The macOS packaging installs config under /usr/local/etc/fips, wired through
the launchd plist and build-pkg.sh, but the default-path constants and the
config search path were hardcoded to /etc/fips for all Unix. On macOS the
daemon and fipsctl therefore looked in a directory that does not exist: the
ACL and host-map loaders hit their NotFound no-op arm and returned empty
state, so a populated peers.deny reported effective_mode "default_open" with
enforcement inactive, and host-file aliases went unloaded, with no error.
The peers.allow, peers.deny and hosts defaults now follow the platform's
packaging, and fipsctl keygen writes its identity there too. The config
search path keeps probing /etc/fips first and adds /usr/local/etc/fips after
it, so an existing install keeps working across the upgrade and the packaged
file still wins over a stale leftover. Both the macOS search-path entry and
the keygen output directory read one SYSTEM_CONFIG_DIR constant, so they
cannot drift apart. At startup the daemon warns once about hosts, peers.allow
or peers.deny stranded at the old location; the config file is deliberately
excluded, since both directories stay on the search path and a config left
behind is still read.
The control-socket snapshot tests repoint the ACL reloader at non-existent
paths under the temp dir, so the snapshot no longer reflects whatever ACL
files happen to exist on the machine running the tests.
Platform-gated unit tests pin both layouts, so a future refactor cannot
silently drift either one. Linux and Windows behavior is unchanged.
Adding a second system config directory moves the directory the daemon
derives the identity key path from, since that comes from whichever config
file loaded last. A host carrying fips.yaml at both locations would have
resolved fips.key to the new directory, found none, and under persistent
generated a fresh identity, silently changing its npub, routing address and
mesh IPv6 with no migration path. The daemon now adopts a key stranded at the
legacy path and warns to move it rather than generating one. The fallback is
confined to keys resolved from the system config directory, so a run using
./fips.yaml or a user config is never redirected to a system key.
Co-authored-by: Johnathan Corgan <johnathan@corganlabs.com>
Move PeerAclReloader onto the Reloadable trait: its ACL snapshot is now
published through an arc_swap::ArcSwap so the authorization hot path reads
it without locking, and the former check_reload becomes the trait's
reload(). The node tick calls self.peer_acl.reload().await.
Wire the host map into the tick as well. The host map snapshot was
previously taken once at construction and never polled; it now hot-reloads
on /etc/fips/hosts mtime changes once per tick, alongside the ACL, so
hostname display reflects edits without a restart.
The path_mtu_lookup cache (event-driven, populated from observed traffic)
and the nostr_discovery subsystem (an async spawned task) are deliberately
left off the trait: neither reloads from a backing file, so a no-op reload()
would be misleading. The rationale is documented on the trait module.
The host map and the ACL's embedded alias reloader still stat /etc/fips/hosts
independently each tick. A single small-file stat per tick is cheap, so the
duplicate is left in place; sharing one mtime observation between the two is
a possible future cleanup.
Tests: a node-level test exercises the host-map tick reload end to end
through peer_display_name; the ACL reloader tests are updated to drive the
async reload().
Implement TCP Wrappers-style peer access control using
/etc/fips/peers.allow and /etc/fips/peers.deny files. Evaluation
order: allow overrides deny, default permit when no files exist.
Three enforcement points: outbound connect (before dialing), inbound
handshake (msg1 receipt, after restart/rekey classification), and
outbound handshake completion (msg2, before peer promotion). Files
support npub, hex pubkey, host alias, and ALL wildcard entries with
automatic mtime-based reload.
Adds fipsctl acl show query, 954-line acl module with unit tests,
and a 6-node Docker integration harness (testing/acl-allowlist/)
exercising insider, outsider, and allowed-remote scenarios. CI
matrix entry included.
Closes#50
Co-authored-by: Johnathan Corgan <johnathan@corganlabs.com>
redshiftandJohnathan Corgan
Alex XieandJohnathan Corgan