365 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Vitor PamplonaandGitHub 09f2ec79e7 Merge pull request #3798 from davotoula/fix/code-review-followups
Address buzz CLI review findings; pin the wrapper copies and the amy arg surface
2026-07-29 10:03:11 -04:00
davotoula 42bf2a43d8 fix: address code-review findings on the buzz CLI + wrapper scripts
Three findings from the review of the Sonar literal-extraction pass. None were
introduced by that pass — it renamed or sat next to each one.

no_relays told the wrong story. `relaysFor` returns an empty *non-null* set when
--relays was given but every entry failed `normalizeGroupRelay`, so the elvis to
`outboxRelays()` never fires and the user was told to pass the flag they had just
passed. The message now names the real problem and echoes the rejected value; the
`no_relays` error code is unchanged.

`participants` was string-munged. `arr.toString().trim('[',']').split(",")` turns
any shape other than a flat string array into plausible-looking fake pubkeys, and
splits a comma-bearing string into two entries. Now decoded as a JsonArray, with
non-string elements skipped rather than stringified. Extracted to
`participantsOf` so it is testable; BuzzParticipantsTest covers the shapes and
was confirmed to fail (3 of 5 cases) against the old implementation.

Nothing kept the two copies of the buzz-agent wrappers in sync. They exist as
byte-identical trees under cli/src/main/resources/buzz-agent (what `agent up`
extracts) and tools/buzz-agent (what the README tells people to use), with no
build step or test pinning them — I had to hand-apply the same patch twice this
week. BuzzAgentWrapperSyncTest now asserts it. The tools/ tree is declared as a
`:cli:test` input, without which Gradle calls the task up-to-date after a
tools/-only edit and misses exactly the drift being guarded (verified both ways).
2026-07-29 15:42:20 +02:00
vitorpamplonaandgithub-actions[bot] 5a665950b8 chore: sync amy Homebrew formula to v1.13.1 2026-07-29 13:38:36 +00:00
davotoula 30c7dbc2f3 Code review:
1. `title="$(git log -1 … | cut …)"` aborts the whole script under
   `set -euo pipefail` when the worktree has no commits
2. `base_branch` only fell back to `main`
2026-07-29 14:14:28 +02:00
davotoula 4700e51d82 fix: add explicit default case to the workflow-ship branch guard 2026-07-29 14:13:51 +02:00
davotoula 7718e3ab19 fix: extract duplicated string literals 2026-07-28 20:29:21 +02:00
Claude a569095e19 feat(concord): honor CORD-02 §9 read-only seal on dissolved communities
A dissolved community (owner-signed kind-3308 tombstone) is sealed
read-only per CORD-02 §9: held keys still open history, but nothing new
is honored. The `dissolved` flag was folded in quartz but ignored by the
write gates, so members — and the CLI — could still post to a dissolved
community.

- commons: ConcordChannel now tracks `dissolved` from the folded state
  and `canPost()` returns false when set, so the Android composer (which
  gates on it) is hidden. The self-delete carve-out is unaffected — it
  runs through the note context menu, not the composer.
- amethyst: show a read-only notice where the composer would be so the
  seal is explained rather than silent.
- cli: `amy concord send` folds the community and refuses with a
  `dissolved` error before building/publishing; `amy concord channels`
  surfaces the `dissolved` flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HateTjrutJ23wAEttEwHQA
2026-07-28 17:22:24 +00:00
Claude 8e79abaa82 feat(cli): fewer steps to connect a Buzz agent — accept-from-channel, agent up, doctor
Collapses the operator setup from an 8-flag command + two hand-written scripts to
essentially two commands, without removing any of the safety.

- `buzz workflow run` gains `--accept-from-channel` (parity with the job
  scheduler): scope intake to the channel's kind-39002 roster instead of pasting
  every teammate key. `--worktree` now defaults to the current directory.
- Ship the gated reference wrappers (tools/buzz-agent/workflow-agent.sh →
  agent+commit; workflow-ship.sh → push+PR after the gate), split around the
  approval gate the way agent-exec.sh is the one-shot ungated version.
- `buzz agent up RELAY --repo DIR --approver NPUB` — one command: resolves the
  channel (the relay's only one, or --channel), defaults worktree/intake, extracts
  the bundled wrappers to ~/.amy/buzz-agent, and delegates to `workflow run`. The
  only thing it can't default is the human approver.
- `buzz agent doctor [--repo DIR]` — preflight that turns the security checklist
  into a green/red report: gh authenticated, token can write to the repo, default
  branch protected against force-push, worktree clean. Exits non-zero if not.
- cli build: set duplicatesStrategy on processResources (the explicit
  resources.srcDir re-adds the default root, which now doubles the bundled scripts).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-27 15:40:50 +00:00
Vitor PamplonaandClaude Opus 5 8dcc78056d refactor(buzz): move the Backlog and Workflow boards into the channel overflow
The two new boards were added as top-bar icons, which put a Buzz channel back to
four (Canvas, Backlog, Workflow runs, ⋮) and truncated the title row the bar is
there to show — "nosfabrica.commun…" instead of the full relay. That is the
crowding #3729 had just removed; this branch predates it and the merge stacked
them.

Canvas keeps the only icon: it is the channel's shared document, i.e. content.
Backlog and Workflow runs are two more views of the channel, reached
occasionally, so they join Threads and Share in the overflow — and pick up the
`!isDm` gate the icons never had.

Also gives the job board a string resource; the branch's i18n pass left
"Backlog" hardcoded in JobBoardScreen and in the icon's contentDescription.

Adds cli/tests/buzz/agent-exec.sh, which covers what the two loop harnesses
stub out. job-loop.sh proves the scheduler drives *an* --exec program; nothing
committed exercised the real one — the wrapper that turns a job into a PR. With
a stubbed `gh` and agent (no network, credentials, or Claude Code) it asserts
the happy path end to end (task on stdin → agent → commit → push the job branch
→ PR url on stdout) and, as importantly, the paths that must fail: an agent that
changed nothing becomes a job error, an empty task is rejected before the agent
runs, missing scheduler env is a hard error rather than a silent no-op, an agent
that committed for itself is not double-committed, and the default-branch guard
holds — asserting `main` on the remote is left untouched. 19/19.

Verified on emulator-5554: the bar is Canvas + ⋮ again with the full relay name
visible, the menu reads Threads / Backlog / Workflow runs / Share / Members /
Leave, and Backlog still opens from it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 23:37:22 -04:00
Vitor Pamplona ba1baa359f Merge branch 'main' into test/buzz-agent-support 2026-07-26 23:02:48 -04:00
Claude 3c440a6d27 fix(cashu): case-insensitive P2PK lock match + all-or-nothing redeem
Two bugs found auditing the P2PK redeem path:

- Hex case: a lock's `data` pubkey is sender-formatted and NUT-11 doesn't
  mandate a case, but our key index is keyed by lowercase x-only (Hex.encode
  is lowercase). An uppercase/mixed-case lock we actually hold the key for was
  falsely rejected as unredeemable. Normalize the lock to lowercase before the
  lookup, and compare identity-key locks case-insensitively.
- Multi-mint partial redeem: callers redeem one mint-group at a time, each
  swapping + publishing. An unsignable P2PK lock in a later group threw only
  after earlier groups were already spent + published, leaving a half-redeemed
  state the user was told had failed. Add `firstUnsignableP2pkLock` /
  `requireP2pkRedeemable` and pre-flight every group before redeeming any,
  mirroring the existing unknown-mint pre-check (wallet ViewModel + amy CLI).

