The static compose's mixed-profile services are next-only, so the floating
subnet arrived without them: four services kept ipv4_address pins on a
network that no longer declares a subnet, which docker rejects outright at
`up`. They now float with the rest, take the per-run config directory, and
carry the run name suffix their container_name was missing.
Phase 3 of the admission-cap test conflicted for a real reason rather than a
textual one. This line asserts size-agnostically — sustained inbound from
each denied peer plus "was never promoted" — because the XX handshake
message sizes differ from IK and may change again. That assertion is kept;
what comes across from maint is the address handling underneath it, which
matters here for the same reason: with the subnet floating, a restarted
container can change address, and matching on a single one silently
under-counts the very evidence the assertion rests on.
Two local CI runs on one host both asked docker for 172.20.0.0/24 and the
second lost its whole static family to "Pool overlaps". Docker honours a
fixed subnet request verbatim, so the only robust fix is to stop making one:
fips-net now requests no subnet and docker assigns from its own pool, which
cannot hand the same range to two runs.
That means node addresses are not known before `up`, so peers address each
other by container hostname instead. The generator emits node-<id>, or the
topology's docker_host where the compose hostname differs — only the gateway
profile, whose services are gw-*. External peers keep the address the
topology gives them, since it is not ours to assign. The resolv.conf mount
stays: dnsmasq is what forwards these names to docker's resolver and .fips
to the daemon, so removing it would take out every .fips assertion.
generated-configs is now per-run as well. A shared directory let two runs
overwrite each other's node configs, which the subnet collision had been
hiding by killing runs before that window opened. The generator, the compose
bind mounts and env_file, the six scripts that read it, and teardown all
follow FIPS_CI_NAME_SUFFIX; unset, every path renders as before. Teardown
keeps the directory after a failed run, where it is the evidence of what the
failing nodes were configured with.
Three things this exposed that were wrong independently:
admission-cap built its tcpdump patterns from the topology file's docker_ip
literals. Floating the subnet makes those match nothing, which would have
left its expect-zero "no Msg2 leaked" assertion passing because it could no
longer see anything at all. It now reads addresses from the running
containers. Restarting the denied peers together also made them swap
addresses, so each peer's counts were really the pair's total; they are
restarted one at a time now, and a check fails the suite outright if two
denied peers ever share an address, because per-peer attribution is
impossible once they do.
Attribute lookups in the generator used a fixed ten-line window and read the
next node's fields when a node omitted an attribute. An external node
followed by an internal one was classified as internal, which under hostname
peering would emit a name that resolves nowhere. Lookups are bounded to the
node's own block; generated output is byte-identical for all eight
topologies.
The rekey outbound-only variant used to rewrite peer addresses to hostnames
to set up its scenario. The generator now does that everywhere, so the
rewrite matched nothing and was silently doing no work. It asserts the
premise instead, and fails if a numeric address ever reappears.
Verified by running three instances of this compose at once — tcp-chain plus
two independent meshes — which drew 10.128.2/3/4.0/24 with no overlap while
both meshes passed ping-test 20/20 over the real .fips path. tcp-chain is
run by neither CI runner, so it was checked by hand: chain peer counts 1/2/1
and multi-hop .fips reachable both directions over TCP.
gateway-lan still pins its own IPv4 and fd02:: ranges and is unchanged here,
so the gateway profile is not yet concurrency-safe.
Conflict in the admission-cap suite: this line's copy is the XX variant,
with a different phase 3 and an extra phase the other line does not have.
Took the polled final read from the merge, kept this variant's more
specific failure message and its enforcement-evidence phase.
Also templated two container references that phase and the peer-list read
own. They are unique to this line, so the pass that introduced the per-run
name suffix never saw them, and this suite would have looked up containers
under names that no longer exist once a run sets the suffix.
The suite red-ed with an empty final peer_count while every substantive
assertion passed: both denied peers showed inbound handshake attempts and
zero outbound responses, which is the gate this suite exists to verify.
