/** * Salsa20 stream cipher, released in 2005. * Salsa's goal was to implement AES replacement that does not rely on S-Boxes, * which are hard to implement in a constant-time manner. * Salsa20 is usually faster than AES, a big deal on slow, budget mobile phones. * * - {@link https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf | XSalsa20}, * extended-nonce * variant was released in 2008. It extends Salsa20's 64-bit nonce to 192 bits, * and became safe to be picked at random. * - Nacl / Libsodium popularized term "secretbox", - which is just xsalsa20poly1305. * We provide the alias and corresponding seal / open methods. * "crypto_box" and "sealedbox" are available in package * {@link https://github.com/serenity-kit/noble-sodium | noble-sodium}. * - Check out * {@link https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/salsafamily-20071225.pdf | PDF} * and {@link https://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html | website}. * @module */ import { createCipher, rotl } from "./_arx.js"; import { poly1305 } from "./_poly1305.js"; import { abytes, clean, equalBytes, getOutput, swap32IfBE, swap8IfBE, wrapCipher, } from "./utils.js"; /** * Salsa20 core function. It is implemented twice: * 1. Simple loop (salsaCore_small, hsalsa_small) * 2. Unrolled loop (salsaCore, hsalsa) - 4x faster, but larger & harder to read * The specific implementation is selected in `createCipher` below. * Performance numbers for 1MB inputs: * * default x 779 ops/sec @ 1ms/op * * if salsa+hsalsa are merged x 459 ops/sec @ 2ms/op * * small x 132 ops/sec @ 7ms/op */ /** RFC 7914 §3 Salsa20/8 core quarter-round on words a, b, c, d. */ function salsaQR(x, a, b, c, d) { x[b] ^= rotl((x[a] + x[d]) | 0, 7); x[c] ^= rotl((x[b] + x[a]) | 0, 9); x[d] ^= rotl((x[c] + x[b]) | 0, 13); x[a] ^= rotl((x[d] + x[c]) | 0, 18); } /** RFC 7914 §3 double-round schedule: four column rounds, then four row rounds. */ function salsaRound(x, rounds = 20) { for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) { salsaQR(x, 0, 4, 8, 12); salsaQR(x, 5, 9, 13, 1); salsaQR(x, 10, 14, 2, 6); salsaQR(x, 15, 3, 7, 11); salsaQR(x, 0, 1, 2, 3); salsaQR(x, 5, 6, 7, 4); salsaQR(x, 10, 11, 8, 9); salsaQR(x, 15, 12, 13, 14); } } // Shared scratch for the unused auditability helper below; it would be // non-reentrant under overlapping/nested calls, but current code doesn't invoke it. const stmp = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint32Array(16); /** Small version of salsa without loop unrolling. Unused, provided for auditability. */ // prettier-ignore function salsa(s, k, i, out, isHSalsa = true, rounds = 20) { // Create initial array using common pattern const y = Uint32Array.from([ s[0], k[0], k[1], k[2], // "expa" Key Key Key k[3], s[1], i[0], i[1], // Key "nd 3" Nonce Nonce i[2], i[3], s[2], k[4], // Pos. Pos. "2-by" Key k[5], k[6], k[7], s[3], // Key Key Key "te k" ]); const x = stmp; x.set(y); // const x = y.slice(); salsaRound(x, rounds); // hsalsa extracts 8 specific words for the 32-byte subkey; salsa adds the original state. if (isHSalsa) { const xindexes = [0, 5, 10, 15, 6, 7, 8, 9]; for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) out[i] = x[xindexes[i]]; } else { for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) out[i] = (y[i] + x[i]) | 0; } } /** Identical to `salsaCore`. Unused. */ // @ts-ignore const salsaCore_small = (s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds) => salsa(s, k, Uint32Array.from([n[0], n[1], cnt, 