/** * ChaCha stream cipher, released * in 2008. Developed after Salsa20, ChaCha aims to increase diffusion per round. * It was standardized in * {@link https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8439 | RFC 8439} and * is now used in TLS 1.3. * * {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | XChaCha20} * extended-nonce variant is also provided. Similar to XSalsa, it's safe to use with * randomly-generated nonces. * * Check out * {@link http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf | PDF}, * {@link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20 | wiki}, and * {@link https://cr.yp.to/chacha.html | website}. * * @module */ import { createCipher, createPRG, rotl } from "./_arx.js"; import { poly1305 } from "./_poly1305.js"; import { abytes, clean, equalBytes, getOutput, swap8IfBE, swap32IfBE, u64Lengths, wrapCipher, } from "./utils.js"; /** * ChaCha core function. It is implemented twice: * 1. Simple loop (chachaCore_small, hchacha_small) * 2. Unrolled loop (chachaCore, hchacha) - 4x faster, but larger & harder to read * The specific implementation is selected in `createCipher` below. */ /** RFC 8439 §2.1 quarter round on words a, b, c, d. */ // prettier-ignore function chachaQR(x, a, b, c, d) { x[a] = (x[a] + x[b]) | 0; x[d] = rotl(x[d] ^ x[a], 16); x[c] = (x[c] + x[d]) | 0; x[b] = rotl(x[b] ^ x[c], 12); x[a] = (x[a] + x[b]) | 0; x[d] = rotl(x[d] ^ x[a], 8); x[c] = (x[c] + x[d]) | 0; x[b] = rotl(x[b] ^ x[c], 7); } /** Repeated ChaCha double rounds; callers are expected to pass an even round count. */ function chachaRound(x, rounds = 20) { for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) { // RFC 8439 §2.3 / §2.3.1 inner_block: four column rounds, then four diagonal rounds. chachaQR(x, 0, 4, 8, 12); chachaQR(x, 1, 5, 9, 13); chachaQR(x, 2, 6, 10, 14); chachaQR(x, 3, 7, 11, 15); chachaQR(x, 0, 5, 10, 15); chachaQR(x, 1, 6, 11, 12); chachaQR(x, 2, 7, 8, 13); chachaQR(x, 3, 4, 9, 14); } } // Shared scratch for the auditability-only helper below; only the test-only // __TESTS.chachaCore_small hook reaches it, so production exports stay reentrant. const ctmp = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint32Array(16); /** Small version of chacha without loop unrolling. Unused, provided for auditability. */ // prettier-ignore function chacha(s, k, i, out, isHChacha = true, rounds = 20) { // `i` is either `[counter, nonce0, nonce1, nonce2]` for the ChaCha block // function or the full 128-bit nonce prefix for the HChaCha subkey path. // Create initial array using common pattern const y = Uint32Array.from([ s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3], // "expa" "nd 3" "2-by" "te k" k[0], k[1], k[2], k[3], // Key Key Key Key k[4], k[5], k[6], k[7], // Key Key Key Key i[0], i[1], i[2], i[3], // Counter Counter Nonce Nonce ]); const x = ctmp; x.set(y); chachaRound(x, rounds); // HChaCha writes words 0..3 and 12..15 after the rounds; the ChaCha // block path adds the original state word-by-word. if (isHChacha) { const xindexes = [0, 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15]; for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) out[i] = x[xindexes[i]]; } else { for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) out[i] = (y[i] + x[i]) | 0; } } /** Identical to `chachaCore`. Reached only through the test-only `__TESTS` export. */ // @ts-ignore const chachaCore_small = (s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds) => // Keep the reference wrapper on the same [counter, nonce0, nonce1, nonce2] layout as chacha(). chacha(s, k, Uint32Array.from([cnt, n[0], n[1], n[2]]), out, false, rounds); /** Identical to `hchacha`. Unused. */ // @ts-ignore const hchacha_small = chacha; /** RFC 8439 §2.3 block core for `state = constants | key | counter | nonce`. */ // prettier-ignore function chachaCore(s, k, n, out, cnt, rounds = 20) { let y00 = s[0], y01 = s[1], y02 = s[2], y03 = s[3], // "expa" "nd 3" "2-by" "te k" y04 = k[0], y05 = k[1], y06 = k[2], y07 = k[3], // Key Key Key Key y08 = k[4], y09 = k[5], y10 = k[6], y11 = k[7], // Key Key Key Key y12 = cnt, y13 = n[0], y14 = n[1], y15 = n[2]; // Counter Nonce Nonce Nonce // Save state to temporary variables let x00 = y00, x01 = y01, x02 = y02, x03 = y03, x04 = y04, x05 = y05, x06 = y06, x07 = y07, x08 = y08, x09 = y09, x10 = y10, x11 = y11, x12 = y12, x13 = y13, x14 = y14, x15 = y15; for (let r = 0; r < rounds; r += 2) { x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 16); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 12); x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 8); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 7); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 16); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 12); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 8); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 7); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 16); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 12); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 8); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 7); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 16); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 12); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 8); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 7); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 16); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 12); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 8); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 7); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 16); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 12); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 8); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 7); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 16); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 12); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 8); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 7); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 16); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 12); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 8); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 7); } // RFC 8439 §2.3 / §2.3.1: add the original state words back in state order. let oi = 0; out[oi++] = (y00 + x00) | 0; out[oi++] = (y01 + x01) | 0; out[oi++] = (y02 + x02) | 0; out[oi++] = (y03 + x03) | 0; out[oi++] = (y04 + x04) | 0; out[oi++] = (y05 + x05) | 0; out[oi++] = (y06 + x06) | 0; out[oi++] = (y07 + x07) | 0; out[oi++] = (y08 + x08) | 0; out[oi++] = (y09 + x09) | 0; out[oi++] = (y10 + x10) | 0; out[oi++] = (y11 + x11) | 0; out[oi++] = (y12 + x12) | 0; out[oi++] = (y13 + x13) | 0; out[oi++] = (y14 + x14) | 0; out[oi++] = (y15 + x15) | 0; } /** * hchacha hashes key and nonce into key' and nonce' for xchacha20. * Algorithmically identical to `hchacha_small`, but this exported path * normalizes word order on big-endian hosts. * Need to find a way to merge it with `chachaCore` without 25% performance hit. * @param s - Sigma constants as 32-bit words. * @param k - Key words. * @param i - Nonce-prefix words. * @param out - Output buffer for the derived subkey. * @example * Derives the XChaCha subkey from sigma, key, and nonce-prefix words. * * ```ts * const sigma = new Uint32Array(4); * const key = new Uint32Array(8); * const nonce = new Uint32Array(4); * const out = new Uint32Array(8); * hchacha(sigma, key, nonce, out); * ``` */ // prettier-ignore export function hchacha(s, k, i, out) { let x00 = swap8IfBE(s[0]), x01 = swap8IfBE(s[1]), x02 = swap8IfBE(s[2]), x03 = swap8IfBE(s[3]), x04 = swap8IfBE(k[0]), x05 = swap8IfBE(k[1]), x06 = swap8IfBE(k[2]), x07 = swap8IfBE(k[3]), x08 = swap8IfBE(k[4]), x09 = swap8IfBE(k[5]), x10 = swap8IfBE(k[6]), x11 = swap8IfBE(k[7]), x12 = swap8IfBE(i[0]), x13 = swap8IfBE(i[1]), x14 = swap8IfBE(i[2]), x15 = swap8IfBE(i[3]); for (let r = 0; r < 20; r += 2) { x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 16); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 12); x00 = (x00 + x04) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x00, 8); x08 = (x08 + x12) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x08, 7); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 16); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 12); x01 = (x01 + x05) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x01, 8); x09 = (x09 + x13) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x09, 7); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 16); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 12); x02 = (x02 + x06) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x02, 8); x10 = (x10 + x14) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x10, 7); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 16); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 12); x03 = (x03 + x07) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x03, 8); x11 = (x11 + x15) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x11, 7); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 16); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 12); x00 = (x00 + x05) | 0; x15 = rotl(x15 ^ x00, 8); x10 = (x10 + x15) | 0; x05 = rotl(x05 ^ x10, 7); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 16); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 12); x01 = (x01 + x06) | 0; x12 = rotl(x12 ^ x01, 8); x11 = (x11 + x12) | 0; x06 = rotl(x06 ^ x11, 7); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 16); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 12); x02 = (x02 + x07) | 0; x13 = rotl(x13 ^ x02, 8); x08 = (x08 + x13) | 0; x07 = rotl(x07 ^ x08, 7); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 16); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 12); x03 = (x03 + x04) | 0; x14 = rotl(x14 ^ x03, 8); x09 = (x09 + x14) | 0; x04 = rotl(x04 ^ x09, 7); } // HChaCha derives the subkey from state words 0..3 and 12..15 after 20 rounds. let oi = 