Every consensus-relevant layer of the planned headers explorer (BlockHeader80
parser, DifficultyTarget compact↔target, CalculateNextWorkRequired retarget,
MedianTimePast, header validator end-to-end, P2P wire codecs, reorg/chain
selection, OTS proofs) is pinned to upstream test vectors committed under
quartz/src/commonTest/resources/bitcoin/, matching the existing
nip44.vectors.json / bip39.vectors.json / mls/*.json pattern.
The single highest-value test is a nightly differential check asserting
LocalHeadersBitcoinExplorer.blockHash(h) == OkHttpBitcoinExplorer.blockHash(h)
for every height in [checkpoint, tip] — any consensus drift surfaces as a
disagreeing height.
Maps cleanly onto the existing Phase 1/3/4/5/7/9 work, adding ~5–7
engineer-days total to the plan budget. No new top-level phase needed.
Lock the design choices from the 2026-05-19 review against the intervening
2026-05-14 onchain-zaps work:
- Move the module from quartz/.../nip03Timestamp/bitcoin/ to a sibling
quartz/.../bitcoin/ package so the headers explorer, header validator,
peer pool and store can be reused by the future onchain-zap merkle-proof
work without an inverted import path.
- Use androidx.sqlite + BundledSQLiteDriver for HeaderStore, matching the
existing SQLiteEventStore. Schema lives in commonMain via IModule. Drops
the hand-rolled flat-file + sidecar height index.
- Drop the bundled headers blob. Ship a single hardcoded PinnedCheckpoint
constant; first-run sync starts from the checkpoint and pulls forward
over P2P. APK growth: 0 bytes.
- Pre-checkpoint OTS heights fall through to OkHttpBitcoinExplorer via
BitcoinExplorerEndpoint (shared with the onchain-zap EsploraBackend).
Strict-mode users get an explicit error instead of a network call.
- Mark trustless NIP-BC onchain-zap verification as out of scope and
capture it as a follow-up plan (BIP-37 merkleblock or full-block fetch
on top of this stack).
Resolves open questions Q1, Q2 and Q4 from the original plan; Q3 (Quartz
public API vs internal) left open for Phase 0.
Receipts were only being checked for a valid event signature — anyone could
sign a kind:9735 and have it counted toward another user's zap totals. NIP-57
Appendix F mandates three additional checks: receipt.pubkey == LNURL
provider's nostrPubkey (MUST), bolt11 invoice amount == zap request "amount"
tag (MUST), and lnurl tag == recipient's lnurl (SHOULD).
- Adds LnZapReceiptValidator + LnurlForm in quartz commonMain (pure logic).
- Adds LnurlEndpointCache (jvmAndroid) and the LnurlEndpointResolver
interface for async lookup. The cache is primed by outbound zaps (existing
LightningAddressResolver fetches now extract nostrPubkey) and on demand for
inbound receipts when no entry is present.
- Adds OkHttpLnurlEndpointResolver in commons, wired into LocalCache via
AppModules using the existing money-tier OkHttp builder (so Tor settings
apply).
- LocalCache.consume(LnZapEvent) now: drops receipts that fail MUST checks
synchronously when the cache is warm, defers credit until async resolution
finishes on cache miss, and falls back to legacy signature-only behavior
when no resolver is wired (tests).
- LnZapRequestEvent.create() now accepts amountMillisats + lnurl; both are
threaded through Account.createZapRequestFor and emitted as tags so future
receipts can be validated against them.
21 new tests cover validator reasons, lnurl form canonicalization across
lud16/URL/bech32, and cache eviction.
Without busy_timeout SQLite returns SQLITE_BUSY immediately when
BEGIN IMMEDIATE can't acquire a lock — e.g. during a WAL
auto-checkpoint or a reader briefly upgrading its snapshot — instead
of retrying. ParallelInsertTest's reader+writer test hit this ~10%
of runs. 5s matches Room's default and adds no overhead in the
uncontended case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#2946 fixed the ClassCastException with a bespoke AtomicReference<Map>
+ CAS copy-on-write helper. Quartz already has a concurrent-map
abstraction for exactly this purpose — LargeCache — with platform-tuned
actuals (ConcurrentSkipListMap on jvmAndroid, CacheMap on Apple, custom
on Linux). Swap to it.