Two pre-existing defects combined. The final count was sampled once, in
the same second the load driver issues its last round of peer restarts, so
the read can land on a daemon busy with those restarts and return nothing.
And the fallback meant to cover that could never fire, because the shell
applies it to the last stage of the pipeline, which succeeds on empty
input - so an unanswered query was indistinguishable from a genuine zero,
and reported as a cap violation.
Poll the final read for a short window instead, and give the two cases
distinct output. A real regression still fails, just after the retry
window, since the loop exits early only on the expected value. Extract the
read the two phases share rather than leaving them to drift.
Two runs on one host destroyed each other's containers, producing
mid-test "No such container" failures that look like real defects. The
automated builder runs a full local CI on the same box every few minutes,
so the machine is contended almost always and this has red-ed both a hand
run and an automated gate.
Two independent causes are fixed here. Container names were hardcoded, and
docker names are global rather than scoped by compose project, so two runs
collided on the same name; every name now takes an optional suffix that
the harness sets from the run id. And the cleanup sweep matched a label
shared by every run, so one run's teardown force-removed another's
containers; resources now also carry a per-run label and the sweep can be
narrowed to it.
A third hazard turned up that was not in the original report: the sidecar
suite passes explicit compose project names, which override the run-scoped
project and put it outside the shared prefix entirely. Its project names,
network, and derived container references are now scoped too.
Both are default-off. With the suffix unset, names render exactly as they
do today and a bare compose invocation is unchanged, which is what keeps
the hosted CI and the documentation correct. A cleanup run with no run id
still reaps everything, which is what a manual "clear the box" wants.
The literal-name sweep was not sufficient: six scripts build container
names dynamically from node labels, and two suites create their own
containers outside compose. Those are handled at their construction sites.
Verified: syntax check on all modified scripts; compose validation on
every modified file with the suffix both set and unset; and a synthetic
two-run reproduction that shows the old cleanup destroying a bystander run
and the new one leaving it alone.
Known gap: subnets are still hardcoded, so two concurrent full runs will
still collide on address-pool overlap. That fix reaches into topology
configs, chaos scenarios, diagrams and production source, so it is left
for its own change rather than half-done here.
A CI worker may preempt an in-flight ci-local.sh run (SIGTERM, then SIGKILL
after a grace period) to restart on a newer commit. For that kill to be safe,
the script must clean up after itself and never let a dying run collide with
its restart. It previously had no signal handling, shared the default compose
project name across runs, and tore down each suite only at the suite end.
- Derive a per-run id (honoring FIPS_CI_RUN_ID, else short-sha+random) and
namespace every docker resource to it: a fipsci_<run>_<suite> compose project
per suite and per parallel chaos child, and per-run image tags
(fips-test:<run>, fips-test-app:<run>) retagged to :latest only after both
builds succeed so :latest never points at a half-built image.
- Install a bounded, idempotent teardown trap on SIGTERM/SIGINT (+ EXIT): reap
parallel chaos children, then force-remove this run's docker resources via
the new ci-cleanup.sh, wrapped in timeout so a stuck down cannot wedge it.
- Exit 143 (SIGTERM) / 130 (SIGINT), distinct from 0 (pass) / 1 (failed), so a
preempting worker tells a cancelled run from a real failure.
- Add ci-cleanup.sh (also ci-local.sh --reap): force-removes leftover CI
resources by the com.corganlabs.fips-ci=1 label and the fipsci_ project
prefix, robust to however a prior run died.
- Label every per-suite docker resource so the label sweep reaps it after a
SIGKILL regardless of network name: direct docker run/network resources, the
sidecar compose services, and every per-suite compose network (acl-allowlist,
boringtun, firewall, nat, static, both tor suites, and the chaos generator
template). Parametrize the static/sidecar compose image refs so the per-run
tags are honored.