Also document that P2PK.signWitness's `["P2PK"` prefix guard is load-bearing
for safety (prevents cross-protocol signature reuse when signing with the
identity key), not just for parsing. Adds tests for case-insensitive matching
and the pre-flight helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QKeRaX749TYnJ7oR8UpqA4
2026-07-27 01:26:36 +00:00
Claude ee5efba88d perf(cashu): avoid needless wallet-key decrypt and secret parse on redeem
Follow-up to the P2PK redeem support:

- Gate the redeem signing-key gathering behind an actual P2PK lock. The
  wallet P2PK key is decrypted from kind:17375 via the signer — a network
  round-trip on a NIP-46 bunker (and a possible approval prompt). The common
  case (a plain, unlocked token) needs none of it, so only fetch keys when
  `anyP2pkLocked()` is true. Applies to both the wallet ViewModel and the amy
  CLI token-redeem path.
- Fast-reject in `P2PK.parseSecret`: NUT-10 well-known secrets are JSON
  arrays, so bail before the throwing JSON parse when the string isn't one.
  Redeem parses every proof's secret once, so this drops a thrown+caught
  exception per plain proof (also benefits the nutzap redeem path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QKeRaX749TYnJ7oR8UpqA4
2026-07-27 01:21:29 +00:00
Claude 63ff055b53 feat(cashu): claim P2PK-locked tokens and clear errors when we can't
Pasting a P2PK-locked cashu token (NUT-11) into the wallet sent the proofs
to /v1/swap with no witness, so the mint rejected them with an opaque
`witness is missing for p2pk signature` 400. Only the NIP-61 nutzap path
signed witnesses; the generic redeem path had no P2PK support at all.

- quartz: add `signP2pkWitnesses` (pure, resolver-driven) + the
  `P2PKUnredeemableException` it throws when a locked proof's key is
  unknown, and a `CashuMintOperations.redeemToken` that signs then swaps.
- commons: `CashuWalletOps.redeemToken` now takes the wallet P2PK key and
  (local-signer-only) identity key, indexes them by x-only pubkey, and
  routes through the P2PK-aware path. Add `describeRedeemError`, which tells
  a user whose token is locked to their own identity key (e.g. Bey Wallet's
  P2PK send) — but who is on a bunker/external signer that can't sign a raw
  witness — to import their nsec elsewhere to claim it.
- amethyst: `CashuWalletState.redeemSigningKeys()` surfaces both keys
  (identity key only for a local NostrSignerInternal); the wallet ViewModel
  wires them in and reports via `describeRedeemError`.
- cli: `amy cashu receive token` passes the same keys and reports a distinct
  `p2pk_locked` error code.

Adds P2PKRedeemTest covering pass-through, x-only + compressed locks,
verifiable witnesses, and the unredeemable case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QKeRaX749TYnJ7oR8UpqA4
2026-07-26 23:39:49 +00:00
Claude aaf7affedc Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into claude/buzz-amethyst-support-nfxog7
# Conflicts:
#	amethyst/src/main/java/com/vitorpamplona/amethyst/ui/screen/loggedIn/notifications/dal/NotificationFeedFilter.kt
2026-07-26 22:41:48 +00:00
Claude 67223d612f refactor: rename BOLT12 zaps placeholder NIP to the assigned NIP-B1
The BOLT12 zaps feature was built against a placeholder NIP identifier
("nipXX" / "NIP-XX", and "NIP-2421" in one plan). The number NIP-B1 has
now been assigned, so update the naming across every module:

- rename the Quartz package `nipXXBolt12Zaps` -> `nipB1Bolt12Zaps`
  (commonMain + commonTest) and every import referencing it.
- KDocs/comments: `NIP-XX` -> `NIP-B1` in quartz, commons, amethyst, cli.
- wire binding prefix: `nostr:nipXX:` -> `nostr:nipB1:`
  (Bolt12ZapValidator.NIP_URI_PREFIX, NIP-47 pay `payer_note`, tests).
- KindNames: Bolt12 Zap / Bolt12 Offers NIP number "XX" -> "B1".
- plan doc references `NIP-2421` -> `NIP-B1`.

Leaves the unrelated `nipXXPodcasting20` package and the audio-rooms
draft (also placeholder "NIP-XX") untouched. quartz main + test compile
and spotless is clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012P3krSe92wicpswBr2CP9s
2026-07-26 20:32:16 +00:00
Claude 994bd8ee15 docs(cli): record the landed Android workflow board in the plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-26 17:23:49 +00:00
Claude 5d32cc8396 feat(cli): drive Buzz workflows from amy (trigger, run, approve/deny)
Switch the agent-support-channel prototype from the speculative agent-job
kinds (43001-43006, reserved with no upstream builder) to Buzz's real,
source-confirmed workflow primitive: 30620 def / 46020 trigger / 46001-46007
lifecycle / 46010 approval gate / 46030-46031 grant-deny (pinned against
buzz-relay's command_executor.rs). This bakes the human-approval gate into
the protocol — anyone in the channel can drive a run, but a human grants
before anything is pushed.

- commons WorkflowRunAggregator folds trigger + lifecycle + grant/deny into
  per-run state (TRIGGERED/RUNNING/AWAITING_APPROVAL/APPROVED/COMPLETED/
  FAILED/DENIED), correlating by run id (= trigger event id = approval token);
  8-case test.
- cli `amy buzz workflow` — trigger/list/show/approve/deny plus the `run`
  runner: per new trigger it does the agent work in a fresh worktree+branch,
  posts the 46010 gate, and on a later poll runs --on-approve (push + PR) and
  emits 46005 completed; a deny discards the worktree (run is DENIED).

On a real Buzz relay the relay executes the workflow YAML; self-hosted on
geode there is no engine, so amy is the runner and emits the lifecycle events
itself (documented divergence). Two store realities, both verified against
geode: decisions are fetched by author (quartz's store serves #d only for
addressable kinds, and 46030/46031 are regular), and the runner is
restart-safe (runs at the gate are rebuilt from the deterministic run id).

Also hardens the exec helper against a broken pipe when --exec doesn't read
stdin, and fixes worktree teardown to run git against the owning repo.

End-to-end headless harness (cli/tests/buzz/workflow-loop.sh) covers the
grant and deny paths through an embedded geode relay: 14/14 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-26 16:50:54 +00:00
Claude 2e92d787a8 feat(buzz): notify the requester when their agent job finishes or fails
Finished/failed jobs now land in the Notifications tab, addressed to the requester.

1. NotificationFeedFilter: an early-return branch accepts a JobResultEvent (43004) or
   JobErrorEvent (43006) when it p-tags me (the requester) and isn't my own event —
   mirroring the existing Buzz-DM branch, since I don't "follow" the workspace bot and
   the job kinds aren't in the generic relevance path. It maps to the generic NoteCard,
   so it renders the result (PR URL) / error text.

2. JobErrorEvent now carries the requester as a `p` tag (new requester() accessor + a
   `requester` param on build, mirroring JobResultEvent); the scheduler passes
   job.requester on both error paths. Previously a failed job wasn't addressed to anyone,
   so a failure could never notify. Tests updated.

Relay sourcing (verified): a job outcome reaches LocalCache via the always-on `#h`
joined-group chat tail on the workspace relay (RELAY_GROUP_ALL_TIMELINE_KINDS includes
43001-43006), so for a shared channel the team has joined, results are pulled continuously
and now notify. A channel you haven't joined (or a job event with no `#h`) would still need
a dedicated `#p`=me subscription (mirroring BuzzDmDiscovery) — not added, since the
support-channel model always has members joined.

App compiles (fdroidDebug); quartz + commons tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-26 15:05:31 +00:00
Claude 0b19a89b0c feat(buzz): geode BuzzMembershipPolicy — self-host the agent channel
A thin server-side policy so `amy serve --buzz` hosts a private, agent-authorized
Buzz workspace on one JVM process — no Block Rust relay + Postgres/Redis/MinIO.

- quartz: BuzzMembershipPolicy : FullAuthPolicy (buzz/relay/). Runs the NIP-42
  handshake, then layers Buzz's two authorization rules: (1) only members (the team)
  may read/write; (2) NIP-OA virtual membership — an un-enrolled agent key is granted
  membership for its connection when its AUTH event carries an owner-signed `auth` tag
  whose owner is a member and whose signature authorizes that agent. An unauthenticated
  read is told `auth-required` (not `restricted`) so the client runs NIP-42 and retries.
  Deliberately does NOT emit relay-signed 39000-39003 metadata or run workflows (a
  policy can't emit events; the job channel doesn't need them). 8 unit tests.
- cli: `amy serve --buzz [--members npubs]` composes the policy into geode's RelayEngine.
  Members = admins + --members.