Removes the bespoke putAuthStatus/removeAuthStatus helpers, the
ExperimentalAtomicApi opt-in, and the AtomicReference imports.
The RelayAuthenticatorConcurrencyTest from #2946 still passes against
the new implementation.
OkHttp dispatches WebSocket callbacks on one thread per relay socket,
so RelayAuthenticator's plain LinkedHashMap was mutated concurrently
from many threads during connection storms. When a bucket crossed
HashMap's TREEIFY_THRESHOLD the racing treeify corrupted internal
state and threw ClassCastException: LinkedHashMap$Entry cannot be
cast to HashMap$TreeNode from onDisconnected.
Primal-style clients emit "dim 317.0x498.0" in NIP-92 imeta tags. DimensionTag.parse
called Int.parseInt on each component, threw NumberFormatException, and returned
null. With dim==null and no cached aspect ratio, GifVideoView / UrlImageView built
the container without an aspectRatio modifier, so the inline image collapsed to
zero height and the post body looked empty until Coil delivered the bitmap.
Parse each component as Double then truncate to Int. Adds DimensionTagTest covering
integer, float, truncation, 0x0 and malformed inputs.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1crao6Hwip8k5ByoLxVrc
Adds a third public Namecoin ElectrumX server to the default and
Tor-preferred lists in DEFAULT_ELECTRUMX_SERVERS / TOR_ELECTRUMX_SERVERS:
electrum.nmc.ethicnology.com:50002 (IPv4 142.44.246.181, OVH Canada)
Operated by @ethicnology, who ships the namecoind + ElectrumX + mempool
podman stack at github.com/ethicnology/namecoin-compose. Probed live:
- server.version -> ElectrumX 1.19.0, protocol 1.4
- server.features -> Namecoin mainnet genesis 000000000062b72c...c770
- scripthash.get_history for d/testls -> full history (heights up to
822885), and blockchain.transaction.get decodes the OP_NAME_UPDATE
output correctly. Same code path used by ElectrumXClient against all
other public servers, no client changes required.
TLS uses a publicly-trusted Let's Encrypt cert, so usePinnedTrustStore
is left at the default (false). This makes it the first entry in the
list whose TLS does NOT depend on PINNED_ELECTRUMX_CERTS, and adds
useful diversity:
- electrumx.testls.space (self-signed, pinned, often ECONNRESETs)
- nmc2.bitcoins.sk / 46.229.238.187 (self-signed, pinned)
- relay.testls.bit / 23.158.233.10 (self-signed, pinned)
- electrum.nmc.ethicnology.com (LE cert, system trust store)
If every self-signed peer is unreachable (e.g. corporate networks that
strip unknown CAs but allow LE chains), resolution can still succeed.
No bare-IP companion entry is added for 142.44.246.181: unlike the
46.229.238.187 / 23.158.233.10 pinned peers (which use DER-SHA256
pinning that ignores hostname verification), an IP-literal endpoint
against the LE cert would fail standard hostname verification under
the system trust manager (SAN covers only the hostname). The IP is
captured in this commit message and the source comment for reference.
Verification on this branch:
- :quartz:spotlessCheck OK
- :quartz:jvmTest OK (BitRelayResolverTest etc. unchanged)
Tapping the Bitcoin card on the wallet screen now navigates to a new
OnchainTransactionsScreen that lists transactions touching the account's
Taproot address, mirroring the NWC transactions view.
- OnchainBackend gains getTxsForAddress(address, afterTxid) returning
BitcoinAddressTx rows (netValueSats, confirmations, blockHeight,
blockTime, counterparty addresses). EsploraBackend implements it via
GET /address/{addr}/txs and /address/{addr}/txs/chain/{last_seen}
for pagination; CachingOnchainBackend passes through.
- OnchainTransactionsViewModel loads the address from the account
signer + LocalCache.onchainBackend, paginates, and for each chain
row scans LocalCache for an OnchainZapEvent with a matching txid so
the UI can render the Nostr counterparty (sender pubkey for
incoming, p-tagged recipient for outgoing).
- ALL / ZAPS / NON-ZAPS filter chips reuse the existing
TransactionFilter enum. Mempool rows are flagged "Pending" in
bitcoin-orange.