0; out[oi++] = x00; out[oi++] = x01; out[oi++] = x02; out[oi++] = x03; out[oi++] = x12; out[oi++] = x13; out[oi++] = x14; out[oi++] = x15; swap32IfBE(out); } /** * Original, non-RFC chacha20 from DJB. 8-byte nonce, 8-byte counter. * The nonce/counter layout still reserves 8 counter bytes internally, but the shared public * `counter` argument follows noble's strict non-wrapping 32-bit policy. See `src/_arx.ts` * near `MAX_COUNTER` for the full counter-policy rationale. * @param key - 16-byte or 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 8-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Encrypts bytes with the original 8-byte-nonce ChaCha variant and a fresh key/nonce. * * ```ts * import { chacha20orig } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(8); * chacha20orig(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4)); * ``` */ export const chacha20orig = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 8, allowShortKeys: true, }); /** * ChaCha stream cipher. Conforms to RFC 8439 (IETF, TLS). 12-byte nonce, 4-byte counter. * With smaller nonce, it's not safe to make it random (CSPRNG), due to collision chance. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 12-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Encrypts bytes with the RFC 8439 ChaCha20 stream cipher and a fresh key/nonce. * * ```ts * import { chacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(12); * chacha20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4)); * ``` */ export const chacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, allowShortKeys: false, }); /** * XChaCha eXtended-nonce ChaCha. With 24-byte nonce, it's safe to make it random (CSPRNG). * See {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | the IRTF draft}. * The nonce/counter layout still reserves 8 counter bytes internally, but the shared public * `counter` argument follows noble's strict non-wrapping 32-bit policy. See `src/_arx.ts` * near `MAX_COUNTER` for the full counter-policy rationale. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 24-byte extended nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Encrypts bytes with XChaCha20 using a fresh key and random 24-byte nonce. * * ```ts * import { xchacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(24); * xchacha20(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4)); * ``` */ export const xchacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 8, extendNonceFn: hchacha, allowShortKeys: false, }); /** * Reduced 8-round chacha, described in original paper. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 12-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Uses the reduced 8-round variant for non-critical workloads with a fresh key/nonce. * * ```ts * import { chacha8 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(12); * chacha8(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4)); * ``` */ export const chacha8 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, rounds: 8, }); /** * Reduced 12-round chacha, described in original paper. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 12-byte nonce. * @param data - Input bytes to xor with the keystream. * @param output - Optional destination buffer. * @param counter - Initial block counter. * @returns Encrypted or decrypted bytes. * @example * Uses the reduced 12-round variant for non-critical workloads with a fresh key/nonce. * * ```ts * import { chacha12 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(12); * chacha12(key, nonce, new Uint8Array(4)); * ``` */ export const chacha12 = /* @__PURE__ */ createCipher(chachaCore, { counterRight: false, counterLength: 4, rounds: 12, }); // Test-only hooks for keeping the simple/reference core aligned with the unrolled production core. export const __TESTS = /* @__PURE__ */ Object.freeze({ chachaCore_small, chachaCore }); // RFC 8439 §2.8.1 pad16(x): shared zero block for AAD/ciphertext padding. const ZEROS16 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(16); // RFC 8439 §2.8 / §2.8.1: aligned inputs add nothing, otherwise append 16-(len%16) zero bytes. const updatePadded = (h, msg) => { h.update(msg); const leftover = msg.length % 16; if (leftover) h.update(ZEROS16.subarray(leftover)); }; // RFC 8439 §2.6.1 poly1305_key_gen returns `block[0..31]`, so AEAD key // generation only needs 32 zero bytes. const ZEROS32 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32); function computeTag(fn, key, nonce, ciphertext, AAD) { if (AAD !