Verified end-to-end against a live `amy serve --buzz`: a member writes (published:true),
an outsider is rejected (restricted: not a workspace member); plus the 8-case unit suite
(member/non-member/unauth/reads/allowed-kinds/NIP-OA-agent/non-member-owner/tampered).

Plan doc + cli README updated with the two relay options (amy serve --buzz vs the Rust
stack) and when you'd need each.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-26 14:12:51 +00:00
Claude a7d5fbfa8a feat(buzz): reference --exec wrapper that turns jobs into PRs
tools/buzz-agent/agent-exec.sh — the last mile from the scheduler to a live channel.

Honors the `amy buzz agent serve --exec` contract: reads the task on stdin, runs a
coding agent (Claude Code by default, or any $AGENT_CMD) inside the job's git worktree,
verifies a diff exists, commits, pushes the `claude/job-*` feature branch, opens (or
reuses) a PR, and prints the PR URL as the job result (kind-43004); any failure exits
non-zero → job error (kind-43006). It never touches the default branch and never
force-pushes — merge stays a human action on GitHub.

README documents the load-bearing guardrails, since Buzz enforces none of them: a
PR-only fine-grained token (Contents + Pull requests write, nothing else), branch
protection on the default branch (require PR + review + CI, block force-push/deletion),
and scoped intake (--accept-from) + agent tool allowlist.

Verified end-to-end against a throwaway repo with a stubbed gh + agent (happy path
pushes the branch and prints the PR URL; no-change path errors cleanly). Plan doc
follow-up #3 marked done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 20:53:21 +00:00
Claude 62799ac08c fix(buzz): harden agent scheduler + instant board feedback (audit round 2)
Second batch of audit fixes (an independent review confirmed C1 and surfaced these).

Scheduler (BuzzAgentCommands):
- H1: the runForever poll ran directly in supervisorScope, so a transient relay
  error/drain-timeout thrown by selectPending killed the unattended daemon. Wrap each
  poll in try/catch (rethrow CancellationException) and keep looping.
- H2: worktrees + branches leaked on Ctrl-C/kill (coroutine finally doesn't run) and a
  leftover branch made a job permanently un-runnable on rerun. Add a JVM shutdown hook
  that force-removes still-active worktrees/branches, and use `worktree add -B` so the
  branch is reset-or-create (idempotent).
- M2: worktree lifecycle moved inside the try so the finally always cleans up, including
  the failed-setup early return.
- M3: runOnce isolated each job in a try/catch so one throw can't cancel the batch.

App:
- M1: fileBuzzJob/upvoteBuzzJob/cancelBuzzJob now cache.justConsumeMyOwnEvent(signed)
  before publish, so the board reflects the action immediately (publish only sends to
  relays; the event wasn't in LocalCache yet, making the optimistic reload a no-op).
- L2: RelayStatusBar derives this relay's booleans with derivedStateOf, so global relay
  churn no longer recomposes the whole bar.
- L4: the upvote reaction now carries NIP-25 `p` (job author) and `k` (kind) tags.
- L5: JobBoardScreen DisposableEffect keyed on (channelId, relayUrl).

Verified: cli/tests/buzz/job-loop.sh 11/11 green; app compiles (fdroidDebug).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 20:39:43 +00:00
Claude 76524264a9 fix(buzz): drain agent-exec pipes concurrently; memoize board buckets
Audit fixes.

- BuzzAgentCommands.runExec: the responder read the child's stdout fully and THEN
  its stderr, which deadlocks a chatty child (a coding agent easily fills the ~64 KB
  stderr pipe while we block on stdout) and let the child hang past --exec-timeout
  (readBytes has no timeout). Now stdout/stderr are drained on their own coroutines
  and stdin is fed on another; the timeout is enforced by waitFor, and on expiry
  destroyForcibly closes the pipes so the readers finish. Same concurrent-drain fix
  applied to the git() helper. Verified: cli/tests/buzz/job-loop.sh 11/11 green.
- JobBoardScreen: bucket the backlog into a JobGroups holder under remember(jobs)
  so the four filter/sort passes run once per new backlog, not on every recomposition
  (e.g. each isLoading toggle).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 20:30:35 +00:00
Claude ed574bf023 feat(buzz): shared per-channel Jobs board (P0) for the agent backlog
Evaluate placement, then add the first interactive agent surface in the app.

Placement: the existing agent screens (AgentConsole/Attestation/PersonaEdit) are
owner-global telemetry entered per-relay and buried behind a channel-list footer.
A Buzz job is h-scoped to a channel, so the backlog is per-channel — it belongs
where Canvas/Forum already live (RelayGroupTopBar, gated by BuzzRelayDialect.isBuzz),
not inside the owner Console. Keep the two surfaces separate.

- JobBoardScreen + JobBoardViewModel (ui/screen/loggedIn/buzz/): the shared backlog
  of one channel. Reads the job kinds (43001-43006) + their kind-7 upvotes scoped to
  the channel h, folds via the shared BuzzJobAggregator, groups by lifecycle state
  (In progress / Queued-by-upvotes / Done / Closed), live via subscribeAsFlow. Every
  member sees the same board.
- Three write actions via new Account helpers: fileBuzzJob (43001, FAB → New task
  dialog), upvoteBuzzJob (kind-7 "+" e-tagging the job, h-scoped so the scheduler +
  board count it), cancelBuzzJob (43005, own jobs only). Merge is deliberately NOT
  here — a done job's result is its PR; merge happens on GitHub.
- Route.BuzzJobBoard(channelId, relayUrl) + AppNavigation wiring + a Checklist entry
  in RelayGroupTopBar next to the Canvas action.

Reuses the AgentConsoleViewModel fetch/watch pattern and existing MaterialSymbols
(no font regen). App compiles (fdroidDebug).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 18:57:21 +00:00
Claude e0d6febd5b feat(cli): parallel backlog scheduler for the shared Buzz agent channel
Evolve `amy buzz agent serve` from a sequential responder into a scheduler that
manages a shared feature-request backlog by itself — the model where a whole team
drives an AI in one channel, not a 1:1 chat.

- Parallel execution with isolation: `--parallel N` runs up to N jobs at once,
  each in its own `git worktree` + branch (`--worktree REPODIR`, off `--base-ref`,
  named `<branch-prefix><jobid>`) so concurrent autonomous runs never clobber one
  working tree. `--parallel > 1` requires `--worktree`; worktree add/remove is
  mutex-serialized while the agent work runs concurrently. Branch/worktree/base-ref
  are exported to `--exec` (BUZZ_BRANCH/WORKTREE/BASE_REF) so it commits, pushes the
  branch, and opens the PR. Merge stays on GitHub — never here.
- Group-driven priority: BuzzJobAggregator now folds kind-7 upvotes (distinct
  reactors, dislikes excluded) into JobView.upvotes, and `byPriority` orders the
  backlog most-upvoted-first, oldest-first tiebreak. The stack reprioritizes itself
  as the channel reacts. `buzz job list/show` surface upvotes.
- Channel-as-allowlist: `--accept-from-channel` obeys any member of the channel's
  kind-39002 roster ("anyone in the channel can drive"), union with explicit
  `--accept-from` npubs.
- Harness cli/tests/buzz/job-loop.sh gains a parallel case (3 jobs, --parallel 3,
  one branch/worktree each, cleaned up); aggregator gains upvote + priority tests.
  11/11 harness checks + all unit tests green.

Fits entirely inside amy: amy is the scheduler, the coding agent is whatever
`--exec` points at, GitHub owns merge. Plan doc updated with the model + the
"can this live in Amy" architecture note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 18:19:40 +00:00
Claude 635e785753 feat(cli): buzz agent-job loop — file/track jobs + a driving responder
Prototype the "human drives an AI coding agent to develop Amethyst" support
channel on top of the existing block/buzz integration, all through amy.