Decision: keep the hand-rolled psbt/ + taproot/ consensus layer rather than
adopting fr.acinq.bitcoin-kmp. Rationale: a deliberately small single-key-path
P2TR subset, pinned to authoritative BIP-341/350 test vectors at every layer
(sighash, tweak, witness signature bytes, addresses, tx serialization), and
consistent with the project's minimal-dependency stance.
Recorded in amethyst/plans/2026-05-14-onchain-zaps.md with the consequence
spelled out (we own correctness; revisit if scope expands past single-key-path
P2TR). The psbt/ and taproot/ packages now carry a pointer back to that
decision so a future reader doesn't reflexively swap in a library.
Doc-comment + plan-doc only; no logic change.
A Comment event (kind 1111) scoped to an external identifier (`I` tag)
previously rendered as a bare text post and landed in the Home "New
Threads" feed. Treat it as a reply to that external scope: it now shows
in the conversations feed and renders a typed chip (hashtag, geohash,
url, or generic) above the comment text.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01ArHkNXu1ANrVGZAyMWg4Xu
The big one: the source package was named `nipBCOnchainZaps/build/`, which
the repo .gitignore (`build/`) silently matched — so OnchainZapBuilder.kt
(the main source, not just its test) was NEVER committed. The pushed branch
did not compile; the pre-commit hook only checks the working tree, so this
went unnoticed. Renamed the package `build` -> `builder` (a source package
must never be named `build`) and updated all references; the recovered files
are now actually tracked.
Re-audit findings on the previous fix commit:
- CachingOnchainBackend.txCache was unbounded -> memory leak in a long
session. Added a bounded cache (maxCachedTxs, oldest-entry eviction).
- OnchainZapSender still trusted the signer's returned PSBT for witness
UTXOs and tap internal keys (used to compute the sighash + the verified
output keys). Now it copies ONLY the PSBT_IN_TAP_KEY_SIG records back onto
the PSBT we built, so a signer can contribute signatures and nothing else;
verification and finalization run entirely on our own PSBT.
Test coverage added:
- OnchainZapBuilderTest: confirmed-UTXO filter — unconfirmed UTXOs excluded
by default, spendable only with allowUnconfirmed, confirmed preferred.
- CachingOnchainBackendTest: confirmed-tx cached forever, unconfirmed
re-fetched after TTL, not-found never cached, tip/fee TTL, bounded
eviction.
All quartz / commons jvmTest suites pass; quartz android + amethyst compile.
CRITICAL
- PsbtSignatureVerifier: independently verifies every key-path signature in a
PSBT (BIP-340 sig over the BIP-341 sighash, against the tweaked output key).
- OnchainZapSender now rejects a signer that returns a different transaction
than it was asked to sign (byte-compares the unsigned tx) and verifies all
signatures before broadcasting — closes a substitution attack where a
malicious/buggy external signer could redirect funds.
HIGH — break test circularity
- Pin the full BIP-341 keyPathSpending input-0 witness: signing the vector
sighash with the vector tweaked key reproduces the vector signature
byte-for-byte (also pins BIP-340 nonce determinism).
- Pin TaprootAddress.fromPubKey + SegwitAddress.encodeP2TR against all seven
BIP-341 wallet-test-vector P2TR mainnet addresses.
- EsploraBackendTest: JSON-parsing coverage for /tx, /address/{}/utxo, the
mempool.space and blockstream fee formats, and schema-fallback.
MEDIUM
- OnchainZapBuilder filters to confirmed UTXOs by default (allowUnconfirmed
opt-in) and signals BIP-125 RBF (nSequence 0xFFFFFFFD).
- CachingOnchainBackend: TTL-caching decorator (confirmed tx forever,
unconfirmed/tip/fees short TTL) so a feed of onchain zaps doesn't fan out
into one HTTP request per event. Wired in AppModules.
- OnchainZapVerifier computes real confirmation depth from the chain tip and
asserts the backend echoed the requested txid.
- EsploraBackend falls back to the standard Esplora /fee-estimates endpoint
(blockstream.info) when /v1/fees/recommended 404s.
LOW
- BitcoinTransaction.parse caps input/output/witness-item counts to stop a
hostile varint from triggering a giant pre-allocation.
