience, which most hosts otherwise don't have.

Step 1: Find your node's mesh address

You need the fd97:... address assigned to your fips0 adapter. Two equivalent ways to get it:

ip -6 addr show fips0

Look for the inet6 fd... line: every mesh address begins with fd, and the rest is derived from your key, so it will not be fd97 unless you are lucky. The address up to the / is what you want.

Or via the daemon:

sudo fipsctl show status

The JSON has an ipv6_addr field — that is your address.

For the rest of this tutorial we will write the address as <your-fips0-addr>. Substitute the actual fd97:... value when you run the commands. Save it to a shell variable for convenience:

FIPS0_ADDR=$(ip -6 addr show fips0 | awk '/inet6 fd/ {print $2}' | cut -d/ -f1)
echo "$FIPS0_ADDR"

You should also know your npub from persistent-identity:

NPUB=$(sudo cat /etc/fips/fips.pub)
echo "$NPUB"

<your-npub>.fips and <your-fips0-addr> are two names for the same destination.

Step 2: Bring up an HTTP server bound to fips0

Make a small directory with one file in it so the server has something to serve:

mkdir -p /tmp/mesh-demo
echo '<h1>Hello from the mesh</h1>' > /tmp/mesh-demo/index.html
cd /tmp/mesh-demo

Start a Python HTTP server bound to your fips0 address:

python3 -m http.server --bind "$FIPS0_ADDR" 8080

Leave the server running. The terminal will show:

Serving HTTP on fd97:... port 8080 (http://[fd97:...]:8080/) ...

Two things to notice:

  • The "Serving HTTP on …" line names your fd97:... address explicitly. Python is binding only to that one address.
  • The default would have been 0.0.0.0 — which is not what you want here. Without --bind, the server would be reachable from your LAN and any public IP this host has, not just from the mesh.

Step 3: Verify the service locally

Open a second terminal. From the same host, fetch the page:

curl -6 "http://[$FIPS0_ADDR]:8080/"

Expect:

<h1>Hello from the mesh</h1>

Now fetch it by name. Both forms should work:

curl -6 "http://${NPUB}.fips:8080/"

The daemon's local DNS responder turned the npub-form name into the fd97:... address, and the request landed at your HTTP server.

What just happened. The kernel routed your local request via the loopback path because the destination address is assigned to one of your own interfaces. You exercised the client side (DNS, IPv6 socket open, HTTP request) and the server side (HTTP listener, response). What you have not yet verified is reachability from another mesh node. That is the next concern.

If you have fipstop available, open it now in another terminal and switch to the Node tab. The right-half of the Traffic block — the Listening on fips0 panel — should list a tcp row at port 8080 with a python(<pid>) Process column. The State column reads OPEN because the firewall has not been turned on yet; everything bound to fips0 is currently mesh-reachable. The yellow banner above the panel says "fips-firewall.service inactive — all listeners exposed". Both signals will flip in the next two steps.

Step 4: Reachability from a mesh node

Any mesh node — a direct peer, or a node several hops away — reaches your service the same way you reached test-us01 in reach-mesh-services: it looks up <your-npub>.fips, gets back your fd97:... address, opens a TCP connection to it, and the FIPS data plane carries the packets across the mesh to you. From the remote host the curl looks identical to yours:

curl -6 "http://${NPUB}.fips:8080/"

If you have a second machine on the mesh — or you can ask another operator to try it — this is the moment to confirm. A node that can already ping6 ${NPUB}.fips should also be able to fetch your page. If it can ping but the curl times out, jump to Troubleshooting — but most likely the firewall step in this tutorial has not happened yet, so a remote attempt right now will succeed straight through to your HTTP server.

That is the problem. With no firewall in place, any mesh node that can route to you — your direct peers, and every node beyond them in the mesh — can reach port 8080. You have not yet made a deliberate decision about whether you want that. The rest of this tutorial replaces the implicit "every port with a listener is reachable" with an explicit "only the ports I have opened are reachable, optionally only from specific mesh nodes." That is the firewall's job, and it is the only mechanism in play in the rest of this tutorial.

(There is a separate, unrelated control called the peer ACL that decides which npubs may establish a peer connection with your node at the transport layer. It is not part of the firewall and does not affect what is described below; Step 7 is a brief signpost to it.)