0]), out, false, rounds); /** Identical to `hsalsa`. Unused. */ // @ts-ignore const hsalsa_small = salsa; /** Identical to `salsaCore_small`. Uses only the low 32 bits of Salsa20's 64-bit counter state. */ // prettier-ignore function salsaCore(s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds = 20) { // Public wrappers expose only the low 32 bits of Salsa20's 64-bit counter; y09 stays zero. // Based on {@link https://cr.yp.to/salsa20.html | the Salsa20 reference page}. let y00 = s[0], y01 = k[0], y02 = k[1], y03 = k[2], // "expa" Key Key Key y04 = k[3], y05 = s[1], y06 = n[0], y07 = n[1], // Key "nd 3" Nonce Nonce y08 = cnt, y09 = 0, y10 = s[2], y11 = k[4], // Pos. Pos. "2-by" Key y12 = k[5], y13 = k[6], y14 = k[7], y15 = s[3]; // Key Key Key "te k" // Save state to temporary variables let x00 = y00, x01 = y01, x02 = y02, x03 = y03, x04 = y04, x05 = y05, x06 = y06, x07 = y07, x08 = y08, x09 = y09, x10 = y10, x11 = y11, x12 = y12, x13 = y13, x14 = y14, x15 = y15; for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) { x04 ^= rotl(x00 + x12 | 0, 7); x08 ^= rotl(x04 + x00 | 0, 9); x12 ^= rotl(x08 + x04 | 0, 13); x00 ^= rotl(x12 + x08 | 0, 18); x09 ^= rotl(x05 + x01 | 0, 7); x13 ^= rotl(x09 + x05 | 0, 9); x01 ^= rotl(x13 + x09 | 0, 13); x05 ^= rotl(x01 + x13 | 0, 18); x14 ^= rotl(x10 + x06 | 0, 7); x02 ^= rotl(x14 + x10 | 0, 9); x06 ^= rotl(x02 + x14 | 0, 13); x10 ^= rotl(x06 + x02 | 0, 18); x03 ^= rotl(x15 + x11 | 0, 7); x07 ^= rotl(x03 + x15 | 0, 9); x11 ^= rotl(x07 + x03 | 0, 13); x15 ^= rotl(x11 + x07 | 0, 18); x01 ^= rotl(x00 + x03 | 0, 7); x02 ^= rotl(x01 + x00 | 0, 9); x03 ^= rotl(x02 + x01 | 0, 13); x00 ^= rotl(x03 + x02 | 0, 18); x06 ^= rotl(x05 + x04 | 0, 7); x07 ^= rotl(x06 + x05 | 0, 9); x04 ^= rotl(x07 + x06 | 0, 13); x05 ^= rotl(x04 + x07 | 0, 18); x11 ^= rotl(x10 + x09 | 0, 7); x08 ^= rotl(x11 + x10 | 0, 9); x09 ^= rotl(x08 + x11 | 0, 13); x10 ^= rotl(x09 + x08 | 0, 18); x12 ^= rotl(x15 + x14 | 0, 7); x13 ^= rotl(x12 + x15 | 0, 9); x14 ^= rotl(x13 + x12 | 0, 13); x15 ^= rotl(x14 + x13 | 0, 18); } // Write output let oi = 0; out[oi++] = (y00 + x00) | 0; out[oi++] = (y01 + x01) | 0; out[oi++] = (y02 + x02) | 0; out[oi++] = (y03 + x03) | 0; out[oi++] = (y04 + x04) | 0; out[oi++] = (y05 + x05) | 0; out[oi++] = (y06 + x06) | 0; out[oi++] = (y07 + x07) | 0; out[oi++] = (y08 + x08) | 0; out[oi++] = (y09 + x09) | 0; out[oi++] = (y10 + x10) | 0; out[oi++] = (y11 + x11) | 0; out[oi++] = (y12 + x12) | 0; out[oi++] = (y13 + x13) | 0; out[oi++] = (y14 + x14) | 0; out[oi++] = (y15 + x15) | 0; } /** * hsalsa hashes key and nonce-prefix words into the 32-byte subkey used by XSalsa20. * Identical to `hsalsa_small`. * Need to find a way to merge it with `salsaCore` without 25% performance hit. * @param s - Sigma constants as 32-bit words. * @param k - Key words. * @param i - Nonce-prefix words. * @param out - Output buffer for the derived subkey. * @example * Derives the XSalsa20 subkey from sigma, key, and nonce-prefix words. * * ```ts * const sigma = new Uint32Array(4); * const key = new Uint32Array(8); * const nonce = new Uint32Array(4); * const out = new Uint32Array(8); * hsalsa(sigma, key, nonce, out); * ``` */ // prettier-ignore export function hsalsa(s, k, i, out) { let x00 = swap8IfBE(s[0]), x01 = swap8IfBE(k[0]), x02 = swap8IfBE(k[1]), x03 = swap8IfBE(k[2]), x04 = swap8IfBE(k[3]), x05 = swap8IfBE(s[1]), x06 = swap8IfBE(i[0]), x07 = swap8IfBE(i[1]), x08 = swap8IfBE(i[2]), x09 = swap8IfBE(i[3]), x10 = swap8IfBE(s[2]), x11 = swap8IfBE(k[4]), x12 = swap8IfBE(k[5]), x13 = swap8IfBE(k[6]), x14 = swap8IfBE(k[7]), x15 = swap8IfBE(s[3]); for (let r = 0; r < 20; r += 2) { x04 ^= rotl(x00 + x12 | 0, 7); x08 ^= rotl(x04 + x00 | 0, 9); x12 ^= rotl(x08 + x04 | 0, 13); x00 ^= rotl(x12 + x08 | 0, 18); x09 ^= rotl(x05 + x01 | 0, 7); x13 ^= rotl(x09 + x05 | 0, 9); x01 ^= rotl(x13 + x09 | 0, 13); x05 ^= rotl(x01 + x13 | 0, 18); x14 ^= rotl(x10 + x06 | 0, 7); x02 ^= rotl(x14 + x10 | 0, 9); x06 ^= rotl(x02 + x14 | 0, 13); x10 ^= rotl(x06 + x02 | 0, 18); x03 ^= rotl(x15 + x11 | 0, 7); x07 ^= rotl(x03 + x15 | 0, 9); x11 ^= rotl(x07 + x03 | 0, 13); x15 ^= rotl(x11 + x07 | 0, 18); x01 ^= rotl(x00 + x03 | 0, 7); x02 ^= rotl(x01 + x00 | 0, 9); x03 ^= rotl(x02 + x01 | 0, 13); x00 ^= rotl(x03 + x02 | 0, 18); x06 ^= rotl(x05 + x04 | 0, 7); x07 ^= rotl(x06 + x05 | 0, 9); x04 ^= rotl(x07 + x06 | 0, 13); x05 ^= rotl(x04 + x07 | 0, 18); x11 ^= rotl(x10 + x09 | 0, 7); x08 ^= rotl(x11 + x10 | 0, 9); x09 ^= rotl(x08 + x11 | 0, 13); x10 ^= rotl(x09 + x08 | 0, 18); x12 ^= rotl(x15 + x14 | 0, 7); x13 ^= rotl(x12 + x15 | 0, 9); x14 ^= rotl(x13 + x12 | 0, 13); x15 ^= rotl(x14 + x13 | 0, 18); } let oi = 0; // XSalsa20 takes words 0,5,10,15 and 6,7,8,9 as the 32-byte subkey material. out[oi++] = x00; out[oi++] = x05; out[oi++] = x10; out[oi++] = x15; out[oi++] = x06; out[oi++] = x07; out[oi++] = x08; out[oi++] = x09; swap32IfBE(out); } /** * Salsa20 from original paper. 8-byte nonce. * With smaller nonce, it's not safe to make it random (CSPRNG), due to collision chance. * @param key - 16-byte or 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 8-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * Only the low 32 bits of Salsa20's 64-bit counter state are exposed here; * the high word stays zero and the implementation still caps the public * value to 32 bits. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Encrypts bytes with the original 8-byte-nonce Salsa20 stream cipher. * * ```ts * import { salsa20 } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(8); * salsa20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4])); * ``` */ export const salsa20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(salsaCore, { allowShortKeys: true, counterRight: true, }); /** * XSalsa20 extended-nonce salsa. * With 24-byte nonce, it's safe to make it random (CSPRNG). * @param key - 32-byte key. * This XSalsa20 wrapper does not enable Salsa20's 16-byte legacy key mode. * @param nonce - 24-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Encrypts bytes with XSalsa20 and a random 24-byte nonce. * * ```ts * import { xsalsa20 } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(24); * xsalsa20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4])); * ``` */ export const xsalsa20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(salsaCore, { counterRight: true, extendNonceFn: hsalsa, }); /** * xsalsa20-poly1305 eXtended-nonce (24 bytes) salsa. * With 24-byte nonce, it's safe to make it random (CSPRNG). * Also known as `secretbox` from libsodium / nacl. * No AAD input is supported here. Caller-provided `output` buffers for * `encrypt()` / `decrypt()` must be `input.length + 32` bytes because the * implementation uses a 32-byte leading scratch area before returning `+16`. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 24-byte nonce. * @param AAD - Must be omitted; XSalsa20-Poly1305 secretbox does not support associated data. * @returns AEAD cipher instance. * @example * Encrypts and authenticates plaintext with XSalsa20-Poly1305. * * ```ts * import { xsalsa20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(24); * const cipher = xsalsa20poly1305(key, nonce); * cipher.encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])); * ``` */ export const xsalsa20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 24, tagLength: 16 }, (key, nonce) => { // This borrows caller key/nonce buffers by reference; mutating them after construction changes // later encrypt/decrypt outputs. return { encrypt(plaintext, output) { // xsalsa20poly1305 optimizes by calculating auth key during the same call as encryption. // Unfortunately, makes it hard to separate tag calculation & encryption itself, // because 32 bytes is half-block of 64-byte salsa. // Need 32 extra bytes up front for the auth-key scratch area described above. output = getOutput(plaintext.length + 32, output, false); // output[0..32] = Poly1305 auth key, output[32..] = plaintext then ciphertext. const authKey = output.subarray(0, 32); const ciphPlaintext = output.subarray(32); output.set(plaintext, 32); // authKey is produced by xoring the first 32 bytes with zeros. clean(authKey); // output = stream ^ output; authKey = stream ^ zeros(32) xsalsa20(key, nonce, output, output); const tag = poly1305(ciphPlaintext, authKey); output.set(tag, 16); // Clean up auth-key remnants and the temporary tag copy. clean(output.subarray(0, 16), tag); // Return output[16..]. return output.subarray(16); }, decrypt(ciphertext, output) { // tmp part passed tag ciphertext // [0..32] [32..48] [48..] // Authenticate the ciphertext before decrypting it; on tag failure the scratch/output // buffer may already contain copied ciphertext and derived auth-key material. abytes(ciphertext); output = getOutput(ciphertext.length + 32, output, false); // output[0..32] is auth-key scratch, output[32..48] is passed tag, // output[48..] is ciphertext then plaintext. const tmp = output.subarray(0, 32); const passedTag = output.subarray(32, 48); const ciphPlaintext = output.subarray(48); output.set(ciphertext, 32); // authKey is produced by xoring the scratch area with zeros. clean(tmp); const authKey = xsalsa20(key, nonce, tmp, tmp); const tag = poly1305(ciphPlaintext, authKey); if (!equalBytes(passedTag, tag)) { clean(output); throw new Error('invalid tag'); } // output = stream ^ output[16..] xsalsa20(key, nonce, output.subarray(16), output.subarray(16)); clean(tmp, passedTag, tag); // Return output[48..], skipping zeroized output[0..48]. return ciphPlaintext; }, }; }); /** * Alias to `xsalsa20poly1305`, for compatibility with libsodium / nacl. * Check out {@link https://github.com/serenity-kit/noble-sodium | noble-sodium} * for `crypto_box`. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 24-byte nonce. * @returns Wrapper with `seal()` and `open()` helpers. * @example * Uses the libsodium-style `seal()` and `open()` wrapper. * * ```ts * import { secretbox } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(24); * const box = secretbox(key, nonce); * box.seal(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])); * ``` */ export function secretbox(key, nonce) { const xs = xsalsa20poly1305(key, nonce); return { seal: xs.encrypt, open: xs.decrypt }; } //# sourceMappingURL=salsa.js.map