- OnchainZapEventTest: asserts kind:8333 on-the-wire tag structure against the
NIP-BC spec.
- alt tag now includes the amount ("Onchain zap: N sats"), matching the spec
example.
All quartz / commons / androidHostTest suites pass; amethyst compiles.
Wires the NIP-55 Android external-signer contract for sign_psbt, so
NostrSignerExternal.signPsbt is real instead of a stub.
- CommandType.SIGN_PSBT ("sign_psbt") — also available in NIP-55 `perms`
lists, since Permission wraps CommandType directly.
- SignPsbtResult result type.
- SignPsbtQuery (background ContentResolver) + SignPsbtRequest /
SignPsbtResponse (foreground Intent), modeled on the derive_key
string-in/string-out shape: the PSBT hex rides the `nostrsigner:` URI,
the signed (not finalized) PSBT comes back in the `result` field.
- BackgroundRequestHandler.signPsbt / ForegroundRequestHandler.signPsbt.
- NostrSignerExternal.signPsbt now runs the background-then-foreground
query. Signer apps that predate sign_psbt reply with no `result`, which
surfaces as CouldNotPerformException — the send dialog shows it as a
failure ("update your signer").
NIP-46 (NostrSignerRemote) still throws UnsupportedMethodException — the
bunker-side command isn't standardized yet.
Implements the send half of the onchain zaps plan: a minimal, fund-safe
BIP-174 PSBT pipeline plus the OnchainZapBuilder and `NostrSigner.signPsbt`.
Every cryptographic step is validated against the BIP-341 wallet test
vectors.
nipBCOnchainZaps/psbt/:
- BitcoinIO: little-endian Bitcoin consensus byte reader/writer (u16/u32/u64,
compact-size varint, var-bytes).
- BitcoinTransaction: OutPoint / TxIn / TxOut / transaction model with legacy
and BIP-144 segwit serialization, segwit-aware parsing, and witness-stripped
txid. Validated against the genesis coinbase tx and the BIP-341 9-input
unsigned tx.
- TaprootSigHash: BIP-341 SigMsg + TapSighash tagged hash for key-path spends.
All six base sighash types plus both ANYONECANPAY variants verified against
the seven BIP-341 keyPathSpending vectors.
- Psbt: BIP-174 container subset (global unsigned-tx, per-input witness-utxo /
tap-internal-key / tap-key-sig / sighash-type, per-output tap-internal-key).
Unknown records round-trip verbatim. Typed accessor extensions.
- PsbtSigner: signs the key-path P2TR inputs a given private key controls —
derives the BIP-341 tweaked key, computes the all-inputs sighash, produces a
BIP-340 Schnorr signature. Leaves inputs the key does not control untouched.
- PsbtFinalizer: moves tap-key-sigs into the witness stack, yields a
broadcastable transaction.
nipBCOnchainZaps/build/:
- OnchainZapBuilder: largest-first coin selection + unsigned-PSBT assembly for
a NIP-BC zap. Sender spends from / changes back to the single Taproot address
derived from their Nostr pubkey; recipient output pays the recipient's
derived address. Dust-aware change handling, InsufficientFundsException,
self-zap and dust-amount guards.
nipBCOnchainZaps/taproot/:
- TaprootAddress.tweakSecretKey: BIP-341 taproot_tweak_seckey (key-path-only),
including the odd-y internal-key negation. Validated against the BIP-341
vector's tweakedPrivkey.
Secp256k1Instance: new `privKeyNegate` primitive across commonMain expect +
jvm / android / native actuals.
Signer hierarchy — new `NostrSigner.signPsbt(psbtHex): String`:
- NostrSignerSync / NostrSignerInternal: real implementation.
- NostrSignerWithClientTag: delegates to the wrapped signer.
- NostrSignerRemote (NIP-46) and NostrSignerExternal (NIP-55): throw
SignerExceptions.UnsupportedMethodException — the bunker command and the
Android Intent contract are Phase B, and depend on signer-app support.
Tests: 31 new tests across the psbt/build/signers packages, anchored on the
BIP-341 wallet-test-vectors so the tweak, sighash, signature, and finalized
transaction are all checked against an authoritative source.
Still pending: Phase B (NIP-55 sign_psbt Intent) and Phase D (send UI +
broadcast + publish kind 8333).