- Give each parallel chaos child a unique /24 from 10.30.x (a new --subnet
override on the sim CLI, assigned per-child in ci-local.sh) so parallel
children never collide on a shared docker subnet, and a chaos net can never
span a fixed-subnet suite (sidecar/static in 172.20.x). 10.30.x sits outside
docker's default-address-pool range, so an auto-assigned net cannot land on
it either; node IPs derive from the subnet, so no scenario config changes.
At the inbound peer cap the XX FMP handshake had two cap checks: an early
gate in handle_msg3 and the late promote_connection check. On XX the
peer's identity is not known until the third handshake message, by which
point all three messages have already crossed the wire, so the early gate
saved no wire bytes and governed exactly the same net-new-peer set as the
late check (known and pending-outbound peers return earlier via the
cross-connection paths). Remove the early gate and rely on the promotion
check, and log the resulting MaxPeersExceeded rejection at debug instead
of warn so a cap'd node under sustained inbound pressure does not emit
WARN spam for expected policy rejections.
Re-enable the two previously-ignored inbound-cap unit tests, rewritten to
drive a full XX three-message handshake and assert the path-agnostic
invariant (no promotion over cap, peer count unchanged, no
connection/link/index leak) plus the known-peer reconnect bypass.
Update the admission-cap integration suite's enforcement-event
discriminator to match: drop the removed early-gate string and count the
new debug-level promotion-cap rejection.
The admission-cap suite asserted IK wire sizes (inbound Msg1 len 84,
outbound Msg2 len 104) to verify the inbound max_peers cap. On the XX
handshake those sizes differ and Msg2 is always sent before identity is
known, so the IK discriminator matched nothing and the suite failed
despite the cap working correctly.
Replace the wire-size discriminator with a protocol-agnostic cap-holds
invariant: each denied peer must keep re-initiating handshakes
(sustained inbound, size-agnostic), no denied peer may be promoted to an
active session, the node must log cap-enforcement events, and the capped
node must hold exactly max_peers. Raise node-c's handshake logging to
debug in the mesh profile so the early-gate drop is visible alongside the
late-check rejection.
Also record in the changelog that for peers the node also dials, the cap
is enforced by the retained late check rather than the early msg3 drop.
New integration scenario verifying the early-gate silent-drop behavior
of the inbound max_peers admission check at sustained scale, using the
existing 5-node mesh topology with one node's node.limits.max_peers
lowered to 1. This forces 2 of the cap'd node's 3 configured peers
into a sustained denied state, and asserts via tcpdump that no Msg2
responses go back to those denied peers across a 60s capture window.
A background load-driver restarts the denied peer containers every 15s
to reset their auto-reconnect exponential backoff (5s base / 300s cap),
producing fresh Msg1 bursts each cycle. Without this loop the gate
fires ~3-4 times per denied peer in a 60s window; with restarts the
observed rate is 15 per denied peer (~30 total firings), high enough
that any Msg2 leakage would be caught with strong statistical
confidence.
Local run on this branch: cap'd node-c converged to peer_count=1 with
node-b admitted; nodes d and e sustained-retried as denied; tcpdump
captured 30 inbound Msg1 (len 84) packets from the denied pair and 0
outbound Msg2 (len 104) packets, with final peer_count unchanged.
Files:
testing/static/scripts/admission-cap-test.sh — new test script with
inject-config subcommand (sets node.limits.max_peers) and a
3-phase test driver (converge, capture-with-load, per-peer assert)
testing/ci-local.sh — register admission-cap as a new suite category
(ADMISSION_SUITES), wire run_admission_cap function, add to
run_suite dispatch, list_suites, and the default integration sweep
Together with the existing unit-level coverage in src/node/tests/unit.rs
(handle_msg1_silent_drops_at_cap_for_new_peer with mock-transport Msg2
discriminator, and handle_msg1_admits_existing_peer_at_cap as the
bypass regression guard), the gate's silent-drop behavior is now
verified both at single-firing wire-observable resolution and at
sustained multi-firing cross-process scale.
Johnathan Corgan