- commons: BuzzJobAggregator (BuzzJobs.kt) — a pure, tested folder that
  correlates the Buzz agent-job kinds (43001-43006) by their `e` request
  reference into JobView records with a REQUESTED→ACCEPTED→IN_PROGRESS→
  COMPLETED/FAILED/CANCELLED state machine (newest terminal wins). Shared so a
  future mobile Jobs board reuses one correlation path. 9 unit tests.
- cli: `amy buzz job request|list|show|cancel` (requester side) and
  `amy buzz agent serve --exec CMD` (the responder loop): polls for REQUESTED
  jobs targeting my key, gates intake on `--accept-from` (allowlist) and
  `--channel`, then accepts (43002) → progress (43003) → runs `sh -c CMD`
  (task text on stdin; BUZZ_JOB_ID/REQUESTER/CHANNEL/RELAY/AGENT in env) →
  result (43004) or error (43006). Point `--exec` at a coding agent to drive it.
- cli/tests/buzz/job-loop.sh — self-contained headless harness over an embedded
  `amy serve` relay; asserts the full loop AND the permission gate (an allowlist
  excluding the requester handles nothing).
- Design doc cli/plans/2026-07-25-buzz-agent-support-channel.md: the three-layer
  permission model (Buzz scopes by identity, not capability flags — so
  "can't merge/destroy main" lives in GitHub branch protection + the `--exec`
  credential, not the relay), the MVP architecture, and the prioritized mobile
  app gap list (approvals inbox, jobs board, diff/PR review, …).

Schema caveat: kinds 43001-43006 are reserved in Buzz with no upstream builder;
the tag layout is Quartz's best-effort model, to be reconciled upstream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011mApqAbr8vkLC7gUDjavu6
2026-07-25 17:18:30 +00:00
Claude 42e69fd424 fix(bolt12): audit fixes — verify crash, decode hardening, send robustness
- amy bolt12 verify: the id-only query with a <Bolt12ZapEvent> type crashed
  with ClassCastException when the id pointed at a non-9736 event. Constrain
  the filter to kind 9736 and cast defensively (query<Event>() as?), returning
  a clean not_found instead.
- Bolt12ZapActions.decodeOffer/decodeProof: a parseable bech32 with an
  over-8-byte amount TLV threw in tu64 on field read instead of honoring the
  null contract; guarded the field extraction in runCatching. Adds a
  malformed-amount regression test.
- Account.sendBolt12Zap: wrap the NWC response callback in try/catch/finally so
  a post-payment receipt-assembly failure (e.g. a remote signer error) steps
  progress and surfaces "paid, no receipt" instead of vanishing as an uncaught
  coroutine exception.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SpgpWLKzgD7vS9Fs4CXTR3
2026-07-25 01:23:23 +00:00
Claude 57f95cf154 feat(cli): add amy bolt12 — decode, verify, offers, and two-step send
Adds a BOLT12 zap (NIP-XX) command group over a new shared commons
Bolt12ZapActions (assembly-only, mirrors ZapActions):

  bolt12 decode LNO1|LNP1        decode an offer or payer proof
  bolt12 verify EVENT-ID         validate a kind:9736 in the local store
  bolt12 offer get/set           read/publish a kind:10058 offer list
  bolt12 intent … / zap …        two-step out-of-band send (amy has no NWC
                                  rail): intent prints the payer_note; zap
                                  wraps the signed intent + settled proof
                                  into a validated kind:9736 and publishes

Keeps cli a thin assembly layer — all logic is quartz's Bolt12ZapBuilder/
Validator/codecs via commons Bolt12ZapActions. Adds Bolt12ZapActionsTest;
updates README + ROADMAP. Interop harness and NWC-fetched proofs remain TODO.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SpgpWLKzgD7vS9Fs4CXTR3
2026-07-25 00:22:42 +00:00
Claude a7748dfda5 fix: clear compiler warnings across all modules
Sweep of Kotlin compiler warnings in every module's main source sets
(quartz, commons, cli, desktopApp, amethyst, nappletHost).

Genuine code fixes:
- Drop unnecessary !!/safe-calls and redundant elvis/casts (OkHttp's
  now-non-null `body`, smart-cast callbacks, non-null String receivers).
- Remove provably-redundant conditions (`canvas == null` after a
  non-null content check; `account != null` implied by `canModerate`).
- Migrate deprecated kotlinx.collections.immutable persistent ops
  (add/remove/put/addAll -> adding/removing/putting/addingAll).
- Migrate LocalClipboardManager -> LocalClipboard (+ scoped setText),
  ContextCompat.startActivity -> context.startActivity, TabRow ->
  SecondaryTabRow, and @ConsistentCopyVisibility on a private-ctor data class.
- Delete dead ReceiveDialog.onGenerate param (never invoked).
- Fix a platform-Boolean type-mismatch on a ThreadLocal read.

Deprecations with no available successor are narrowly @Suppress-ed with
a reason: androidx.security.crypto (EncryptedSharedPreferences/MasterKey),
androidx.privacysandbox.ui, WebView.databaseEnabled, BluetoothDevice
.connectGatt, media3 setEnableAudioTrackPlaybackParams, FirebaseMessaging
.token, and InputMethodManager.SHOW_IMPLICIT.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015Xb9YbBqhdZsHxMzitmyvn
2026-07-24 16:36:17 +00:00
Claude bb39fb29fc feat(buzz): invite-link redemption + live-interop fixes (amy)
Validated against the production relay wss://amethyst.communities.buzz.xyz
by joining and running a full DM round-trip. Adds the join primitive and
fixes the interop gaps that live testing surfaced.

- quartz: BuzzInviteLink — parse `https://<host>/invite/<token>` (relay-signed
  base64url payload → community/role/expiry). A Buzz invite is NOT a NIP-29
  code; it is redeemed over HTTP against the tenant host. Unit-tested with a
  real token; rejects the Concord `/invite/<naddr>#…` shape (no collision).
- cli: `amy buzz join <invite-url>` — the real 3-step claim: GET /api/join-policy,
  POST /api/invites/accept-policy, then NIP-98-signed POST /api/invites/claim.
  Proven live (status: joined, role: member).
- cli: Context.publish now authenticates-then-retries on an `auth-required`
  relay (warm the connection with a pendingOnAuthRequired REQ, then re-publish)
  — the write path had no NIP-42 handling, so every Buzz write was rejected.
- cli: Buzz reads (dm list / read / console / personas) use the auth-aware
  drain (pendingOnAuthRequired).
- cli: `dm open` surfaces the relay's synchronous OK `response:{channel_id}` —
  the authoritative DM channel id (the relay assigns it; it is not polled).
- cli: `dm list` rewritten to the relay's actual discovery — kind-44100
  member-added notifications (#p=me) filtered to the kind-40099 `dm_created`
  channels. The deployed relay does NOT emit kind-41001.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J8KBSw6smQRyXLiWHeDsZ8
2026-07-22 14:56:37 +00:00
Claude c79e7d361f feat(buzz): wire Buzz direct messages end-to-end (app + amy)
A Buzz DM is a relay-authoritative NIP-29 group whose h/id is a
relay-generated UUID, so its timeline reuses the whole relay-group chat
stack unchanged. This adds the missing discovery + product layer:

- commons: BuzzDmRegistry — process-wide registry fed by LocalCache from
  the relay-signed DmCreatedEvent (41001) and per-viewer DmVisibilityEvent
  (30622); tracks conversations (channel id -> participants/relay) and the
  viewer's hidden set. Unit-tested.
- LocalCache: record 41001/30622 into the registry on consume (was
  store-only).
- Account: openBuzzDm (41010), hideBuzzDm (41012), addBuzzDmMember (41011).
  The relay assigns the channel UUID and confirms via 41001 — we never
  mint it.
- Android: BuzzDmListViewModel (two-phase fetch: discover 41001/30622 #p=me,
  then fetch each DM's 39000-39003 roster so the shared composer's member
  gate passes), BuzzDmListScreen (inbox), BuzzNewDmScreen (publish 41010,
  await the 41001, jump into the shared RelayGroupChatScreen). Reached from
  a Direct Messages card on the Workspaces tab.
- CLI: amy buzz dm list/open/hide/add-member, mirroring buzz-cli.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J8KBSw6smQRyXLiWHeDsZ8
2026-07-22 14:09:45 +00:00
Claude 12aa9fe954 feat(cli): first-class 'amy buzz' commands for block/buzz workspaces
Thin assembly over quartz + commons (no new protocol in cli/):
- buzz post RELAY GID <text>  — publish a kind-40002 stream message (h-scoped)
- buzz read RELAY GID         — drain the recent human-visible timeline (9/40002/40099)
- buzz attest AGENT           — sign a NIP-OA OwnerAttestation offline, print the auth tag
- buzz console [--relays]     — drain kind-44200 turn metrics (#p=me), NIP-44-decrypt,
                                and aggregate via the shared commons AgentFleetAggregator
- buzz personas [--relays]    — list my kind-30175 personas (newest per slug)

Join/leave/create reuse 'amy relaygroup' (Buzz workspaces are NIP-29 groups). Wired
into Main dispatch + usage; README command table + ROADMAP updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J8KBSw6smQRyXLiWHeDsZ8
2026-07-22 05:01:25 +00:00
Claude 5f5356c0fe fix: complete PR clone multi-value, git-status auth spoofing, CLI robustness
Addresses review findings from a merge-time audit.

- **Complete the headline multi-value `clone` fix for PRs** (was applied only to
  kind:30617). GitPullRequestEvent (1618) and GitPullRequestUpdateEvent (1619)
  carry `clone` with the same spec shape but still emitted repeated single-value
  tags and read only the first value — so the exact interop bug this branch set
  out to kill was still live for PRs, both directions (ngit keeps only the last
  repeated tag; we lost every URL after the first from ngit's multi-value tag).
  Now both emit one multi-value `["clone", …]` tag and read both forms. Verified
  on the wire + GitNip34InteropTest + CLI harness (40 checks).

- **Android git-status spoofing (GitStatusIndex)**: newest-status-wins with no
  author check meant anyone could publish a kind-1632 and make someone else's
  issue render closed. Now filter statuses to the repository owner (from the
  status's own `a` tag), declared maintainers (from the cached announcement), or
  the target item's author — matching NIP-34 and the CLI's derivation. Pre-existing
  on main; this branch made the CLI/Android divergence visible.

- **CLI robustness**: `git comment`/`git patch` no longer block forever reading
  stdin on an interactive TTY (amy is non-interactive — error instead). The local
  `git` subprocesses in `git init`/`git apply` now drain stdout on a side thread
  under a bounded `waitFor` + `destroyForcibly`, so a wedged git can't hang the
  CLI.

Left as a follow-up (cosmetic): GitBrowseCommands.candidateUrls duplicates
GitRepositoryBrowserViewModel's — worth lifting to shared code, not worth the
cross-module coupling here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude 4e0ac212ee fix(cli): second audit pass — read routing, status perf, publish-ack + robustness
Findings from a second review round (two independent reviewers), with fixes:

Read path (git issues/patches/prs/thread):
- **Reads ignored the repo's own relays** (correctness). They queried only the
  account outbox/bootstrap (general relays); NIP-34 events live on the repo
  announcement's advertised relays (often GRASP/git-specific), which general
  relays don't mirror — so `amy git issues <repo>` with no --relay could return
  empty. Now fetch the announcement once and read from queryTargets ∪ its
  advertised `relays`. Verified live: `git issues`/`git prs` on the amethyst
  repo now return real events (and derive `closed`) with NO --relay.
- **O(items × statuses) status rescan** with un-memoized `rootEventId()` reparse
  → pre-group statuses by root id once (O(1) lookup per item).
- **Status query could truncate / exceed relay caps**: statuses are now paged
  (`drainAllPages`) and the `#e` id set is chunked to 50 (under the common
  ~100-value relay filter cap).
- **Latency regression**: capped the list `drainAllPages` idle timeout to 12s
  (was the 30s default; `drain` had been 8s).
- **Nondeterministic status on same-second ties** → deterministic id tie-break.
- Reuse the fetched repo for the maintainer set (removes a redundant round-trip).

Write path:
- **`git init` silently reported success when the 30618 state publish failed**
  — its ack was dropped. Now surfaced as `state_published_to`/`state_rejected_by`
  with a stderr warning on total rejection.
- **`git apply`** feeds stdin as UTF-8 (was JVM default charset — corrupted
  non-ASCII patches) and joins the stdin thread in `finally` (no leak on error).
- **`normalizeCloneUrl`** drops the port from `ssh://git@host:port/…` (it was
  carried into the https URL, making it unreachable).
- **Delivery fallback** to the account outbox (repo unresolved / no advertised
  relays) now warns to stderr instead of reporting silent success.

Known limitation (documented, not fixed): patch-revision-chain status derivation
follows only the root item, and `git thread` shows first-level replies only
(nested trees and 1619 PR-updates are out of scope). 38/38 harness green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude 63d01c9287 fix(cli): audit fixes — shallow-clone euc, read truncation, process deadlock
Findings from a review pass over the git-parity branch, with fixes:

- **`git init` announced a WRONG earliest-unique-commit on shallow clones**
  (interop-critical). `git rev-list --max-parents=0 HEAD` returns the shallow
  boundary commits, not the true root, so the repo would be announced under a
  different cross-fork identity than ngit computes. Now: detect shallow clones
  and omit the euc with a warning to pass `--earliest-commit`; on full clones
  derive the deterministic `--first-parent` mainline root instead of an
  arbitrary `tail -1`.

- **`git issues|patches|prs` silently truncated and mis-derived status** on
  active repos: one single-page `drain` pulled items AND status events under a
  shared cap, so status events (newer, more numerous) could crowd items out of
  the window and the close-status that determines an item's state could fall
  outside it → a closed item read as open. Now paginate the items
  (`drainAllPages`) and fetch exactly the statuses that `e`-reference them.
  Verified on the live amethyst repo: 51 PRs paginated, 19 correctly closed.

- **Pipe-buffer deadlocks** (latent): `GitInitCommand.git()` discards stderr to
  the OS (a chatty command can no longer fill its stderr pipe and hang the
  stdout read); `GitApplyCommand.runGit()` writes stdin on a background thread
  while draining stdout, so a patch larger than the pipe buffer can't deadlock.

- Minor: `git cat` binary detection uses an index loop instead of boxing 8000
  bytes; `GitRepositoryEvent.clones()/webs()` dedupe.

The harness `git init` test now runs against a fresh full checkout (this repo's
CI checkout is shallow) and adds a shallow-clone case asserting the euc is
omitted. 38/38.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude fa32ea50a3 test(cli): live interop check against the real ngit-published amethyst repo
Adds a `--live` block that reads the actual amethyst repository ngit publishes
to relay.ngit.dev and asserts our reader parses ngit's real multi-value `clone`
tag (currently 4 URLs) plus its published issues. This is the real-world proof
of the multi-value interop fix: the pre-fix reader would have surfaced only the
first clone URL. Opt-in (needs network + the live relay), skipped by default.

Verified manually end-to-end against the live repo: repo announcement (4 clone
URLs), issues (1621), patches (1617), pull requests (1618, with a real `closed`
status derived from ngit's status event), and a NIP-22 comment via `git thread`
all read correctly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude 1a77c95531 fix(quartz): NIP-34 wire-format interop with ngit (clone/web, issue p, plain r)
Verified Amethyst's NIP-34 events byte-for-byte against the ngit reference
implementation (DanConwayDev/ngit-cli) and the spec, and fixed three real
interop divergences in quartz — so ngit/gitworkshop and Amethyst read each
other's git repos, issues, patches, and PRs without losing data.

