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Admit rekey msg1 from established peers when addr forms differ
Companion to the ethernet `accept_connections: false` rekey-deadlock fix from earlier this release: the same dual-init failure mode shows up over UDP when peers register by hostname, and the existing addr_to_link-only carve-out in `should_admit_msg1` doesn't cover it. The carve-out's first predicate keys `addr_to_link` by the literal `TransportAddr` that `initiate_connection` inserted, which is the hostname-form when a peer config carries a hostname (e.g., `core-vm.tail65015.ts.net:2121`). Inbound packets always arrive with numeric source addrs because `udp_receive_loop` builds the `TransportAddr` from the `SocketAddr` the kernel reports via `recvfrom`. `TransportAddr` equality is byte-exact, so the two forms don't match and the lookup misses. With `udp.accept_connections: false` (or `udp.outbound_only: true`, which forces it false) the gate then rejects the rekey msg1 from an established peer. The dual-init tie-breaker stalls because the loser side never produces msg2; both sides retry indefinitely and the winner side keeps logging "Dual rekey initiation: we win, dropping their msg1" at 1Hz. The earlier ethernet fix didn't generalize to this variant because ethernet TransportAddrs are always numeric MAC bytes — both the config-time form and the inbound-arrival form match identically. Add a second predicate to `should_admit_msg1`: an active peer's `current_addr()` matching `(transport_id, remote_addr)`. `current_addr` is updated and refreshed from inbound encrypted-frame source addrs (`handlers/encrypted.rs`), which are always numeric `SocketAddr`-form, so this catches the established peer regardless of how its `addr_to_link` key was originally inserted. The fast `addr_to_link` check stays first; the iteration over peers is bounded by peer count and only runs when the first predicate misses. Regression coverage in this commit: - Unit test `test_should_admit_msg1_admits_rekey_when_addr_form_differs` in `src/node/tests/handshake.rs`. Constructs the failing scenario in-process: `addr_to_link` populated with hostname-form key, peer's `current_addr` at the resolved numeric form, query with numeric form. Without the new predicate this fails immediately. - New integration topology `rekey-outbound-only` plus matching docker-compose profile. Same 5-node mesh shape as `rekey-accept-off` but `inject-config` sets `udp.outbound_only: true` on node-b and rewrites node-b's peer-c address from the numeric docker IP to the docker hostname (`node-c:2121`), reproducing the production hostname-vs-numeric mismatch. The test asserts no sustained "Dual rekey initiation: we win" log lines on any node (>10 = bug) and the existing rekey health checks catch the connectivity loss the loop produces. - `testing/ci-local.sh` and `.github/workflows/ci.yml` extended to run the new variant in the local sweep and the GitHub CI integration matrix alongside `rekey` and `rekey-accept-off`. Verified locally: full `bash testing/ci-local.sh` sweep passes 29/29 suites (23m 12s) with the new variant green; 1084 unit tests pass.
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@@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ jobs:
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- suite: rekey-accept-off
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type: rekey-accept-off
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topology: rekey-accept-off
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- suite: rekey-outbound-only
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type: rekey-outbound-only
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topology: rekey-outbound-only
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- suite: acl-allowlist
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type: acl-allowlist
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# ── Outbound LAN gateway integration test ──────────────────────
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@@ -460,6 +463,41 @@ jobs:
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docker compose -f testing/static/docker-compose.yml \
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--profile rekey-accept-off down --volumes --remove-orphans
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# ── Rekey + udp.outbound_only=true variant ─────────────────────────────
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- name: Generate and inject configs (rekey-outbound-only)
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if: matrix.type == 'rekey-outbound-only'
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env:
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REKEY_TOPOLOGY: rekey-outbound-only
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REKEY_OUTBOUND_ONLY_NODES: b
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run: |
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bash testing/static/scripts/generate-configs.sh rekey-outbound-only
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bash testing/static/scripts/rekey-test.sh inject-config
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- name: Start containers (rekey-outbound-only)
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if: matrix.type == 'rekey-outbound-only'
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run: |
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docker compose -f testing/static/docker-compose.yml \
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--profile rekey-outbound-only up -d
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- name: Run rekey test (outbound-only variant)
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if: matrix.type == 'rekey-outbound-only'
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env:
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REKEY_TOPOLOGY: rekey-outbound-only
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REKEY_OUTBOUND_ONLY_NODES: b
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run: bash testing/static/scripts/rekey-test.sh
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- name: Collect logs on failure (rekey-outbound-only)
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if: matrix.type == 'rekey-outbound-only' && failure()
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run: |
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docker compose -f testing/static/docker-compose.yml \
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--profile rekey-outbound-only logs --no-color | tail -300
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- name: Stop containers (rekey-outbound-only)
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if: matrix.type == 'rekey-outbound-only' && always()
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run: |
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docker compose -f testing/static/docker-compose.yml \
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--profile rekey-outbound-only down --volumes --remove-orphans
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# ── ACL allowlist integration test ─────────────────────────────────────
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- name: Run ACL allowlist integration test
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if: matrix.type == 'acl-allowlist'
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