Phase A.1 of the onchain zaps plan (amethyst/plans/2026-05-14-onchain-zaps.md):
the verify/receive path of NIP-BC. Send-side (PSBT, builder, signPsbt) is the
next phase.
Adds:
- nipBCOnchainZaps/taproot/SegwitAddress: BIP-173 / BIP-350 native segwit
address encoder/decoder, witness v0..v16, on top of the existing Bech32 util.
- nipBCOnchainZaps/taproot/TaprootAddress: BIP-341 key-path-only derivation
from a Nostr pubkey. Computes the TapTweak tagged hash, applies the additive
tweak via Secp256k1Instance.pubKeyTweakAdd, and encodes as bc1p... bech32m.
- Secp256k1Instance: new pubKeyTweakAdd primitive wired through commonMain
expect + jvm / android / native actuals.
- nipBCOnchainZaps/chain: pluggable OnchainBackend interface plus BitcoinTx,
BitcoinTxOutput, Utxo, FeeEstimates data models.
- nipBCOnchainZaps/chain/EsploraBackend (jvmAndroid): OkHttp-based
Esplora-compatible client (mempool.space / blockstream.info) covering
/tx, /address/{addr}/utxo, /tx broadcast, /blocks/tip/height, and
/v1/fees/recommended.
- nipBCOnchainZaps/verify/OnchainZapVerifier: enforces every NIP-BC client
rule -- reject self-zap, fetch tx, derive recipient Taproot scriptPubKey,
sum only outputs paying the recipient (excluding change back to sender),
cap claimed amount at verified amount, mark unconfirmed as Pending.
Tests (commonTest, runs on jvmTest):
- SegwitAddressTest: BIP-350 known-good vectors for v0/v16 + round-trip for
v1 (P2TR).
- TaprootAddressTest: BIP-341 wallet-test-vectors tagged hash + tweaked
output key + scriptPubKey, plus address round-trip and prefix/length
sanity.
- OnchainZapVerifierTest: confirmed / pending / self-zap / missing tx /
zero-verified-amount / multi-output-sum / amount-capping with an
in-memory FakeBackend wired to real TaprootAddress-derived scripts.
Plan: amethyst/plans/2026-05-14-onchain-zaps.md documents the full v1 scope,
the merge into the existing NIP-47 wallet UI, the subscription kind-list
edits, and the Note.zapsAmount fold-in approach for display.
Implements NIP-BC onchain zap events analogous to NIP-57 lightning
zap receipts but for Bitcoin transactions. The recipient's Nostr
pubkey is used directly as the internal key of a BIP-341 P2TR output.
Mirrors the nip88Polls package structure with a single `zap/` subpackage:
- OnchainZapEvent (kind 8333) with profile / event / addressable-event
zap builders
- Tags: BitcoinTxIdTag (i = bitcoin:tx:<txid>), AmountTag (sats),
BlockTag (hash + height), ProofTag (raw-tx + merkle proof) for
optional SPV verification
- TagArrayExt / TagArrayBuilderExt for parsing and assembly
- EventFactory wired so kind 8333 deserializes into OnchainZapEvent
Reuses standard ETag/ATag/PTag/KindTag from nip01Core. Does not yet
implement client-side transaction verification or PSBT signer methods.
The upstream NIP draft for kind:34551 community rules
(nostr-protocol/nips#2331) was renumbered from 9A to 9B per maintainer
feedback that slot 9a is already claimed by the push-notifications
draft (nostr-protocol/nips#2194):
https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/pull/2331#issuecomment-4442813289
This commit updates all human-readable references in the merged
community-rules code:
- 7 Kotlin files in quartz (CommunityRulesEvent, CommunityRulesValidator,
5 tag classes) — Kdoc comments
- 13 Kotlin files in amethyst (composer, feed filter, rules editor,
Account, AccountSettings, tests) — code comments + Kdoc
- 1 English strings file (values/strings.xml) — 2 user-facing strings
- 54 translation strings files (values-*-r*/strings.xml) — same two
strings, untranslated "NIP-9A" token replaced with "NIP-9B"
Kind number (34551), schema, tag names, and behaviour are unchanged.
No public API or DTO field renames. Pure docs/strings.
