Notify initiator when inbound ACL rejects a Noise XX handshake

Under Noise XX the responder only sees the initiator's static key
in msg3, so the inbound-handshake ACL check cannot fire until msg3
has already been processed. By then the initiator has received
msg2, passed its own outbound ACL check, and promoted its side of
the peering. Silently tearing down the responder's state left the
initiator as a "connected" peer with no traffic until the
link-dead timeout fired tens of seconds later; the acl-allowlist
integration test on the next branch timed out at the 5s
convergence check on blocked nodes.

The responder now sends an encrypted Disconnect on the
freshly-completed Noise session before tearing down. The initiator
decodes it via the existing handle_disconnect path and cleans up
the zombie peer within one RTT. DisconnectReason::Other is used
instead of SecurityViolation so the wire payload does not name the
ACL mechanism; the behavioural signature (explicit reject right
after handshake) is the only observable leak.

Supporting changes:

- Add send_encrypted_link_message_raw in node/mod.rs that operates
  on a raw NoiseSession + indices without going through self.peers,
  since the peer has not yet been promoted at the reject site.
- Declare the acl test module in node/tests/mod.rs. It had been
  orphaned since PR #50 so none of its tests ran; two of them no
  longer compiled against the current next branch. Fixed the two
  and replaced test_inbound_msg1_denied_by_acl (asserts IK-era
  behaviour that cannot happen under XX) with
  test_inbound_msg3_denied_triggers_disconnect, a full end-to-end
  UDP test covering both the responder cleanup and the initiator's
  Disconnect-driven cleanup.

src/node/tests/mod.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ use crate::transport::{LinkDirection, TransportAddr, packet_channel};
 use crate::utils::index::SessionIndex;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
+mod acl;
 #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
 mod ble;
 mod bloom;