== undefined) abytes(AAD, undefined, 'AAD'); // RFC 8439 §2.6 / §2.8: derive the Poly1305 one-time key from counter 0, // then MAC AAD || pad16(AAD) || ciphertext || pad16(ciphertext) || len(AAD) || len(ciphertext). const authKey = fn(key, nonce, ZEROS32); const lengths = u64Lengths(ciphertext.length, AAD ? AAD.length : 0, true); // Methods below can be replaced with // return poly1305_computeTag_small(authKey, lengths, ciphertext, AAD) const h = poly1305.create(authKey); if (AAD) updatePadded(h, AAD); updatePadded(h, ciphertext); h.update(lengths); const res = h.digest(); clean(authKey, lengths); return res; } /** * AEAD algorithm from RFC 8439. * Salsa20 and chacha (RFC 8439) use poly1305 differently. * We could have composed them, but it's hard because of authKey: * In salsa20, authKey changes position in salsa stream. * In chacha, authKey can't be computed inside computeTag, it modifies the counter. */ export const _poly1305_aead = (xorStream) => (key, nonce, AAD) => { // This borrows caller key/nonce/AAD buffers by reference; mutating them after construction // changes future encrypt/decrypt results. const tagLength = 16; return { encrypt(plaintext, output) { const plength = plaintext.length; output = getOutput(plength + tagLength, output, false); output.set(plaintext); const oPlain = output.subarray(0, -tagLength); // RFC 8439 §2.8: payload encryption starts at counter 1 because counter 0 produced the OTK. xorStream(key, nonce, oPlain, oPlain, 1); const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, oPlain, AAD); output.set(tag, plength); // append tag clean(tag); return output; }, decrypt(ciphertext, output) { output = getOutput(ciphertext.length - tagLength, output, false); const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength); const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength); const tag = computeTag(xorStream, key, nonce, data, AAD); // RFC 8439 §2.8 / §4: authenticate ciphertext before decrypting it, and compare tags with // the constant-time equalBytes() helper rather than decrypting speculative plaintext first. if (!equalBytes(passedTag, tag)) { clean(tag); throw new Error('invalid tag'); } output.set(ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength)); // Actual decryption xorStream(key, nonce, output, output, 1); // start stream with i=1 clean(tag); return output; }, }; }; /** * ChaCha20-Poly1305 from RFC 8439. * * Unsafe to use random nonces under the same key, due to collision chance. * Prefer XChaCha instead. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 12-byte nonce. * @param AAD - Additional authenticated data. * @returns AEAD cipher instance. * @example * Encrypts and authenticates plaintext with a fresh key and nonce. * * ```ts * import { chacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(12); * const cipher = chacha20poly1305(key, nonce); * cipher.encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])); * ``` */ export const chacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16 }, /* @__PURE__ */ _poly1305_aead(chacha20)); /** * XChaCha20-Poly1305 extended-nonce chacha. * * Can be safely used with random nonces (CSPRNG). * See {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha | the IRTF draft}. * @param key - 32-byte key. * @param nonce - 24-byte nonce. * @param AAD - Additional authenticated data. * @returns AEAD cipher instance. * @example * Encrypts and authenticates plaintext with a fresh key and random 24-byte nonce. * * ```ts * import { xchacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const key = randomBytes(32); * const nonce = randomBytes(24); * const cipher = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce); * cipher.encrypt(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])); * ``` */ export const xchacha20poly1305 = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher({ blockSize: 64, nonceLength: 24, tagLength: 16 }, /* @__PURE__ */ _poly1305_aead(xchacha20)); /** * Chacha20 CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator). * It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only. * Compatible with libtomcrypt. It does not have a specification, so unclear how secure it is. * @param seed - Optional seed bytes mixed into the internal `key || nonce` state. When omitted, * only 32 random bytes are mixed into the 40-byte state. * @returns Seeded concrete `_XorStreamPRG` instance, including `clone()`. * @example * Seeds the test-only ChaCha20 DRBG from fresh entropy. * * ```ts * import { rngChacha20 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const seed = randomBytes(32); * const prg = rngChacha20(seed); * prg.randomBytes(8); * ``` */ export const rngChacha20 = /* @__PURE__ */ createPRG(chacha20orig, 64, 32, 8); /** * Chacha20/8 CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator). * It's best to limit usage to non-production, non-critical cases: for example, test-only. * Faster than `rngChacha20`. * @param seed - Optional seed bytes mixed into the internal `key || nonce` state. When omitted, * only 32 random bytes are mixed into the 44-byte state. * @returns Seeded concrete `_XorStreamPRG` instance, including `clone()`. * @example * Seeds the faster test-only ChaCha8 DRBG from fresh entropy. * * ```ts * import { rngChacha8 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha.js'; * import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils.js'; * const seed = randomBytes(32); * const prg = rngChacha8(seed); * prg.randomBytes(8); * ``` */ export const rngChacha8 = /* @__PURE__ */ createPRG(chacha8, 64, 32, 12); //# sourceMappingURL=chacha.js.map