- Repository announcement `clone`/`web` were emitted as REPEATED single-value
  tags (`["clone", a]`, `["clone", b]`). The spec and ngit use ONE multi-value
  tag (`["clone", a, b]`), and ngit's parser keeps only the LAST of repeated
  known tags — so multi-URL repos silently lost every URL but one in both
  directions. Now emitted as a single multi-value tag; `clones()`/`webs()` read
  BOTH the spec form and the legacy repeated form, so old events still parse.
  (`relays`/`maintainers` were already correct multi-value tags.)

- Issues (kind 1621) were missing the `["p", <repo-owner>]` tag that patches and
  PRs already include — a maintainer watching `#p` wouldn't see them. The
  builder now adds it (fixes both the CLI and the Android issue-creation path,
  which both passed an empty notify list).

- Patch / PR / PR-update `r` tags carried the `"euc"` marker
  (`["r", commit, "euc"]`). Per the spec and ngit that marker belongs only on
  the kind-30617 announcement; other `r` tags are plain `["r", commit]`. A `#r`
  filter matches either shape, so this is a spec-compliance/byte-parity fix.

`alt` (NIP-31) tags are intentionally still omitted — quartz treats the generic
alt client-hint as deprecated, and ngit/gitworkshop parse the structured tags,
so it isn't required for interop.

Adds `GitNip34InteropTest` (5 cases: multi-value write, tolerant read of both
forms, issue p-tag, plain patch r-tag) and 4 wire-format assertions to the CLI
git harness (37 offline). No regressions in the nip34 or Search suites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude d3e208322c feat(cli): add amy git label (NIP-32) and amy git apply (patch → working tree)
Close two more ngit/nak parity gaps:

- `git label TARGET LABEL[,LABEL]` — attach NIP-32 kind:1985 labels to an
  issue/patch/PR (the `ngit pr label` / `issue label` surface), over quartz's
  existing `LabelEvent`. Namespace defaults to `ugc`; `--namespace` overrides.
- `git apply PATCH_ID` — fetch a kind:1617 patch and apply it to the local
  working tree via `git am` (the `nak git patch apply` / `ngit pr apply`
  surface); `--check` dry-runs `git apply --check`, `--print` emits the patch.
  Shells out to `git` like `git init`, since it operates on the local checkout.

Verified end-to-end: a patch published to a relay, fetched, and `git am`'d as a
real commit into a scratch repo; labels land as kind 1985. The harness gains 5
assertions (label + a full publish→apply round-trip), now 33 offline.

Remaining out-of-scope items are documented: git-packfile push (needs a git
write layer quartz lacks) and NIP-34 cover notes (kind 1624, no quartz builder).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude b06184ac49 feat(cli): add amy git init — bootstrap a repo from the local git checkout
Match `ngit init` / `nak git init`: read the local git repository and publish a
NIP-34 repository announcement, deriving the fields instead of making the user
type them. Shells out to `git` to determine the name (top-level dir), clone URL
(origin remote, ssh→https normalized), earliest-unique-commit (root commit),
and — for the accompanying kind:30618 state — the branch/tag tips and HEAD.
Publishes the 30617 announcement and (unless `--no-state`) the 30618 state in
one shot. Every derived value is overridable with a flag; outside a git repo
the derivation is skipped and `--name`/`--clone` are supplied manually.

This is the one `amy git` verb that shells out to `git`, since it is inherently
about the local working tree — exactly like the tools it mirrors.

Verified against the amethyst checkout itself (derives name=amethyst, the origin
clone URL, the root commit as EUC, and a 30618 with the live branches + HEAD).
The harness gains 4 assertions driving `git init` against its own checkout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:58 +00:00
Claude 45d33c016e feat(cli): add amy git browse|cat|log — read git objects over smart-HTTP
Give `amy git` the git-object read side of `nak git download` / a shallow
clone. `browse` lists a repo's tree, `cat` prints (or `--out` writes) a file at
a ref, and `log` shows recent commit history — all over the git smart-HTTP v2
protocol via quartz's `GitHttpClient` (the same shallow-clone path the Android
repo browser uses). REPO may be a NIP-34 coordinate/naddr (whose announcement
supplies the clone URL) or a raw http(s) clone URL; `--clone` and `--ref`
override the URL and branch/tag.

Read-only: pushing git objects back to clone/GRASP servers stays out of scope.

Verified live against a public repo (octocat/Hello-World) — browse/cat/log all
return correct trees, blobs, and history. The harness gains a `--live` block
(28 assertions with `--live`, 24 in the default offline run) exercising these
against `$LIVE_REPO`, skipped by default since it needs a reachable git host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:57 +00:00
Claude 9922eef9f7 feat(cli): add amy git grasp list|set (NIP-34 GRASP server list, kind 10317)
Declare/read a user's preferred GRASP (Git-over-Nostr hosting) servers in
preference order — the NIP-65-style list `ngit`/`nak git` consult to decide
where PR tip branches (`refs/nostr/<pr-id>`) get pushed. `set` publishes a
kind:10317 to the outbox; `list` reads it back cache-first (anonymous-capable).
Thin assembly over quartz `UserGraspListEvent`. The git push itself stays out
of scope, as with the rest of the packfile transport.

Extends the git NIP-34 harness with a grasp round-trip (24 assertions) and
updates the README/ROADMAP/help tables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:57 +00:00
Claude ad66e6c224 feat(cli): full NIP-34 git collaboration parity for amy git
Extend `amy git` from repo announce/list/show/issue to the complete
pure-Nostr surface of `ngit` and `nak git`, so every NIP-34 collaboration
flow is scriptable without a GUI.

New sub-verbs (all thin assembly over quartz's `nip34Git` builders):

- `git state`   — kind:30618 repository state (branch/tag tips + HEAD)
- `git patch`   — kind:1617 patch from `git format-patch` (--file or stdin),
                  with --root/--root-revision, --commit, --parent-commit,
                  and --in-reply-to for revision chains
- `git pr` / `git pr-update` — kind:1618 pull request + kind:1619 tip update
- `git comment` — NIP-22 kind:1111 reply on an issue/patch/PR/repo (the
                  modern replacement for the deprecated kind:1622 git reply)
- `git open|applied|close|draft` — kind:1630/1631/1632/1633 status events
                  (aliases `merged`/`resolved` for applied); applied carries
                  --merge-commit / --commit / --patch
- `git issues|patches|prs` — list a repo's items with status derived from the
                  newest authoritative (owner/maintainer/author) status event,
                  with --open/--applied/--closed/--draft/--status filters
- `git thread`  — one item plus its status timeline and comments

Shared parsing/fetch/routing glue lives in `GitSupport`; the existing
announce/list/show/issue verbs now reuse it. The git *packfile* transport
(clone/fetch/push of real objects to clone/GRASP servers) stays out of
scope — it needs a git plumbing layer, not an event builder — and is
documented as such.

Adds `cli/tests/git/git-nip34-headless.sh` (21 assertions, drives the whole
flow against `amy serve` and checks the status-deriving reads) and updates
the README/ROADMAP command tables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKMaNoK5M2PQKCAxhxWzPr
2026-07-21 03:37:57 +00:00
Vitor PamplonaandGitHub 15ce992b61 Merge pull request #3650 from vitorpamplona/fix/napplet-account-isolation-and-consent
fix: v1.13.0 pre-release QA — napplet account isolation, Concord authority, and 30 other fixes
2026-07-20 13:28:41 -04:00
Vitor PamplonaandClaude Opus 4.8 4e7242a295 feat(concord): assign CORD-04 roles from the Members roster
`Account.grantConcordRole` had been implemented with zero callers, so role
grants were unreachable from the app while the changelog claimed they ship.
This adds the missing surface: a "Roles…" item beside "Make admin" opening a
multi-select over the roles the viewer may hand out.