Verified: :quartz:spotlessCheck, :amethyst:spotlessCheck,
:commons:spotlessCheck all clean.
- quartz: Event.threadRootIdOrSelf() now falls back to markedReply()?.eventId
when both markedRoot() and unmarkedRoot() are absent
- amethyst: After upstream PR #2855 split the notifications feed into
notificationsFollowing and notificationsEveryone, the hiddenUsers.flow
collector still only invalidated the original notifications feed. Extends
it to invalidate all three.
- amethyst: CardFeedContentState.refreshSuspended() takes an additive-only
path when lastNotes is populated — it only adds cards for new admissions,
never removing cards for notes that no longer pass the filter. Re-muting
mid-session correctly rejected muted-thread reactions in the filter, but
the existing cards stayed in the UI as "Show Anyway" placeholders. Calls
clear() before invalidateData() on each notification feed so the refresh
hits the full-rebuild branch and removals propagate.
@Volatile resolves via kotlin.jvm on JVM but needs an explicit
kotlin.concurrent.Volatile import on Native; Dispatchers.IO is internal
on Native, so the in-process WebSocket switches to Dispatchers.Default
(no blocking I/O on that path); and Native's LinkedHashMap is final
without removeEldestEntry, so Nip98AuthVerifier's replay cache now caps
itself with an explicit insertion-order eviction loop (access-order was
unused — the cache is write-only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces JVM-only @Volatile + synchronized double-checked locking with
kotlin.concurrent.atomics.AtomicBoolean.compareAndSet so the file builds
on all commonMain targets, mirroring the pattern in BasicRelayClient.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two simplifications:
1. Derive admin URL from RelayEngine.url. NIP-86 spec mandates that
the admin endpoint is "the same URI as ws(s)://, called via
http(s)://" — so KtorRelay derives the NIP-98 binding URL by
calling relay.url.toHttp() instead of accepting publicUrl as a
separate config. Single source of truth (info.relay_url),
accidental misconfiguration impossible, no Host-header fallback.
StaticConfig.AdminSection.public_url is gone.
2. Uniform code path for admin-enabled vs disabled. Empty allow-list
isn't a special case anywhere: Nip86Server.isAuthorized returns
false for everyone, dispatch rejects, Nip86HttpHandler returns
NotAdmin → 403. KtorRelay always assembles the Nip86HttpRoute
and registers the POST endpoint; Nip86Server.isEnabled() and the
"is admin on?" branches in the handler and route are deleted.
Nip86EndToEndTest's admin-disabled case is now a behavioral test:
sign a valid token, expect 403 NotAdmin (was 405 with the no-route
variant, was 403 with the fake-disabled-route variant).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move the NIP-86-over-HTTP orchestration (NIP-98 verify → admin
allow-list gate → parse → dispatch → serialize) into quartz so any
relay implementation that wants the standard transport can plug its
HTTP framework in without re-deriving the sequence — and without
accidentally skipping NIP-98 verification or the admin check.
• Nip86Server (quartz) gains allowList + isEnabled() + isAuthorized();
dispatch becomes dispatch(pubkey, req) and enforces the allow-list
itself, so in-process callers can't bypass it either.
• Nip86HttpHandler (new, quartz) takes only primitives (authHeader,
url, body) and returns a sealed Response — Disabled, PayloadTooLarge,
MissingAuth, BadAuth, NotAdmin, BadRequest, Ok(pubkey, req, resp,
json). Constants for the 1 MiB body cap, application/nostr+json+rpc
content type, and WWW-Authenticate scheme live here.
• Nip86HttpRoute (geode) shrinks to a Ktor adapter: bounded read,
extract URL/auth, call handler, map Response → Ktor status codes.
Audit logging stays in geode — not a quartz concern.
External relay authors: import quartz, build a Nip86HttpHandler with
their Nip86Server + Nip98AuthVerifier, and write a ~30-line adapter
for their framework. The full security-critical flow is in the box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nip86Server used to take an optional IEventStore and call store.delete()
only on banevent — banpubkey and disallowkind would update the BanStore
but leave existing matching events served by REQ. That's inconsistent
(an operator who bans a spam pubkey expects the spam to be gone) and
a real safety issue (banning a CSAM event wouldn't actually remove
existing copies if the store was null).
