A CI worker may preempt an in-flight ci-local.sh run (SIGTERM, then SIGKILL
after a grace period) to restart on a newer commit. For that kill to be safe,
the script must clean up after itself and never let a dying run collide with
its restart. It previously had no signal handling, shared the default compose
project name across runs, and tore down each suite only at the suite end.
- Derive a per-run id (honoring FIPS_CI_RUN_ID, else short-sha+random) and
namespace every docker resource to it: a fipsci_<run>_<suite> compose project
per suite and per parallel chaos child, and per-run image tags
(fips-test:<run>, fips-test-app:<run>) retagged to :latest only after both
builds succeed so :latest never points at a half-built image.
- Install a bounded, idempotent teardown trap on SIGTERM/SIGINT (+ EXIT): reap
parallel chaos children, then force-remove this run's docker resources via
the new ci-cleanup.sh, wrapped in timeout so a stuck down cannot wedge it.
- Exit 143 (SIGTERM) / 130 (SIGINT), distinct from 0 (pass) / 1 (failed), so a
preempting worker tells a cancelled run from a real failure.
- Add ci-cleanup.sh (also ci-local.sh --reap): force-removes leftover CI
resources by the com.corganlabs.fips-ci=1 label and the fipsci_ project
prefix, robust to however a prior run died.
- Label every per-suite docker resource so the label sweep reaps it after a
SIGKILL regardless of network name: direct docker run/network resources, the
sidecar compose services, and every per-suite compose network (acl-allowlist,
boringtun, firewall, nat, static, both tor suites, and the chaos generator
template). Parametrize the static/sidecar compose image refs so the per-run
tags are honored.
- Give each parallel chaos child a unique /24 from 10.30.x (a new --subnet
override on the sim CLI, assigned per-child in ci-local.sh) so parallel
children never collide on a shared docker subnet, and a chaos net can never
span a fixed-subnet suite (sidecar/static in 172.20.x). 10.30.x sits outside
docker's default-address-pool range, so an auto-assigned net cannot land on
it either; node IPs derive from the subnet, so no scenario config changes.
At the inbound peer cap the XX FMP handshake had two cap checks: an early
gate in handle_msg3 and the late promote_connection check. On XX the
peer's identity is not known until the third handshake message, by which
point all three messages have already crossed the wire, so the early gate
saved no wire bytes and governed exactly the same net-new-peer set as the
late check (known and pending-outbound peers return earlier via the
cross-connection paths). Remove the early gate and rely on the promotion
check, and log the resulting MaxPeersExceeded rejection at debug instead
of warn so a cap'd node under sustained inbound pressure does not emit
WARN spam for expected policy rejections.
Re-enable the two previously-ignored inbound-cap unit tests, rewritten to
drive a full XX three-message handshake and assert the path-agnostic
invariant (no promotion over cap, peer count unchanged, no
connection/link/index leak) plus the known-peer reconnect bypass.
Update the admission-cap integration suite's enforcement-event
discriminator to match: drop the removed early-gate string and count the
new debug-level promotion-cap rejection.
The admission-cap suite asserted IK wire sizes (inbound Msg1 len 84,
outbound Msg2 len 104) to verify the inbound max_peers cap. On the XX
handshake those sizes differ and Msg2 is always sent before identity is
known, so the IK discriminator matched nothing and the suite failed
despite the cap working correctly.
Replace the wire-size discriminator with a protocol-agnostic cap-holds
invariant: each denied peer must keep re-initiating handshakes
(sustained inbound, size-agnostic), no denied peer may be promoted to an
active session, the node must log cap-enforcement events, and the capped
node must hold exactly max_peers. Raise node-c's handshake logging to
debug in the mesh profile so the early-gate drop is visible alongside the
late-check rejection.
Also record in the changelog that for peers the node also dials, the cap
is enforced by the retained late check rather than the early msg3 drop.
New integration scenario verifying the early-gate silent-drop behavior
of the inbound max_peers admission check at sustained scale, using the
existing 5-node mesh topology with one node's node.limits.max_peers
lowered to 1. This forces 2 of the cap'd node's 3 configured peers
into a sustained denied state, and asserts via tcpdump that no Msg2
responses go back to those denied peers across a 60s capture window.
A background load-driver restarts the denied peer containers every 15s
to reset their auto-reconnect exponential backoff (5s base / 300s cap),
producing fresh Msg1 bursts each cycle. Without this loop the gate
fires ~3-4 times per denied peer in a 60s window; with restarts the
observed rate is 15 per denied peer (~30 total firings), high enough
that any Msg2 leakage would be caught with strong statistical
confidence.
Local run on this branch: cap'd node-c converged to peer_count=1 with
node-b admitted; nodes d and e sustained-retried as denied; tcpdump
captured 30 inbound Msg1 (len 84) packets from the denied pair and 0
outbound Msg2 (len 104) packets, with final peer_count unchanged.
Files:
testing/static/scripts/admission-cap-test.sh — new test script with
inject-config subcommand (sets node.limits.max_peers) and a
3-phase test driver (converge, capture-with-load, per-peer assert)
testing/ci-local.sh — register admission-cap as a new suite category
(ADMISSION_SUITES), wire run_admission_cap function, add to
run_suite dispatch, list_suites, and the default integration sweep
Together with the existing unit-level coverage in src/node/tests/unit.rs
(handle_msg1_silent_drops_at_cap_for_new_peer with mock-transport Msg2
discriminator, and handle_msg1_admits_existing_peer_at_cap as the
bypass regression guard), the gate's silent-drop behavior is now
verified both at single-firing wire-observable resolution and at
sustained multi-firing cross-process scale.
Johnathan Corgan