Both rank rules are enforced by delegating to `AuthorityResolver` rather than
reimplementing them:

- assignable roles are `roles().filter { myRank < it.position }` — the fold
  drops a grant whose granter does not strictly outrank every assigned role, so
  offering one at or above our own position would publish an edition that every
  client then silently discards;
- reachable members are `authority.canActOn(me, target, MANAGE_ROLES)`, which
  already folds the whole rule (hold the bit, not banned, target isn't the
  owner, strictly outrank) and makes self-promotion fall out for free.

Out-of-reach members show the item disabled *with a reason* instead of omitting
it, so there is no silently no-op control.

The grant REPLACES a member's role set rather than merging into it, so the
dialog preselects their current roles. That preselection is provably complete:
a member's rank is the lowest position they hold, and the dialog only opens
when we strictly outrank that rank, so every role they hold sits strictly below
us and is therefore rendered — no held role can be silently stripped.

`amy concord roles` also gained a `grants:` section reading the post-fixpoint
`authority.roleHolders()`. It previously printed role *definitions* but never
the *grants*, which made the fold outcome unverifiable from the CLI; a
rank-violating grant now shows up as visibly absent rather than as if it landed.

Device-verified on a test community (Admin/QA Lead/Helper/Greeter): the picker
hides roles above the viewer, disables on members who outrank them, preselects
correctly, and a saved grant survived the fold and a fresh relay drain read
back from a second client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 11:35:48 -04:00
Vitor PamplonaandClaude Opus 4.8 62440748a7 fix(concord): stop a rejected edition orphaning the honest ones after it
An unauthorized control edition in the middle of an entity's chain
permanently froze that entity. Observed on device for a member's GRANT:

    v0 owner    (grant mods)
    v1 owner    (grant admins)     <- fold stopped here, forever
    v2 MIDTIER  (escalation, correctly rejected)
    v3,v4,v5 owner                    orphaned, unreachable

`AuthorityResolver` filtered unauthorized editions out BEFORE calling
`EditionFold.foldEntity`, and the walk only advances when the next
version cites the current head's hash. Removing v2 severed the chain, so
every honest edition above it was lost. Any member could permanently
freeze any member's role assignment — including the owner's ability to
change it — with a single event, recoverable only by a Refounding. It
predates the recent rank gates (verified with a zero-role identity); the
gates only widen which editions can poison.

Armada does not have this bug, and its approach settles the design.
Reading its control-plane fold (read for semantics only — Armada is
AGPLv3, Amethyst is MIT, no code taken): the chain walk runs over the
UNFILTERED set, producing an ordered candidate list — chain-verified head
first, then every remaining edition version-descending — and authority is
applied AFTERWARDS, per candidate, picking the first admissible one. A
rejected edition is skipped during the ascending admissibility walk
without truncating it. For the chain above, Armada picks v5.

So the fix is not to filter later but to gate later: `EditionFold` gains
candidate-based gated folding, and the resolver and community state now
gate per candidate instead of pre-filtering the pool. Authority checks
themselves are unchanged — only WHEN they run moved. Applied to ROLE,
GRANT, BANLIST, CHANNEL, METADATA and the authorized-head map.

The writer had to be fixed too, for a sharper reason than expected. With
an ungated `headOf`, a rogue banlist edition at the tip is read as
current state, so the owner's next ban REPUBLISHES THE ROGUE'S CONTENT
UNDER THE OWNER'S SIGNATURE — an unauthorized empty banlist laundered
into an owner-signed one the moment the owner bans anyone else. Tolerant
reading cannot heal that, because the resulting edition is genuinely
authorized. `ConcordModeration.headOf` now folds the authority-gated
heads, and `owner` is a REQUIRED parameter rather than defaulted, since a
silently-wrong default here is a consensus footgun.

Banlist healing is preserved with one necessary change: the ancestry walk
now runs over the full pool rather than the authorized subset. Ancestry is
structural — walking only authorized editions stops at the rejected one
and misreads genuine ancestors as concurrent forks, resurrecting bans an
unban had cleared.

Six regression tests, each verified to fail without the fix. Two process
notes worth recording: the first "without the fix" run reported BUILD
SUCCESSFUL because Gradle served a stale up-to-date `jvmTest` — trusting
it would have meant concluding the tests were worthless. And the
forged-edition test initially passed both ways because the forgery's
content coincided with the honest outcome; it was rewritten so the
mid-chain arm genuinely discriminates.

The rank-gate, rogue-higher-version, floor and rollback tests all pass
unchanged.

Known gap: `headOf` gates through the per-kind permission map, which is
coarser than the resolver's rank gates, so the writer can still pick a
head the reader rejects when an in-permission but out-of-rank edition
sits at the tip. Tolerant reading makes that benign, but it is not an
exact reader/writer match; tightening it needs the resolver to expose
per-entity heads.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 09:06:13 -04:00
davotoula 2d29f7ccda no empty methods
use constants instead of repeating strings
2026-07-20 13:58:06 +01:00
Vitor PamplonaandClaude Opus 4.8 73d59a29bf fix(nip46): gate identity reads on pairing; make decrypt consent informed
Two problems in the remote signer, both about a client getting something
without the user meaningfully agreeing to it.

**`get_public_key` and `get_relays` answered anyone.** Every other method
runs through `ifAuthorized`; these did not, and nothing required a prior
successful `connect`. The service decrypts and dispatches any well-formed
kind-24133 envelope, so anyone holding the `bunker://` URI — pasted into a
malicious app, posted for support, leaked in a screenshot — could ask it
which account it belongs to, without the secret and without connecting.
`get_relays` additionally handed over the inbox relay set. That defeated
the transport/identity split, which otherwise works: the relay-visible
traffic really is anonymous, since the p-tag and author are a transport
key and the payload is NIP-44.

Both now require the client to be paired. The authorizer interface gains
`isPaired` with NO default, so a future authorizer has to state its own
rule rather than silently inheriting "everyone is paired".

`ping` is deliberately left open. It reveals nothing the caller does not
already have — a signer is alive at a pubkey they hold — and first-party
behaviour could be confirmed but third-party clients that ping before
connecting could not be ruled out. Breaking a legitimate handshake to
close a minor oracle is a bad trade. The choice is pinned by a test that
also asserts the pairing check is never consulted, so it stays deliberate
rather than drifting back by accident.

**Decrypt consent showed nothing at all.** The bridge populated the
content preview and raw data only for signing requests, so a decrypt
request produced an empty preview block — no ciphertext, no counterparty,
not even the "Show event" toggle — leaving "AppName wants to read your
private messages" with *Allow always* as the primary button. Meanwhile
the coordinator documented the opposite: "Amethyst decrypts first, then
asks permission to expose." That was never implemented.

Now:
- The counterparty is resolved and shown, so the prompt reads "…read your
  private messages **with Alice**". It never degrades to nothing —
  cached name, else a shortened npub. Knowing *whose* messages is a
  categorically different decision.
- The message is decrypted BEFORE prompting and the plaintext is the
  preview, as documented. It is a local operation and nothing is exposed
  until approval. Failure, blank and hang all collapse to an explanatory
  string under a timeout, so the dialog is never empty and cannot stall.
- A narrower grant is offered ALONGSIDE the broad one, not instead of it:
  `DecryptFrom(counterparty)` keyed `decrypt:<hex>` next to `Decrypt`.
  The dialog's primary button becomes "Always allow for Alice" with the
  broad option demoted. Because the ledger stores an opaque op key, no
  persisted decision migrates and the storage format is untouched.

  Scoping decrypt per counterparty *instead* would have been worse than
  the bug: a DM client would prompt once per conversation, training users
  to approve everything. A narrow option beside the broad one gives
  granularity without the prompt explosion.

Also fixes a latent bug found on the way: `AllowForSession` recorded the
*requested* op rather than the *granted* one, which would have widened a
narrow session grant back to broad.

Verified by three sabotage passes; the tests that stayed green under them
are the intended negative guards. One existing test asserted the buggy
behaviour outright ("public reads are never gated") and was rewritten.