Step 5: Activate the mesh firewall baseline

FIPS ships a default-deny nftables baseline at /etc/fips/fips.nft that restricts inbound traffic on fips0 to ICMPv6 echo and conntrack replies. The baseline is not enabled by default — activation is an explicit step the operator has to take.

Activate it:

sudo systemctl enable --now fips-firewall.service

This loads the table immediately and arranges for it to load on every subsequent boot. Confirm:

sudo nft list table inet fips

You will see one chain named inbound hooked at input, roughly:

table inet fips {
    chain inbound {
        type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;
        iifname != "fips0" return
        ct state established,related accept
        icmpv6 type echo-request accept
        counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
    }
}

The chain admits ICMPv6 echo (so ping6 from any mesh node still works) and conntrack replies (so your outbound connections still get their replies back). Everything else inbound on fips0 hits the final counter ... drop.

What this changed. Your HTTP server is still running and still reachable from this same host (same-host traffic to fd97:... goes via the loopback path, which has iifname != "fips0" and short-circuits at the first rule). But any mesh node trying to reach fd97:...:8080 now has its TCP SYN dropped before it can reach your server. From the remote end the connection times out.

The fipstop panel reflects the change immediately: the yellow "firewall inactive" banner disappears, the panel title becomes a plain "Listening on fips0", and your tcp 8080 python(<pid>) row flips to DarkGray with filt in the State column. Every other row also goes DarkGray — none of them have an explicit accept rule yet, and the chain falls through to counter drop.

So the firewall is in the right shape but in the wrong state for our purpose: we want mesh nodes to reach port 8080. The next step opens that one port.

Step 6: Open port 8080 via a drop-in

Drop-ins live under /etc/fips/fips.d/ with the .nft suffix. Each file is included into the inbound chain at the marked point and may contain any nftables rule lines valid in that context.

Create one for your HTTP service:

sudo tee /etc/fips/fips.d/http-mesh-demo.nft >/dev/null <<'EOF'
tcp dport 8080 accept
EOF

Reload the firewall:

sudo systemctl reload-or-restart fips-firewall.service

Confirm the rule is live:

sudo nft list table inet fips

The inbound chain now contains your tcp dport 8080 accept rule between the conntrack rule and the final counter drop.

A curl from any mesh node will now reach the HTTP server. The path is: remote node's mesh data plane → forwarded across the mesh → your direct peer's link to you → fips0 ingress → inbound chain → matches tcp dport 8080 accept → delivered to the HTTP server.

In the fipstop panel, your tcp 8080 python(<pid>) row flips back to default White with OPEN in the State column on the next poll tick. No other row changes — they remain DarkGray filt because you have only opened this one port. The panel doubles as a security screen for the rest of the tutorial: any service whose row reads OPEN is mesh-reachable, anything DarkGray is filtered. If you later add a saddr-restricted drop-in (covered just below), the row will land at filt? rather than OPEN, signalling that the rule exists but is source-scoped — the panel deliberately does not classify restricted accepts as fully open.

If you only want to expose the service to a specific node or set of nodes, source-filter the rule. The address filter applies to the mesh-source address as it arrives on fips0, which is the originating node's address — not necessarily a direct peer. Replace the drop-in contents with something like:

ip6 saddr fd97:1234:5678:9abc:def0:1234:5678:9abc tcp dport 8080 accept

The source address is the node's mesh address, which it publishes in its fips.pub (and which you can resolve from its npub). For multiple nodes, use a set:

ip6 saddr {
    fd97:1111:2222:3333:4444:5555:6666:7777,
    fd97:8888:9999:aaaa:bbbb:cccc:dddd:eeee
} tcp dport 8080 accept

For the worked example, leave the drop-in unfiltered — any mesh node that can route to you can fetch your page.

Step 7: A note on the peer ACL

The firewall you just configured is the only control in scope for this tutorial. There is a separate, optional control called the peer ACL that you may run across in other docs; it is unrelated to the firewall and worth a sentence here only so you do not confuse the two.

The peer ACL decides which npubs may establish a peer connection with your node at the transport layer. It does not look at ports, drop-ins, or fips0 traffic. You do not need it for this tutorial.