Replace the IEventStore param with onBan: suspend (Filter) -> Unit. The
dispatcher fires it after each ban method with the Filter that selects
the now-banned events:
banpubkey → Filter(authors = [pk])
banevent → Filter(ids = [id])
disallowkind→ Filter(kinds = [k])
KtorRelay wires onBan = { f -> relay.store.delete(f) }, so the existing
SQLite delete-by-filter path handles every shape without the caller
having to know which field to populate. The default no-op keeps the
unit test for the dispatcher dependency-free.
withInt is now suspend so disallowKind's handler can call the suspending
onBan inline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename RelayConfig → StaticConfig and the persistence/RelayStateStore →
config/RuntimeConfig so the two configuration tiers — boot-time TOML
versus operator-mutable runtime state — are obvious from the class
names. The `persistence/` package is gone; everything related to config
lives in `config/`.
For overlapping fields (NIP-11 info doc, pubkey / kind allow-deny
lists), StaticConfig now seeds RuntimeConfig on first boot via the new
RuntimeConfig(seed = …) constructor and an AuthorizationSeed type. The
runtime file wins from then on: later edits to [authorization] in the
TOML are ignored once an admin RPC has written the snapshot. As a
consequence, KindAllowDenyPolicy and PubkeyAllowDenyPolicy are no
longer stacked in geode's policy chain — BanListPolicy already reads
the same lists from the BanStore, and double-stacking would silently
diverge after the first admin mutation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the previous geode rename — quartz's jvmAndroid tests
extend the geode testFixtures `RelayClientTest` and were calling
`defaultRelay.preload(...)`. After moving `preload` off `RelayEngine`
and into an extension function in `geode.testing`, these tests need
the import explicitly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a Namecoin record's value isn't valid JSON (a real failure mode
when an operator hand-builds the value and miscounts braces), the
NIP-05 path used to silently swallow the parser exception and surface
a misleading "no nostr field" message. That sends the publisher
chasing a phantom missing field when the actual problem is the value
itself.
Concrete case that triggered this: a `name_update` published a
474-byte d/testls value with one closing brace short of balanced. The
string parses up to the missing brace, after which kotlinx.serialization
throws "Unfinished JSON term at EOF at line 1, column 474". That error
was previously dropped, leaving the operator to debug "no nostr field"
without ever seeing the underlying JSON parse failure.
Changes:
- New NamecoinResolveOutcome.MalformedRecord(name, error). Distinct
from NoNostrField. The `error` field is the parser's own diagnostic
(e.g. "Unfinished JSON term at EOF at line 1, column 474") so the
publisher can locate the broken byte without spelunking.
- NamecoinNameResolver.performLookupDetailed: parse via a new
parseValueOrError helper and surface MalformedRecord instead of
collapsing into NoNostrField. Also rejects non-object top-level
values (arrays, primitives, null) with a useful diagnostic
("top-level value is JsonArray, expected JSON object").
- DesktopSearchScreen handles the new outcome by surfacing the parser
error verbatim in the Namecoin status banner, so the column number
reaches the publisher's screen.
Tests (commonTest / NamecoinImportTest):
- "NIP-05 lookup surfaces MalformedRecord with parser detail when
value is broken JSON": a deliberately one-brace-short value yields
MalformedRecord with a non-empty diagnostic.
- "NIP-05 lookup surfaces MalformedRecord when top-level value is a
JSON array": ensures non-object top-level values are rejected with
a useful "expected JSON object" message rather than silently
parsing as something unusable.
Tests don't pin the exact parser wording (kotlinx.serialization can
change it across versions); they only pin that the message is
attributed to JSON parsing rather than to a missing field.
Comprehensive design doc for a headers-only Bitcoin P2P client that would
let NIP-03 OTS attestations be verified locally against the proof-of-work
chain instead of a trusted block explorer. Parked pending direction on
NIP-BC onchain-zaps verification, which has overlapping requirements.
NIP-92 imeta tag entries are encoded as "key SPACE value" strings.
When IMetaTagBuilder.add() received an empty (or whitespace-only)
value the encoder produced "key " with a trailing space, which
schema-validating relays reject as a malformed tag value.
Claude
Vitor PamplonaandGitHub
davotoula
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