Not done: the batched consent sheet still records the broad op for
"remember" — offering the narrow choice per row there is a UX design
question, not a mechanical change.

Needs a device check before release: the decrypt preview runs the account
signer before consent. That is free for a local key, but an account backed
by an external NIP-55 signer (Amber) may show Amber's own prompt ahead of
Amethyst's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 21:28:05 -04:00
Vitor PamplonaandClaude Opus 4.8 6045e28830 fix(cashu): validate a token's mint URL before contacting it
`MintHttpClient` only trimmed trailing slashes — no scheme check, no host
check — and `token.mint` comes verbatim from any pasted or posted Cashu
token. Tapping Redeem on a token in someone's note therefore made the
device issue HTTP requests to an arbitrary URL: `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`,
LAN addresses, `169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata), any scheme at all —
plus it disclosed the user's IP to whoever controlled the URL.

Validation now runs in the constructor, so no caller can issue a request
before it. The rule: `https://` to a public host, or `http://` to a
`.onion` host, and nothing else. Onion mints matter — a blanket
"https only" rule would have silently broken every Tor mint.

Rejected hosts cover the private/loopback/link-local/unique-local ranges
plus CGNAT, multicast, reserved and `0/8`: none is a public unicast host,
so allowing them buys nothing and leaks reachability.

The bypasses are what make this worth care, and each has a test:
IPv4-mapped and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`, `::127.0.0.1`),
the full `inet_aton` spellings (`2130706433`, `0177.0.0.1`, `0x7f000001`,
`127.1`), trailing-dot hosts, and userinfo disguise
(`https://mint.example.com@127.0.0.1/`) — handled by splitting on the
LAST `@`. The host parse is hand-rolled rather than delegated to
`java.net.URI`/`HttpUrl` precisely because those normalise these forms
inconsistently.

A mint the user added to their own wallet is exempt from the host and
https rules — a self-hosted mint on a LAN is a legitimate setup, and the
threat here is a *pasted, untrusted* token pointing inward, not a mint
the user chose. The exemption never relaxes the scheme check. It is
threaded properly rather than TODO'd: the melt path passes the wallet's
known mints and marks the mint user-configured only on a match; the
wallet ops and CLI pass it directly, since those URLs are the user's own.

Refusal gets its own message rather than reusing the mint-error string,
whose wording would have misattributed our own refusal to the mint.

DNS rebinding is out of scope and noted in a comment — the check runs
pre-resolution and cannot defend against a host that resolves differently
on the second lookup.

Verified by disabling the scheme and host checks: 11 of 20 tests fail,
every rejection case among them, and every allow case still passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 21:02:59 -04:00
Claude 4efb2cca98 fix(quartz,cli): audit fixes — bounded drains, no event loss, honest verdicts, false-reject traps
Adversarial audit of the PR's own changes (8 finder angles, verified
before fixing). Quartz core:

- fetchAll-family drains get a wall-clock ceiling (maxTotalMs, default
  10x the idle window, delay()-watchdog: cancellable and virtual-time
  testable). The pure idle window was unbounded when a relay trickled
  events forever — sandboxed napplet queries, set -e fetches, and
  marmot await stuck inside one drain. Streaming relays still finish.
- The suspending onEvent hook no longer runs inside a cancellable
  timeout scope (an expiring window could cancel verifyAndStore
  mid-write and silently drop a received event); the timeout is armed
  only when the channels are dry (no per-message timeout-job churn).
- fetchAll is a projection over fetchAllWithHooks: fixes its
  unsynchronized events/seenIds mutation from concurrent socket
  threads and deletes the duplicate loop + per-event activity channel.
- publishAndConfirmDetailed regains its only-responders contract
  (synthetic no-response entries no longer render as 'relay rejected
  your message' in app callers); results built by pure associateWith;
  shared failure-reason constants + PublishResult.isTransportFailure.
- NIP-65 mutations: split read+write r-tags for the same URL now merge
  to BOTH instead of last-wins dropping a facet (+ test).
- TcpProber's 128-thread pool drains after 60s idle.

CLI:

- publishGuard: all-transport failure exits 124 as timeout; rejected/1
  is reserved for an actual OK-false answer.
- --help anywhere in argv is hoisted centrally; 'amy notes post "x"
  --help' prints usage instead of publishing.
- rejectUnknown false-reject traps fixed: geochat --no-fetch behind an
  early return, and 13 elvis-alias short-circuit sites read eagerly.
- Aliases load once per Context and only match name-shaped inputs (no
  shadowing a real npub/NIP-05/hex); stderr color requires a
  positively-known terminal (TERM sniff polluted captured logs).
- Relay-CSV strictness unified on RawEventSupport.relayFlag (post,
  graperank publish/followers/register no longer silently drop
  malformed URLs); Args.timeoutMs(+OrNull) replaces 27 hand-rolled
  conversions, all strict; offer/debit --timeout > 3600 rejected with
  a 'looks like milliseconds' hint; NPub.create idiom; stale jq .id in
  the marmot reactions harness; printUsage drift (offer pay --with,
  profile --clink-offer, search --kind).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CP4kfLCa3wWtE8Khy21Pkj
2026-07-19 00:17:43 +00:00
Claude 962d1706dc fix(quartz): fetchAll-family timeouts are idle windows, not absolute deadlines
The fetchAll/fetchAllWithHooks accessories wrapped their whole
collection loop in one withTimeoutOrNull, so a relay actively
streaming a large backlog was cropped mid-delivery the moment the
absolute deadline hit — even though the loop already has proper
terminal conditions (per-relay EOSE / CLOSED / cannot-connect) and the
timeout's only real job is stall detection.

timeoutMs now measures the delta since the LAST message: every event
or terminal signal resets the window (fetchAll gains a conflated
activity ping so event progress is visible to its wait loop), and only
a full window of silence ends the fetch early. fetchFirst/count keep
absolute waits (single-response — idle and absolute coincide), and
subscribe's duration timeout stays absolute by design (a live stream
has no terminal state).

Since the pages/pool helpers delegate to fetchAll, pagination inherits
the semantics. This also changes app-side callers of these accessories
— in their favor: the timeout only ever fired on slow relays, exactly
when cropping loses data.

New commonTest suite pins the behavior: a relay emitting every 200ms
under a 300ms window streams to completion (10/10 events); a stall
ends one window after the last message, not after the start; EOSE
still returns immediately. CLI docs reworded (--timeout = idle window).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CP4kfLCa3wWtE8Khy21Pkj
2026-07-18 23:39:25 +00:00
Claude 620fc465df feat(cli): publish results carry each relay's rejection reason; converge output shapes
With no external consumers yet, converge the --json surface to its
ideal shape in one pass:

- quartz gains publishAndCollectResults: the NIP-01 OK message, connect
  errors, and silent timeouts now survive as PublishResult(accepted,
  message) per relay instead of dying in a debug log. The existing
  boolean APIs delegate unchanged. Silent relays are reported as
  'no response within timeout' rather than omitted.
- Context.publish returns the rich map; the new
  RawEventSupport.ackFields(ack) is the one canonical projection every
  publisher emits: published_to (urls) + rejected_by as
  [{relay, reason}] — 'why didn't it post' now answers itself, in
  partial failures and in the rejected error alike.
- author/pubkey rule enforced module-wide: 'author' is the key that
  signed an event (feed/search/dm/message list items), 'pubkey' an
  identity being described; profile show and outbox add the bech32
  npub beside the hex when the user is the primary subject.
- Event-list items converge on event_id/author/created_at/content
  (dm, feed, search, marmot message, geochat, concord).
- Byte counts standardize on *_bytes keys (blossom/nsite size ->
  size_bytes); the text renderer drops the fragile bare-'size'
  heuristic and colors stderr progress independently of a piped
  stdout.
- Error details are sentences everywhere (not bare gids); dead Result
  class removed from the quartz publish accessory.

Docs updated (DEVELOPMENT output conventions, README rejected example).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CP4kfLCa3wWtE8Khy21Pkj
2026-07-18 23:30:06 +00:00