For when you do:

Step 8: Stop the server and tidy up

When you are done, stop the HTTP server in the first terminal with Ctrl-C. The drop-in stays in place; remove it if you do not want port 8080 reachable after the demo:

sudo rm /etc/fips/fips.d/http-mesh-demo.nft
sudo systemctl reload-or-restart fips-firewall.service

The fips-firewall.service itself can stay enabled — default-deny on fips0 is a sensible posture even with no extra services running. To turn it back off:

sudo systemctl disable --now fips-firewall.service

What you've learned

  • Bind interface = audience. Binding to a specific address opts in to one audience; binding to wildcard (0.0.0.0 / [::]) opts in to all of them, including ones you forgot you had. For mesh-only exposure, bind to your fd97:... address. The fipstop Listening on fips0 panel marks wildcard binds with a trailing * after the process name as a reminder that the bind is not fips0-specific.
  • Same-host loopback is misleading. A local curl to your own fd97:... address goes via the loopback path, not through fips0 ingress. To actually verify mesh-side reachability you need a second machine, or to read what the firewall is doing in nft list table inet fips.
  • The mesh firewall is opt-in. fips-firewall.service is not enabled by default. Once it is enabled, fips0 is default-deny except for ICMPv6 echo and conntrack replies.
  • Ports open via drop-ins. Each file under /etc/fips/fips.d/*.nft adds rules into the inbound chain. Source-filter with ip6 saddr to scope a port to specific mesh nodes.
  • Two independent controls at two different layers. The firewall is a layer-3 filter on fips0: it controls which TCP/UDP ports are reachable and (optionally) which mesh source addresses may reach them. The peer ACL is a transport-layer admission filter on Noise handshakes: it controls which npubs may become direct peers of your node. They are unrelated — the ACL does not touch fips0 traffic, and the firewall does not look at npubs.

You now have the mental model for hosting any IPv6 service behind a deliberate exposure policy. The mechanics generalize: SSH on port 22, a database on port 5432, a custom protocol on its own port — same --bind rule, same drop-in shape.

Troubleshooting

  • A remote mesh node cannot reach the service after the firewall reload. Check the drop-in syntax with sudo nft -c -f /etc/fips/fips.nft before reloading; a syntax error in any drop-in causes the whole table to fail to load and the previous rules persist. Then sudo nft list table inet fips to confirm your tcp dport 8080 accept rule is present in the inbound chain.
  • Local curl works, remote curl times out. The packet is reaching fips0 ingress and being dropped by the baseline. Either your drop-in did not load (see above) or it has a source filter that excludes the remote node's address.
  • Local curl fails after binding to fips0. Double-check that your FIPS0_ADDR matches the address shown in ip -6 addr show fips0. The Python server message also echoes the bound address — confirm it starts with fd97:, not 127.0.0.1 or ::.
  • Address already in use from Python. Another process holds port 8080. Pick a different port (8081, 9000, …) for both the python3 -m http.server invocation and the drop-in.
  • Watch the firewall counter to confirm drops. The counter ... drop line at the bottom of the chain increments on every dropped inbound packet. After a remote mesh node attempts to reach a port you have not opened, sudo nft list table inet fips will show the counter packet count rising.
  • Use fipstop to spot-check listener and filter state. The Listening on fips0 panel on the Node tab shows every fips0-reachable listener and its current filter state. A row staying filt after you expected OPEN usually means the drop-in failed to load (a syntax error in any file under /etc/fips/fips.d/ aborts the whole reload, leaving the previous ruleset in place) or the drop-in carries a source filter and now reads filt? rather than OPEN.

What's next

  • ground-up-mesh.md — Bring up two devices on a shared physical link — Ethernet, WiFi, or Bluetooth — with no pre-existing IP infrastructure between them. The second deployment mode of FIPS, where the mesh is the network rather than an overlay on top of one. Coexists with overlay peers; the same daemon carries both.

For more depth on the firewall and ACL surface:

  • ../how-to/enable-mesh-firewall.md — operator recipes for the baseline, drop-in patterns, and how to fold the baseline into an existing nftables.conf.
  • ../reference/security.md — consolidated security reference: nftables baseline rules, drop-in format, peer ACL semantics, default exposures by transport, threat-resistance matrix.
  • ../design/fips-security.md — threat model, why the baseline is opt-in, the metadata- privacy posture.

If you want to host a service that is not on a FIPS node — say, an existing HTTP server on a regular LAN box — and expose it to mesh peers through a fips-gateway, that's the inbound port-forward mode: the gateway runs a mesh-side listener on fips0 and forwards to a LAN target. The operator recipe is at ../how-to/deploy-gateway.md#configure-the-inbound-half; a hand-held walk-through on an OpenWrt AP is at deploy-fips-gateway.md under "Advanced" in README.md.